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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA1359, LOOKING AHEAD ON THE U.S.- AFRICAN UNION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA1359 2006-05-16 07:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO5725
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA
DE RUEHDS #1359/01 1360747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160747Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0571
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0202
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGBA/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 001359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, D (T. SMITH), S/P, 
AF/EPS, S/CT 
AF/FO FOR AMB. RUTH DAVIS 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO EAID PGOV AU
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD ON THE U.S.- AFRICAN UNION 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
REF: A. 05 ADDIS ABABA 3844 
     B. 04 ADDIS ABABA 3183 
     C. 04 ADDIS ABABA 3185 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. (SBU) Note from Charge Vicki Huddleston:  This "think 
piece" on the African Union (AU) was drafted by political 
officer Cate McGeary whose brilliant coverage of the AU over 
the past two years has kept pace with the rapid changes in 
the institution and in our relations with it.  Her 
voluminous, timely, and nuanced reporting greatly influenced 
the implementation of U.S. policy goals with the AU, 
particularly in support of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 
Kate will be replaced by an entire U.S. Mi++EoQQ-pficial emergence 
of the AU from the OAU in July 2002.  Post has s~xbo|x.  The AU looks to 
the USG for political support and dialogue.  Regularizing 
policy planning talks with the AU and playing a lead role in 
new Addis-based AU coordination structures would enable us to 
achieve our shared goals with Africa.  Building closer 
relationships with AU member state missions in Addis would 
also provide the USG with greater insight into AU 
decision-making processes and ensure U.S. views are 
considered.  The AU Commission has shown great political will 
in pushing forward a member state-approved plan of action for 
achieving peace and security, governance, development, 
health, and other objectives shared by the USG.  Bolstering 
AU initiatives and institutional capacity to achieve them, as 
well as helping the AU fine-tune its interventions, will help 
promote best practices on the continent and foster AU member 
state adherence to higher standards.  These ideas for 
building a mutually productive relationship with the AU are 
expanded upon in a "Mini USAU MPP" developed by post for 
Department consideration (to be emailed to AF/RSA and AF/FO) 
ahead of the departure of our current AU Watcher.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------- 
BRIEF OVERVIEW 
-------------- 
 
3. (SBU) While the OAU was focused on ridding Africa of 
colonialism and had largely been discredited for its inaction 
in the face of member state abuses, the AU promotes African 
peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for its 
development and integration agenda.  The 15-member AU Peace 
and Security Council (PSC) was launched in May 2004.  AU 
engagement in Darfur through the African Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) has been seen as a test of the new organization's 
political will, and of its ability to work with Western 
partners.  The AU believes that its deployment to Darfur 
demonstrates an attitude of "non-indifference" to problems 
facing the continent, rather than the OAU's 
"non-interference."  The AU is increasingly looked to by 
member states to coordinate positions in international fora 
and to increase African bargaining power in trade 
negotiations.  It seeks to foster member state best practices 
in areas of good governance, health and development. (Note: 
There are 53 AU member states, including Western Sahara but 
not Morocco.  End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) AU ability to deliver in holding member states to 
higher standards and positively intervening to address crises 
on the continent continues to be constrained by its 
simultaneous efforts to transform the institution from an 
OAU-inherited structure.  One-quarter of AU member states 
were sanctioned in 2006 for failing to pay assessed 
contributions, and many complain of AU Commission (AUC) lack 
of transparency.  The AUC has begun a process of improving 
management, financial and administrative practices -- and 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001359  002 OF 005 
 
 
engages in dialogue with international partners to garner 
support for that effort. 
 
5. (SBU) Over 35 non-African countries have been accredited 
to the AU since March 2005.  Addis-based Ambassadors have 
recently decided to form a separate donor/partner 
coordination mechanism devoted to AU issues.  While the EU is 
currently the AU's largest donor and political partner, the 
AU looks to the U.S. for political support and engagement on 
key issues such as continental peace and security, terrorism, 
health challenges, trade and UN reform.  The U.S. will be the 
first non-African country to have a separate mission to the 
AU. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
DEVELOP THE INSTITUTION, CREATE A BETTER SECURITY PARTNER 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
6. (SBU)  The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is an ad-hoc 
arrangement heavily dependent on partner support as the AU 
lacks the institutional structures to run a comprehensive 
peace support operation.  The African Standby Force (ASF) 
effort is critical to rendering the AU more capable of 
managing operations of various levels of complexity, whether 
to fill the gap before the UN is able to deploy or to retain 
longer-term responsibility for conflict management.  ASF 
envisions the creation of five regional brigades by 2010.  In 
conjunction with key partners, including the USG, the AUC is 
leading the effort to establish common logistics; standard 
operating procedures (SOPs); command, control, communications 
and information systems (C3IS); training and evaluation 
procedures and doctrine for African peacekeeping forces. 
 
7. (SBU) The USG should continue to utilize the Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI) and other programs to play a 
lead role in C3IS support for the AU ASF effort, and work to 
expand NATO-AU relations into a longer-term training and 
capacity-building partnership.  Ensuring the timely 
transition of AMIS to a UN operation, and that AMIS is 
enhanced to meet growing challenges in Darfur in the interim, 
will help maintain AU credibility.  Paying heed to AMIS 
lessons-learned will go far in fostering a more capable AU 
intervention in the next crisis and before ASF is in place. 
Such lessons include making sure the AU mission has adequate 
logistics and command and control structures in place prior 
to significant deployment, and supporting headquarters 
financial and administrative structures able to meet the 
requirements of a field mission. 
 
8. (SBU) Any effort to improve AU resolution of regional 
conflicts also requires support to improve central AU 
management, finance, procurement and administrative 
practices.  Slow or substandard financial reporting, 
recruitment and payment of contractors, and lack of a 
procurement apparatus severely hamper AU capability in AMIS 
and beyond.  The USG should play a lead role in mustering 
international partners to support AU institutional 
capacity-building, as well as in pressing the AU to implement 
NQ`