Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MEXICO2220, TEN ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FACING MEXICO'S NEXT PRESIDENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MEXICO2220.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06MEXICO2220 | 2006-04-26 19:46 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Mexico |
VZCZCXRO5871
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #2220/01 1161946
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261946Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0524
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0337
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2214
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 MEXICO 002220
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/MEX, WHA/EPSC
STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC:MARK CARRATO
TREASURY FOR IA MEXICO DESK: JASPER HOEK
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/NAFTA: ANDREW RUDMAN
ENERGY FOR KATHY DEUTSCH
PARIS FOR USOECD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: TEN ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FACING MEXICO'S NEXT PRESIDENT
REFTELS: AS NOTED IN TEXT
------------------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
------------------------
¶1. (SBU) Whoever wins Mexico's presidential election on July 2
will inherit both the economic strengths built and bolstered
during the Fox Administration and the daunting challenges that Fox
leaves unfulfilled or simply unaddressed. Fox's major economic
legacy will be the macroeconomic stability that prevailed during
his six-year term and the fruits this stability have borne: low
inflation, a solid banking and financial sector, a middle-class
housing boom, and the rapid expansion of credit to business and
consumers. But as positive as this legacy is - and despite
efforts by Fox's economic team to "armor-plate" Mexico's economic
institutions against the political pressures his successor will
face - the challenges Fox leaves are formidable. This cable
considers ten of them:
-- Reform the Tax System and Maintain Fiscal Balance.
-- Defuse the Pensions Time Bomb.
-- Confront Declining Oil Reserves and Reform the Energy Sector.
-- Take on the Unions without Shutting Down the Country.
-- Plan for a Transition to Fully Open Agricultural Trade.
-- Stop Talking about Competitiveness and Do Something About It.
-- Institutionalize the Rule Of Law And Confront the Violence.
-- Cultivate Respect For Intellectual Property Rights.
-- Invest in Human Capital Needed For a Knowledge-Based Economy.
-- Address Mexico's Persistent Poverty.
¶2. (SBU) Any future Mexican government faces the challenge of
creating sufficient economic growth. The conventional wisdom is
that Mexico needs to at least match the growth rates of its most
competitive peers - 6% to 8% annual growth on a sustained basis -
in order to create enough employment to lift millions of its
citizens from poverty and provide an attractive alternative to
illegal migration to the U.S. Mexico is unlikely to achieve this
without substantial investments in key sectors including energy,
telecommunications, infrastructure, and education. Furthermore, a
lack of public security, corruption, and outdated bureaucratic and
regulatory structures combine to hinder Mexico's global
competitiveness and sap economic vitality.
---------------------------------
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY UNDER FOX
---------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) Mexico's next president will inherit a stable, growing
economy (Mexico 1070, 161). The Mexican economy, which is tightly
linked to U.S. economic cycles, rebounded from near zero growth in
the first years of this decade to 4.4% growth in 2004 and 3.0% in
¶2005. Forecasts are for continued growth of 3% to 4% growth
in 2006 and 2007. Inflation has been controlled and is expected
to remain in the current 3% to 4% range (Mexico 106, 05 Mexico
3721). Thanks to increased appetite for emerging market debt in
general and a perception of political, economic, and institutional
stability in Mexico, international investors seeking higher yields
embraced Mexican bonds.
¶4. (SBU) Boosted by record high oil prices, public finances have
steadily improved under Fox, with the broad measure of the budget
deficit (which includes the parastatal companies and other off-
budget items) at just 1.4% of GDP. International reserves, thanks
to oil exports, spectacular growth in remittances (Mexico 443,
2042, 2097, 2123, 2154, 05 Mexico 4186), and a healthy tourism
sector (05 Mexico 3385), have grown to nearly USD 70 billion.
¶5. (SBU) An able cadre of leaders at the Finance Ministry
(Hacienda) has taken advantage of the favorable environment to pay
down Mexico's foreign debt by borrowing on the domestic market,
which has grown in depth and sophistication. Total net public
debt stands at just 38% of GDP, of which foreign debt is just over
12% of GDP. To smooth any ripples created by the upcoming
presidential elections and subsequent transition, Hacienda has pre-
financed all foreign debt payments due in 2006 and 2007 (05 Mexico
5032). This favorable macroeconomic picture has kept the peso and
investor confidence in Mexico stable.
MEXICO 00002220 002 OF 008
-----------------------------
¶I. REFORM THE TAX SYSTEM AND
MAINTAIN FISCAL BALANCE
-----------------------------
¶6. (SBU) One of Mexico's most pressing public policy problems is
its fiscal system, which currently relies on oil-related revenues
for 37% of the federal budget (05 Mexico 5998, 04 Mexico 9273).
States and municipalities in turn rely on transfers, largely
linked to oil-revenues, from the federal government for nearly all
their revenues (05 Mexico 6865). Non-oil-related taxes, including
individual and corporate income taxes and a value-added tax (VAT),
accounted for less than 10% of GDP. This low tax base and an over-
dependence on volatile oil revenues have hindered adequate long-
term investments in education, health, and transportation
infrastructure (05 Mexico 6966, 5852) and will limit the ability
of Fox's successor to respond - responsibly - to the relentless
demands he will face from his various constituencies. The next
president will need to expand the tax take, especially from the
middle class and the rich.
¶7. (SBU) Due to a prohibition against private investment in the
energy sector, the government must provide the tens of billions of
dollars needed in energy investments in the coming decade. An
inefficient state-controlled energy sector also eats away some 1%
of GDP in annual electricity subsidies alone. Booming oil
revenues have largely been squandered on subsidizing electricity,
gasoline, and natural gas consumption (05 Mexico 5635). Luckily,
oil revenues have been high enough to keep public finances healthy
for the time being. However, the current system, which spends
rather than saves excess oil revenues (05 Mexico 2460), will not
withstand a major drop in oil prices without either drastic budget
cuts or increased borrowing. Proposed fiscal reforms center on
expanding the tax base by applying the VAT to food and medicine
(currently not taxed), lowering taxes on the state-oil monopoly,
Pemex, and improving state and municipal capacities to raise their
own revenues (04 Mexico 6480).
----------------------------------
II. DEFUSE THE PENSIONS TIME BOMB
----------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) Perhaps the weakest point in Mexico's longer-term budget
picture is a public pensions system with enormous and growing
unfunded liabilities which each year consume a greater portion of
the budget. The actuarial deficit (the money that would be
required to fully fund) of Mexico's pension promises to government
and parastatal workers is estimated at well over 100% of GDP (05
Mexico 1804, 922). Mexico's government workers, workers at Pemex
and the state-owned electricity companies, and employees of
Mexico's Social Security Institute (IMSS) enjoy extremely generous
pension benefits that can exceed 100% of final salary upon
retirement. These benefits are almost entirely unfunded and
payments to retirees now come out of annual budget appropriations.
¶9. (SBU) Without meaningful reforms, successive administrations
will see less and less money available for other public needs. A
step was made in the right direction in 2004 when Congress
mandated that IMSS, whose workers have Mexico's most generous
pension system, could not hire new employees without fully funding
their pensions (04 Mexico 6089). This reform, however, was
thwarted by a new deal between the union and IMSS following the
resignation of longtime IMSS director and union opponent Santiago
Levy (Mexico 1655, 05 Mexico 6084). A reform to the government
employees' pension system (ISSSTE), whose actuarial deficit is
estimated at 45% of GDP, has languished (05 Mexico 184). A new
president will have to find a way to move pension reform forward.
-------------------------------------
III. CONFRONT DECLINING OIL RESERVES
AND REFORM THE ENERGY SECTOR
-------------------------------------
¶10. (SBU) Oil revenue accounts for about one third of the GOM
budget. In December 2005 a leaked Pemex study revealed that
production in Mexico's Cantarell oil field, the second largest on
earth and representing 61 percent of Mexican oil production, would
decline by as much as 75 percent by 2008 (Mexico 1174). While
rejecting the report, Pemex executives tell us they are reasonably
MEXICO 00002220 003 OF 008
comfortable with their own projected decline rate of "less than
ten percent per year" which they call "not trivial, but not
catastrophic either." Pemex has several opportunities to make up
production lost from Cantarell, but these are medium- and long-
term projects that hinge on Pemex's ability to partner with
foreign firms to bring the necessary expertise and billions of
dollars of investment capital. Mexico's greatest potential lies
in deep water of the Gulf of Mexico, but constitutional
restrictions prevent Mexico from sharing ownership of the reserves
with a foreign partner, a necessary condition for attracting
outside participation.
¶11. (SBU) Investments during Fox's term will likely permit Pemex
to maintain production at relatively constant rates through 2010.
After that, Mexico's situation will require legislative changes
which would enable Pemex to maintain total production volumes near
the current 3.3 MMBD level. Without these reforms, production
will certainly fall. The only reforms now under discussion,
however, are modest changes to Pemex's corporate structure that
would allow the company to retain and invest a greater share of
its earnings. Despite reports from all political parties of broad-
based support for these changes (Mexico 1526), Congress will be
unable to pass even a limited set of changes before it adjourns
April 30. More fundamental changes to Mexico's constitution and
laws prohibiting foreign investment in the sector are not even on
the horizon right now. Discounting the possibility of a
precipitous fall in Cantarell production, and assuming oil prices
stay at least flat, Mexico's new leadership will still have to
begin to confront needed reforms immediately upon taking office to
permit the new developments needed to offset a significant medium-
term fall in production.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
IV. TAKE ON THE UNIONS WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE COUNTRY
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶12. (SBU) Few major reform proposals will move forward without
some confrontation or deal with the unions representing the
affected industries. Unions gained power and influence over many
decades of working closely with the PRI, delivering votes in
exchange for unaffordable benefits for workers and untold riches
for union leaders. Due to union protections, for example, the
state-owned Mexico City electric utility (LyFC) has what is in
effect its own construction and manufacturing subsidiaries with
some 10,000 employees. LyFC retirees not only retire at full
salary, but also receive the same annual union-negotiated raises
that active employees receive. In addition to unions for
government and parastatal employees - including the 1.2 million
strong teachers union - powerful unions exist for
telecommunications, transportation, and mining workers, among
others.
¶13. (SBU) When the PRI lost its absolute control over Mexican
institutions, the PRI-controlled unions became juggernauts, and
the threat of strikes in any of the major sectors they dominate is
usually enough to force the government to back down on whatever
reforms it may be contemplating. In 2004, for example, Congress
passed a reform to the IMSS pension system in the face of major
marches and protests by IMSS employees that shut down parts of
Mexico City for days - protests against a reform that only
affected future employees. IMSS Chief Santiago Levy was forced to
resign and a new contract was signed largely because the 300,000
plus strong union threatened to shut down the country's public
health system. While few would argue against the need for worker
protections, Mexico's unions have become a force against needed
reforms and in favor of economic stagnation. The economy is
especially harmed because heavily-unionized sectors (e.g. oil and
gas, telecommunications, electricity, health) are controlled by
one or few entities whose workers can literally paralyze the
country. Labor market rigidity may actually be one of the biggest
obstacles to economic growth in Mexico. Without labor market
reforms that would make it easier and less costly to hire and fire
workers, and limit their extremely generous benefits and severance
packages, investment and industrial growth here will be
handicapped.
----------------------------------
¶V. PLAN FOR A TRANSITION TO FULLY
OPEN AGRICULTURAL TRADE
MEXICO 00002220 004 OF 008
----------------------------------
¶14. (SBU) Mexico's next President will face one of NAFTA's last
remaining, and most emotionally charged, issues: the scheduled
full opening of agricultural trade in 2008, when all agricultural
tariffs and quotas between the three NAFTA members will be
eliminated. Two of the most sensitive products in Mexico are corn
and dried beans; considered by many to be part of Mexico's
cultural patrimony and therefore deserving of special protection.
In addition to this cultural argument, protection advocates point
out that a substantial number of small farmers rely on these crops
for their livelihood. According to 2003 data from the Secretariat
of Agriculture, Mexico has over two million corn farmers, 85% of
whom have less than five hectares, and 56% cultivate even less
than two hectares. Although significant, there are far fewer bean
farmers - 140,000 total, about half of whom have five hectares or
less.
¶15. (SBU) Some agricultural organizations have argued that a full
opening of agricultural trade in 2008 would cause severe social
upheavals, as large numbers of farmers are forced out of business
and further impoverished. This has led to calls to renegotiate or
delay open and free trade in agriculture. Lopez Obrador has made
some public statements that call into question his support for the
2008 opening and many observers doubt that PRD would follow
through on the commitment if AMLO becomes president. The PRI has
also suggested delaying measures that would open Mexican produced
corn and beans to NAFTA competition. However, current Ministry of
Economy officials and most politicians have stated that
renegotiating NAFTA is not an option and that the opening must
take place as scheduled. Many organizations appear realistic and
determined, and have begun developing plans to deal with the
transition and become more competitive by 2008. Others are simply
counting on the disproportionate political clout of the farming
sector to protect their inefficient industry and allow them to
muddle through. Those involved in corn trade point out that most
of these subsistence farmers are not really affected by the trade
since only about one-third of domestic corn actually enters into
the market, and Mexico is already exceeding their NAFTA quota for
corn imports. Nevertheless, the emotional arguments have led to
call to renegotiate. (Mexico 1839)
---------------------------------------
VI. STOP TALKING ABOUT COMPETITIVENESS
AND DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT
---------------------------------------
¶16. (SBU) Mexico's waning international competitiveness as a
destination for foreign direct investment has become an obsession
among Mexican business leaders and politicians. There are no
shortage of analyses, all of which point to badly needed reforms
to Mexico's labor code, constitutional changes to allow foreign
private participation in the energy sector, reforms to the fiscal
regime, and greater respect for rule of law. But what has been
lacking is the political will to take on extremely entrenched
interests, particularly in an increasingly charged political
environment.
¶17. (SBU) While it is true that the combination of relatively low
wages and proximity to the U.S. is an advantage that is difficult
to match in India and China, particularly for production of heavy
and bulky items such as automobiles and refrigerators, Mexico
cannot rely on these industries if it expects to continue
attracting high levels of foreign direct investment. (Mexico 203,
206) One obstacle is Mexico's own domestic industries, many of
them powerful monopolies that have grown fat and happy in an
environment of bureaucratic inefficiencies that indirectly protect
them from foreign competition.
¶18. (SBU) Although Mexico last year appointed a widely respected
official to head the Federal Competition Commission, they have
thus far been unable to level the playing field for competition in
areas where the major Mexican monopolies are dominant, including
telephones, broadcasting, and cement. New investors are thus
unable to offer competitive services and lower prices. Telmex,
for example, continues to control 95 percent of the fixed line
market and charges high prices for network access (Mexico 1123, 05
Mexico 5375). Telmex fights attempts to increase competition in
the sector, using court injunctions to delay or alter regulatory
MEXICO 00002220 005 OF 008
decisions that favor other companies. Telmex and the broadcasting
giants Televisa and TV Azteca (Mexico 1080) can derail competition
in the broadcast sector by playing off of politicians' nationalist
rhetoric and old habits of protectionism. These practices have
prevented Mexico from adopting new technologies and expanding
networks.
¶19. (SBU) The GOM's sale of government-owned airlines Mexicana and
pending sale of AeroMexico is proof that increased competition has
positive affects on the Mexican economy. With waning market share
and ties with the government severed, Mexicana and AeroMexico are
no longer able to protect themselves from competition. Easing of
market restrictions and increased commercial opportunities enabled
new airlines to emerge and compete with the public monopolies.
The result: airline travel is becoming more affordable for the
average Mexican and niche specialty markets are being developed,
increasing employment opportunities and Mexico's client base.
--------------------------------------
VII. INSTITUTIONALIZE THE RULE OF LAW
AND CONFRONT THE VIOLENCE
--------------------------------------
¶20. (SBU) When asked which single factor is the most troublesome
for U.S. businesses operating in Mexico, the answer is invariably
rule of law. Mexico's record on law enforcement, investigation,
and prosecution is poor, and Federal and local police departments
and judiciary are widely considered corrupt and ineffective.
Although this has an effect on many aspects of life in Mexico, it
has a particular impact on the business community. Without
stronger respect for the rule of law, and greater competence,
transparency, and reliability in Mexico's judiciary and law
enforcement agencies, U.S. businesses must compete with local
companies which have historically relied on political connections
and bribery - and have often thrived doing so. Even those
companies which are comfortable operating in such an environment
waste hundreds of millions of dollars annually doing so, whether
paying "fees" to have permits processed, settling lawsuits under
egregious terms in order to keep their cases out of the court
system, or fighting criminal procedures that often arise here
against plaintiffs in civil suits.
¶21. (SBU) Another aspect of rule of law is the effect of
criminality and violence on businesses in Mexico. As one Mexican
businessman stated, "violence is not the friend of investors," and
indeed the Mexican Institute on Competitiveness published a report
(Mexico 1536) which estimated that Mexico loses 15 percent of GDP,
or USD 1.8 billion, annually due to crime. Although no business
or association was willing to identify a specific investment that
was lost due to the security situation in Mexico, they all
acknowledge that it raises the cost of doing business here.
Security costs have doubled over the last two years and companies,
while not afraid to invest, note that they are fearful of losses
from hijackings and threats of kidnappings directed at their
executives.
-----------------------------------------
VIII. CULTIVATE RESPECT FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
-----------------------------------------
¶22. (SBU) Although Mexican government officials under the Fox
Administration increased their dedication to protecting
intellectual property, the scope and scale of IPR abuses across
multiple industries continues to outpace their efforts. The
International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates over $1.25
billion in trade losses in 2005 for sound and video recordings,
business and gaming software, and books. The textiles industry is
also extremely hard hit by trademark piracy. There are an
estimated 50,000 street vendors in Mexico selling pirated
merchandise.
¶23. (SBU) There is general agreement that Mexico has decent,
though not perfect, IPR laws on its books. The challenge for the
new administration is not legislative, but improved enforcement.
Although PGR, IMPI and Aduanas annually seize and destroy millions
of counterfeit and smuggled merchandise, there is little follow-on
prosecution. IPR violators in Mexico are safe in the knowledge
that although they may lose some merchandise to official raids,
MEXICO 00002220 006 OF 008
there is little chance that they will face jail time or monetary
sanctions (Mexico 1522). Improved prosecution depends on two
factors - agencies must improve their investigation and case-
building techniques, and the Mexican judiciary must be willing to
enforce the law. Unfortunately, judges and magistrates here have
historically shown little understanding or appreciation for the
importance of IPR protection and the ties between IPR piracy and
other serious crimes (Mexico 969).
¶24. (SBU) The stakes for Mexico are high if the situation does not
improve. The Mexican Recording Industry Association estimates job
loss for their industry alone at over 25,000 due to piracy. And,
industry efforts to cut prices to compete with cheap pirated
copies means they now have little profits to invest in launching
new, home-grown talents. According to the Association president,
the last time they launched a major Mexican artist was 8 years
ago. Other industries face similar job losses and disincentives
for innovation.
-------------------------------------------
IX. INVEST IN THE HUMAN CAPITAL NEEDED FOR
A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY
-------------------------------------------
¶25. (SBU) With over 100 million people and the 12th largest
economy in the world, Mexico could be a major economic power. But
Mexico lags badly in most socio-economic indicators (05 Mexico
7288), including the vital area of education and technology. Some
50% of Mexican adults over age 15 have had only a primary school
education. Mexico's education spending per student at the primary
and secondary levels is just 28% and 29%, respectively, of the
OECD average. Relatively well-paid teachers are simply not
delivering results. The percentage of Mexican 15 year-olds
reading at the two highest levels of a standardized test is just
6.9, compared to an OECD average of 31.8 and a U.S. figure of
33.7. This neglect of education and a general lack of
entrepreneurial spirit, perhaps quashed by decades of corrupt PRI
rule that promoted dependence on the state, have resulted in a big
lag in technological innovation and adoption. This lag will
handicap Mexico's prospects in an age of globalization where the
creation and adoption of technology are keys to improved
competitiveness.
¶26. (SBU) Mexico's lack of global competitiveness, coupled with
government bureaucracy, deters potential innovators, especially
Mexicans, from setting up business in Mexico. Lengthy patent
processes, a lack of markets for specific products, and a lack of
venture capitalists willing to risk money on new companies with
little or no-track record hinder the development of Mexico's high
technology sectors. In addition, most businesses and citizens
have little access to more common technological tools like the
internet and they lack the knowledge of how to efficiently utilize
them.
¶27. (SBU) OECD statistics confirm the need for Mexico to nurture
its technology sector. Mexico has just one-third the OECD average
of internet users per 1,000 people, and just one-fifth the U.S.
figure. Mexico has just 0.8 broadband internet subscribers per
100 people vs. an OECD average of 10.1 and 24.9 in Korea, one of
its global competitors. The International Telecommunications
Union's "Digital Access Index" ranks Mexico 64th, well behind
nearly all other OECD members. If modern economies depend and
thrive on innovation, Mexico, judged by patent applications, is in
trouble. With one-third the U.S. population, Mexico receives only
one-fourteenth the number of patent applications as the U.S., and
of those, only 4% are filed by Mexicans (05 Mexico 7316). In
order for Mexico to increase access, utilization, and technology
investment, it will have to find new ways to attract foreign
investors and build global confidence in its technology and R&D
sectors. Streamlining the patent process, easing licensing
regulations, and developing technology investment incentives would
also boost output, lower costs, and increase access in the sector.
----------------------------------------
¶X. ADDRESS MEXICO'S PERSISTENT POVERTY
----------------------------------------
¶28. (SBU) For a country as rich in natural resources as Mexico,
and with its physical proximity to the largest market in the
MEXICO 00002220 007 OF 008
world, Mexico's poverty is a persistent national shame. This is
perhaps Mexico's greatest economic challenge, and not one that can
be solved by simply tweaking one policy or another. To Fox's
credit, the "Oportunidades" program has been recognized as one of
the best government poverty reduction programs in Latin America
(recently featured in the Economist). It is structured as an
incentive program for families (in rural areas particularly) to
keep kids in school and to make regular visits to the doctor. The
incentives include support payments and a discount/coupon system
for families to have access to lower cost staple foods. A World
Bank study indicated the Oportunidades coverage of 4 million
families (now covering more than 5 million of the poorest families
living in rural areas) resulted in increased enrollment for both
boys and girls in middle school.
¶29. (SBU) Mexico's widespread poverty has nevertheless created the
phenomenon of large numbers of migrants traveling legally or
illegally in the U.S. to earn a living and support their family.
This in turn has created a massive remittance flow to Mexico -
largely to Mexico's poorest regions - that itself has created
certain opportunities for economic development. The level of
remittance income in 2005 grew by 17%, to $20 billion USD, and was
up 27% in January 2006 (to $582 million USD) compared to January
¶2005. Officially, remittances are equal to approximately 2.4% of
national GDP, while unofficial sources claim a much higher total
(some as high as 10%). Remittances may equal as much as 30% of
the GDP of rural states such as Michoacan and in some rural
agricultural communities, remittances are responsible for 60-70%
of the total economic activity.
¶30. (SBU) There are numerous organizations attempting to take
advantage of the opportunity presented by the skyrocketing flow of
remittance income, but they are inadequate to promote large-scale
investment and capital-building. The government development bank,
Bansefi, has been leading these efforts for the GOM; other
organizations, including USAID, also have programs encouraging
rural development by bringing residents into the formal financial
system. Banks, which have traditionally shied away from offering
services in rural areas, now claim to be reaching out to
previously under serviced populations. However, in reality, most
national banking chains are still avoiding communities of less
than 25,000 inhabitants, where a majority of remittance recipients
live. The next administration will face the challenge and
opportunity of turning remittances - Mexico's second largest
source of foreign exchange (after oil) - into a productive engine
of economic growth and continuing the expansion - begun under Fox
- of the financial sector into rural areas.
-----------------------
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENT
-----------------------
¶31. (SBU) These are considerable challenges, and there is no
reason to believe that any of the three major candidates will be
able to confront all of them, or even many of them, in a concerted
and effective way. These challenges are all interdependent.
Increased competitiveness is dependent on lower energy,
telecommunications, and transportation costs, as well as a better-
educated workforce and greater use of technology. Energy reform
is impossible without some form of fiscal reform that would
replace lost oil-related budget revenues. Increased investments
in education, health, and infrastructure are made much more
possible by pension and fiscal reforms. Pension, energy, and
regulatory reforms, are dependent on dealing with unions. It will
be very difficult for future president to successfully link these
various reforms into a comprehensive strategy for the next six
years, but their interplay will be impossible to avoid. Hanging
over all these challenges is one that is more intangible, though
nevertheless critical: how not to squander the macroeconomic
stability that has prevailed throughout the Fox years. The
challenges facing Fox's successor will be difficult enough, and
the pressures on him sufficiently daunting, without having to
confront an environment of inflation, high interest rates, and
stagnant growth.
¶32. (SBU) Fundamentally, Mexico is a land of privilege (or lack
thereof) rather than opportunity. Its political debates, as
Mexican columnist Luis Rubio often points out, tend to be backward-
rather than forward-looking. There is little awareness among the
MEXICO 00002220 008 OF 008
Mexican general public of how fast the world outside is changing,
and how much Mexico needs to change just to avoid slipping further
behind. The next president, even if genuinely reform-minded, and
even if he has a working majority in the Congress, will only have
enough political capital to try two or three major reforms. The
protected special interests will ensure that those efforts will be
difficult and drawn-out, and likely will lead to a scaling-back
from the original level of ambition. But, as this message
indicates, two or three major reforms will not be enough. The way
out of the dilemma for Mexico is to undergo some sort of sweeping
cultural transformation, leading to a strong national consensus in
favor of policies leading to higher productivity and economic
growth. The visionary leadership that might be capable of
inducing such a transformation is not (so far) evident in the
three major candidates currently running for president in Mexico.
Such transformations have taken place in East Asia, but so far,
not in Mexico or elsewhere in Latin America. We need to continue
to push for growth-oriented policies here, through both bilateral
and trilateral mechanisms. But the leadership to make them happen
must be home-grown.
GARZA