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Viewing cable 06CAIRO2100, DEFMIN TANTAWI WITH GEN ABIZAID ON IRAQ, HAMAS,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06CAIRO2100 2006-04-05 14:25 2011-04-20 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9135
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9164
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9146
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9147
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9148
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9149
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9150
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9151
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9152
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9153
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9154
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9155
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9156
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9157
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9158
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9159
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9160
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9161
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9157
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9162
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9163
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10055
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10059
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10057
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10069
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10067
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10076
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10078
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10056
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10059
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10081
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10079
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10075
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10077
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10079
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10070
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10082
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10083
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10058
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10068
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10071
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10072
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10080
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10076
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10058
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10074
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10073
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10185
VZCZCXRO3171
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHEG #2100/01 0951425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051425Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7212
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS IS IZ LE EG SY KPAL
SUBJECT: DEFMIN TANTAWI WITH GEN ABIZAID ON IRAQ, HAMAS, 
TERRORISM, AND IRAN 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  In a March 29 meeting CENTCOM Commander 
GEN Abizaid and Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi, 
joined by DCM Jones, discussed regional affairs, terrorism, 
military cooperation, and the International Medical Center 
(IMC).  Tantawi (1) stressed the importance of a strong Sunni 
participation in a new Iraqi government; (2) urged the USG to 
give Hamas a chance to change; (4) pressed the U.S. to engage 
with Syria and called for a global conference on terrorism; 
(5) said cooperation with the GOI is strong; and (6) asked 
for help in resolving the IMC matter.  GEN Abizaid (1) agreed 
on the need for Sunni participation in Iraq; (2) reiterated 
what the USG expects from Hamas; (3) called for greater 
integration of U.S. and Egyptian militaries; (4) promised to 
relay the call for a conference on terror; and (5) said 
addressing the IMC matter will take time. 
 
2.  (C)  Iraq:  GEN Abizaid briefed Field Marshal Tantawi 
duirng a March 29 meeting on the situation in Iraq and plans 
to transition (over time) more responsibility to the Iraqi 
security forces.  Tantawi stressed the GOE's concern that the 
Sunnis play a strong role in the new government.  Agreeing 
that Sunni participation is key, Abizaid noted their growing 
role in the army.  When Tantawi reiterated his offer to train 
Iraqi security forces in Egypt, Abizaid expressed his 
appreciation, but explained that the timing is not right for 
security forces to leave Iraq for training.  Tantawi also 
asked about Iranian interference in Iraq.  Abizaid agreed 
that this is a concern, but said the Iranians can interfere, 
but not dominate. 
 
3.  (C)  Hamas:  Tantawi said that because Hamas was 
democratically elected, they deserve a chance to change.  He 
added that Abu Mazen also deserves a chance to persuade Hamas 
to change.  Abizaid said that the USG is waiting for Hamas to 
recognize Israel, disavow violence, and recognize the 
preexisting agreements.  Without this, the DCM noted, 
progress would be difficult.  The DCM also thanked the Field 
Marshal for the key role Egypt plays in the peace process and 
in addressing humanitarian needs in Gaza. 
 
4.  (C)  U.S.-GOE Relations:  Tantawi said that his March 
trip to the U.S. was good, but complained that there are some 
members of Congress who do not appreciate Egypt.  Abizaid 
stressed that Egypt must persuade the Congress of Egypt's 
value, and promised to support the GOE in this effort. 
 
5.  (C)  Military Cooperation:  Abizaid expressed his 
appreciation for Egypt's support of U.S. regional priorities, 
noting that GOE facilitation of Canal transits was 
particularly vital.   Abizaid said he could not do his job 
without such support.  Abizaid told the Field Marshal that he 
would like to bolster military cooperation, particularly in 
the areas of command and control and air defense and to look 
for more ways to integrate the two militaries.  Tantawi 
agreed that this would be useful, particularly in the BRIGHT 
STAR exercises. 
 
6.  (C)  MFO:  Abizaid told the Field Marshal that shifting 
responsibility to CENTCOM for information sharing, logistics, 
and force protection will enhance MFO's effectiveness and 
have no negative implications for the mission. Tantawi said 
he is comfortable with the arrangements. 
 
7.  (C)  Iran:  Tantawi noted that Iran under Ahmadinejad's 
leadership has been difficult and confirmed that Egypt's 
relations with Iran are bad.  Nonetheless, Tantawi stressed, 
the U.S. must continue to deal with the Iranians quietly. 
Acting against them with force would be extremely dangerous, 
he said.  Abizaid said it is clear that the nuclear program 
has military objectives and that Iran's intelligence service 
is operating in Iraq in a manner contrary to stability. 
 
8.  (C)  Global War on Terrorism:  Abizaid briefed Tantawi on 
the transition to NATO forces in Afghanistan, noting its 
political advantages, and reviewed the challenges to progress 
on the GWOT.  Tantawi proposed convening a global conference 
on terrorism to include political leaders of all nations 
(without exceptions).  He said a conference would compel 
nations like Syria to take responsibility for the issue.  The 
DCM highlighted that at such a conference the U.S. would call 
attention to the problematic records on terror held by some 
nations (i.e, Syria).  Tantawi responded that this should not 
be a deterrent and urged the U.S. to engage Syria.  The DCM 
said the U.S. needs more cooperation from Syria to stop 
supporting Palestinian terrorists in Lebanon, to control its 
borders, and to stop interfering with Lebanese politics. 
Tantawi said that Mubarak is working with Assad on these 
issues and that border control is improving, albeit in part 
because Assad needs to do so to control Syria's internal 
security.  Abizaid said he would relay the conference 
proposal in his channels. 
 
9.  (C)  Egyptian-Israeli relations:  Tantawi said that 
GOE-GOI cooperation is strong and noted that Mofaz is no 
longer criticizing Egypt in the press.  Tantawi's advisor for 
American affairs MG Ahmed Mo'taz explained that high level 
liaison meetings occur monthly and that working level 
officers liaise daily. 
 
10.  (C)  International Medical Center:  Tantawi asked 
Abizaid for support in resolving the IMC problem so that 
treatment of third country patients can resume.  The DCM said 
that stopping the treatment will allow us to work through 
this problem more easily.  Abizaid added that the USG will 
need time to address the matter in a way that does not 
irritate the relationship.  Tantawi said "I need the 
Embassy's help." 
RICCIARDONE