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Viewing cable 06HANOI767, LEADERSHIP RUMORS ABOUND FOLLOWING THE 14TH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI767 2006-04-04 02:55 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO1100
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0767/01 0940255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040255Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1354
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0856
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KIRF VM
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP RUMORS ABOUND FOLLOWING THE 14TH 
PARTY PLENUM 
 
REF: A) Hanoi 222, B) Hanoi 596 
 
HANOI 00000767  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Rumors continue to swirl about the 
likely changes in Vietnam's leadership following the 
10th Party Congress in April.  They have grown 
especially intense since last week's close of the 14th 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
(CPV), which announced that it had put together its 
list of eligible candidates for the next Central 
Committee (to be elected during the Party Congress) and 
had decided on some Politburo recommendations.  Our 
most plugged-in insiders have contradictory, though 
authoritatively stated, predictions about the 
leadership slate.  We note that in the last Party 
Congress, the Central Committee threw out the 
Politburo's recommendations altogether and booted 
surprised General Secretary Le Ka Phieu to the curb. 
As explained to us by the Chairman of the U.S.-Vietnam 
Society, "...at this time, all of Vietnam is very busy 
helping the Party Personnel Committee with their work." 
This is leadership politics, Vietnam-style.  End 
Summary. 
 
Candidates to Next Central Committee Certified 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2. (SBU) The CPV's Central Committee met March 20-25 in 
its 14th Plenum to agree to a list of eligible 
candidates for the next Central Committee, which will 
be submitted to the 10th Party Congress (now scheduled 
for April 18-25) for its endorsement.  The Plenum also 
discussed a draft working agenda, working regulations 
and voting procedures for the Congress, and passed them 
on to the Politburo to complete for submission to the 
Congress. 
 
One scenario 
------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Ngo Cuong, Editor-in-Chief of the Supreme 
People's Court (SPC)-affiliated Judicial Journal, 
reported that according to his boss and mentor, SPC 
Presiding Judge Nguyen Van Hien, the plenum approved 
separate lists of 175 possible nominees and 31 
candidate-alternates to the new Central Committee, from 
which 160 official members and 25 alternates (who will 
not have voting rights) will be selected during the 
Party Congress. 
 
4. (SBU) Hien also said the plenum discussed whether 
current Politburo members may be retained for the next 
Politburo.  They reached consensus that only six of the 
current 14 Politburo members can continue to serve in 
the next Central Committee and on the next Politburo. 
These six are 1) Party Secretary Nong Duc Manh, 2) Ho 
Chi Minh City Party Chief Nguyen Minh Triet, 3) 
Standing Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung, 4) 
Hanoi Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong, 5) CPV Central 
Economic Commission Director Truong Tan Sang and 6) 
Public Security Minister Le Hong Anh.  Manh, Triet, 
Dzung and Trong will likely take the four top positions 
of Party Chief, State President, Prime Minister, and 
National Assembly Chairman, Hien said. Nguyen Van Chi, 
currently a Secretariat member and head of the CPV 
Control Commission (the CPV's inspectorate), will 
likely replace Phan Dzien as the permanent member of 
the Secretariat, the Deputy Party Secretary position. 
(Note:  These predictions have appeared in the Japanese 
press.  End Note.) 
 
5. (SBU) Hien also reportedly said the plenum agreed to 
convene a 15th (and final) Plenum right before the 
Party Congress takes place to review other eligible 
candidates for the next Politburo and Secretariat. 
Also, during the 14th Plenum, Party Chief Manh was 
asked to take the positions of State President and 
Party Chief following the Party Congress, but he 
refused to accept the offer.  (Note:  Conflation of the 
party secretary role and the presidency has been a 
perennial proposal in Vietnamese politics.  End Note.) 
 
Another Version 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Offering a somewhat different prediction, 
Senior Colonel Tran Nhung, former chief of the 
international affairs division of Quan Doi Nhan Dan 
(People's Army) newspaper, says that Triet will replace 
 
HANOI 00000767  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Manh as Party Chief at the next Party Congress, while 
Manh will likely become the President.  He asserted 
that Control Commission chief Nguyen Van Chi will 
replace Tran Dinh Hoan as chief of the CPV Personnel 
Commission, and Truong Tan Sang, head of the Economic 
Commission, may well replace Phan Dzien.  He also said 
participants the 14th Plenum reached consensus that the 
Party Chief will be approved by all members attending 
the Party Congress.  This should be considered a sign 
of improved democracy within the Party's activities at 
the top level, Nhung averred.  (Note:  According to 
current Party statutes, the Party Chief is elected by 
members of the new Central Committee, not the entire 
Party Congress.  End Note.) 
 
7. (SBU) Legally, leadership changes made at the Party 
Congress do not take effect until the National Assembly 
(NA) officially approves them.  Nhung said this will 
occur at the NA's spring session, which is now slated 
for May 16-June 27.  He explained this unusually rapid 
transition by quoting his mentor, NA Chairman Nguyen 
Van An, who said that new nominations are essential to 
"showcase Vietnam's intention toward long-term 
leadership credibility," especially given that the 
country is hosting the next APEC summit.  Official 
sources at the Office of the National Assembly (ONA) 
hinted that the NA will likely discuss issues of top 
personnel positions at the end of its forthcoming 
session. 
 
And Another Version... 
---------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Nguyen Chi Dzung, former Editor-in-Chief of 
the ONA-affiliated Legislative Journal, said Triet will 
be President, as Manh will likely retain his position 
as Party Chief for at least half a term of the next 
Central Committee, to be replaced by Triet, who will 
then concurrently take the two top positions. 
According to Dzung, Triet is supported by "progressive 
elements" within the Party, including Vo Van Kiet and 
Nguyen Tan Dzung.  However, given opposition from 
conservative elements, and in order to avoid any 
psychological frustration with respect to the issue of 
geographical representation, such a circuitous 
transition is important, Dzung asserted. 
 
New Voting and Working Regulations 
---------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Also according to Dzung, Nhung and Ngo Van 
Hoa, a professor from the Institute of History, the 
12th Plenum (held in December 2005) agreed that there 
would be no "preparatory meeting" before the main Party 
Congress, and that there will be no foreign guests 
invited to attend the Congress.  Such changes in 
working regulations are designed to "facilitate true 
discussions" on critical issues, including the 
assignment of top personnel, to avoid what has been the 
customary historical practice that all significant 
issues are discussed and decided upon during a 
preparatory meeting, Hoa asserted. 
 
10. (SBU) Hoa noted that no officials of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam attended the Congress in February of 
the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, which suggests 
there will be no foreign delegations, including those 
from Laos and China, attending the next CPV's own 
Congress.  (Note:  Vietnam, Laos, China and Cambodia's 
communist parties have long maintained a tradition of 
exchanging delegations to each other's Congresses. 
China's Hu Jintao, who was then Vice President, and the 
former Lao Party Chief attended the 9th CPV Party 
Congress in 2001.  End Note.) 
 
11. (SBU) According to Senior Colonel Nhung, the new 
working regulations may lead to last-minute changes in 
the list of candidates for the next Central Committee 
and Politburo even though they have already been 
certified by the retiring Central Committee.  Members 
of the sixty-four provincial delegations and five 
delegations representing the seven Party "blocs" 
(foreign relations, mass mobilization, science and 
education, ideology and culture, internal affairs, 
military affairs and public security), may take the 
opportunity to introduce new names during the formal 
Congress, Nhung asserted. 
 
 
HANOI 00000767  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
12. (SBU) Dzung, Hoa and Nhung also noted that the 12th 
Plenum had decided that officials holding top positions 
do not necessarily have to correspond to geographical 
representation, a significant change from the existing 
decades-long arrangement whereby the three top 
leadership slots are divided among northern, central 
and southern candidates.  Dzung said it is possible 
that Triet, who is from the south, may be selected as 
Party Chief during the upcoming Congress, with Nguyen 
Tan Dzung (another southerner) nominated to the 
premiership, which is "a scenario that conservative 
elements within the Party would hate to see."  Dzung 
also repeated a proliferating rumor about a recent 
lunch hosted by former State President Le Duc Anh for 
six of the eight retiring Politburo members and former 
Party Chief Do Muoi.  The alleged purpose of that 
unconfirmed lunch was to prevent both Triet and DPM 
Dzung from taking leadership positions.  There had been 
discussions before the 14th Plenum on whether to also 
retain Nguyen Van An from the North as the new Party 
Chief in the next Central Committee as a compromise 
solution, he said. 
 
Central Committee Warns Against Abuse of Democracy 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
13. (SBU) In addition to its personnel work, the 14th 
Plenum also reportedly attempted to temper the recent 
high volume of calls for political reform following the 
Secretariat's March release of the draft Political 
 
SIPDIS 
Report for public comment.  While CPV-run dailies like 
Nhan Dan (The People) and Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's 
Army) newspapers tended to only cover neutrally 
constructive comments, some leading print and 
electronic newspapers, namely Tuoi Tre (Youth) and 
Vietnam Net, pushed the envelope by publishing reader 
comments that questioned the so-called "transitional 
period to socialism in Vietnam." 
 
14. (SBU) A formal announcement from the plenum claimed 
that "tens of thousands of people have contributed 
ideas" to the draft report, praised constructive 
comments, and noted that "the Central Committee 
strongly criticizes and rejects ill-intentioned and 
hostile opinions, abusing the consultation of the 
Political Report to distort, slander and tarnish the 
party, State and our people."  On March 27, Nhan Dan 
newspaper started publishing articles to reaffirm 
Maxism-Lenism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the Party's 
ideological foundation.  These articles also attacked 
pluralism and underlined the importance of the CPV's 
leadership role. 
 
15. (SBU) Dr. Hoang Ngoc Giao, a senior lecturer from 
Hanoi National University, said the Central Committee's 
warning and Nhan Dan's articles are discouraging, and 
reflect the CPV's "status-quo" approach to critical 
political and economic issues.  Nhung and Dzung, 
however, said the extraordinary series of critical 
articles published ahead of the next Party Congress and 
the novel way the Congress will be conducted signal a 
trend toward more democracy in Vietnam. 
 
Party Discipline 
---------------- 
 
16. (SBU) The 14th Plenum also confirmed the decision 
to reprimand Secretary of the Lang Son Provincial Party 
Committee Hoang Cong Hoan for poor leadership and 
"failure to follow Party procedures."  According to 
contacts in the Party, the official censure was the 
final result of an expensive infrastructure debacle 
involving the decision to move a cement factory in Lan 
Son city and purchase new equipment for the factory. 
Lang Son Party officials traveled to China (without 
central permission, our contact said) and signed a deal 
to import new equipment for the factory when the old 
equipment was still serviceable.  The new equipment 
turned out to be useless and cost Lang Son a 
substantial portion of its budget.  The two Lang Son 
deputy Party Chiefs also received reprimands.  Hoan, 
however, landed on his feet; although the Party decided 
to remove him from the Lang Son Party Secretary 
position, it has offered him a new one as the deputy 
Chairman of the CPV's Financial Affairs Commission in 
Hanoi, a more desirable and prestigious position. 
 
Comment 
 
HANOI 00000767  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
------- 
 
17. (SBU) Although the future government is starting to 
crystallize around specific individuals as the Party 
congress nears, we will not really know which factions 
are ascendant within the CPV until the Congress plays 
out.  The half-hearted attempt to quash political 
debate in the final run-up suggests that the CPV will 
enter the Congress with a somewhat more reformist 
agenda, but we should expect that after the Congress 
there will be pressure on dissonant voices in the 
Party, the Government and the media to unite behind the 
new leadership and political platform.  End Comment. 
 
MARINE