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Viewing cable 06NAHA85, GOJ-NAGO AGREEMENT ON FUTENMA PLEASES CONSERVATIVES, ANGERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAHA85 2006-04-11 08:51 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Naha
VZCZCXRO8994
RR RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0085/01 1010851
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110851Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0448
INFO RUHBANB/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFIUU/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFIUU/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0128
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHMBRA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 0081
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0484
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0200
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0165
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0439
RUEAHIC/USARPAC COMMAND CENTER FT SHAFTER HI
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
RHMFIUU/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFIUU/5AF YOKOTA AB JA
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFIUU/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000085 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PREL JA
SUBJECT: GOJ-NAGO AGREEMENT ON FUTENMA PLEASES CONSERVATIVES, ANGERS 
 
REFORMISTS, PUTS GOVERNOR ON THE SPOT 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:   On April 8, 2006 Japan Defense Agency 
(JDA) Director General Fukushiro Nukaga and Nago Mayor Yoshikazu 
Shimabukuro reached an agreement on a two runway, V-shaped 
configuration for the Marine Corp Air Station (MCAS) Futenma 
relocation facility (FRF) to be constructed on the coastal 
portion of Camp Schwab in Nago. Okinawan reaction to the 
Nukaga-Shimabukuro agreement has fallen along predictable lines, 
with conservatives accepting the plan and reformists opposing 
it.  The one notable exception from the conservative camp is 
Governor Inamine, who has refused to deviate from his refusenik 
opposition to any plan other than the original (and now 
obsolete) Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) offshore 
airbase plan.  The GOJ-Nago agreement has dealt another serious, 
public blow to the argument of reformists and local media that 
no one within Okinawa will accept a within-prefecture relocation 
of MCAS Futenma; the first blow came this January when Nago 
voters overwhelmingly elected Shimabukuro, a candidate who 
supported a revised "coastal Schwab" plan, over his two 
competitors, both of whom rejected any relocation of MCAS 
Futenma within Okinawa.  Although the GOJ's focus now appears to 
be shifting toward persuading Governor Inamine to also accept 
the agreement, the reality is that with Nago's agreement, 
Inamine has become almost irrelevant on the Futenma relocation 
issue. End Summary. 
 
Conservatives Supporting Nukaga-Shimabukuro Agreement 
 
2.  (SBU)  Illustrating the Governor's near-isolation within his 
own conservative coalition, prominent members of the Okinawa LDP 
have expressed support for last week's agreement, in contrast to 
Inamine's continued opposition.  Typifying the party's reaction, 
Okinawa LDP Secretary General Kosuke Gushi publicly supported 
the agreement on April 9, saying that the plan would hasten 
removal of the danger posed by MCAS Futenma.  He added that he 
highly evaluated the plan because it "satisfies Nago and 
recognizes the need to have flight routes that avoid flying over 
people's houses."  Okinawa LDP lower house Diet member Osamu 
Ashitomi hailed the agreement to us, saying he "strongly 
appreciated this settlement because my electoral district 
includes Futenma.  My constituents will be happy that the air 
station is to be relocated to a safer location."  (note: 
Ashitomi told us he will shortly organize a "Futenma Relocation 
Promotion Council" composed of pro-agreement conservative 
politicians from Ginowan and Nago cities).  Conservative mayors 
from four northern Okinawan towns (Ginoza, Onna, Higashi, and 
Kin) also announced their support of the "V-plan," on April 9, 
giving Mayor Shimabukuro some political cover from reformist 
attacks. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Privately, most conservatives were not pleased with 
Inamine's rejection of the DPRI agreement last October over the 
FRF issue, and had hoped strongly that once Nago and the GOJ 
announced an agreement, the Governor would not openly oppose it. 
 Inamine's continued opposition is likely to further strain his 
ties with his own party.  LDP Chief Gushi hinted at these 
strains when he stated on April 8 that he would like to 
 
NAHA 00000085  002 OF 004 
 
 
cooperate with "the Governor who says he is opposing the revised 
coastal Schwab plan" and ask him to "change his stance to a plan 
that respects the Nago City agreement." 
 
4. (SBU) The only cautious comment from within the conservative 
camp came from the coalition's junior member, the Komei party. 
On April 10, Komei leader Itosu Tomonori avoided directly 
publicly supporting the agreement by stating he wanted to see 
how talks between Governor Inamine and Mayor Shimabukuro 
progressed, as well as the results of further briefings on the 
plan to Nago residents by the GOJ. 
 
Reformists and Media Regroup, Launch Three-Pronged Attack 
 
5. (SBU)  The opposition "reformist" parties, joined by the 
local anti-base media, have rolled out a three-prong strategy to 
counter the agreement by placing their hopes on the Governor's 
continued refusal to support the agreement; attacking the plan 
itself; and, failing all else, waiting things out until the 
Koizumi administration ends and a new leader takes his place. 
Currently, the reformists and media are focusing their ire on 
the GOJ and Mayor Shimabukuro, with Governor Inamine so far 
escaping much criticism (probably because the reformists welcome 
his continued refusnik stance).  The media have begun touting 
the line that Inamine is the true representative of the Okinawa 
people and as such has the final decision.  At the same time, 
the papers have encouraged Inamine to continue his opposition to 
the new plan, hoping to bolster him against GOJ and conservative 
attempts to get him to change his stance.  Among the reformist 
leaders, Yonekichi Shinzato, Secretary General of the Okinawa 
Social Democratic Party, commented April 10 that the new plan 
"does not provide for safety of local residents; it only 
strengthens the function of bases in Okinawa."  Masaharu Kina, 
Chairman of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, said "danger 
will be increased due to the expansion of the scale of the 
airbase.  Mayor Shimabukuro broke his public campaign pledge." 
Masaaaki Maeda, Vice Chairman of the Okinawa Communist Party, 
stated that the Koizumi administration's "hardline" attitude 
would only lead to opposition from Okinawans; "the Japanese 
government should give up trying to build  a new base in 
Okinawa."  And Shokichi Kina, leader of the Democratic Party in 
Okinawa, said Futenma relocation was an issue not just for Nago 
City, but for all Okinawans to decide. 
 
6. (SBU)  Maverick independent lower house Diet member Mikio 
Shimoji told us April 11 that he believed the GOJ, using carrots 
and sticks, had forced Shimabukuro to agree - in response to 
pressure from DOD on the GOJ to secure local agreement.  This 
had caused Shimabukuro to make a "hasty decision," said Shimoji. 
 Shimoji also alleged that Shimabukuro's assistants had been 
spreading campaign money around northern Okinawa municipalities, 
which had influenced their mayors to support the Nago mayor's 
decision. 
 
7. (SBU)  Okinawa's two newspapers are doing their best to 
discredit Shimabukuro by accusing him "violating" his campaign 
 
NAHA 00000085  003 OF 004 
 
 
pledge to oppose the previous Schwab-coastal plan.  Articles 
critical of Shimabukuro state that he originally promised Nago 
voters he would reject the "coastal plan," while ignoring 
Shimabukuro's oft-repeated campaign statement that he would be 
willing to consider a revised "coastal plan."  Some anti-base 
activists are agitating for the Mayor's recall, but their effort 
seems unpromising, since by law a politician cannot be recalled 
within the first year of his election. 
 
8. (SBU)  Since the V-plan has adjusted flight routes so that 
they ostensibly will not pass over residential areas, reformists 
and the media are finding it difficult to focus on solely on the 
proposed FRF's safety problems and are turning to environmental 
and noise issues as reasons to object to the new plan. 
Nonetheless, since all five principal mayors from the northern 
Okinawa have signed off on the plan, it remains to be seen how 
much environmental issues will really resonate with most 
Okinawans.  In a November 2005 island-wide poll, the largest 
reason cited for opposing the October DPRI agreement  (74.5 
percent) was concern the GOJ had ignored Okinawans' opinions and 
forced the "coastal plan" on them - not fear of environmental 
damage.  When it comes to how local residents in the Henoko area 
feel about environmental harm from the FRF, we have frequently 
been told by their ward chiefs that they are much more focused 
on the economic benefits from the FRF for their communities than 
on environmental damage. 
 
Waiting on Governor to Accept Plan? 
 
9. (SBU)  With the conservatives and reformists having made 
their positions clear, Governor Inamine's isolation within his 
own ruling camp has become painfully obvious.  Both after 
learning of the agreement late on April 7, and again after his 
own meeting with Nukaga in Tokyo on April 8, Inamine told 
reporters his opposition to the Schwab plan had not changed. 
However, he added that he "respected" the agreement, leading 
some observers to conclude the governor would not lead an effort 
to block the agreement.  If the Governor chooses to confine his 
actions on Futenma relocation to his current symbolic, personal 
protest, it is likely he will continue to have no actual effect 
on FRF construction, since few believe Inamine will be called on 
to grant planning or survey permits in the short time remaining 
before his term ends this December. 
 
10. (SBU)  Nevertheless, the GOJ appears to want Inamine to 
soften his attitude toward the agreement.   Statements by such 
influentials as senior LDP figure Taku Yamasaki (who said on 
April 8 he "awaits a final decision from Inamine") carry the 
impression that without some positive signal from Inamine, the 
GOJ will not feel it has gained sufficient Okinawan approval to 
claim success on the FRF issue. 
 
Governor and Others Hoping This Not A Final Agreement 
 
11. (SBU)  The Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) seems to be 
hoping that this is not the final agreement, thus allowing the 
 
NAHA 00000085  004 OF 004 
 
 
Governor to avoid being the stumbling block.  Inamine's Chief of 
staff, Reiji Fumoto, told us on April 10 that he was sure "this 
was not the final plan," acknowledging that if it were the 
Governor would be forced to do something.  Earlier this year, 
Inamine was warned by fellow conservatives not to worsen 
relations with the GOJ as this could cut the vital economic 
pipeline from Tokyo.  Thus Inamine may be hoping the current 
agreement will be stopped before any of its ramifications cross 
his desk for signature.. 
 
12. (SBU) Comment.  With a background of some three weeks' worth 
of media stories stressing the "wide gap" between the GOJ and 
Nago, announcement of the April 8 agreement truly caught most 
Okinawans by surprise - the conservatives, pleasantly so.  The 
reformists and media have been mightily confounded by the 
spectacle of five northern mayors blessing the agreement, 
belying the reformist line that the vast majority of Okinawans 
will never accept Futenma relocation to Henoko.  Whether 
Governor Inamine will soften his opposition remains to be seen - 
but whether he does nor not, Futenma relocation remains likely 
to be one of the central issues in this autumn's gubernatorial 
election to replace Inamine, with the focus being the future 
conservative candidate's approach.  The reformist candidate is 
virtually guaranteed to reject Futenma relocation within 
Okinawa, in keeping with longstanding reformist orthodoxy.  End 
comment. 
REICH