Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06LAPAZ937, IMF AGREEMENT ENDS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LAPAZ937.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LAPAZ937 2006-04-03 20:35 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0937/01 0932035
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 032035Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8738
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5753
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3031
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6903
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4140
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1453
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1397
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3707
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4093
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8629
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS LA PAZ 000937 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/AND 
TREASURY FOR SGOOCH 
ENERGY FOR CDAY AND SLADISLAW 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID PGOV BL
SUBJECT: IMF AGREEMENT ENDS 
 
 
1. Summary:  Bolivia's Standby Agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expired on March 31, and 
the GOB has indicated that it does not want to sign a new 
agreement with the Fund.  The lack of a Fund agreement could 
jeopardize donations from multilateral and bilateral 
institutions and undermine fiscal restraint by the GOB, 
causing the Bolivian Central Bank President concern.  A Fund 
team will conduct its annual Article 4 review of Bolivia in 
May, during which its future relationship with Bolivia will 
be better defined.  Although Bolivia is currently in decent 
macroeconomic shape, Bolivian Finance Ministry contacts are 
worried that increased government spending will result in 
large gaps in the 2006 budget.  End summary. 
 
Bolivia's IMF Agreement Expires 
------------------------------- 
2. Bolivia's Standby Agreement with the IMF, which began in 
April 2003 and was renewed twice, expired on March 31, 2006, 
without a final review by an IMF team which would have 
enabled Bolivia to draw on the last portion of its IMF loan. 
Bolivia has had some type of relationship with the Fund 
almost continuously since 1986.  According to press reports, 
the GOB plans to wash its hands of the Fund.  Development 
Planning Minister Carlos Villegas was quoted in the press on 
April 2 stating, "Today for the first time in our history, 
Bolivia spoke as an equal with the Fund, and told it we are 
not going to sign letters of intention." 
 
3. IMF resident representative, Esteban Vesperoni, told us on 
April 3 that the IMF had not received official notification 
to this effect from the GOB but acknowledged that Finance 
Minister Luis Arce had told him informally that Bolivia did 
not need the Fund right now.  Vesperoni told us he agreed 
with Arce, as Bolivia did not currently have a balance of 
payments problem.  He cautioned, however, that the absence of 
a Fund agreement could restrict other donors' ability to lend 
to Bolivia and would make both donors and the Bolivian 
Central Bank "uncomfortable."  The President of the Central 
Bank stated to the press on April 2 that forgoing a Fund 
agreement was risky, as it could result in a lack of fiscal 
discipline and less budgetary support and multilateral 
financing. 
 
Future Relationship with the Fund 
--------------------------------- 
4. The GOB agreed to a visit by a six or seven person Fund 
team in early May to conduct an "Article 4" review, which 
Vesperoni explained was an annual review, not related to a 
particular agreement, that was required for all Fund members. 
 He said that the future of the Bolivian-IMF relationship 
would be discussed at that time.  He speculated that the GOB 
was attempting to distance itself from the Fund in order to 
avoid giving a signal to the Bolivian public that the IMF is 
interfering in the drafting of its National Development Plan, 
due to be released in late April.  He thought that after the 
Plan was completed, the GOB might be more open to discussions 
with the Fund.  He explained that the Fund could offer 
several options that did not involve the IMF Board, which has 
the ability to sign formal, binding agreements with 
conditions.  These could include an "intensified 
surveillance" program, under which monitoring teams would 
analyze Bolivia every three to six months, or a somewhat more 
formal "staff monitoring program."  Such programs would allow 
the IMF to remain abreast of developments in Bolivia and 
would send positive signals to the international donor 
community, without involving formal agreements or credits. 
Vesperoni said that a monitoring program would be sufficient 
for Bolivia for the next six months, but was less confident 
about Bolivia's long-term needs. 
 
Monetary and Fiscal Impacts 
--------------------------- 
5. Vesperoni did not see any "dark clouds" on the medium-term 
horizon with respect to monetary policy (unless a potential 
staff shake-up at the Central Bank changed the current 
direction), but said that fiscal policy was a bit more 
complicated.  According to contacts, the Bolivian Treasury 
currently has a USD 500 million funding gap for 2006.  Other 
Finance Ministry contacts have also expressed their concern 
to us that new government policies, particularly in the areas 
of health, education, and minimum wage, would result in large 
gaps in the 2006 budget. 
 
6. Comment:  The GOB's public comments regarding the end of 
the IMF agreement are part of a larger government strategy to 
highlight Bolivian sovereignty and rid the GOB of foreign 
influence (except from Cuba and Venezuela).  The government 
intends to eliminate consultants in the GOB and have all GOB 
staff paid out of resources from the national treasury, 
instead of by NGOs, multilateral donors, or foreign 
governments, even if it means increasing the fiscal deficit. 
According to press reports, Minister Villegas said that the 
National Development Plan would "ensure" economic stability, 
but that the focus of the plan would not be stabilization. 
He added that the GOB would adopt a monetary policy that 
would reduce interest rates and that public investment would 
be a high priority.  Given these comments, Bolivia's 
macroeconomic future could be in jeopardy.  End comment. 
GREENLEE