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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA807, CSE CONTINUES TECHNICAL WORK AS PLC/FSLN BATTLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA807 2006-04-11 16:35 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0022
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0807/01 1011635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111635Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5934
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: CSE CONTINUES TECHNICAL WORK AS PLC/FSLN BATTLE 
OVER INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0802 
 
     B. MANAGUA 0464 
     C. MANAGUA 0430 
     D. MANAGUA 0304 
     E. MANAGUA 0281 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The inter-institutional battle over control 
of Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) continues even 
as the CSE embarks on a new electoral cycle.  In the midst of 
conflicting court rulings and a PLC-driven National Assembly 
threat to invalidate CSE president Roberto Rivas' appointment 
of substitute magistrates, senior CSE civil servant Rodrigo 
Barreto claims that "encouraging" the CSE magistrates to sign 
an agreement not to break quorum during the electoral cycle 
is the only way to avoid chaos before and after the November 
national elections.  In addition, CSE technical advisors from 
IFES report that the CSE has in its possession as many as 
200,000 undistributed national/voter ID cards (cedulas).  End 
Summary. 
 
INTER-INSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE OVER CSE CONTINUES UNABATED 
 
2. (U) Angry over some February CSE decisions that favored 
political rival Eduardo Montealegre, the PLC has ordered its 
magistrates to refuse to form a quorum in the Council in an 
attempt to force the body to compromise (Ref D).  To form a 
quorum before the March 5 regional elections, CSE president 
Roberto Rivas, backed by a legally dubious decision from a 
Sandinista-controlled court, summoned FSLN substitute 
magistrates to convene the Council.  In response, the PLC 
legislators -- backed at times by the minority party caucuses 
-- have threatened to vote on an "authentic interpretation" 
of Article 6 of the Electoral Law, which states quite clearly 
that only the primary magistrates may name substitutes to sit 
on the Council.  The following is a summary of events since 
February: 
 
- March 22: The PLC-controlled First Civil Chamber of the 
Appellate Tribunal of Managua (TAM) accepted a legal petition 
from the PLC and instructed the National Assembly to issue an 
"authentic interpretation" of Article 6 of the Electoral Law. 
 This decision contradicted an earlier ruling from the TAM,s 
(FSLN-controlled) Second Civil Chamber, which earlier 
accepted a legal petition from the FSLN against the issuance 
of an "authentic interpretation" of Article 6 by the National 
Assembly.  In reaction to the First Civil Chamber's decision, 
Sandinista deputies in the National Assembly reiterated their 
opposition to the "authentic interpretation" and insisted 
that such an act would require a qualified majority 
(two-thirds) vote in the Assembly.  (Note: Any qualified 
majority vote requires the approval of Sandinista deputies.) 
 
- April 3: Sandinista magistrates on the CSE enacted a reform 
to the CSE,s internal regulations that would allow the CSE 
president to name substitute magistrates in the event that 
primary magistrates fail to attend three sessions in a row. 
This reform would allow the Sandinistas to overcome the 
Liberal boycott of the CSE, which has prevented the Council 
from forming a quorum. 
 
- April 4:  National Assembly president Eduardo Gomez 
withdrew the "authentic interpretation" of Article 6 of the 
Electoral Law from the Assembly agenda on April 4 after 
Sandinista deputies transmitted a ruling from the 
(Sandinista-controlled) Esteli Appellate Court ordering the 
Assembly to halt discussion of the measure.  Liberals 
complained that Gomez closed the April 3 session after 
promising that discussion of the "authentic interpretation" 
would be on the April 4 agenda.  CSE president Roberto Rivas 
stated that he would not recognize any interpretation 
approved by a simple majority (47 votes) that modifies the 
Law in any way. 
 
After previously agreeing to support the interpretation, 
ALN-PC deputy Augusto Valle announced that the eight ALN-PC 
deputies would not vote in favor of the "poorly presented" 
interpretation, and instead encouraged the Liberal CSE 
magistrates to attend the CSE sessions and commit to forming 
a quorum during the elections cycle.  Valle noted that the 
PLC magistrates might use the same tactic to avoid 
proclaiming ALN-PC candidate Eduardo Montealegre president, 
should he win the November elections.  ALN-PC deputy Maria 
Eugenia Sequiera added that the absence of the PLC 
magistrates is allowing the Sandinistas to control the 
electoral body. 
 
 
CSE OFFICIAL: PLEASE FORCE MAGISTRATES TO MAKE QUORUM, OR WE 
FACE CHAOS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - 
 
3. (SBU) Poloff met with senior CSE civil servant Rodrigo 
Barreto on March 30 to discuss his concerns regarding the 
National Assembly's "authentic interpretation" of Article 6 
of the electoral law.  Barreto came "on behalf of all the 
conscientious CSE workers" who don't want to see Nicaragua 
paralyzed by inter-institutional chaos before the elections. 
He claimed that they are all concerned that the PLC will use 
the "authentic interpretation" of Article 6 of the Electoral 
Law to invalidate the Atlantic Coast elections.  The PLC 
would then use the resulting crisis to force the other 
parties into an amnesty deal for Aleman. 
 
4. (SBU) Barreto pointed out that, while the Electoral Law 
does not permit the CSE president to select substitute 
magistrates, it also (in Article 15) requires the magistrates 
to attend sessions and requires them to name substitutes if 
they cannot be present.  Hence, this current situation 
represents another case of the political parties interpreting 
the law as they see fit.  Barreto predicted that the 
Sandinistas would use the same trick of breaking quorum to 
paralyze the CSE if the November elections must enter a 
second round (that they know they cannot win). 
 
5. (SBU) Barreto recounted that in 2001, the OAS and 
diplomatic corps forced the CSE magistrates to sign an 
agreement not to break quorum and keep the Council in 
permanent session during the elections season.  In early 
2004, the file containing the original agreement mysteriously 
disappeared from the CSE database, but Rodrigo promised to 
provide a copy from other sources.  He believes forcing the 
magistrates to sign a similar accord is the only way to 
guarantee stability during the election season, and sought 
USG and international community support for this goal. 
 
IFES: UP TO 200,000 CEDULAS NOT DISTRIBUTED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (SBU) During an April 6 meeting with IFES, local director 
Rafael Lopez Pintor informed Emboffs that IFES has almost 
completed its review of national/voter ID cards (cedulas). 
Lopez Pintor reported that the CSE has in its possession 
185,000-200,000 unclaimed cedulas in various locations 
throughout the country, including over 38,000 in Managua.  He 
said that IFES will publish the names of the cedula owners 
and location of the cedulas and advertise this information 
throughout the country.  Lopez Pintor also noted that the CSE 
"scrubbed" the official voter list (padron) of the names of 
15,000 deceased Nicaraguans. 
 
7. (SBU) Poloff queried IFES about PLC allegations that FSLN 
mayors are assisting Sandinistas to obtain cedulas in an 
expedited manner (within 15 days).  Lopez Pintor responded 
that he does not possess any specific knowledge regarding the 
validity of the PLC claims, but suggested that it is 
certainly possible to process a cedula in 15 days -- though 
most Nicaraguans certainly don't receive such expedited 
service. 
 
COMMENT: PLC/FSLN ANTICS HIGHLIGHT DISRESPECT FOR THE LAW 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (C) The struggle over the CSE has highlighted the 
unfortunate reality that the law in Nicaragua is only 
respected when it serves one's political or personal 
interests.  As Barreto explained, both the PLC and FSLN blocs 
in the CSE have broken the law to try to gain control of the 
Council and then defended their actions by calling in dubious 
legal judgments from partisan courts.  Post believes that 
Barreto's suggestion to press the CSE magistrates to sign an 
agreement not to break quorum is a worthy initiative and will 
discuss the issue with the OAS elections team later this 
month. 
TRIVELLI