Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KINSHASA562, NEW IDPS IN ITURI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KINSHASA562.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA562 2006-04-10 17:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO8249
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR
DE RUEHKI #0562/01 1001747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101747Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3621
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHRO/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KINSHASA 000562 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA- MMARX, CGOTTSCHALK, MSHIRLEY 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP- TANDERSON, NCOX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI- RJENKINS, KHUBER 
AID/W FOR AFR- KO'DONNELL, JBORNS 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO- JMYER,ADWYER 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP- DSUTHER, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG- RNEWBERG 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: NEW IDPS IN ITURI 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 343 
     B. KINSHASA 359 
     C. KINSHASA 378 
     D. KINSHASA 478 
 
1. (U) Summary. A group of approximately 13,000 new IDPs 
fleeing fighting between FARDC forces and a local militia 
in southern Ituri have arrived in Cantonnier, 18 
kilometers southeast of Bunia.  Emergency humanitarian 
needs have largely been addressed, though more IDPs 
continue to arrive every day. Prospects for a quick return 
are not good, since the FARDC, weakened by a mutiny among 
some troops, was forced into a retreat during the last 
major offensive, and allowing militia elements appear now 
to be highly dispersed regroup and rearm.. Militia 
activity has increased significantly in March, and many 
observers are now concerned that security may actually 
worsen in the coming weeks as militias recruit new 
elements from among the ranks of dissatisfied former 
combatants. Some observers believe worry that the Ituri 
conflict may now even have entered a new guerilla phase. 
One positive development, however, is that ethnicity 
appears to have play a smaller  role in the Ituri 
conflict. End summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Humanitarian situationSituation 
---------------------- 
 
2. (U) On March 20, USAID/OFDA Rep Jay Nash talked to a 
new group of IDPs in the town of Cantonnier (also known as 
Katoni or Kotoni), 18 kilometers southeast of Bunia on the 
road leading to Kasenyi on Lake Albert. These IDPs had 
fled the fighting between the government FARDC troops and 
the anti-government militia led by Cobra Matata from March 
6 to 11. The IDPs arrived y were from a variety of 
villages in southern Ituri, including principally those in 
the areas of near the towns of Tcheyi, Gethy, Aveba, and 
Songolo. 
 
3. (U) The IDPs in Cantonnier numbered approximately 
13,000 according to German Agro-Action (GAA), and m.  Most 
are staying living with host families.  The normal 
rResidents of Cantonnier are of Lendu ethnicity, but the 
IDPs, who are all of Ngiti ethnicity, were reported to 
have been having been well received by the local 
population.  An estimated 4,000 are staying in a makeshift 
IDP camp located next to the primary school of Cantonnier, 
and some are spending the nights in the school itself, 
vacating the premises every morning so that school can 
continue. Some IDPs reported that more IDP families are 
arriving from the troubled areas every day. 
 
4. (U) At the outset of the crisis, many of these IDPs 
originally fled past Cantonnier to the southern 
neighborhoods of Bunia or to the hills around the town of 
Zumbe to the north of Cantonnier,.  The IDPs apparently 
feared fearing that the fighting would move northward and 
eventually reach the main east-west road. Many of these 
IDP families have now, however, returned to Cantonnier 
where they are often able to earn some cash by assisting 
the residents with work in their fields.  An estimated 
5,000 IDPs remain in the Bunia neighborhoods of Yambi and 
Kindia.  At the time of OFDA Rep's visit to Zumbe, local 
authorities reported approximately 200 IDPs were still 
present. 
 
5. (U) IDPs in Cantonnier have received assistance in food 
and non-food supplies since the first groups began 
arriveding, and have made relatively few complaints. GAA 
has distributed WFP food rations, and UNICEF partner NGOs 
Cesvi (Italian) and Solidarites (French) have addressed 
most non-food and water/sanitation needs respectively, 
using UNICEF contingency stocks. (Note: USAID/OFDA 
contributes every year to these stocks, and at Cantonnier, 
USAID-branded plastic sheeting could be seen on the 
latrines and water purification facilities. End Note.) 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000562  002 OF 006 
 
 
6. (U) Using UNICEF-provided materials, Cesvi had put up a 
new temporary primary school so that IDP children could 
can continue their education.  IDPs expressed their wish 
that UNICEF now provide shelter for the secondary school 
students, and that school materials, including notebooks, 
pens, and books, be distributed. IDP leaders are concerned 
that final-year secondary school students may miss the 
critical state exams in July and thus be precluded from 
graduating this year. 
 
--------- 
Security 
--------- 
 
7. (U) IDPs with whom OFDA Rep spoke said they would not 
consider returning home until the area had been 
definitively cleared of militia elements.  Having fled the 
area, they know thatbelieve they will be considered to be 
government sympathizers if they return home and 
subsequently meet up with any militiamen. 
 
8. (U) The civilian population of this area often suffers 
from violence committed by both sides of the conflict. 
When they come to villages, the militiamen loot, rape, 
burn houses, and kidnap men for their movementto forcibly 
join their ranks.  When the area is retaken by FARDC 
forces, anyone those found in the towns or surrounding 
areas is are often considered to be a militiaman or 
militia sympathizers.  Any rRemaining men found will often 
be beaten or killed, and many of the women will be raped. 
Any remaining belongings are confiscated. 
 
9. (U) When asked about their security at Cantonnier, the 
IDPs said that conditions were less than ideal. Harassment 
by the FARDC troops who are stationed in the town is not a 
major problem most of the time, but when there is 
insecurity in the area, the troops "get stirred up" and 
tend to go on a rampage, accusing everyone of being 
militiamen and mistreating them accordingly. At such 
times, civilians flee into the hills of Zumbe until the 
crisis is over. IDPs felt that their security would 
improve dramatically if MONUC would sendt some troops to 
the area to both discourage militia attacks in the area 
and act to as a damper on the FARDC's activities. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
10. (U) In early March, MONUC and FARDC forces launched a 
joint offensive against the militia that is under the 
direction of Cobra Matata in the Tcheyi area south of 
Aveba in southern Ituri. (reftel A)This militia group is 
one of several claiming to belong to the Movement 
Revolutionnaire Congolais (MRC). The offensive, however, 
failed dramatically in just two days time, and resulted in 
the government-loyal forces losing considerable territory 
in southern Ituri to the MRC militia. (reftel B) Fearing 
the arrival of either MRC militia or government troops in 
their villages, much of the population of the area fled 
northward to the Bunia-Kasenyi road and beyond. 
 
11. (U) The One reason for the quick MONUC-FARDC defeat 
and retreat to Kagaba, north of Aveba, was a mutiny by 
some of the FARDC troops. A pPart of the FARDC force 
deployed for the offensive were some elementsconsisted of 
a "commando" unit specially trained in Angola and brought 
indeployed from Aba in Haut-Uele District to support the 
Ituri FARDC troops. On the second day of fighting, the 
some in the FARDC commando unit returned to Aveba from the 
front line at Tcheyi and attempted to kill the FARDC 
commander (General "Bob" Ngoie), who narrowly escaped a 
grenade thrown at him by jumping out a window.  The 
commando unit succeeded in raiding MONUC supplies, but was 
eventually disarmed and sent back to Bunia to face courts- 
martial. (reftel C) 
 
12. (U) All of the dDetails surrounding the mutiny are not 
 
KINSHASA 00000562  003 OF 006 
 
 
clear, but during a visit to the central prison in Bunia, 
where some thirty "leaders" of the mutiny are now being 
held, the OFDA Rep was able to hear their version of 
events. The FARDC commandos were the "lead" unit in the 
offensive against Tcheyi.  When they began the battle, 
they theysaid they were surprised to see many of the 
militia forces wearing FARDC uniforms. They claimed that 
they were relatively successful at holding their own 
against the enemy, but ran out of ammunition on the second 
day. When they asked for more supplies, the FARDC 
commandos say said they were told there wasn't  anynone 
were available and were subsequently ordered to retreat. 
At this point the commandos began to think that they had 
been set up by the FARDC commander in charge, General 
"Bob" Ngoie, to be slaughtered, or at a minimum, badly 
humiliated. The commandos' explanation of this is that 
General Bob did not like them since they were an elite 
group that had come from outside his command and outside 
the area. They also suspected that the General was making 
deals with the enemy militia, and that that was how the 
militia came to have FARDC uniforms and other supplies. 
The commandos claimed that it was for these reasons that 
when they retreated back to the command post at Aveba they 
attacked the general personally. They then raided MONUC 
supplies because they were hungry and had felt abandoned. 
They claim to be surprised at having been arrested, and 
insist that they should be tried elsewhere than in Bunia, 
where they believe they will not receive a fair trial 
because General Bob has too much influence over the 
military court. 
 
13. (U) Comment: Whatever credibility is given to the 
commandos' allegations, it seems likely that this is what 
the commando group genuinely came to believe at some point 
during the battle and thus probably is the reason for the 
mutiny.   It is probable, even, that the commandos thought 
they would be vindicated once they were able to tell their 
story and get the information about General Bob out to the 
military hierarchy.    End comment. 
 
--------------------------------- 
General consequences of the FARDC setback in Aveba-Tcheyi 
--------------------------------- 
 
14. (U) It is the view of both MONUC and the humanitarian 
sorganizations working in Ituri that believe the 
setbackfailure of the FARDC/MONUC joint operation suffered 
in Tcheyi has had serious negative consequences. Since 
then, there have since been numerous attacks by three 
different militia groups, all belonging in name to the MRC 
umbrella militia organization, on FARDC positions in a 
number of different parts of Ituri. (reftel D) 
Bogoro was attacked by the group led by Ngudjolo (of Lendu 
ethnicity), cutting for one day the road leading from 
Bunia to Kasenyi on Lake Albert.  A truck carrying soap to 
Bunia from Kasenyi for a USAID/OTI-sponsored ex-combatant 
reintegration project was attacked and burned in this 
skirmish. Another group reportedly led by Owudu (of Ngiti 
ethnicity) and Saidi (of Hema ethnicity) attacked FARDC- 
protected villages along the Semliki River and along Lake 
Albert south of Kasenyi.  In north-central Ituri, a group 
associated with Peter Karim (Lendu) has attacked FARDC 
positions near Nioka. In some cases, whole villages have 
been taken and held for a day by militia groups.  Such was 
the case twice for both Katoto and Kakwa/Cafe, which were 
attacked by an Ngudjolo-led group of mixed Lendu-Gegere 
militiamen. 
 
15. (U) As all most of Ituri (with the exception of the 
Tcheyi area) was calm prior to the failed Tcheyi military 
offensive, most many observers see regard the recent 
attacks as a direct result of the various militia bandss 
having been emboldened by the perceived weakness of the 
FARDC.   There are also, however, persistent rumors that 
militia leaders are successfully recruiting new fighters 
by offering $50 to anyone who will join.  Since fFew of 
the 17,000 combatants in Ituri demobilized by MONUC last 
spring are apparently satisfied with their post- 
 
KINSHASA 00000562  004 OF 006 
 
 
demobilization benefits packages, recruitment efforts are 
seen as having a high potential for successcreating a 
successful environment for militia recruiting efforts. 
 
16. (U) Two popular theories attribute the recent 
insecurity to sources outside Ituri district. The first 
theory suggests that the attacks are part of a full- 
fledged destabilization campaign (bankrolled by Kinshasa 
politicians) who want to disrupt elections in Ituri. In 
this hypothesis, the non-participation of Ituri would 
provide losing politicians a  motive for declaring the 
election results invalid. 
 
17. (U) Another theory notes that this has all happened as 
at the same time that the Uganda government has stepped up 
its warnedings of a possible invasion of the DRC if local 
authorities do not dislodge the LRA in Garamba National 
Park to the north of Ituri, and postulates that. This 
theory suggests   Uganda wants to split FARDC attention 
between Garamba and Ituri so as to better be able to 
continue having access to mineral resources.  (NOTE: MONUC 
authorities remain unconvinced that LRA has a permanent 
base in Garamba andregard Uganda's threats of invasion as 
pure political posturing meant to assuage domestic 
constituencies are thus skeptical of Uganda's reasons for 
issuing warnings. End Note.) 
 
18. (U) Whatever the cause(s) of the increase in militia 
activity in Ituri in mid March, it is generally thought by 
humanitarians and military alike that it will be important 
for MONUC and FARDC to mount a successful counterattack 
quickly before the insecurity spreads. MONUC officials in 
Ituri is of the view thatsaid the militias have adopted a 
strategy of dispersing into small groups scattered around 
much of throughout southern and central Ituri.  By staging 
small attacks on villages and then quickly retreating, 
these groups will be able to convey a picture of 
significant instability in the region, yet beand will be 
more difficult for MONUC and the FARDC to find and root 
outeliminate. Several MONUC authorities thus referred 
tosaid the Ituri conflict has having now entered a new 
"guerilla" phase. 
 
--------------------- 
Planned counterattack 
--------------------- 
 
19. (U) MONUC has statedofficials said that a 
counterattack is being planned, and the FARDC leadership 
is in the process of sending additional troops from North 
Kivu to replace the mutineer commando unit. (reftel D). 
According to the FARDC commander of the 1st integrated 
brigade, it has been decided that the mutinous commando 
unit will be completely disbanded and its components 
distributed among other brigades. 
 
20. (U)  MONUC continues to be concerned whether the FARDC 
will prove sufficiently competent towill be successful 
against the militias, even with additional reinforcements 
huge advantage in numbers and support from other non-Ituri 
units.  MONUC officers reported that in battle, FARDC 
troops tended to panic, discharging their weapons 
frantically in a completely disorderly fashion, and 
thusthereby depleting their ammunition without gaining any 
military advantage. 
 
2120. (U) The Pakistani contingent of MONUC provided one 
week of additional training to the first battalion to 
arrive from North Kivu during the week of March 13, and. S 
some members of the battalion were among those trained 
over a period of three months by various MONUC contingents 
last year. During a presentation by the full battalion, 
the OFDA Rrep had the opportunity to ask the troops 
directly if they thought they had been sufficiently 
trained.  and tThey responded affirmatively, adding that 
they were anxious to get started fighting the militias. 
They asked only that they be given sufficient equipment 
and ammunition.  (NOTE: The battalion is of mixed 
 
KINSHASA 00000562  005 OF 006 
 
 
composition, and a show of hands revealed relatively even 
representation of ex-government, ex-RCD Goma, ex-MLC, and 
ex-Mai Mai elements.) 
 
2221. (U) Another concern of MONUC staff is that plans for 
the offensive may be leaked to the militias.  It has been 
their experience that the militia seems to have been well 
informed ahead of time of the details of any joint MONUC- 
FARDC operations. As MONUC does not not feel it hashave 
the capacity or the authority to conduct major operations 
completely on its own, this problem of being unable to 
mount a surprise offensive is likely to continue. 
 
--------- 
Prospects 
--------- 
 
2322. (U) Some observers believe that if outside sources 
are financing new recruitment among the militias, and 
especially if the FARDC cannot soon re-establish its 
authority in the areas of southern Ituri that it once 
controlled, the prospects for providing a safe environment 
for elections in Ituri will be limited. Elections are now 
only three months away, and m Many observers, even within 
MONUC, are openly pessimistic that Ituri can be returned 
to pre-March levels of security before that timeelections 
are held in June. 
 
2423. (U) One very well-informed local source that OFDA 
contacted, however, was of the view thatbelieved the 
situation was not nearly as grim as it appeared.  This 
person noted that though the road to Kasenyi had closed 
briefly due to insecurity, commercial traffic and NGO 
traffic had now fully resumed.  Similarly, though Aveba 
and Gethy had been briefly abandoned by FARDC, there were 
now once again FARDC units in place there.  Since the 
militia stronghold of Tcheyi was nowalso empty, the MRC 
could be viewed even as having lost territory. 
 
2524. (U) On the subject of militia dispersion, this 
observer was of the view that thissaid the phenomenon was 
more due to disagreement, splintering and differing 
visions among the militia leaders than to a conscious, 
coordinated strategy.  Ngiti leaders Owudu and Cobra are 
no longer together, with the former joining Hema militia 
leader Saidi to form a smaller, very militant group in the 
southern Lake Albert area.  Cobra, however, is but the 
latter again making signs that he and his second in 
command, Dark, might yet be willing to surrender to MONUC. 
Lendu militia leader Ngudjolo is responsible for the 
attacks on the towns of Kakwa/Cafe and Katoto, but his 
actions have been condemned by leaders of the Lendu 
community in the area where he is operating.  Though Peter 
Karim's men still cause trouble in the Nioka-Kwandromo 
area, their leader has reportedly retreated to a position 
in the bush 60 kilometers west of these towns. 
 
2625. (U) Whichever analysis proves more accurate, OFDA 
Rep Rep observed that Ituri seems much less ethnically 
divided than in the past. Indeed, if instability continues 
or expands, it seems unlikely that it will, at least 
initially, be ethnically based. During his visit, OFDA Rep 
had the opportunity to talk to three different groups of 
ex-combatants working in various reintegration projects. 
All of these groups were ethnically mixed, with all former 
major ethnic militias represented in each, yet and the ex- 
militiamen all appeared remarkably at ease with one 
another. When asked, they treated the question of 
ethnicity as if it had no importance at all anymore, 
pointing out that even the militias that were still active 
in the bush are now of mixed ethnicity.  This facility of 
integration among ex-combatants is consistent with the 
very reconciliatory attitudes of many Ituri civilians with 
whom OFDA Rep Rep has discussed ethnicity in past visits. 
It, and lends further support to the view that the ethnic 
animosities of the past were largely the result of 
manipulations of the populations by various warlords 
jostling for control of Ituri's resources. 
 
KINSHASA 00000562  006 OF 006 
 
 
MEECE.