Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06HANOI943, Party Selects New (Old) Leadership; Senior

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06HANOI943.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI943 2006-04-25 11:19 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO3717
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0943/01 1151119
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251119Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1611
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY PRIORITY 1022
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR VM
SUBJECT: Party Selects New (Old) Leadership; Senior 
Positions Remain Unclear 
 
Ref: Hanoi 895 and previous 
 
HANOI 00000943  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
This is a joint Embassy Hanoi-ConGen HCMC report. 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1. (SBU) The Communist Party closed its 10th National Party 
Congress (NPC) April 25 after re-electing Nong Duc Manh to 
the position of Party General Secretary.  The Party's new 
Central Committee, elected April 23, also selected the new 
Politburo and Party Secretariat.  Although many of those who 
had been rumored to be in line for top positions are in the 
new Politburo, the Party is keeping quiet about who will 
actually assume what job.  Based on Vietnamese practice, the 
positions of State President, Prime Minister and Chairman of 
the National Assembly will not be formally announced until 
they receive the blessing of the National Assembly, which 
could be as early as mid-May or as late as December.  The 
Congress' delegates also endorsed official Party documents 
such as the Political Report, which for the first time 
allows some Party members to engage in capitalist activities 
and updated the Party Statutes to reflect this change. 
 
2. (SBU) Our initial appraisal of the new Politburo and 
Central Committee membership is that, with increased 
representation by Ministry of Public Security officials and 
the reduction of the total number of Politburo and Party 
Secretariat members, as well as the elevation of the 
 
SIPDIS 
Directors of the Party Control Commission, the Internal 
Affairs Commission and the relatively hardline Minister of 
Culture and Information, the Party is sending a message 
about its intent to address corruption and strengthen 
central control.  Regional balance also appears not to have 
been a major consideration this time; southern and northern 
leaders prospered, at the expense of their central 
Vietnamese colleagues.  Moreover, the lack of clarity of 
when exactly Vietnam's new senior leaders will be formally 
selected may suggest continued internal disagreement over 
the composition of the top leadership as well as concerns 
that Government and Party functions not get sidetracked 
during the year Vietnam hosts APEC.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
The Party's New Leaders 
----------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) closed its 
10th National Party Congress (NPC) April 25 with the 
announcement of its new Politburo lineup, including the re- 
election of General Secretary Nong Duc Manh.  In order of 
the number of votes the new Politburo members received from 
the new Central Committee, they and their current positions 
(which are likely to change in most cases) are: 
 
-- Nong Duc Manh - Party General Secretary 
-- Le Hong Anh - Minister of Public Security 
-- Nguyen Tan Dzung - Standing Deputy Prime Minister 
-- Nguyen Minh Triet - Secretary of HCMC Party Committee 
-- Truong Tan Sang - Chairman, Party Economic Commission 
-- Nguyen Phu Trong - Secretary, Hanoi Party Committee 
-- Pham Gia Khiem - Deputy Prime Minister 
-- Phung Quang Thanh - Vice Minister of Defense, General 
Chief of Staff 
-- Truong Vinh Trong - Chairman, Party Internal Affairs 
Commission 
-- Le Thanh Hai - Chairman of HCMC People's Committee 
-- Nguyen Sinh Hung - Minister of Finance 
-- Pham Quang Nghi - Minister of Culture and Information 
-- Ho Duc Viet - Chairman of the National Assembly's 
Committee for Science, Technology and Environment 
-- Nguyen Van Chi - Chairman, Party Control Commission 
 
4. (SBU) Regional balance was not a significant 
consideration for the Party Congress.  Southerners and 
northerners dominate the Politburo, with HCMC having three 
representatives -- Triet, Sang and Hai.  Our contacts told 
us that Ba Thanh, the brash and conservative Party Secretary 
of Danang, was lobbying hard for a slot on the Politburo. 
He was rebuffed.  In contrast to previous Party 
pronouncements that the new Politburo would have 15-17 
members, the new lineup only has 14 members.  Asked to 
comment on this during an April 25 press conference, Party 
General Secretary Manh said that "there were not enough 
individuals who met the criteria for Politburo membership. 
If some appear in the future, we can consider increasing the 
size of the Politburo." 
 
 
HANOI 00000943  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
5. (SBU) There have been some foreign press reports 
indicating that, as numbers two, three and four on the list, 
Le Hong Anh will be President, Nguyen Tan Dzung will be 
Prime Minister and Nguyen Minh Triet will be Chairman of the 
National Assembly.  However, virtually all of our contacts 
have been unwilling to speculate on whether the number of 
votes received (and thus position on the list) will 
correspond with the eventual Politburo hierarchy, cautioning 
us "not to read too much into it."  Although rumors will 
continue to swirl about who will assume what position, 
nothing will be official until the National Assembly 
convenes and formally elects the new leadership.  During his 
press conference, General Secretary Manh refused to get 
drawn out on the subject of personnel decisions, noting that 
"the National Assembly has the final word on the subject." 
"Please wait and see," he said. 
 
6. (SBU) When exactly the National Assembly will meet to 
bless the leadership changes is the subject of some 
speculation.  The National Assembly will convene again on 
May 16, and National Assembly member and head of the Vietnam 
Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO) Vu Xuan Hong told 
the Ambassador April 14 that the legislature's first order 
of business will be to discuss and approve Vietnam's new 
leaders.  On April 23, however, senior Party official Dao 
Dzuy Quat (deputy director of the Party's Culture and 
Information Commission) floated a trial balloon in the 
Vietnamese press saying that the timing for the leadership 
handover has not been decided and suggesting that Vietnam 
needs "experienced leadership" in place for the November 
2006 APEC summit, and so the National Assembly would wait 
until December to approve the new leadership slate. 
 
7. (SBU) At any rate, once the National Assembly elects a 
new Prime Minister, the PM will nominate Cabinet ministers 
for National Assembly endorsement.  Current (but retiring) 
Deputy Prime Minister and member of the Secretariat Vu Khoan 
said in an interview on April 24 that cabinet ministers "do 
not have to be Central Committee members, or even Party 
members."  He acknowledged, however, that their work would 
be "very difficult" if they are not. 
 
New Party Secretariat 
--------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The Party Secretariat, which handles the day-to-day 
management of Party affairs, was also announced.  Its 
members (and their current positions) are: 
 
-- Nong Duc Manh - Party General Secretary 
-- Truong Tan Sang - Chairman, Party Economic Commission 
-- Truong Vinh Trong - Chairman, Party Internal Affairs 
Commission 
-- Nguyen Van Chi - Chairman, Party Control Commission 
-- Pham Quang Nghi - Minister of Culture and Information 
-- Le Van Dzung, Chief of People's Army of Vietnam's General 
Political Department 
-- Tong Thi Phong, Chairman, Party Mass Mobilization 
Commission 
-- To Huy Rua, Director, Ho Chi Minh Political Institute 
 
9. (SBU) The Secretariat's Standing Member, an influential 
position that regulates the paper flow to the Politburo and 
administers many key personnel decisions, previously held by 
Phan Dzien, has not yet been announced.  The first five of 
the eight members of the Secretariat listed above are 
concurrent members of the Politburo, which is an increase 
from the previous Secretariat, which had four Politburo 
members out of nine total Secretariat members. 
 
New Central Committee 
--------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) On April 23, the delegates to the NPC elected the 
Party's new Central Committee, which has increased in size 
from 150 to 160 regular members, with 21 non-voting 
alternates.  Our early assessment is that the new CC's 
membership does not reflect a major new direction for 
Vietnam, but there have been some changes from the previous 
committee's lineup. 
 
11. (SBU) No Foreign Ministry officials were elected as 
regular CC members (unless one counts Deputy Prime Minister 
Pham Gia Khiem, who is also a new Politburo member and is 
rumored to be in line to replace Foreign Minister Nguyen Dzy 
Nien, who was not a Politburo member).  Interestingly, there 
is one MFA official among the CC alternates:  Department of 
International Organizations Director General Pham Binh Minh, 
 
HANOI 00000943  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
who is well-known as our and others' interlocutor for our 
respective human rights dialogues.  His inclusion as a CC 
alternate may auger a promotion in the near future.  Other 
prominent rumored losers for membership in the CC include: 
Nong Duc Manh's son, Nong Quoc Tuan, who is head of the 
National Youth Federation; General Nguyen Chi Vinh, an MOD 
General in charge of intelligence and closely associated 
with former conservative President Le Duc Anh; and, and 
Madame Pham Phuong Thao, Chairwoman of the HCMC People's 
Council.  (The slate of 207 candidates for the CC was Qt 
made public.) 
 
12. (SBU) At 16 out of 160 CC members, the percentage of 
military members of the new CC remains unchanged from the 
previous committee, although the ratio of "political 
commissars" to those in command positions has increased over 
the previous Central Committee.  This is likely a reflection 
of either the increased importance of these commissars with 
the Vietnamese military or the decreased importance of Party 
credentials in the selection of military region commanders. 
The alternates appear to be a who's who of younger leaders 
that the Party is cultivating -- many from the district 
level -- including the former Youth Union Chairman of HCMC. 
 
13. (SBU) The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also 
substantially increased its presence on the Central 
Committee, with six of the current eight MPS Vice Ministers 
plus the current Minister represented.  This adds weight to 
the speculation that the Ministry of Public Security 
will divide into two ministries, a Ministry of State 
Security and a Ministry of Police, because even if the vice 
ministers not selected for the Central Committee retire, six 
vice ministers is too many for one Ministry.  It is worth 
noting that the current Minister of Public Security, Le Hong 
Anh, was the highest vote-getter in the Politburo election 
after the unopposed General Secretary Manh. 
 
14. (SBU) Finally, in spite of the Party's trumpeting of its 
new and more "democratic" style of allowing NPC delegates to 
nominate CC candidates, or for individuals to nominate 
themselves, it does not appear that any of these new-style 
candidates made the final cut. 
 
Party Documents 
--------------- 
 
15. (SBU) The NPC's delegates also voted on and approved the 
Political Report, which is little changed from the previous 
versions that had been circulated for comment -- and 
criticized in reformist press (reftels).  Significantly, the 
report contains language allowing Party members to engage in 
capitalist activities, although the language was not nearly 
as open as reformists had wished.  Questioned at the press 
conference on whether capitalists would be able to become 
Party members, General Secretary Manh responded that "the 
issue requires further study and specific regulations."  In 
a further change meant to broaden its national appeal, the 
Party transformed itself from the "vanguard of the working 
class" to the "vanguard of the working class and the 
representative of the nation's interest." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
16. (SBU) Our initial appraisal of the new Politburo and 
Central Committee membership is that, with increased 
representation by Ministry of Public Security officials and 
tightening of the number of officials represented in the 
Politburo and Secretariat, the Party is sending a message 
about its intent to address corruption and strengthen 
central control.  Moreover, the lack of clarity as to when 
exactly Vietnam's new senior leaders will be formally 
elected may suggest continued internal disagreement over the 
composition of the top leadership, as well as an 
opportunistic move by the existing leadership (who are not 
happy about retiring) to extend their terms.  Once the 
senior-most slots are allocated, there likely will be 
additional personnel maneuvers to fill other key slots, 
including the Party Secretaries of Hanoi and HCMC and the 
leadership of the Vietnam Fatherland Front. 
 
17. (SBU) Embassy and ConGen HCMC will follow up with closer 
examinations of the new Politburo and Central Committee. 
 
MARINE