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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA745, ALLQ,S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, ASSERTS AGUIRRE SACASA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA745 2006-04-04 22:48 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0745/01 0942248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 042248Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5825
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0611
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: ALLQ,S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, ASSERTS AGUIRRE SACASA 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0738 
     B. MANAGUA 0709 
     C. MANAGUA 0720 
     D. 2005 MANAGUA 3025 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, until recently a 
presidential-hopeful for the Liberal Constitutional Party 
(PLC), is disappointed with PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman's 
decision to influence the outcome of the PLC's selection of 
its presidential candidate.  He believes that Aleman's hold 
on conventioneers enabled Jose Rizo to garner three times the 
votes he merited, enabling Rizo to avoid a runoff vote. 
Aguirre Sacasa asserted that, in an unencumbered primary, he 
would have been the candidate facing Rizo or Enrique Quinonez 
in a runoff.  To Aguirre Sacasa, the overriding objective now 
is to beat Ortega and the Sandinistas, who are 'loaded for 
bear and will do whatever it takes to win.'  He appears 
willing to encourage the PLC to accept primaries that include 
departmental deputies as the price for uniting the 
anti-Sandinista forces.  His assessment that Aleman will 
likely reject the primary proposal is probably on mark.  The 
question is how Rizo will respond to the offer.  End Summary. 
 
The Finger 
- - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, former Nicaraguan 
Ambassador to the United States, and until recently a 
presidential-hopeful for the PLC, related to polcouns on 
April 3 his disappointment with PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman's 
decision to influence the outcome of the PLC's March 31 
departmental and April 2 national conventions to select its 
presidential candidate (Ref A).  Aguirre Sacasa opined that 
convention winner Jose Rizo garnered three times the votes he 
merited because of Aleman's "instructions" ("dedazo," or 
finger) to party conventioneers to vote for Rizo.  If the 
convention had been unencumbered, Aguirre Sacasa believes no 
candidate would have won on the first round (requiring 51% of 
the votes), and that he and Rizo, or possibly Enrique 
Quinonez, would have competed in the runoff. 
 
3.  (C) Aleman's last-minute addition of 200 conventioneers 
to his liking clearly stacked the decks in his candidate 
Rizo's favor, argued Aguirre Sacasa, lamenting that he had no 
time to lobby these newly branded conventioneers.  He related 
that Aleman opposed Quinonez' candidacy and decided that Rizo 
was a safer, more palatable candidate.  Polcouns offered that 
perhaps Daniel Ortega was the "hand" behind Aleman's finger 
and had instructed Aleman that Rizo, not Quinonez, is an 
acceptable candidate. 
 
4.  (C) Nonetheless, Aguirre Sacasa has resigned himself to 
the situation, opining that Rizo would make a "decent" 
president and sharing that Aleman has offered him the vice 
presidency.  He claimed that rival presidential candidates 
Eduardo Montealegre (ALN-PC) and Daniel Ortega (FSLN) have 
approached him with the same offer.  Of course, he would 
never consider an alliance with Ortega, but he esteems 
Montealegre. 
 
5.  (C) To Aguirre Sacasa, the overriding objective at this 
point is to beat Ortega.  "Like the famous Shakespearean 
play, 'all's well that ends well.' If the Liberals unite we 
will win; if we are divided, Ortega will win," he warned, 
predicting that Ortega would receive 42% of the votes, Rizo 
32%, and others (Montealegre and Lewites) 26%.  Aguirre 
Sacasa disparaged the accuracy of the polls, which currently 
show Montealegre and Lewites in the lead, although he 
admitted that Rizo enjoys little popular support and 
acknowledged that Montealegre enjoys much more support than 
Rizo, at least for now. 
 
LOADED FOR BEAR 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) According to Aguirre Sacasa, this time around Daniel 
Ortega and the Sandinistas are determined to win the 
election.  "They are loaded for bear and will do whatever it 
takes to win.  A divided Liberalism plays into their hands," 
warned Aguirre Sacasa.  He ventured that Herty will draw more 
votes from the Liberals than Ortega and could eventually 
withdraw from the race.  Polcouns replied that the polls 
suggest Lewites could attract some 15% of FSLN votes, a 
sizeable sum, and perhaps more because many poll respondents 
hesitate to indicate their choice out of fear of a FSLN 
reprisal. 
 
LAST CALL FOR PRIMARIES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) Aguirre Sacasa mentioned that everyone is eager to 
hear the U.S. Ambassador's proposal for primaries.  He 
believes that the PLC will be willing to enter into 
inter-party primaries, if it only encompasses presidential 
candidates.  Indeed, in January the PLC had offered 
inter-party primaries, but Montealegre rejected them and the 
Embassy did not support them.  Polcouns remarked that Jose 
Antonio Alvarado had submitted a counter offer, close to what 
the IRI proposed months ago, but that to our knowledge, the 
PLC had never responded to Alvarado's offer.  Further, 
polcouns explained that the USG will never support a primary 
under Aleman's hegemony; his rigging of the PLC primaries is 
evidence that he cannot be trusted.  Aguirre Sacasa, who took 
credit for proposing the inter-party primaries, explained 
that once he started campaigning, he left the task to others, 
adding that he was unaware that the PLC had never replied to 
Alvarado's initiative. 
 
8.  (C) Polcouns remarked that the Embassy initiative 
includes departmental deputies and entails creating an 
inter-party working group independent from Aleman to 
coordinate the primaries.  Aguirre Sacasa remarked that he 
personally favors the inclusion of departmental deputies, but 
he doubts the PLC will accept primaries for departmental 
deputies because Aleman wishes to control their selection. 
Polcouns replied that if Rizo is determined to distance 
himself from Aleman, as Rizo has asserted to us, supporting 
primaries for departmental deputies might be a worthy litmus 
test of his commitment and independence. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
9.  (C) Aguirre Sacasa still feels the burn from Aleman's 
machinations.  He appears willing to encourage the PLC to 
accept broader primaries, but he may not get far.  His 
assessment that Aleman will likely reject them to maintain 
control of the deputy selection process is probably on mark. 
The question is how  Rizo will do respond to the offer.  Rizo 
may find an excuse to refuse the inter-party primaries. 
Alluding to Eduardo Montealegre, Rizo informed Ambassador on 
April 4 that he would accept the offer only if the other 
presidential aspirants are selected via their own internal 
primaries. 
TRIVELLI