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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA851, NICARAGUA AND SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA851 2006-04-18 21:09 2011-08-19 20:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0851 1082109
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182109Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6002
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0617
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0017
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN AND WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2026 
TAGS: ETRD ETTC PREL CU VE NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA AND SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE 
LIBERTAD ACT 
 
REF: A. STATE 57782 
 
     B. 05 MANAGUA 3103 
     C. 05 MANAGUA 1577 
     D. 05 MANAGUA 1659 
     E. 05 MANAGUA 1944 
     F. 05 MANAGUA 2195 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Government of Nicaragua (GON) remains 
responsive to U.S. efforts in favor of a democratic 
transition in Cuba and maintains frank communication with the 
Embassy on Cuba-related policies and issues. 
Nicaraguan-Cuban trade and mutual investment are 
statistically insignificant.  A failure to waive Title III of 
the Libertad Act for Nicaragua could undermine continued GON 
support for U.S. Cuba policy and play into the hands of the 
opposition Sandinista party (FSLN), which argues that Cuba 
and Venezuela are more reliable, generous allies than is the 
United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Since post submitted its last cable on Nicaragua and 
Title III of the Libertad Act in December 2005 (reftel B), 
little has changed in the country's relations with the 
government of Cuba.  The GON has been responsive to U.S. 
efforts in favor of a democratic transition in Cuba. 
President Bolanos and his administration have consistently 
demonstrated a strong aversion to Castro's regime and its 
oppression of the Cuban people.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs maintains frank communication with Emboffs regarding 
Cuba-related policies and issues. 
 
3.  (C) With limited financial and political resources to 
influence the Government of Cuba, the GON has taken 
considerable action in international fora to support the 
advancement of democracy, human rights, and fundamental 
freedoms in Cuba.  The GON has consistently supported US 
positions related to Cuba, and has voted in favor of or 
abstained from most related votes in the UN.  It has also 
consistently supported U.S. positions and candidacies in 
international fora more generally.  Although the GON has 
joined international calls for an end to the U.S. economic 
embargo of Cuba, as have many other countries in the region, 
this position reflects a disagreement over tactics rather 
than support for the Castro regime. 
 
4.  (C) As in previous years, during 2005 and the first 
months of 2006, the GON has been supportive of U.S. policies 
on most issues related to Cuba.  The GON resisted 
Cuban-Venezuelan pressure to reject CAFTA in favor of their 
"Bolivarian" alternative (ALBA) (reftel C) and expressed 
understanding of U.S. policy relating to Cuban exile Luis 
Posada Carriles (reftel D).  The GON also continues to 
confront the strongly pro-Castro opposition Sandinista party 
(FSLN), which is counting on Cuban and Venezuelan financing 
and propaganda to win the 2006 national elections (reftels E 
and F).  In 2006 the media have reported that the governments 
of Cuba and Venezuela are working with the FSLN (with no GON 
involvement) in "Operation Miracle" to send groups of 
Nicaraguan citizens to Caracas and Havana for free eye 
surgeries as part of the FSLN's electoral campaign. 
 
5.  (C) Nicaraguan-Cuban bilateral trade has declined 
steadily since 1990-91.  The Nicaraguan Central Bank 
estimated that two-way trade was about $800,000 in 2003.  The 
Central Bank's 2004 and 2005 statistical information limits 
country specific data to Nicaragua's major trading partners. 
Central Bank officials described the country's trade with 
Cuba as statistically insignificant.  The Central Bank's 
annual report lacks country specific information on foreign 
investments, however, post is not aware of any substantial 
Nicaraguan investments in Cuba.  Given the lack of any 
substantive political or economic relations with Cuba, 
Foreign Ministry officials have confided to Emboffs that the 
only reason the GON maintains an embassy in Havana is to 
avoid provoking the ire of the FSLN. 
 
6.  (C) A failure to waive Title III of the Libertad Act for 
Nicaragua could undermine continued GON support for US Cuba 
policy, and for U.S. positions in international fora more 
generally.  It would also undervalue the GON's considerable 
efforts in pressuring Cuba to improve its human rights 
record, and would only strengthen the Sandinistas' arguments 
that Cuba and Venezuela are more reliable, generous allies 
for Nicaragua than is the U.S. 
TRIVELLI