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Viewing cable 06TOKYO2134, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/19/06
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06TOKYO2134 | 2006-04-19 08:04 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO7354
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2134/01 1090804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190804Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1157
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8420
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5793
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8971
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5780
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6971
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1846
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8011
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9884
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 002134
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/19/06
INDEX:
(1) Discord growing between Japan, South Korea; Japan to conduct
maritime survey near Takeshima later this month; Tokyo alarmed at
Seoul's economic assistance to Pyongyang over abduction issue
(2) Shaking world - changing power dynamics: Japan's diplomatic
inability, its diplomatic vacuum in Asia
(3) Ozawa's aggressive moves puzzle New Komeito; Planned
reshuffle of party executives may need to be reviewed
(4) Interviews with Tsuneo Oshiro, Taku Yamasaki on USFJ
realignment and its future course
(5) Politics 2006: Ruling parties adopt constitutional referendum
bill that would grant voting right to those 20 or older; Minshuto
reluctant to go along with the draft bill
(6) Editorial: US force realignment must be settled in a way to
win public support
ARTICLES:
(1) Discord growing between Japan, South Korea; Japan to conduct
maritime survey near Takeshima later this month; Tokyo alarmed at
Seoul's economic assistance to Pyongyang over abduction issue
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Abridged)
The relationship between Japan and South Korea is already sour
due to Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine and
other issues. Tensions are likely to rise even further with
Japan's plan to conduct a maritime survey later this month around
Takeshima, a group of disputed islets known as Dokdo in South
Korea. There is a growing backlash from South Korea. Tokyo is
also visibly concerned about Seoul's move to consider massive
economic assistance to Pyongyang in exchange for returning South
Korean nationals abducted to North Korea.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe called yesterday Japan Coast
Guard Commandant Hiroki Ishikawa to the Prime Minister's Official
Residence to order him to send off a research vessel as planned,
while giving full consideration to safety. Abe also told a press
conference, "We must deal with the matter in a levelheaded manner
so that it will not affect other issues."
Japan has been lagging behind South Korea in conducting a
maritime survey and naming places in the area. Tokyo's readiness
to face a fierce reaction from Seoul comes from its determination
to catch up with South Korea. The oceanic area in question is in
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by both Japan and South
Korea. Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi said: "Despite Japan's
protests, South Korea has been conducting maritime surveys around
Takeshima for the last four years."
According to South Korea's National Oceanographic Research
Institute, the country has independently named 18 spots in the
sea area in the vicinity of Takeshima. South Korea now aims at
winning international recognition for such names at an
international conference in June. Reportedly four of those places
lie inside Japan's EEZ. Tokyo fears that Japan's inaction would
end up boosting South Korea's de facto control over Takeshima.
TOKYO 00002134 002 OF 011
Tokyo is lobbying Seoul to take joint steps in dealing with North
Korea based on DNA test results that showed a high likelihood of
the husband of abductee Megumi Yokota being South Korean. But
that goal, too, seems to be elusive.
In the South-North cabinet-level talks scheduled to begin April
21, Seoul intends to broach the issue of South Koreans abducted
by North Korea and offer to extend economic assistance to the
North in exchange for resolving the issue. A Foreign Ministry
official said alarmingly, "Economic assistance in connection with
the abduction issue would send the wrong message to the North."
Prime Minister Koizumi told reporters yesterday, "South Korea's
circumstances differ from Japan's. Japan will continue to stick
to a dialogue-and-pressure approach."
(2) Shaking world - changing power dynamics: Japan's diplomatic
inability, its diplomatic vacuum in Asia
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Full)
April 18, 2006
The scene is Washington, D.C., in mid-March. Vice Foreign
Minister Shotaro Yachi was received by Bush administration
officials, who were unusually prickly. The reason was the Iran
issue.
US distrustful of Japan
"Iranian President Ahmadinejad is outrageous. Japan has no time
to waste." Such a remark came from Deputy National Security
Advisor Crouch, Under Secretary of State Burns, and Under
Secretary of Defense Edelman during separate meetings (with
SIPDIS
Yachi). As if by arrangement, they all asked for Japan's
cooperation to build a coalition against Iran.
Will Japan invest a vast amount of money in the Azadegan oil
field project in Iran even if the issue of Iran's nuclear
development program heats up? There was a hint of this sort of
question in remarks made by US officials, although they did not
actually mention the name of Azadegan. Yachi told them, "We on
the part of Japan, as a friend, will work on Iran to act
properly." But the United States has a deep-seated distrust of
Japan on Iran.
Japan endorsed the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after the
terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001. By sending Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) troops to Iraq on the mission of
reconstruction assistance, Japan demonstrated its determination
to work together. The Japan-US alliance has been enhanced to the
level described as being the "best since the end of World War
II," according to a US government official. But the Iran issue is
too intricate to be solved under the "principles of the
alliance." It has posed a difficult simultaneous equation to
Japan.
As the US exhaustion progresses, chances of Japan being forced to
make a difficult choice grow. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
has emphasized the importance of ties with the US, but there is
no sign that he will come up with any specific strategy to deal
with such a situation. How can Japan deal with tasks for which
the US remains unable to show guidelines or to which Japan cannot
TOKYO 00002134 003 OF 011
conform?
"Aid to Myanmar must be cancelled." This sort of view has
recently cropped up in the US government. Reportedly, there is a
growing discontent with Japan, which has continued assistance to
the junta of that country. Japan argues against such a view: "If
it is isolated from the international community, Myanmar will
move closer to China." But the US, which sees human rights
suppression as an important issue, simply shrugs off such a
Japan.
A subtle difference is also seen between Japan and the US in
responses to Indonesia, a major Islamic power. The US is becoming
alarmed about a growing anti-US tendency in that country, while
Japan is the largest customer of Indonesia's natural gas
production. Japan and the US are less likely to take a concerted
action toward Indonesia. What is more serious than that is the
existence of a gap between Japan and the US in diplomacy toward
China.
Last week, high-level officials from such countries as Japan, the
US, South Korea, China, and North Korea gathered in Tokyo and
discussed cooperation in Northeast Asia. Participants included
government officials and private sector individual. The fate of
the North Korean issue drew attention there, but the focus of
closed-door debate was the confrontation between Japan and China.
A foreign policy expert from the US criticized Japan:
"Excessively dwelling on paying homage to Yasukuni Shrine is
undesirable for all of Asia." Following him, US Assistant
Secretary of State Hill asserted: "The stagnant relations between
SIPDIS
Japan and China have stood in the way of cooperation in the Asia
region." The US does not want to see tensions emerge in Asia at a
time when it has enough trouble dealing with other issues like
Iraq.
Business leaders in Japan, as well, are worried about the chill
between Japan and China. Japan Business Federation (Nippon
Keidanren) Chairman Hiroshi Okuda commented: "It's important (for
Japan and China) to have a summit meeting where the leaders of
the two nations can frankly exchange views and understand the
other side's thinking."
China on offensive
As if to fill the void made an absence of Japanese diplomacy in
Asia, China is now on the offensive. Premier Wen Jiabao has
already visited Cambodia and New Zealand this year. Defense
Minister Cao Gangchuan recently raveled to Vietnam and Malaysia.
China is even rumored to be selling arms to Indonesia and the
Philippines.
One idea for Japan to get out of this fix is to invite the
foreign ministers of Central Asian nations to come to Japan in
June to discuss a framework for cooperation in such areas as anti-
terrorist measures, steps to stop the drug trade, and the
environment. Central Asia is an important regions strategically,
and already there is fierce rivalry growing there among the US,
China, and Russia. If the discussions succeed, Japanese diplomacy
in the region could take on additional importance.
"When Japan-US relations are in good shape, Japan can build good
relationships with Asian nations," says Prime Minister Koizumi
TOKYO 00002134 004 OF 011
repeatedly, but how does he intend to make better use the
alliance with the US for Japan's national interests? It is
therefore necessary for Japan to have a complex approach to the
problem, envisioning a changing diplomatic dynamic in the world.
(3) Ozawa's aggressive moves puzzle New Komeito; Planned
reshuffle of party executives may need to be reviewed
SANKEI (Page 3) (Abridged)
April 18, 2006
The New Komeito is puzzled by Minshuto (Democratic Party of
Japan) President Ichiro Ozawa's moves. Ozawa has referred to the
possibility of joining hands with the New Komeito and met with
the president of Soka Gakkai, a lay Buddhist organization serving
as the party's largest support base. Such moves have set off
alarms in the New Komeito that Ozawa is trying to drive a wedge
between the LDP and the New Komeito. Some New Komeito members
have begun mentioning the need for Representative Takenori
Kanzaki to stay on beyond this fall and to review the party's
strategy to deal with Minshuto.
Kanzaki told reporters yesterday about Ozawa's meeting with Soka
Gakkai President Einosuke Akiya: "Mr. Ozawa simply paid a
courtesy call on Mr. Akiya; that was all." Kanzaki was apparently
trying to play down the Ozawa-Akiya meeting.
Akiya met with Ozawa for about 10 minutes on the evening of April
11 at the latter's sudden request. Shortly after becoming
Minshuto president, Ozawa pointed to the possibility of
cooperating with the New Komeito if it could keep a distance from
the LDP. The Ozawa-Akiya meeting has sparked speculation that
Ozawa would actively approach the LDP's partner.
From the Hosokawa administration through the Shinshinto (New
Frontier Party) eras, Ozawa reportedly had connections strong
enough to have direct talks with Soka Gakkai leaders without
going through the Komeito. The New Komeito shares the view with
Soka Gakkai that the party is closer to Minshuto than to the LDP
when it comes to foreign policy and the social disparity issue.
The Ozawa-Akiya session surfaced under such circumstances. Only a
handful of New Komeito members are hopeful that cooperation with
Minshuto will help increase the party's profile and its voice
toward the LDP. But most of the New Komeito members are simply
perplexed. They have an allergic reaction to Ozawa's high-handed
political style.
A senior New Komeito member noted: "Many members still hold
resentment toward Mr. Ozawa, who badmouthed Komeito executives
when he was a partner of our party." A Soka Gakkai executive spat
out, "We must absolutely not team up with Ozawa." New Komeito
Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Junji Higashi disapprovingly said
last night: "Mr. Ozawa is untrustworthy. He first sets off a
whirlwind, then becomes self-centered, and people leave him as a
consequence."
Asked by reporters about the Koizumi-Akiya meeting, Prime
Minister Koizumi yesterday noon bluntly said: "I don't know (what
Mr. Ozawa is thinking about). You must ask him that question. The
LDP-New Komeito relationship is firm." Some New Komeito members
fear that a relentless attack on the party will follow the
provocation of Ozawa. A person connected with the New Komeito
TOKYO 00002134 005 OF 011
even suggested the possibility of making changes to the LDP-
centered campaign cooperation strategy for next year's Upper
House election.
Ozawa is also expected to affect the New Komeito's reshuffle of
its executive members, planned for this fall. The party has been
paving the way for the departure of Kanzaki and Secretary General
Tetsuzo Fuyushiba and the appointment of Acting Secretary-General
Akihiro Ota and Land, Infrastructure and Transport Minister Kazuo
Kitagawa as new party executives. But a senior Soka Gakkai member
said, "The party will have to think hard about who should join
the new executive lineup."
(4) Interviews with Tsuneo Oshiro, Taku Yamasaki on USFJ
realignment and its future course
YOMIURI (Page 17) (Full)
April 18, 2006
Now that the government and Okinawa Prefecture's Nago City have
reached an agreement on the pending issue of relocating the US
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station, Japan and the United States
are in the final phase of intergovernmental consultations over
the realignment of US forces in Japan in order to release a final
report. The Yomiuri Shimbun interviewed Tsuneo Oshiro, a
professor at the University of the Ryukyus, and Taku Yamasaki,
chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's security
affairs panel, to hear their views about problems that cropped up
in the realignment talks and to explore the challenges lying
ahead.
It's time for the government to reconsider how to aid local
hosts: Oshiro
-- The government and the city of Nago have now agreed to lay
down a V-shaped pair of airstrips in the coastal portion of Camp
Schwab.
Oshiro: The agreement came out of the blue. Futenma is said to be
the most dangerous base, and that was evident from the crash (of
a Futenma-based US military helicopter) onto the campus of
Okinawa International University in August 2004. It's desirable
to relocate the airfield to somewhere outside Okinawa Prefecture
or otherwise to an overseas location. But it's important for
Okinawa as well to move it at the earliest possible date. It will
not be easy to get (US) understanding, and the governor (of
Okinawa Prefecture) will be tested on his negotiating capability.
-- How do you evaluate the realignment talks this time?
Oshiro: The schoolgirl rape incident of 1995 touched off the
agreement of SACO (Japan-US Special Action Committee on
Facilities and Areas in Okinawa). The government considered
alleviating Okinawa Prefecture's base-hosting burden while
attaching importance to bilateral security arrangements between
Japan and the United States. The government, Okinawa Prefecture,
and Nago City reached an agreement (on Futenma airfield's
relocation to Nago). It took time, but the government finally set
about carrying out an environmental assessment (of the relocation
site and its environs). However, the government came up with a
new plan in the interim report released in October last year.
That was the idea of building an alternative facility in the
coastal area of Camp Schwab. The government bypassed Okinawa in
its decision-making process on this matter, and the government
TOKYO 00002134 006 OF 011
itself undermined its relationship of mutual trust with Okinawa
Prefecture's Governor Inamine.
-- Do you think Okinawa Prefecture might have failed to cooperate
well?
Oshiro: The government decided on a basic plan (to build a sea-
based facility at a site in waters off the coast of Nago City's
Henoko district to take over the heliport functions of Futenma
airfield). In the meantime, the governor has also cooperated on
what he could. But the government said it could not carry out
Futenma airfield's relocation because environmentalist groups
campaigned against the plan. But that's wrong. The government
didn't have the strong will to build a new facility offshore of
Henoko. At the request of Okinawa Prefecture, the government made
a cabinet decision to set a 15-year time limit on the US
military's use of the new facility and to build that facility as
a dual-purpose airport for joint military and civilian use.
However, the government apparently didn't negotiate those two
preconditions with the United States. The coastal installation
plan adopted this time is to build the new facility in an area on
the premises of a US military base, so the two preconditions were
left out.
-- Okinawa has only grown distrustful of the government?
Oshiro: The United States will redeploy 8,000 Marines (from
Okinawa) to Guam. In addition, the United States will also return
its military bases located south of Kadena airbase. These burden-
lessening plans were not included in the SACO agreement. This is
a step forward toward dissolving Okinawa's excessive burden. The
returning of bases in urban areas is also a plus, indeed.
However, it does not seem to me that such a package can replace
the preconditions the governor has demanded. The government
should reconsider its aid (to Okinawa), including fiscal
measures.
-- Concretely speaking?
Oshiro: Since the SACO accord, the government has invested
approximately 300 billion yen in the development projects of
Okinawa Prefecture and its base-hosting municipalities. However,
the money was for government-set purposes only. Instead, the
government should consider something like subsidies for the
burden of base-hosting localities. It's desirable for local hosts
to use the money for their own accountable purposes.
-- Do you see any change in the mindset of people in Okinawa
Prefecture?
Oshiro: A Chinese submarine intruded into Japan's territorial
waters, and North Korea is reportedly developing nuclear weapons.
In such a situation, national security has become close to the
residents of Okinawa. Historically, Okinawa was tilted toward
China. However, Okinawa is situated near the border. So, the
prefecture has to accept an appropriate burden.
-- What do you want the government to do about base issues?
Oshiro: The United States has shifted its national strategy to
deal with terrorists, nuclear ambitions, and China. They agreed
to move the Marines to Guam against such backdrops, but it's
regrettable that they didn't fully account for that. After the
TOKYO 00002134 007 OF 011
1995 rape incident, the government set up a three-party
consultative body for the foreign minister, the director general
of the Defense Agency, and the governor of Okinawa Prefecture to
talk about base issues and security affairs. But it ended after
meeting only several times. The government should use such a
consultative body to talk not only with Okinawa but also with
other base-hosting localities.
Follow-up needed to translate agreement into action: Yamasaki
-- Japan has held consultations (with the United States over the
realignment of US forces in Japan) for more than two years. But
the government was out of step, particularly between the Defense
Agency and the Foreign Ministry.
Yamasaki: That's true. It's unclear for a while which was the
control tower. From the beginning, the government needed to hold
interdepartmental discussions on this matter involving many of
its sections-in addition to the Foreign Ministry and the Defense
Agency. So the prime minister and his office should have taken
the initiative from the start. Regrettably, the government was
not well aware of how important it is to realign the US military
presence in Japan.
-- Washington was reportedly frustrated at Tokyo's slow response.
Yamasaki: The United States has always had someone in charge of
critical issues regarding its national strategy. For example,
there was (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) Campbell at the
time of consultations on regional contingencies. And now, there's
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lawless. This time, President
Bush has entrusted Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld with everything
about the (realignment) talks. The State Department is working
together with him. Lawless briefs Rumsfeld almost everyday.
Endorsed by Rumsfeld, Lawless has negotiated with Japan. However,
the locus of responsibility was unclear in the Japanese
government, and this irritated the United States.
-- What do you think is significant for the Japanese government
to address the US military's realignment?
Yamasaki: During the post-Cold War decade, Japan considered its
bilateral security alliance with the United States in
anticipation of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. But after the 9-
11 terrorist attacks, there's another theme in terms of dealing
with international terrorist networks. They're a global threat.
Japan makes it a basic policy to maintain its national security
under its security pact with the United States. That's Japan's
basic stance, so Japan must properly coordinate with the United
States. I mean that Japan should ready itself for newly emerging
threats. In the process of realigning US forces in Japan,
however, the United States wants the Self-Defense Forces to take
over the duties of US forces as much as possible. That's a
categorical imperative for the United States. Also, for Japan,
Okinawa-which is home to 75% of all US military bases in Japan-is
the Japan-US security arrangements' Achilles heel. So Japan
needed to consolidate its security arrangements there. That's why
Futenma relocation was at the center of (realignment) talks.
-- For all that, the government didn't provide sufficient
explanations not only to Okinawa but also to other base-hosting
localities, did it?
TOKYO 00002134 008 OF 011
Yamasaki: In the case of Futenma airfield, the government
couldn't explain its relocation because the government had yet to
decide on where to build an alternative facility for its
relocation. The government explored the idea of integrating
Futenma airfield's functions into the US Air Force's Kadena base
and looked into the feasibility of relocating the airfield to an
outlying island. In late September last year, the government
decided on a plan to relocate the airfield to a coastal area of
Camp Schwab. However, Futenma relocation has been left unattended
for 10 years. The US government asked the Japanese government to
get the local host's understanding without fail. It was the prime
minister's initiative that resolved the situation. Prime Minister
Koizumi promised to do so. In October last year, the Japanese and
US governments released the interim report. After that, the
Defense Agency negotiated in earnest with Okinawa Prefecture and
Nago City.
-- Is it possible to translate the final report into action for
sure?
Yamasaki: The role of Prime Minister Koizumi and his government
is up until the final report. After that, it is the post-Koizumi
government's role. When someone comes into office after Prime
Minister Koizumi, the minister in charge (i.e., the defense
chief) will also change. Okinawa is not the only problem. There
are some other issues to resolve. For example, there's the
problem of Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) (i.e., a plan to move
the command functionality of the US Army's 1st Corps from the US
mainland to Camp Zama in the city of Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture).
Besides, there's also the problem of Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi
Prefecture) (i.e., a plan to redeploy a carrier-based wing from
the US Navy's Atsugi Naval Air Station to the US Marine Corps'
Iwakuni Air Station in the city of Iwakuni, Yamaguchi
Prefecture). Someone will have to properly follow up the issue of
realigning US forces in Japan to the end.
-- You preside over the LDP's security affairs panel. So you're
the right person, aren't you?
Yamasaki: I'm concurrently in the post of chairman on the party's
committee for the promotion of Okinawa. So I can do it for
another year and a half or so, if I want to. During that time, we
must get the bilateral agreement underway and hand over the job
to the next person. That's important, I think. Okinawa Prefecture
also will have someone else in charge. If so, it will be even
more important for the government to continue to make efforts.
For now, the government has no system or position to entrust
someone with security issues. When thinking over the realignment
issue this time, it's urgently necessary to raise the Defense
Agency to the status of a ministry.
(5) Politics 2006: Ruling parties adopt constitutional referendum
bill that would grant voting right to those 20 or older; Minshuto
reluctant to go along with the draft bill
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full)
April 19, 2006
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its junior
coalition partner New Komeito agreed yesterday on a draft bill
that would set procedures for amending the Constitution. The
draft bill was formulated by the LDP on April 12. The ruling
coalition intends to engage in a discussion on the draft with the
TOKYO 00002134 009 OF 011
main opposition party Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan),
aiming to pass it through the Diet during the current session.
Although the New Komeito had suggested the minimum age for
granting voting rights be 18, it has now accepted the LDP's idea
that the minimum age should be 20 since those aged 20 and over
are permitted to vote in Upper and Lower House elections.
As to whether to restrict the media from reporting and
forecasting the probable outcome, the draft proposes leaving
decisions up to the media, but it calls for prohibiting
television and radio spots for a week before the referendum day.
The ruling parties propose a debate and vote be conducted on
individual amendments in principle, at the same time, but a
debate and vote would be carried out on amendments to related
articles and chapters.
Minshuto has already balked at accepting the draft bill for a
referendum on amending the Constitution. Therefore, reaching an
agreement between the ruling camp and the main opposition party
will be difficult, even though the ruling coalition wants to
submit the bill to the ongoing Diet session. Given such
circumstances, whether the bill to set procedures for amending
the Constitution will be enacted is uncertain.
"That's different from (our party's plan)," Minshuto President
Ichiro Ozawa told reporters last evening. The largest opposition
party has called for focusing on general principles, while the
ruling coalition's draft focuses only on the specific
constitutional reforms. With this in mind, Ozawa seems to have
made this remark.
The draft proposal contains the ruling bloc's concession to
Minshuto regarding whether to restrict the media and the minimum
age for granting voting rights. "If the media are allowed to
control themselves, there is no need to specify such in law,"
said a senior member of the LDP Research Commission on the
Constitution.
Many Minshuto House of Councillors members are reluctant to go
along with any constitutional referendum bill. They began to
harden their stance toward the referendum bill, with one senior
lawmaker saying, "It is impossible to pass the bill during the
current Diet session. If the ruling coalition alone submits the
bill, we will stubbornly oppose it by submitting
counterproposals."
The ruling camp, however, intends to ask Minshuto to agree to
jointly submit the bill. At yesterday's meeting, one participant
said, "It is important to secure approval from the whole Minshuto
members (including the Upper House)."
Some ruling camp members once called for submitting the bill to
the Diet by the ruling parties alone. LDP Constitutional Research
Commission Chairman Hajime Funada commented, however, "An
important bill that would set procedures amending the
Constitution should be passed by the Diet with more than two-
thirds vote." The ruling camp, therefore, has judged that it
would not be wise to ram the bill through the Diet.
Prior to the Lower House by-election in the Chiba No. 7 district,
Minshuto has assumed the stance of facing down the ruling camp. A
TOKYO 00002134 010 OF 011
senior LDP Upper House member made this comment, "Depending on
the outcome of the by-election, the idea of drafting a joint bill
by the ruling parties and Minshuto may disappear."
(6) Editorial: US force realignment must be settled in a way to
win public support
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full)
April 17, 2006
A meeting held recently in Tokyo between senior foreign and
defense officials of Japan and the United States failed to reach
an agreement.
Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga also met
separately with US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard
Lawless on the sidelines of the senior working-level talks. But
that, too, ended in failure.
The two countries are wide apart on how to split the cost of the
relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The US has asked
Japan bear 75% of the estimated 10 billion dollars, or 1.8
trillion yen, for moving 8,000 US Marines to Guam. Japan has
expressed its willingness to loan 3 billion dollars for building
housing and other facilities.
When America's request for 7.5 billion dollars became clear in
mid-March, we criticized it as extravagant in comparison to
Japan's annual host nation support of 230 billion yen. We also
pointed out a lack of clarity in specifics and the basis for the
estimate.
Considering the fact that it was Tokyo that first requested the
Guam relocation, it is natural for Japan to bear a certain
percentage of the cost. But the US has been transforming its
forces around the globe to suit its own needs. Japan might end up
playing a role in America's new Asia strategy as a result of the
Guam relocation.
We would like to see Tokyo and Washington conduct penetrating
talks on the future role and nature of US forces in Japan along
with negotiations on the cost sharing of the Guam relocation.
How and to what extent Japan should bear the cost? When working-
level talks become deadlocked, there is no other way but to seek
a bilateral political settlement at the highest or cabinet level.
The cost must be split logically in line with the Japan-US
security arrangements.
The question is whether the two countries can settle the issue in
a way that wins public support. The other day at the Diet,
Foreign Minister Taro Aso expressed the government's desire to
reduce Japan's share to under 50% of the total cost. We do not
understand why he had to mention such a specific figure at that
point. Is it wise for the government to refer to a concrete
figure at a time like this when a fierce tug-of-war is going on
between Japan and the US?
Tokyo and Washington failed to meet the March 31 deadline for
their final report on US force realignment. The failure is
ascribable to the inability to convince local governments to
accept the relocation of Futenma Air Station to the coastline of
Camp Schwab, as well as the stalled cost-sharing talks.
TOKYO 00002134 011 OF 011
An ambiguous political settlement must be avoided, however. In
order to maintain a healthy Japan-US alliance, each side must say
what has to be said, and matters must be discussed thoroughly.
The realignment of US forces in Japan is part of the
transformation of the US military around the world. The
realignment also will direct Japan's security policy toward
transformation and restructuring. The cooperative relationship
between the Self-Defense Forces and US forces in Japan is
expected to change drastically especially with the introduction
of the missile defense system.
What does US force realignment mean for Japan? The government is
accountable to answer such a fundamental question apart from the
cost-sharing issue.
SCHIEFFER