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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM972, SUDAN/CHAD: FM Lam Akol Provides Chad-Sudan

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM972 2006-04-24 11:44 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2424
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0972/01 1141144
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241144Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2451
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NATEU/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL CD SU
SUBJECT:  SUDAN/CHAD:  FM Lam Akol Provides Chad-Sudan 
Briefing; U.S.-EU Demarche 
 
Ref:  A) Khartoum 00938, B) State 60228, C) USEU Brussels 
 
01305 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  On April 23, Foreign Minister Lam Akol 
briefed the diplomatic corps on the state of Chad-Sudan 
bilateral relations.  He outlined the events of the past 
several months, stating that Chad had made a series of 
statements and taken several actions that were not 
supported by evidence, and which harmed the longstanding 
relationship.  Sudan wants a stable Chad, and is not 
working to destabilize Chad.  Chad suffers from internal 
conflicts and is not participating in mechanisms 
established under the Tripoli Agreement designed to 
defuse tensions between the states.  FM Akol expressed 
concern about Chad's treatment of its embassy and 
nationals, and noted that Chad had withdrawn from the 
Abuja peace talks on Darfur. After the presentation, 
Charge and EU presented demarche on Chad issues; Akol 
firmly rejected the allegation that Sudan was in any way 
supporting Chadian rebels.  End summary. 
 
U.S.-EU Demarche 
---------------- 
 
2. (SBU) After the group briefing (see below), Charge, 
French Ambassador Robichon, and EC Ambassador Dagerfelt 
met separately with FM Akol to present demarche on 
Sudan/Chad.  (French Amb. had contacted Charge on April 
22 that she had instructions to proceed.  AU did not join 
the demarche).  After presentation of the points to the 
FM, Akol responded as follows: 
 
-- With regard to U.S.-EU concern that Sudan is directly 
or indirectly supporting Chadian rebel groups, Akol said, 
"give us evidence of this support."  He said this 
allegation presumes that Deby's accusations are accurate. 
He added that he hoped we are also making points to the 
Chadian president that he cease his support for the 
Darful rebels.  He reiterated what he had said in the 
larger meeting that Chad had refused to participate in 
the border security operations.   These allegations, he 
said, were unacceptable to the Sudanese Government. 
 
-- Akol also responded to the point that Sudan has an 
obligation to promote democratic stability in Chad.  He 
rejected the point, saying it was none of Sudan's 
business to interfere in Chad's internal affairs. 
 
-- On the point of an early UN assessment mission, Akol 
answered in now familiar terms.  While Sudan continued to 
welcome the UN's humanitarian work in Darfur, the 
government would not accept UN forces unless it was "part 
and parcel of a peace agreement," and that the mandate of 
such a UN force was agreed to by the parties and defined 
in a peace agreement.  The transition from an AU to a UN 
force was not an issue the AU could mandate or engage in; 
this was a political matter that needed agreement of the 
government of Sudan.  Discussions must take place 
directly between Sudan and the UN.  The demand for a UN 
assessment team was therefore premature. 
 
FM Briefing of Ambassadors 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (U) During a 30-minute briefing of approximately 60 
diplomats, Foreign Minister Lam Akol outlined Sudan's 
views on the state of its bilateral relationship with 
Chad.  He made the following points: 
 
-- Chad's allegations are not new, although the scale and 
the steps taken may be so.  These reflect internal 
differences within Chad. 
 
-- Sudan wants a stable Chad, and seeks for all neighbors 
to be stable.  Sudan stands to suffer if Chad's conflict 
spills over, with refugees entering Sudan and security 
problems taking place.  Sudan's relations with Chad had 
been cordial, and the two states exchanged information 
and coordinated on policies.  It is the task of a neutral 
state not to support rebels of a neighboring state. 
 
-- Now, Chad is in trouble.  The demands of President 
Deby's relatives have led to the present circumstances. 
He dismissed the Presidential Guard and closed the 
Chadian consulate in El Geneina and the Sudanese 
consulate in Abeche last November.  Sudan wanted to send 
 
KHARTOUM 00000972  002 OF 002 
 
 
a delegation to discuss matters, and Chad refused. 
President Bashir tried to call President Deby; his 
efforts were met with excuses and no discussion took 
place. 
 
-- Chad then accused Sudan of assisting rebels.  FM Lam 
Akol talked to the Chadian foreign minister in Bamako 
during the Africa-France meeting, but the latter could 
not be forthcoming without instructions from his 
government. 
 
-- As Chadian rebels approached Sudan in December, they 
were met at the border and offered two choices:  disarm 
and enter under UNHCR protection as refugees, or remain 
in Chad. 
 
-- At the African Union Peace and Security Council 
meeting in Addis Ababa in January, Chad repeated the same 
complaints against Sudan, without offering material 
evidence. 
 
-- Sudan continues to stress the need for dialogue, 
although Chad continues to be hostile.  President Deby 
had declared war against Sudan in late after an attack on 
Adre, but withdrew the declaration hours later. 
 
-- In February, the Tripoli mini-summit, chaired by 
Qadafi and the African Union, two agreements were 
reached:  an agreement on how to handle disputes, and a 
communique reflecting the outcome of the meetings.  The 
relationship should have been normalized following this 
development.  Political and military committees were to 
monitor the agreement; they agreed on the composition of 
forces, which involved Chad, Sudan, and others as 
witnesses.  Teams were dispatched to El Geneina, El 
Fasher, and Abeche, although Chad did not send team 
participants.  This occurred, he said, because Chad did 
not want others to see its support for rebels in Darfur. 
 
-- Chad then took several actions:  stating that Sudan 
was behind the attacks on Ndjamena; claiming that the 
attackers were Sudanese; severing diplomatic relations, 
asking Sudanese to leave the embassy and closing it; and 
declaring that genocide was taking place in Darfur, 
calling upon international organizations to become 
involved. 
 
-- Sudan re-iterates that it has nothing against Chad. 
Sudan is the last to want to destabilize it.  Chad has 
internal problems, and we cannot interfere.  Sudan is 
trying to stick to the Tripoli Agreement.  Chad can raise 
issues within the Agreement's context through the two 
committees.  Sudan has sent representatives and is ready 
to interact.  Sudan respects the sovereignty of other 
states and Chad is no exception.  Sudan welcomes the 
Libyan initiative, and the need to cool down. 
 
-- Sudan calls on the international community to support 
the Abuja peace process on Darfur.  On the day following 
breaking diplomatic relations, Chad sent an armed group 
to enter Sudan's embassy in Ndjamena, despite Libya's 
serving as protecting power with a flag flying.  Chad's 
public announcement that it would no longer be 
responsible for the security of Sudanese nationals in 
Chad was an open call to "do what you want to do" with 
Sudanese citizens.  Sudan hopes that Chad will listen to 
logic and re-establish the longstanding ties between Chad 
and Sudan.  Chad needs to look inside itself, and to 
listen to its own citizens.  Chad would do well to deal 
with its conflict credibly, fostering better relations 
with the African Union, UN, and its neighbors. 
 
4. (U) In response to questions, FM Akol noted that Chad 
had unilaterally severed diplomatic relations with Sudan. 
He also said that Chad was withdrawing its delegation 
from the Abuja peace talks; he noted that Chad was no 
longer an honest broker, and that Sudan had asked the 
African Union to drop it from the talks. 
 
STEINFELD