Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BEIRUT1164, MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DODD

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT1164.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT1164 2006-04-13 14:13 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLB #1164/01 1031413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131413Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3059
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 4134
UNCLAS BEIRUT 001164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR H, NEA/ELA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DODD 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (SBU)  The current political situation in Lebanon is 
highly uncertain:  the National Dialogue process, which 
raised expectations for significant political progress when 
it began six weeks ago, appears to have run its course. 
The rivalry between the pro-reform "March 14" coalition 
(consisting of blocs led by Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and 
Samir Ja'ja') and the pro-Syrian "March 8" coalition (led 
by Hizballah, Amal and Michel Aoun) is as heated as ever. 
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who leads the pro-reform 
government, claims a mandate to pursue the goals of "March 
14," but the way forward has not been easy since he took 
office in July 2005.  Lebanese sovereignty has been under 
attack during his term in office, and "governance by 
consensus" has limited Siniora's ability to push for 
closure in the Hariri assassination case.  The government 
has moved ahead gradually with plans for reform -- 
specifically on the economic and electoral fronts -- but 
there is well-organized resistance to these efforts which 
have not moved substantially forward.  Pro-Syrian President 
Emile Lahoud remains in office in defiance of UNSCR 1559 
and is an additional obstacle to reform.  PM Siniora and 
four of his ministers are visiting Washington from April 
17-20 to discuss the government's reform efforts and U.S. 
support for the country in its transition to democracy. 
End summary. 
 
A PRO-REFORM PM HEADING 
A "MADE IN LEBANON" CABINET 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  Fouad Siniora, longtime associate and political 
supporter of assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, took 
office as Prime Minister in July 2005.  Supporting the 
government is a 72-member (out of 128) parliamentary 
majority, elected in May-June 2005 and led by Hariri's son, 
Sa'ad.  Commencing work just months after the withdrawal of 
Syria's military and overt intelligence personnel from 
Lebanon, Siniora's cabinet was the first genuinely "made in 
Lebanon" cabinet after nearly 30 years of de facto rule 
from Damascus. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The pro-reform, pro-sovereignty March 14 
coalition is led by the younger Hariri, along with Druze 
leader Walid Jumblatt, and Lebanese Forces leader Samir 
Ja'ja' (this coalition takes its name from the massive 
rally held in Beirut one month after the elder Hariri's 
murder on February 14, 2005).  The coalition's stated 
political objectives are:  determining the truth and meting 
out justice in the Hariri assassination, restoring 
Lebanon's sovereignty, and pursuing much-needed, but 
long-delayed reforms. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Facing the pro-reform bloc is the "March 8" 
coalition, composed of the Shia movements Hizballah, led by 
Hassan Nasrallah, and Amal, led by Speaker of Parliament 
Nabih Berri.  Free Patiotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, 
with 21 parliamentary seats representing the traditionally 
powerful Maronite community, often sides with Hizballah and 
Amal on political issues and entered into a "cooperative 
alliance" with Hizballah on February 6, with the issuance 
of a joint communique that outlined common political 
goals.  Michel Aoun has made clear on numerous occasions 
his desire to be Lebanon's next president. 
 
AN OBSTACLE COURSE TO THE TRUTH AND SOVEREIGNTY 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Despite the government's advantage of a strong 
parliamentary majority, its room for maneuver is limited. 
The uniqueness of post-civil war Lebanese politics makes 
the Siniora Cabinet more like a miniature Parliament (minus 
Michel Aoun's bloc) than an executive body controlled by 
the parliamentary majority.  In it are ministers belonging 
to, or at least serving at the pleasure of, Hizballah and 
the Amal Movement, which are pro-Syrian and opponents of the 
"March 14" coalition. 
 
6.  (SBU)  This situation has made it difficult for Siniora 
to pursue closure in the Hariri case, the truth of which is 
surely not to the Asad regime's taste.  He was able to win 
grudging acquiescence from his Hizballah and Amal cabinet 
ministers in calling for an extension of the initial 
mandate of the UN International Independent Investigation 
Commission (UNIIIC).  Later, the Amal/Hizballah alliance 
answered him with a crippling, seven week boycott of the 
Cabinet from December 12 until early February.  Their 
pretext was that the Prime Minister had asked the UN, 
without full Cabinet approval, for a broadening of the 
UNIIIC mandate to include all terrorist incidents since 
October 2004 and for the creation of an international 
tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri assassination. 
Since February, the full Cabinet has met but friction is 
never far below the surface. 
 
CAUSES OF INSTABILITY 
--------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  Throughout 2005, Lebanon faced an ongoing 
terrorist campaign that appeared aimed at eliminating some 
of Syria's critics, spreading fear, discrediting the 
Lebanese government, and ultimately rolling back Lebanon's 
recent gains in sovereignty.  The September 2005 attempted 
assassination of television broadcaster May Chidiac, the 
December 2005 assassination of MP and leading journalist 
Gebran Tueni, and three other bombings in Beirut and its 
surroundings since July undercut confidence in the 
government.  The response of the security sector has been 
slow, and a deadlock between Siniora and President Lahoud 
prevents it from more effective action. 
 
8.  (SBU)  By closing its border crossings with Lebanon in 
August 2005, the Syrian regime demonstrated its willingness 
to put an economic stranglehold on Lebanon when it saw 
fit.  Even more importantly, Syria's ally Hizballah remains 
a state-within-a-state, with an armed force that is a match 
for the Lebanese Armed Forces.  Hizballah has ignored UNSCR 
1559's requirement for disarmament of all militias and 
reserves the right to make decisions on inciting violence 
through its conduct of paramilitary operations along the 
Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel.  Hizballah justifies 
its violent actions by claiming that is a legitimate 
"resistance" to Israeli occupation of the Shebaa Farms, 
which it and many other Lebanese parties claim to be 
Lebanese territory.  This claim is not widely shared by the 
international community. 
 
PUSHING AHEAD ON REFORM... 
-------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  Prime Minister Siniora, seeing an opportunity to 
break a deadlock on economic policy that existed for years 
between President Lahoud and then-Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri, assembled a capable economic team and forged ahead 
in drafting a detailed reform program.  Its goal is to 
bring under control Lebanon's mammoth debt-to-GDP ratio, a 
problem that cannot afford to wait.  Beyond fiscal 
adjustment, the government's plan also aims at increasing 
economic growth and employment by making Lebanon an easier 
place in which to do business.  Finally, it aims at 
building social safety nets that make sound economic policy 
politically viable over the long term. 
 
10.  (SBU)  The "Core Group" of friends of Lebanon -- 
including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, 
the UN, and the World Bank -- has made it clear that 
Lebanon enjoys an unprecedented window of opportunity for 
support for a credible and sustainable reform program.  The 
government's economic team appears to understand this well, 
and has worked, on the one hand, to develop a detailed 
program that meets Core Group expectations.  On the other 
hand, it has steadily sought domestic political "buy-in" to 
the program, starting within the Cabinet and with the goal 
of including all political players capable of blocking it. 
One significant problem is that President Lahoud can throw 
a monkey wrench into these many moving parts, in economic 
reform as well as the security sector. 
 
11.  (SBU)  The Siniora government recognizes that political 
reform must accompany economic reform, and the prime 
minister has made reform of the electoral system a 
priority.  While still a work in progress, the draft 
electoral law as currently written will introduce important 
reforms, including the establishment of an independent 
commission to oversee elections (in place of an Interior 
Minister who is likely to be running for election 
himself). 
 
12.  (SBU)  Changing the electoral status quo will not 
necessarily benefit the "March 14" parliamentary majority 
in the next election.  PM Siniora will face a challenge in 
shepherding a draft law, once it is finally produced, 
through his cabinet and on to the Parliament.  For now, he 
simply needs a final draft law. 
 
REFORM AT A CROSSROADS 
---------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU)  Lebanon is presently at a critical juncture.  A 
series of parliamentary "national dialogue talks" -- with 
Siniora, as well as Aoun and the leadership of Hizballah 
and Amal at the table -- has tentatively agreed to ask 
Syria to demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese border, establish 
normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, and 
restrict armed Palestinians to the camps.  However, the 
talks show no sign of cutting through the immediate impasse 
over the Lahoud presidency, as well as the longer-term 
problem of Hizballah's disarmament. 
 
14.  (SBU)  The next meeting of the National Dialogue is 
scheduled for April 28, but no one is quite sure whether 
further progress is possible.  What comes after the 
conclusion of the National Dialogue is also uncertain.  The 
pro-reform government faces numerous challenges and much 
will depend on moving forward with political and economic 
reform and the resulting support of the Lebanese people. 
FELTMAN