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Viewing cable 06TOKYO2341, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/28/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO2341 2006-04-28 08:00 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7659
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2341/01 1180800
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280800Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1528
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8597
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5969
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9163
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5949
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7140
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2023
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8197
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0047
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 002341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/28/06 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Expansion of joint use of US military facilities may obscure 
overburden on Okinawa 
 
(2) Editorial: Japan to pay 3 trillion yen in USFJ realignment; 
Don't let figures take on a life on their own 
 
(3) Deployment of nuclear-powered aircraft carrier: US discloses 
information to convince Yokosuka residents; Gives red-carpet 
treatment to highlight safety; Construction of facilities near at 
hand 
 
(4) USFJ realignment (Part 2): Post-Koizumi leader to carry out 
agreement, shoulder heavy expectations from US 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Expansion of joint use of US military facilities may obscure 
overburden on Okinawa 
 
Okinawa Times (Page 2) (Full) 
April 28, 2006 
 
Commentary 
 
Okinawa houses 75% of all the US military bases in Japan. By 
promoting the joint use of US military facilities and areas in 
Okinawa by US and Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops, it will become 
possible for the government to change this percentage, which 
represents an overload on the prefecture. Meanwhile, the US 
military will be able to reduce its base-maintenance costs by 
letting the SDF use its facilities. The proposal for expanded 
joint use will thus benefit both sides. The government says that 
the promotion of joint use will lead to reducing the base burden 
on Okinawa. This explanation, though, is just a manipulation of 
numbers. There may be even a possibility of Okinawa's burden 
increasing in substance. 
 
DFAA Naha Regional Defense Facilities Administration Bureau 
Director General Tsutomu Sato in a regular press conference 
yesterday revealed the plan for the first time of "studying the 
possibility of additional chances for the SDF to use US military 
facilities and areas in Okinawa." 
 
Sato emphatically said, in an attempt to deny that this was an 
abrupt change: "The interim report (on US forces realignment in 
Japan) referred to an increase in interoperations by Japanese and 
American troops and effective use of US military bases. In the 
process of discussing such measures, the idea emerged." 
 
On the propriety of joint use, though, views in Okinawa are 
divided. Some might oppose setting an expansion of joint use of 
US military bases as the government's established policy in the 
final report, which is due out soon. 
 
The Mid-Term Defense Buildup Plan covering fiscal 2005 through 
fiscal 2009 incorporates a plan to upgrade the Ground Self- 
Defense Force 1st Mixed Regiment in Naha to a brigade. 
 
Regarding the proposed joint use of US military bases, one senior 
Defense Agency (JDA) official said: "Raising the mixed regiment 
to a brigade is now under consideration, but the government is 
 
TOKYO 00002341  002 OF 006 
 
 
probably considering the possibility that Camp Hansen might not 
have enough capacity to accommodate it." 
 
The Mid-Term Plan in 2004 added the clause "responses to invasion 
of islands" and shifted attention to the west, keeping an 
emerging China in mind. Given the situation, in order to scale 
down the presence of US forces in Okinawa without reducing their 
deterrence capability, some people in Okinawa suggest that there 
will be no other means but for the SDF to manage US military 
bases and allow US troops to be stationed there only in times of 
emergency. 
 
But the government is keeping in mind the application of Article 
II, clause 4, paragraph A, of the Japan-US Status of Forces 
Agreement, with the US military as the "master," in its call for 
the joint use of Kadena Air Base and Camp Hansen. 
 
Okinawa residents' uncompromising position is that US military 
troops must be reduced as the premise for implementing the joint- 
use plan. 
 
(2) Editorial: Japan to pay 3 trillion yen in USFJ realignment; 
Don't let figures take on a life on their own 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
April 28, 2006 
 
US Deputy Defense Under Secretary Richard Lawless stated in a 
press conference that Japan would pay an estimated 26 billion 
dollars (2.99 trillion yen) to implement the overall US military 
realignment. His statement is now causing a major stir in Japan. 
 
Lawless made the statement soon after Tokyo and Washington had 
struck a deal on sharing the cost of relocating US Marines from 
Okinawa to Guam, with Tokyo paying 59%, or 6.09 billion dollars 
(approximately 710 billion yen). Many Japanese people, therefore, 
might have doubts as to why Japan would have to pay such a huge 
amount. 
 
The United States is urging Japan to pay 3 trillion yen for the 
USFJ realignment. Administrative Vice Defense Minister Takemasa 
Moriya stated in a speech: "We have estimated that the 
realignment project will cost 2 trillion yen, excluding the cost 
of relocating US Marines, over eight years." The Defense Agency 
estimates a total of 2.71 trillion yen. Lawless presented an 
estimate that exceeds 2.71 trillion yen. Although his statement 
appears to be aimed at a domestic audience, the Japanese side 
cannot be satisfied with it, thinking that Washington is forcing 
Japan to pay additional money. 
 
The United States released the cost without clarifying the 
grounds for its calculation, as it did when it proposed the share 
for the cost of relocating Marines from Okinawa to Guam. 
 
Since USFJ realignment is part of the global transformation of 
the US military, it must be part of the global strategy of the 
United States. At the same time, the USFJ is partly responsible 
for Japan's security based on the Japan-US Security Treaty. It is 
true that Japan worked on the US to reduce its burden of US 
military bases. 
 
If that was the case, the sharing of costs should be determined 
taking the circumstances of the two countries into account. 
 
TOKYO 00002341  003 OF 006 
 
 
Officials in charge of accounting attended the final stage of 
senior working-level talks on the USFJ realignment. The contents 
of the agreement on cost-sharing should be made public based on 
the approval of both sides. The contents should be acceptable for 
the people. 
 
Asked about his impression of Lawless's statement, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Shinzo Abe said at first: "My impression is that it is 
 
SIPDIS 
an incredible sum of money. I will refrain from making a 
comment." He later in a press conference said that the government 
would seek further explanation from the US government. Whether a 
sufficient study was carried out in the government is 
questionable. Reportedly internal discord is evident in the 
government as to whether Japan's share of the USFJ realignment 
cost should be included in the Defense Agency budget or should be 
handled separately. 
 
The government seems to have made such a move based on the 
agreement on Japan's share of the cost of relocating US Marines 
to Guam. However, it should first look into the details of the 
estimated costs and then assess from all angles whether the 
amount is appropriate. 
 
Japan should take responsibility for calculating the cost of 
relocating US bases in Japan. The United States should not 
announce its own calculation without asking Japan. The two 
countries should not let the figures take on a life of their own 
in order to prevent bilateral ties from being strained. 
 
With the realignment of US forces in Japan, the Japan-US alliance 
will face a new stage. With the introduction of a missile defense 
system, the division of roles between Japan's Self-Defense Forces 
(SDF) and USFJ and their cooperation will greatly change. 
There remain only the finishing touches on negotiations on USFJ 
realignment. The government should give the public a clear 
explanation about the share of Japan's cost. 
 
(3) Deployment of nuclear-powered aircraft carrier: US discloses 
information to convince Yokosuka residents; Gives red-carpet 
treatment to highlight safety; Construction of facilities near at 
hand 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Abridged) 
April 28, 2006 
 
The United States is planning to deploy a nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier to Yokosuka Naval Base in Kanagawa Prefecture. 
The US Navy has disclosed partial data on the nuclear reactors 
onboard US Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to local 
residents who fear a nuclear accident. Although the contents of 
the fact sheet fell far short of fully verifying the safety of 
nuclear warships, the US Navy has changed its posture of refusing 
to disclose information under the pretext of maintaining 
confidentiality. The disclosure of the fact sheet offered a 
 
SIPDIS 
glimpse into the US Navy's need to convince Yokosuka residents 
regarding the planned construction of facilities. 
 
Yokosuka Mayor Ryoichi Kabaya received the fact sheet on the 
safety of nuclear-powered warships on April 17. That day, a 
Yokosuka delegation composed of 20 municipal assembly members and 
business leaders received a briefing on the safety of nuclear 
reactors aboard the USS John Stennis in San Diego. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002341  004 OF 006 
 
 
"The Navy's nuclear rectors are pressurized water reactors that 
use solid metal fuel. Output (approximately 200,000 kilowatts) is 
one-fifth of a large power-producing nuclear reactor. Navy 
nuclear warships are loaded with two such reactors." 
 
Referring briefly to the structure of nuclear reactors, a US Navy 
spokesman revealed that their fuel enrichment is 93%, which is 
far higher than that of power-generating reactors (3%-5%), adding 
that they are controlled by 400 highly trained personnel. 
 
Despite its strong desire, the mission was not allowed to take a 
firsthand look at the nuclear reactors. US Naval Forces Japan 
Public Affairs Officer Commander John Wallach, who accompanied 
the mission to San Diego, said: 
 
"We cannot reveal design data and technology of nuclear reactors, 
because if they were copied, we would lose our strategic 
advantage. Even I cannot see the reactors." 
 
Deploying a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Yokosuka is vital 
for the US military's Asia strategy. Still, the disclosure of 
technological information, albeit partially, proved the 
importance of local support. Japanese Embassy Defense Attach 
Rear Admiral Masanori Yoshida, who came all the way from 
Washington, commented: "The US military has never offered an 
explanation this thorough. This is exceptionally good treatment." 
 
The US Navy's earnest efforts to convince Yokosuka residents is 
ascribable to the growing need to build facilities for 
accommodating a new aircraft carrier. 
 
The largest challenge is construction to make the dock's seafloor 
nearly two meters deeper in order to berth a new aircraft 
carrier. Shallow waters threaten the safety of a nuclear aircraft 
carrier, which needs to take in seawater in order to cool off its 
nuclear reactors. 
 
The government intends to include funds for the work in its 
fiscal 2007 budgetary request in August. A preliminary survey for 
that is near at hand. In order to begin construction, it is 
essential to win the concurrence of Mayor Kabaya, the 
administrator of the Yokosuka bay and port. 
 
Proving the safety of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers is the 
key to winning his concurrence. Positively evaluating the 
disclosed information by the US Navy, a Foreign Ministry official 
said, "There is no need to review the government's judgment 
trusting the safety of nuclear-powered vessels." In contrast, a 
nuclear engineer noted, "Some innovative ideas were clearly 
necessary in order to make small reactors that can fit in 
vessels. But it is not possible to verity safety with this 
information." 
 
The conclusion of a disaster prevention pact between the 
municipal government and the US Navy against possible nuclear 
disasters would help put residents at ease. But even San Diego 
has no agreement focusing on nuclear power vessels. 
 
Upon returning home, the mission presented Mayor Kabaya with a 
report supportive of the deployment of a nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier. Some groups in the municipal assembly decided April 26 
to accept the deployment of a nuclear vessel, saying that safety 
has been confirmed. At the same time, there is a growing backlash 
 
TOKYO 00002341  005 OF 006 
 
 
from citizen groups, who claim that the US Navy has disclosed 
only advantageous information and has not disclosed any dangers. 
 
What kind of decision will Kabaya make on construction that is 
directly linked to the deployment of a nuclear vessel? The issue 
will soon reach a critical stage. 
 
(4) USFJ realignment (Part 2): Post-Koizumi leader to carry out 
agreement, shoulder heavy expectations from US 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
April 27, 2006 
 
Hiroshi Marutani, Washington 
 
In early June, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will visit the 
United States. His upcoming US trip will likely be unprecedented. 
President Bush will take Koizumi over to show him Elvis Presley's 
Graceland mansion in Tennessee. Koizumi is a big fan of Elvis. 
Bush will also host a banquet for Koizumi at the White House. 
Chinese President Hu Jintao was eager for a White House banquet 
when he recently visited the United States, but his ardent desire 
did not come true. 
 
Tokyo did not ask Washington to do so. These are all Bush's own 
ideas, one said. Bush is even more favorable in his talk of 
Koizumi. 
 
On April 24, Bush delivered a speech in California on the United 
States' immigration policy. In that speech, Bush stressed his 
"special relationship" with Koizumi. "He's an interesting man," 
Bush said. He went on: "We will talk about Iraqi democracy. Japan 
has sent troops to Iraq." 
 
Koizumi is now one of Bush's favorite buddies. For one thing, 
Koizumi-as is evident from his California remarks-has sent Self- 
Defense Forces troops to Iraq in a state of war. Koizumi made up 
his mind to do so in defiance of opposition in Japan. That's why 
Bush, unlike his predecessors, refers so often to "Japan" and 
"Prime Minister Koizumi." 
 
More than two years later, however, Tokyo is exploring when to 
withdraw the SDF troops from Iraq. Meanwhile, Japan and the 
United States have reached an agreement on the realignment of US 
forces in Japan. The agreement is a categorical imperative for 
Koizumi's successor as well to declare a stronger alliance. 
 
"I have full confidence in the agreement with the Japanese 
government," US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lawless told a 
press conference on April 25 when he was asked about the future 
course of coordination between the Japanese government and base- 
hosting localities. This is a message compelling Japan to keep 
its word without fail in order to complete the US military's 
realignment in Japan by 2012. 
 
The Japanese government is not only tasked with local 
coordination. In May, the two countries' foreign and defense 
ministers will work out a final report, which is to feature 
bilateral fusion in the area of military affairs with integrated 
command functionalities and other steps to go through. 
 
"We were ordered to think big in the process of transformation." 
With this, a Pentagon official stressed the objective of the US 
 
TOKYO 00002341  006 OF 006 
 
 
military's global transformation. The US Marine Corps will move 
troops from Okinawa to Guam. Their presence, however, will remain 
a deterrent in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan will serve as a 
linchpin in the event of an emergency or a terrorist attack. 
 
Lawless also said: "Realignment is not the first thing to do. We 
will transform the alliance first, and realignment comes next." 
He added, "Physical realignment is just a small part of it." He 
also stressed, "Joint training exercises and joint operations 
will strengthen our alliance." Even so, the United States is 
seeking to ensure its military's command integration with Japan 
in the realignment process. In this area, Japan's contribution, 
unlike its cost sharing, is hardly visible. 
 
In the process of negotiating with the United States over its 
military's realignment, Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro 
Nukaga met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, Foreign 
Minister Taro Aso, and Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki to 
coordinate what to negotiate with the United States. They are all 
seen as post-Koizumi candidates. Another prospective one, Yasuo 
Fukuda, will also visit the United States after the holidays in 
early May. There's no doubt that the post-Koizumi leader-whoever 
may become prime minister after Koizumi-will be committed to the 
realignment plan. 
 
"The prime minister and I will discuss a broad range of issues. 
The first thing we're going to talk about is how to ensure the 
deployment of US troops to the satisfaction of Japan." With this, 
Bush said he would take up the realignment of US forces in Japan 
at his final meeting with Koizumi. This shows how much the US 
government weighs the force realignment. 
 
Washington is fully expecting Tokyo to carry out the agreement. 
It is the post-Koizumi generation's job to translate it into 
action. 
 
DONOVAN