Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06AITTAIPEI1165, MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S MEETING WITH KMT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06AITTAIPEI1165.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06AITTAIPEI1165 2006-04-04 08:56 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0013
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1165/01 0940856
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040856Z APR 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9517
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5016
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6207
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001165 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S MEETING WITH KMT 
CHAIRMAN MA YING-JEOU 
 
 
1.  Summary:  Taiwan dailies April 4 focused much of their coverage 
on the Monday meeting between President Chen Shui-bian and KMT 
Chairman Ma Ying-jeou.  Nearly all Taiwan dailies ran a banner 
headline along the lines of: "President Chen Shui-bian said if 
China's President Hu Jintao announces that the '1992 consensus' is 
the principle of 'One China with Different Interpretations,' not the 
'One China' principle, Chen will absolutely respect it." 
 
2.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" editorialized that the way to avoid military 
conflict across the Taiwan Strait is to follow Taiwan's mainstream 
public opinion.  The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" 
suggested in its editorial that President Chen try to understand 
what the Taiwan people want and to refrain from doing anything that 
contradicts their wishes.  The pro-unification "United Daily News" 
said in its editorial that although the proposal for Taiwan 
independence illustrates the dilemma facing the island, the proposal 
per se cannot become an option.  The pro-independence, 
English-language, "Taipei Times" said in its editorial that while it 
is good for President Chen and Chairman Ma to engage in a 
discussion, neither Chen nor Ma can do anything if China does not 
soften it attitude toward Taiwan.  End summary. 
 
A) "Follow Mainstream Public Opinion In Order to Move Closer to Good 
Fortune and to Move Away from Disaster" 
 
The pro-independence, "Liberty Times" [circulation: 600,000] said in 
an editorial (4/4): 
 
"... In the international community, China holds the patent for the 
'1992 Consensus,' and there are no political parties in Taiwan that 
can ignore this fact.  To use the ambiguous '1992 Consensus' as a 
way to resume cross-Strait negotiations means to allow China to put 
'The One China Principle' into the '1992 Consensus.'  Consequently, 
Taiwan will become a loser no matter [what happens] in any future 
negotiations.  It is like wrapping China's attempt to invade Taiwan 
in a peaceful [looking] guise. 
 
"[KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's] proposal supports the status quo, but 
does not seek immediate unification or independence [and] seems 
reasonable, but it is actually implausible.  What is Taiwan's status 
quo?  Mainstream public opinion has showed very clearly that Taiwan 
is a sovereign and independent democracy. 
 
"If leaders of the ruling party and opposition parties could set an 
example and cooperate with each other, it would be easy to seek 
consensus on the basis of mainstream public opinion.  This is the 
way that will move closer to good fortune and move away from 
disaster." 
 
B) "A Dialogue with Interaction, But Without Consensus" 
 
The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] 
said in its editorial (4/4): 
 
"Ma Ying-jeou said he hoped that President [Chen Shui-bian] could 
re-adopt the 'Five No's' and Ma tried to persuade him by using the 
example of the rapid rise in Chen's approval rating in 2000.  After 
Chen stated the 'Five No's' in his 2000 inauguration speech, Chen's 
approval rating rapidly rose to 80 percent, in a sharp contrast to 
the 39 percent of the total votes he received in the presidential 
election in 2000.  Ma even said the opposition parties would 
definitely do their best to support Chen [if Chen were to re-adopt 
the 'Five No's'].  President Chen, however, did not respond at all. 
On the contrary, Chen tried to defend his controversies.  For 
example, Chen pointed out that [despite opposition from the United 
States,] he nonetheless pushed for the 'referendum' in order to 
strengthen Taiwan's democracy, even at the cost of being excoriated 
by U.S. President [George W. Bush] and consequently having a 10 
percent drop in his approval rating. ... 
 
"The process that ceased the functioning of the National Unification 
Council was [noisy and tumultuous], and it even surprised the 
international community.  What was the consequence?  There was no 
rise in the [Taiwan] president's approval rating.  The approval 
rating for the ruling party even has reached a new nadir. ... The 
fact that the approval ratings for the president and the ruling 
party are low shows that what the president and the ruling party do 
are contrary to the desires of the Taiwan people. ..." 
 
"... For President Chen, we suggest with utmost sincerity that he 
come down from the 'clouds of power' and really try to understand 
the needs of the ordinary people. ..." 
 
C) "Constitutionally One Taiwan" or "Constitutionally One 
China"? 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
 
editorialized (4/4): 
 
"The reality is that the R.O.C. has been facing a huge dilemma over 
the past 50 years; experiences over more than the past ten years 
have proved that there is no possibility to bring the Taiwan 
independence issue to the negotiation table.  Ma Ying-jeou has tried 
to solve the R.O.C. dilemma under the R.O.C. constitutional 
framework; Chen Shui-bian, however, has highlighted the R.O.C. 
dilemma.  But Chen does not have a chance to bring the solution that 
aims at pushing for Taiwan independence to the negotiation table. 
This is the dilemma that Taiwan faces:  the proposal for Taiwan 
independence points out the R.O.C. dilemma, but Taiwan independence 
per se cannot become an option. ..." 
 
D) "Chen-Ma Talks a Positive Start" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language, "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] opined in an editorial (4/4): 
 
"Chen and Ma continued to differ on the term and meaning of the 
so-called "1992 consensus,"  Chen said that he could not fin any 
official documentation to support its existence, adding that it was 
a fabrication made up by former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su 
Chi in 2000.  Regardless of how the ruling or opposition party views 
it, the question is what Beijing thinks.  China believes that "One 
China" refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC), and there is 
little room for either side to have its own interpretation.  Chen 
urged Chinese President Hu Jintao to clarify whether Beijing would 
agree to each side of the Strait interpreting the "One China" policy 
differently, adding that he would respect the result. 
 
"Although the pan-Blue and pan-Green camps may hold opposing views 
on cross-Strait policy, their differences are no greater than the 
disparity between Taiwan and China.  Chen has now put the ball in 
China's court.  IF China fails to adopt a flexible approach, neither 
Ma's interim agreement no Chen's proposal to establish a peaceful, 
stable framework for interaction between the two sides will mean 
anything. ..." 
 
YOUNG