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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA1005, DARFUR: AU CONTINUES TO SUPPORT TRANSITION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA1005 2006-04-14 14:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO3820
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1005/01 1041407
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141407Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9992
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/E, D (SMITH), 
EUR/RPM, IO/UNP 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO EAID SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AU CONTINUES TO SUPPORT TRANSITION 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary/action request:  Addis-based Darfur 
Liaison Group (LG) heads of mission met April 14 with 
African Union (AU) Peace and Security Commissioner Amb. Said 
Djinnit to discuss the AU's draft roadmap for implementation 
of the March 10 Peace and Security Council (PSC) decision on 
Darfur.  Djinnit emphasized that the PSC did indeed approve 
a transition of AMIS to a UN mission and to pursue a 
strategy to render that transition as smooth as possible. 
He said that the AU is committed to ensuring that the UN can 
deploy its planning mission to Darfur soonest and that the 
AU would enlist the support of African leaders to gain 
Sudan's cooperation.  Djinnit called upon the UN and other 
AU partners to also apply pressure. 
 
2.  (SBU) On the roadmap itself, Djinnit mandated CMD 
Director Wane to immediately begin work with partners to 
identify specific actions that must be taken to implement 
the PSC decision.  Djinnit committed himself to personally 
attend a meeting with partners on April 17 to define how 
AMIS can better implement its mandate; to spur Joint 
Operations Center (JOC) set-up and the provision of partner 
assistance in that respect; and to discuss the agenda for an 
AMIS pledging conference to take place in mid-May.  Action 
Request:  Post requests urgent Washington guidance on these 
points, including how to approach the issue of NATO 
assistance to the JOC.  End summary/action request. 
 
3. (U) Present at the meeting were Amb. Djinnit, Conflict 
Management Director Wane, DITF member Commodore Mesfin 
Binega, British Ambassador,  EC Delegation Head, DCM, and 
Poloff (notetaker). 
 
------------------------------------ 
WORK TOGETHER TO ENHANCE THE ROADMAP 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) EC Delegation Head Clarke, on behalf of Darfur 
partners, presented draft partner comments on the AU's 
roadmap for implementation of the March 10 PSC decision 
(Note:  Relevant documents were forwarded to AF/SPG.  End 
note).  The LG noted that partners want to work closely with 
the AU to implement a practical roadmap.  Djinnit agreed 
that the current draft roadmap should be more action- 
oriented.  He mandated CMD Director Wane to begin work 
immediately with the LG and technical committee to enrich 
the roadmap.  Djinnit agreed with the need to address UN 
transition planning gaps in the roadmap. 
 
---------------------------- 
CLARIFICATIONS ON TRANSITION 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) In response to partner concern that Sudan continues 
to resist transition, and calls for the AU to do more, 
Djinnit said that the AU did its utmost ahead of the March 
10 PSC decision, and continues to devote every effort to 
engage senior Sudanese officials.  For example, Sudanese VP 
Taha joined the political talks following Konare's 
intervention with President Bashir.  Djinnit noted that the 
AU's greatest asset is the committee of heads of state.  He 
said that the Commission is working closely with AU Chair 
Sassou-Nguesso and his team to develop a strategy of 
engagement with the Sudanese.  Djinnit welcomed discussion 
with the Friends of Darfur group to pinpoint timing of 
highest-level pressure from the AU and partners.  He urged 
the international community to not forget its responsibility 
to also engage Sudan in line with UNSC decisions. 
 
6. (SBU) Djinnit also addressed partner concerns regarding 
mixed messages on transition coming from AU leadership, 
particularly comments by AU Commission Chairperson Konare to 
UNSYG Annan regarding several options for the future of 
AMIS.  Djinnit said that he has discussed that concern with 
Konare and is clear that Konare's intent is not to undo the 
PSC decision.  Djinnit made clear that the PSC decided for a 
transition, and also to craft a roadmap to facilitate 
transition.  According to Djinnit, Konare's comments should 
be seen in the context of a worst case scenario where there 
is no political agreement and Sudan continues to resist 
transition. 
 
7. (SBU) Djinnit noted that the AU is working on the basis 
of a PSC decision to transition AMIS to a UN operation by 
September 30.  At the same time, he said, the AU wants to 
ensure transition is smooth.  This requires, at minimum, 
agreement on an enhanced humanitarian ceasefire, and Djinnit 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001005  002 OF 003 
 
 
said that he encouraged his team to table a comprehensive 
document for discussion before the end of April.  Djinnit 
reiterated that the PSC set no preconditions for transition. 
Securing an agreement on time will render transition easier, 
but transition will still happen if there is no agreement. 
Djinnit indicated that the AU Commission must report to the 
PSC in May to take stock of the situation.  He noted that 
the March PSC called for the character of a UN mission to be 
decided based on the prevailing situation on the ground, so 
the international community may need to be creative. 
Djinnit acknowledged that joint planning is behind schedule 
and said he personally believes it is not time to begin 
discussing other feasible options. 
 
 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
GREATEST FOCUS REMAINS ABUJA 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Consistent with the PSC decision to facilitate a 
smooth transition, Djinnit noted, the AU is putting maximum 
effort towards securing an agreement in Abuja.  Djinnit said 
that Sassou-Nguesso is fully engaged and prepared to go to 
Abuja as necessary.  He stated his conviction that VP Taha 
intends to make progress towards a political settlement and 
noted that the parties need time to bargain on the details 
of an agreement.  Djinnit reiterated that the AU wants to 
work with partners to determine the best timing for highest- 
level engagement. 
 
---------------------------------- 
AU SUPPORTS UN TRANSITION PLANNING 
---------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The LG welcomed the recent visit of UN ASG for 
Peacekeeping Operations Annabi and encouraged Djinnit to 
ensure the AU does all it can to secure a Sudanese green 
light for the transition planning/assessment mission. 
Djinnit acknowledged that transition coordination was behind 
schedule, but said that the AU now fully understands the 
urgency of getting the planning mission to Darfur.  Djinnit 
said that the AU will include promoting cooperation with the 
UN in its agenda for engaging the Sudanese at all levels. 
 
10. (SBU) The LG suggested that, while formation of the AU 
Chair-led committee of heads of state is in progress, it is 
vital to ensure high-level attention is focused on getting 
the UN planning mission to move forward.  Djinnit agreed, 
and said he suggested to Annabi that UNSYG Annan approach 
the League of Arab States Secretary General and other key 
African leaders such as South African President Mbeki, 
Senegalese President Wade, Nigerian President Obasanjo and 
perhaps Ethiopian PM Meles to engage with Bashir.  Djinnit 
added that he would seek to mobilize Konare to do the same. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
ENHANCING AMIS, IMPROVING THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
11. (SBU) Djinnit asked partners to provide technical advice 
on how best to ensure more robust interpretation and 
implementation of AMIS' mandate and called a meeting for 
April 17, which he will personally attend.  He suggested 
that the UN Assistance Cell to the AU also engage directly 
with the AMIS Force Commander to identify gaps and an 
implementation plan.  Djinnit said that he had already 
requested the Force Commander to develop such a document. 
 
12. (SBU) Djinnit agreed with partners that the Joint 
Operations Center (JOC) is also key to improving AMIS 
effectiveness.  He said that he asked Annabi for UN 
assistance to set up the JOC, but noted that other partner 
assistance would also be required.  Djinnit expressed 
dissatisfaction with the slow rate of progress in 
establishing the JOC and noted that the April 17 meeting 
should also discuss partner proposals for the JOC.  The LG 
pointed out that effective JOC set-up will require a package 
of support, to include training and other elements, in 
addition to staffing assistance.  (Comment:  Post requests 
guidance on how to approach the NATO aspect of assistance to 
AMIS with Djinnit on April 17.  End comment).  The LG noted 
commitment to ensure AMIS troops meet UN training and 
equipment standards to facilitate retaining the African 
character of a UN mission. 
 
13. (SBU) On Sudan's refusal to renew the mandate of the 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001005  003 OF 003 
 
 
Norwegian Rescue Committee in Darfur, Djinnit asked for 
additional details and undertook to have SR Kingibe raise 
the issue with the Sudanese government.  Regarding partner 
participation in the Cease Fire Commission, Djinnit said he 
had encouraged the AU mediation team to accommodate partner 
concerns. 
 
---------- 
CHAD-SUDAN 
---------- 
 
14. (SBU) Djinnit expressed concern that Chad-Sudan tensions 
could eclipse Darfur.  He noted that the AU needs to find a 
way for AMIS to support protection of monitors along the 
Chad-Sudan border without compromising AMIS' core tasks in 
Darfur. 
 
------------------- 
PLEDGING CONFERENCE 
------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Djinnit suggested that the AMIS pledging 
conference focus on financial and logistical support for 
AMIS before transition, but also take advantage of the 
opportunity to take stock of progress in Abuja.  He said 
that the conference should give the AU assurance that it can 
sustain AMIS through September, and also enhance AMIS to 
account for new requirements under the enhanced humanitarian 
ceasefire agreement (such as increased troop levels with the 
need for more accommodations, helicopters to verify 
positions of the parties, etc). 
 
16. (SBU) Djinnit expressed appreciation for the UK 20 
million pound pledge, USG requests currently with Congress, 
and the additional 50 million euros forthcoming from the EU. 
He reiterated his deep concern, though, that even after an 
additional 50 million euros is received from the EU, AMIS 
funding will expire by June.  He pleaded with partners, 
including the USG, to ensure that AMIS cash sustainment 
needs are met.  Djinnit called for the pledging conference 
to take place by mid-May at the latest. 
 
 
HUDDLESTON