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Viewing cable 06KINSHASA623, SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN SHABUNDA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA623 2006-04-19 15:53 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXYZ0022
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #0623/01 1091553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191553Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3721
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000623 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA- MMARX, CGOTTCHALK, MSHIRLEY 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP- TANDERSON, NCOX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI- RJENKINS, KHUBER 
AID/W FOR AFR- KO'DONNELL, JBORNS 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO- JMYER, ADWYER 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP- DSUTHER, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG- RNEWBERG 
GENEVA FOR NYKLOH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PREF PGOV KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN SHABUNDA 
AND MWENGA, SOUTH KIVU 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) In general, security and humanitarian access have 
significantly improved in Shabunda and Mwenga territories 
over the past few years. Long-term security issues in 
these territories are caused by the activities of 
dissident Mai Mai groups rather than the actions of the 
FDLR.  Particularly since the capture in February of 
dissident Mai Mai commander Major Alexander, residents 
have begun to move relatively freely and to engage in 
various livelihood activities. However, security has 
deteriorated recently in the northern part of both 
territories due to arrivals of FDLR fleeing FARDC/MONUC 
attacks on FDLR positions in Kalehe Territory. These 
retreating elements have attacked local populations and 
caused new displacements estimated at 30,000 people. Some 
Mwenga and Shabunda residents wonder what purpose MONUC 
and FARDC think they are serving in attacking FDLR, since 
such operations often result only in the movement of FDLR 
from one place to another and thus spread insecurity 
rather than diminish it.  END SUMMARY 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. (U) This is the first of two communications reporting 
observations made by USAID/OFDA Rep Victor Bushamuka 
during a visit to Shabunda and Mwenga Territories March 22 
to 29. The objective of the visit was to assess the 
security and humanitarian situation in the area. During 
the visit, OFDA Rep met with civilian and military 
authorities, humanitarian actors in the territories, IDPs, 
residents, and FDLR combatants. 
 
3. (U) Mwenga and Shabunda are territories in South Kivu 
province, located 94km southwest and 200km west of Bukavu 
respectively. These territories have suffered extensive 
Mai Mai and FDLR activities since the start of the war in 
1998. During most of the 1998-2003 DRC-Rwanda war, the two 
main towns of Shabunda and Mwenga were occupied by the 
forces of the Rensemblement Congolais pour la Democratie 
(RCD), a then Rwanda-backed ex-rebel movement, while the 
rest of the territories were controlled by Mai Mai and 
FDLR troops. 
 
4. (U) With the formation of the transitional government 
in 2003, the RCD and Mai Mai forces in the areas were 
theoretically merged into two FARDC brigades, the 120th in 
Shabunda and the 107th in Mwenga. The merger has not yet 
been fully realized as each group has in fact kept control 
of the territory it occupied during the war and there has 
been minimal mixing of the troops. 
 
5. (U) Though FDLR populations reside in Shabunda and 
Mwenga Territories, insecurity over the past two years has 
been caused mostly by dissident Mai Mai.  In 2005, Mai Mai 
commanders in Shabunda and Mwenga refused an order by 
military authorities to go to "brassage" (mixing) 
integration camps, saying they did not want to leave their 
areas of control open to a take over by ex-RCD troops. 
Furthermore, Mai Mai commander Major Alexander of Shabunda 
said that he would consider integration only if he were 
given the rank of general in the FARDC, something which he 
has not been offered. Since then, Major Alexander's group 
has been one of the main sources of insecurity in 
Shabunda, creating several displacements of the population 
during multiple skirmishes with FARDC troops. The most 
recent confrontation was in January-February 2006 in the 
localities of Bakisi, Katchunga, Lumba, and Lugungu. The 
fighting was believed to have displaced about 3,000 
families into the forest, but some of these eventually 
made their way south toward Shabunda center. 
 
-------- 
Shabunda 
-------- 
 
6. (U) The dissident Mai Mai commander Major Alexander was 
captured by FARDC in February 2006 in north Shabunda. 
However, some residents of Shabunda are still skeptical of 
how effective the arrest will be in improving security 
since Alexander's followers are still at large in the 
forest. The dissident Mai Mai are believed to be 
concentrated around Kiseku southeast of Shabunda town. 
Nonetheless, since the capture of Alexander, there have 
been no more attacks by this group on FARDC positions or 
the civilian population. 
 
7. (U) Shabunda residents feel differently regarding the 
ex-RCD-dominated FARDC brigade present in the territory, 
depending on whether they are from the north of the 
territory or the south. For people living north of the 
river Ulindi, the former Mai Mai stronghold area, Shabunda 
will be considered insecure as long as ex-RCD troops 
remain in control of it. These villagers are often accused 
by FARDC of collaborating with dissident Mai Mai in the 
forest, and are anxious to see the ex-RCD troops replaced 
by an integrated brigade or a non-ex-RCD brigade. 
 
8. (U) On the other hand, people living south of the river 
are satisfied with the performance of the 120th brigade of 
FARDC, particularly for capturing Alexander and stopping 
the frequent Mai Mai attacks on civilians. Despite the 
difference in opinion between the two populations, there 
is a consensus among both groups that security in the 
territory is generally better now than it has been since 
1998. Many indicated that they are able to grow crops 
without fear of looting by armed groups. 
 
9. (U) One area where security has deteriorated is the 
northeast corner of the territory where Shabunda borders 
Kalehe Territory. Some FDLR combatants fleeing the ongoing 
joint FARDC-MONUC offensive in Kalonge, Bunyakiri, and 
around Kahuzi Biega National Park have moved west into 
Shabunda Territory. These retreating FDLR have established 
checkpoints in Byangama and Kigulube where each person 
passing through is requested to pay $2 or the equivalent 
in goods. Cow traders are also required to pay $5 for each 
cow. Surprisingly, people going through the checkpoint 
seem not to mind paying for their passage. According to 
our interlocutors, no harm comes to people as long as 
these fees are paid. However, a large presence of FDLR in 
the area worries residents due to a possible FARDC-MONUC 
attack on the FDLR. As a result, some of the villages near 
where FDLR have resettled are now deserted.  It is not yet 
clear where the estimated 12,000 inhabitants of these 
villages have gone. 
 
10. (U) FARDC authorities in Shabunda are aware of these 
checkpoints, but admitted to OFDA Rep that they were 
unable to intervene due to a lack of troops. The 120th 
brigade in Shabunda, which used to have over 2,500 troops, 
now has fewer than 800 members. A large part of the 
brigade has gone to the brassage process. The remaining 
force is not enough to assure protection of a vast 
territory such as Shabunda. 
 
------ 
Mwenga 
------ 
 
11. (U) Mwenga has been calm over most of the past year 
despite a heavy presence of FDLR, who established bases in 
the territory at the beginning of the 1998-2003 war. Among 
the well-known FDLR bases in Mwenga are Isopo, Kigalama, 
Kakanga, Ngandu, Kirungutwe, Kalame, Kalambi, and Kasika. 
Mwenga FDLR elements have been coexisting peacefully with 
local populations for several years now and even cultivate 
their own fields and are producing food both for 
consumption and sale in local markets. 
 
12. (U) The current confrontations between FARDC/MONUC and 
FDLR and Mai Mai dissidents in Bunyakiri and Kalonge in 
the territory of Kalehe have, however, negatively affected 
the security situation in northern Mwenga. Some retreating 
FDLR and Mai Mai from Kalehe have found their way to 
Mwenga, increasing the already high number of FDLR in the 
 
territory. These recent arrivals are believed to be 
concentrated in Kitamba, Kigongo, and Ngando in northern 
Mwenga. In fear of a potential FARDC/MONUC attack on their 
bases, the FDLR of Mwenga also deserted their bases, 
retreating several kilometers deeper into the forest and 
abandoning their crops and other livelihood activities. 
These abandoned FDLR fields were looted in January- 
February by FARDC soldiers passing through on foot on 
their way to the integration ("brassage") camp in 
Luberizi. 
 
13. (U) As a consequence of FDLR in Mwenga losing their 
crops and other livelihood activities, the relationship 
with the local population has deteriorated, with multiple 
FDLR attacks on villagers registered in the past two 
months. The attacks often include looting, kidnapping, and 
raping of women, and have instigated massive population 
movements. OFDA Rep visited several localities including 
Kalumba, Kisube, and Bikute, comprised normally of 19,000 
inhabitants, that are now empty. 
 
14. (U) Forest areas, which used to be the safe haven for 
most Mwenga residents fleeing armed confrontations, are 
now an FDLR stronghold. In addition, many residents 
believe that the dissident Mai Mai group of "Colonel 106" 
has also moved to Mwenga from Kahuzi-Biega National Park. 
As a result, the forests of Mwenga are now viewed as one 
of the most dangerous areas in the territory and 
population displacements are now mainly towards the main 
towns including Kamituga and Mwenga center. Although the 
exact number of IDPs in these towns has not yet been 
determined, the administrator of the territory estimates 
the population of Kamituga to have doubled from the 16,000 
inhabitants estimated to be living there in 2003. 
 
---------------- 
Future Prospects 
---------------- 
 
15. (U) Residents of villages located near where the FDLR 
have taken refuge have begun to pay for their security. 
Each household is requested to contribute about a kilo of 
cassava flour and half kilo of beans per week to the FDLR 
through their village chiefs. Many households that are 
unable to contribute have left the area in fear of 
retribution. Similarly, many villages within 10 km of the 
town of Kamituga have requested protection from FARDC and 
have agreed to contribute food and money to the patrolling 
soldiers and their commanders in town. 
 
------------------- 
Civilian Discontent 
------------------- 
 
16. (U) Civilians that OFDA Rep spoke with in Mwenga and 
Shabunda questioned the value of the current joint 
FARDC/MONUC operations against FDLR in Kalehe Territory. 
They observe that when under attack, FDLR elements move to 
new areas, principally Mwenga and Shabunda, and that 
insecurity thus spreads and increases rather than 
decreases. 
DOUGHERTY