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Viewing cable 06LIMA1277, ELECTION UPDATE: FINAL POLL HAS HUMALA A SHOO-IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA1277 2006-04-03 21:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1277/01 0932156
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 032156Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9545
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3195
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9255
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR QUITO 0190
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0363
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6628
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4182
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS LIMA 001277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: ELECTION UPDATE:  FINAL POLL HAS HUMALA A SHOO-IN 
FOR THE SECOND-ROUND, WHILE GARCIA LOOKS INCREASINGLY 
CAPABLE OF EDGING FLORES AT THE FINISH LINE 
 
REF: A. LIMA 1199 
 
     B. LIMA 1197 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY 
---------- 
 
1.  (U)  Ultra-nationalist "outsider" Union por el Peru (UPP) 
candidate Ollanta Humala maintained his substantial lead over 
Unidad Nacional's Lourdes Flores in the latest Apoyo poll, 
released 4/2, although his support fell for the first time in 
nearly two months, from 33 to 31 percent.  Flores continued 
her weekly decline of one point to 26 percent, while APRA's 
Alan Garcia gained a point for the second week running to 23 
percent.  Given that this poll does not/not reflect the views 
of approximately 20 percent of the electorate living in 
isolated rural areas, who are more likely to vote for Humala 
or Garcia than for Flores, Humala's actual support is 
probably higher, while Garcia's stretch run looks 
increasingly capable of edging Flores at the finish line.  In 
the congressional race, APRA remained in front, Unidad 
Nacional fell into a tie with UPP, Fujimorista Martha 
Chavez's Alliance for the Future party surged into a close 
fourth, while former Interim-President Valentin Paniagua's 
Centrist Front and President Toledo's Peru Posible party are 
the other parties that should surpass the four percent 
nationwise threshold to place candidates in Congress.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------- 
THE LATEST POLL RESULTS 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  The Apoyo poll, published on 4/2, interviewed 2000 
registered voters in 77 provinces around the country, 
representing 81 percent of the Peruvian population, on 
3/29-31.  This is the last such poll that will be published 
prior to the election, as Peruvian law prohibits the public 
release of polls during the week prior to voting day.  When 
asked which candidate they would vote for if the election 
were held that day, the response was: 
 
Ollanta Humala          31 percent (down two percent since 
last week -  see Ref B) 
Lourdes Flores          26 percent (down one percent) 
Alan Garcia             23 percent (up one percent) 
Martha Chavez            7 percent (no change) 
Valentin Paniagua        6 percent (no change) 
Others                   7 percent (down one percent) 
 
The results are based on the "valid vote" count, which 
excludes votes cast in blank or respondents who did not name 
a candidate.  In the Apoyo poll, 84 percent of respondents 
provided "valid votes," which are the ballots that the 
election authorities will use to determine the final results. 
 This is up from 82 percent last week. 
 
3.  (U)  The Apoyo poll indicates that none of the candidates 
are likely to win a majority of the vote.  If this holds true 
on election day, there will be a second-round run-off between 
the two candidates receiving the most votes in the first 
round.  According to the poll results, in a run-off Flores 
would beat Humala 55-45 percent (a two-percent gain for 
Flores over the previous week), while Humala would narrowly 
defeat Garcia 51-49 percent (half the margin of the previous 
week). 
 
4.  (U)  APRA continued to lead in the congressional race, 
with 19 percent support (down two percent from last week). 
Unidad Nacional dropped one point to 16 percent, thereby 
falling into a tie with UPP.  The Fujimorista Alliance for 
the Future party rose four points to 15 percent, the Centrist 
Front advanced two points to nine percent, while Peru Posible 
held steady at six percent.  The Christian evangelical 
National Restoration party, the centrist Alliance for 
Progress party and the centrist Independent Moralizing Front 
(FIM) party are at 2-3 percent, within striking distance of 
the four percent threshold for electing a candidate to 
Congress.  The following table lists the support enjoyed by 
 
 
each alliance/party.  Our calculations as to the approximate 
proportional number of legislative slots that each 
party/alliance would take are the first number in the 
parenthesis, while Apoyo's estimate of how many seats each 
party/alliance would take, based on its analysis of 
projections in each electoral district is the second number: 
 
APRA                     19 percent (28-36 seats) 
Unidad Nacional          16 percent (24-25 seats) 
Union por el Peru        16 percent (24-31 seats) 
Alliance for the Future  15 percent (22-15 seats) 
Centrist Front            9 percent (13-08 seats) 
Peru Posible              6 percent (09-05 seats) 
 
(NOTE:  The congressional races will be decided on a 
proportional basis in each of Peru's 25 electoral districts 
(the 24 departments and Callao, with metropolitan Lima 
grouped-in with Lima Department), rather than nationwide. 
Thus it is possible that the final distribution of seats will 
differ substantially from our rough calculations on a 
nationwide basis and the Apoyo projections may be a more 
accurate prediction.  In addition, while the law provides for 
a four percent minimum threshold for a party to place a 
legislator in Congress, there is an exception for those 
parties who manage to elect at least five representatives in 
two or more electoral districts.  Consequently, it remains 
possible that a party with less than four percent of the 
national vote could obtain representation in Congress.  END 
NOTE). 
 
---------- 
COMMENT 
---------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Humala looks like a shoo-in for the second-round 
run-off as he maintained a strong lead over Flores, although 
his support fell by two percent over the past week, with his 
margin over the Unidad Nacional candidate reduced from six to 
five percent.  The drop in Humala's support was based chiefly 
on a five point decline in rural areas (he fell one point in 
Lima and gained a point in the urban interior), however, 
which does not/not have a clear explanation.  It could be 
that negative press coverage of Humala's followers, family 
and campaign (Ref A) could be influencing this electorate, 
but one would think that these developments would have a 
greater effect on urban audiences.  Another possibility is 
that the rural polling performed by Apoyo on these dates 
happened to concentrate on areas less partial to Humala, 
leading to a misleading result (Apoyo claims a margin of 
error of 2.2 percent). 
 
6.  (SBU)  The race for the second spot in the presidential 
run-off between Flores and Garcia is too close to call, 
although Garcia looks increasingly capable of coming from 
behind to pass Flores at the finish line as he did in 2001. 
Nothing the Unidad Nacional candidate tries has yet proven 
effective in halting her steady one-percent weekly fall in 
the polls (a two percent decline in both Lima and other urban 
areas, offset partially by a one percent rise in rural areas 
over the past week).  Garcia, on the other hand, seems to be 
picking up the pace for his stretch sprint, gaining one point 
for the second week running (a one percent rise in Lima and 
urban areas along with a two-percent rise in rural regions). 
With Flores' current margin a bare three points, a 
continuation of current trends would favor Garcia's chances, 
particularly once one factors in the rural vote not covered 
by the Apoyo poll (at least 19 percent of registed voters) 
and the "hidden vote" not reflected in the polls that Garcia 
has demonstrated in the past.  In 2001, Apoyo's final poll 
also had Flores three points ahead of Garcia, only for the 
APRA leader to finish 1.5 points in front once the votes were 
counted.  END COMMENT. 
STRUBLE