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Viewing cable 06NAIROBI1650, SOMALIS IN KENYA: ABANDONED KIDS, IMPOSTORS, AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAIROBI1650 2006-04-13 14:39 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0019
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1650/01 1031439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131439Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1010
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0259
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 4798
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 8408
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4110
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 4357
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1721
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001650 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/CA 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
PASS TO KCC 
PASS TO INL/HSTC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KCRM KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIS IN KENYA: ABANDONED KIDS, IMPOSTORS, AND 
FAKE POLICE CERTIFICATES 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 817, B. NAIROBI 740, C. 05 NAIROBI 4523 
 
D. 05 NAIROBI 3627 
 
1.  (U) Summary: Post has seen great activity since Ref A 
among naturalized Somalis and Somali nationals in Kenya.  A 
rash of Somali Amcit, LPR, and asylee children have 
contacted post with stories of abandonment by Somali family 
members after trips to Kenya or Somalia.  Post has also 
noted several attempts to insert impostors into DNA testing 
requested in the course of immigrant visa processing. 
Finally, Nairobi has noticed that virtually all Somali IV 
applicants are gaining fraudulent Certificates of Good 
Conduct from the Kenyan Police.  While the Kenyan Police has 
arrested an officer and an employee of the Criminal 
Investigations Division who were producing the fraudulent 
certificates, Post believes that the situation is endemic in 
the police service.  Nairobi continues to address these 
issues specific to our Somali applicants.  End Summary. 
 
ABANDONMENT 
----------- 
 
2.  (U) Post is currently aware of 10 children of Somali 
origin, some Amcits, who have been abandoned by family 
members in Kenya and Somalia.  Immigration authorities in 
Kenya believe that these children are often abandoned in 
Kenya so that family members can sell their travel documents 
and "recycle" them to smuggle other Somali children back to 
the U.S. as impostors. 
 
3.  (SBU) Zacharia Mohamed contacted the Embassy with a 
chilling tale of his kidnapping from the U.S. and 
confinement in Somalia.  Zacharia is a 15-year-old child who 
entered the U.S. as an asylum seeker some years ago, but was 
returned to Somalia by his family because he was rebellious 
and "out of control."  Zacharia came to Nairobi's attention 
because he fled captivity in Somalia and turned himself in 
to police in northern Kenya who helped him contact the 
consular section.  When Post in turn contacted the parents, 
they expressed no interest in returning him to the U.S; 
instead they first attempted to have him released to the 
custody of family members by impersonating an Embassy lawyer 
over the phone and demanding the release of the child, then 
later sent Zacharia's grandmother to take custody of him 
from Kenyan Police with the presumed intent to return him to 
Somalia.  Zacharia has visible physical marks from his 
confinement in Somalia and told us disturbing stories of 
being bound and forced to read the Quran. 
 
4.  (SBU) The Kedir siblings, four Amcits and three LPRs, 
were brought to Kenya by their father last summer.  Post was 
contacted by their concerned mother in the U.S, and we 
recently found the children in Mombasa.  Phone conversations 
with the children reveal that they have contracted skin 
problems and malaria during their stay in Kenya.  Their 
mother in the U.S. is not yet an Amcit, and is currently 
unemployed and unable to pay for their return to the U.S. 
The father's whereabouts are unknown.  Nairobi expects to 
make a "welfare and whereabouts" visit to the children in 
the near future. 
 
5.  (SBU) Zarah Haggen came to Kenya with her parents from 
the U.S. and was left behind.  Her parents subsequently 
returned to the U.S. and divorced.  The father of the child 
has requested a "welfare and whereabouts" visit, but the 
Embassy has been unable to contact the child's grandmother 
in Kenya. 
 
6.  (SBU) Sahra Guled is a 15-year-old Amcit who was brought 
to Somalia at the age of three months by her father.  Sahra, 
like Zacharia, somehow escaped from Somalia and stayed with 
distant relations.  She reported that her paternal family in 
Somalia was trying to take her back and she was forced to 
changed houses several times to avoid being found.  DNA 
testing recently confirmed the relationship between her and 
her mother in the U.S. who was in possession of Sahra's 
original birth certificate.  Fortunately in Sahra's case, CA 
was able to secure a return ticket to the U.S. that reunited 
her with her mother and brothers. 
 
IMPOSTORS 
--------- 
 
7.  (U) Nairobi's panel physician has recently brought to 
our attention three specific cases in which applicants have 
attempted to substitute someone similar to their likeness in 
order to foil our request for DNA testing of immigrant visa 
applicants.  In these recent cases, Post requested DNA to 
Qclude a sibling relationship between Somali-American 
petitioners and Kenya-based Somali applicants who are 
petitioning as spouses or fiances, but whom Post suspects 
are in reality siblings.  (Note: Applicants and petitioners 
commit this fraud to avoid the long waiting period involved 
in petitioning siblings, which are numerically controlled.) 
 
8.  (U) A recent attempt at impostor substitution to foil 
DNA testing to exclude a sibling relationship occurred days 
after Post provided impostor detection training to the 
physician and his staff, and resulted in the arrest of two 
Somali women, the impostor and the beneficiary of the 
petition.  Nairobi believes that impostor substitutions 
could also be occurring during DNA testing of petitioners in 
the U.S. and is contacting U.S.-based labs about this 
possibility.  One U.S. lab which tests many of our Somali 
petitioners in the Minnesota region has already agreed to 
include photographic evidence of the person tested in the 
U.S. to ensure that no substitution occurs there either. 
 
9.  (SBU) The most recent case of impostor substitution to 
foil a DNA test to prove a father-child relationship 
included an impostor who, after hours of concealing his 
identity, revealed that he was an Amcit and his Somali- 
American father was knowingly committing immigration fraud 
to petition for the applicant as an IR-2, when in reality 
the applicant was a nephew of the petitioner.  He admitted 
that following our request for DNA testing, his parents flew 
the impostor to Kenya to take a DNA test on behalf of the 
applicant so a father-child relationship would appear to be 
proven by DNA.  A/RSO-I interviewed the Amcit and passed 
information about the petitioner to Diplomatic Security 
agents in the U.S. for further investigation. 
 
FRAUDULENT POLICE CERTIFICATES 
------------------------------ 
 
10.  (U) Due to the diligence of Nairobi's Fraud Prevention 
Unit(FPU) investigations assistant and the support of our 
A/RSO-I, Kenyan police arrested a 14-year veteran of the 
force and a secretary in the Criminal Investigations 
Division (CID) for issuing fraudulent police certificates of 
good conduct to undocumented Somali applicants in Kenya. 
Applicants have paid between $20 and $200 for these 
certificates, which they are not eligible for, as the vast 
majority of Somalis in Kenya are undocumented illegal aliens 
or refugees.  Nairobi believes that the majority of these 
applicants are attempting to procure police certificates 
from official sources that, instead of telling the 
undocumented Somalis that they are not qualified, are 
instead issuing fraudulent certificates and pocketing the 
fees.  Nairobi has recently sent an Advisory Opinion about 
this situation specific to NRB2005847004, applicant name 
ABDI, Hawo Isse. 
 
11.  (SBU) Telltale signs of fraudulent documentation 
include poorly reproduced signatures and manipulation of 
genuine certificates to reflect the name of the applicant. 
Post has brought this issue to the attention of the police 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and will continue 
to seek a lasting solution.  Given the continued volume of 
fake certificates, Post believes this may be a significant 
source of income for corrupt police officers.  Finally, 
Somali applicants are unable to seek police certificates of 
good conduct from Somalia due to a lack of Qtral 
government. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Post continues to monitor these issues among our 
Somali applicant, LPR, and Amcit pool, and seeks solutions 
where possible.  Post also continues to be concerned that 
due to the volume and availability of fraudulent documents 
available to Somali nationals, we cannot be certain of the 
identity of these applicants from the world's only current 
failed state, a land with extensive known links to 
terrorism. 
BELLAMY