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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA1003, DPKO ASG ANNABI MAKES TRANSITION PROGRESS WITH AU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA1003 2006-04-14 13:46 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO3805
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1003/01 1041346
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141346Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9988
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/E, EUR/RPM, D 
(SMITH), IO/UNP. 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DPKO ASG ANNABI MAKES TRANSITION PROGRESS WITH AU 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The UN is cautiously optimistic that 
planning for transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) to a UN mission is on better footing following 
consultations with AU Peace and Security Commissioner Amb. 
Said Djinnit and his team, UN ASG for Peacekeeping Operations 
Hedi Annabi told a group of partner Ambassadors April 13. 
Annabi has received a visa for Sudan and is scheduled to meet 
Sudanese President Bashir April 15.  Annabi asked for partner 
pressure to keep the AU on track with transition and to 
persuade the Sudanese government to allow transition planning 
to proceed.  The UN agreed to provide enhanced technical 
assistance to the AU to bolster AMIS during the transition 
period, but Annabi cautioned that injecting NATO assistance 
too early could render transition more difficult politically. 
 The AU and UN are to release a joint communique citing 
agreement to expedite transition planning and strengthen AMIS 
in the interim.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) Ambassadors or their representatives from the U.S., 
UK, EC Delegation, France, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada, 
Italy, and the Netherlands were present at the briefing. 
 
--------------------- 
HEADWAY MADE IN ADDIS 
--------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Annabi told the assembled partners that there was 
some doubt in New York on the level of cooperation to be 
expected from the AU for transition planning despite the 
March 10 AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)'s clear decision 
for joint planning.  While body language of some AU officials 
(i.e. AU Commission Chairperson Konare) still leaves room for 
doubt, Annabi said, discussions with Peace and Security 
Commissioner Djinnit and his team clarified matters. 
 
4. (SBU) Annabi said that Djinnit agreed on the need to 
expedite transition planning and engage in more regular 
consultations between Addis and New York, as well as in 
Darfur.  Annabi expressed satisfaction with commitments he 
received from Djinnit that the AU will join the UN on the 
transition planning/assessment mission.  He stated that his 
trip to Addis was a useful investment and noted that the AU 
and UN would release a joint communique on the visit which 
would express agreement on the need to expedite planning as 
well as to enhance AMIS in the interim. 
 
5. (SBU) Asked if the AU team still appears to be considering 
a joint operation or a continued AMIS operation with UN 
logistical assistance to be serious options as Konare seemed 
to have indicated to SYG Annan in New York, Annabi said that 
the only issue Djinnit raised was how to organize and conduct 
planning while also strengthening AMIS (Note:  Konare was not 
in town for Annabi's trip.  End note).  According to Annabi, 
Konare's options were framed to avoid a scenario of UN-Sudan 
confrontation should there be no peace agreement and the 
situation on the ground in Darfur continues to deteriorate. 
Still, Annabi said, SYG Annan conveyed the point that these 
scenarios are impractical. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
HOPE FOR A BASHIR NOD FOR TRANSITION PLANNING 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Annabi said that he and his team received Sudanese 
visas earlier that day and were promised a meeting with 
President Bashir for April 15.  Annabi plans to deliver a 
message from UNSYG Annan to Bashir and to meet with other 
Sudanese officials to try to bridge the divide on transition 
planning.  The Sudanese need to be reassured that the UN does 
not want to impose itself on Sudan and is not a Trojan Horse 
for a Western invasion, Annabi noted.  Annabi commented that 
Sudan has experience with the UN and needs to stop acting 
like the UN is a strange animal.  We want a peacekeeping 
operation and need Sudan's cooperation, he said. 
 
7. (SBU) Annabi indicated that he seeks an affirmative nod 
from Bashir before he proceeds with organizing the transition 
planning mission.  He declared himself not fully optimistic 
that he would get the acquiescence he sought, and asked 
partners to apply pressure on Sudan.  Annabi said that, once 
Bashir gives a green light, it will take a few days to deploy 
a mission.  The UN team would spend two weeks on the ground 
and another week to compile a report for the UNSC. 
 
-------------------- 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001003  002 OF 003 
 
 
KEEP THE PRESSURE ON 
-------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Asked by Ambassador what partners can do to 
facilitate the conduct of the planning mission, Annabi called 
for individual and collective pressure on the AU to reinforce 
the positive spirit in which the AU team now appears to 
display with respect to joint planning.  Annabi also 
requested that partners work to reassure the GNU regarding UN 
intentions.  Annabi said that UNSYG Annan intends to contact 
the Arab League Secretary General, President Obasanjo, 
President Mbeki and other key African leaders to assist with 
the GNU.  He noted that he met with Ethiopian Minister of 
State Tekeda while in Addis to enlist PM Meles' leverage on 
Bashir. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
PLEA TO STRENGTHEN AMIS TO FACILITATE TRANSITION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9. (SBU) Annabi emphasized that, if a future UN PKO in Darfur 
is to be based on AMIS, partners must do everything possible 
to strengthen AMIS in the interim.  Rehatting alone has been 
proven in Sierra Leone not to work, Annabi cautioned.  He 
said it would be delusional to believe that the UN could 
successfully re-hat AMIS as-is.  Annabi added that bolstering 
AMIS will also make transition more politically acceptable 
for Africa, as a stronger AMIS stands less chance of giving 
the impression of a UN rescue.  He said that precise 
requirements to bring AMIS up to par can only be determined 
during the planning mission. 
 
10. (SBU) Annabi assessed that the AU team in Addis has the 
will to enhance AMIS and prepare transition, but has 
incomplete know-how.  While the UN has no mandate or funding 
to provide equipment to AMIS, it can strengthen its 
assistance cell in Addis and offer technical assistance in 
areas such as Joint Operations Center (JOC) set-up, logistics 
and communications  (Note:  These are many of the same areas 
where a NATO contribution is being considered.  Peace and 
Security Commissioner Djinnit will meet with partners April 
17 to discuss partner assistance to the JOC.  End note). 
 
11. (SBU) Annabi asked that partners ensure potential UN 
troop contributing countries live up to their commitments and 
also to encourage Rwanda or Nigeria to provide an extra 
battalion to AMIS now that Senegal and South Africa have 
fallen through.  Annabi noted that the mandate of a UN 
mission will have direct bearing on UN ability to attract 
military and civilian contributions.  He said that the UN 
plans a mission significantly larger than AMIS, but intends 
to compensate for lack of even higher numbers by ensuring 
mobility and rapid reaction capability.  Annabi said that, 
while the UN wants to retain the African character of the 
mission, there will undoubtedly be call for other regions to 
contribute.  He noted a particular need for advanced 
specialized capability only possessed by Western forces. 
 
12. (SBU) Annabi was cautious on the potential contribution 
of NATO to enhance AMIS.  He said that UNSYG Annan supports a 
role for NATO, but expressed concern on the timing of NATO 
involvement.  Annabi said that, while there are things NATO 
and the EU can do to enhance AMIS, talking about NATO 
presence at this stage complicates securing Sudanese 
cooperation on transition planning. 
 
------------------------ 
TEXT OF AU-UN COMMUNIQUE 
------------------------ 
 
13. (U) On 12 and 13 April, 2006, teams from the African 
Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat met in 
Addis Ababa to discuss the implementation of the AU Peace and 
Security Council communique of 10 March 2006, and United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1663 (2006) of 24 March, 
pertaining to the envisaged transition to a United Nations 
operation in Darfur. 
 
14. (U) The two teams agreed to work together to expedite 
planning for the envisaged transition to a United Nations 
operation in Darfur and, in the meantime, to strengthen the 
AU Mission in Sudan.  They also agreed to establish 
mechanisms for coordination and joint planning, in 
consultation with the Government of Sudan and other parties 
concerned. 
 
15. (U) The AU delegation was led by Commissioner for Peace 
and Security Said Djinnit, and included the Head of AMIS, 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001003  003 OF 003 
 
 
Baba Gana Kingibe, as well as senior staff from the Peace and 
Security Department and the Darfur Integrated Task Force. 
The United Nations team was led by Assistant Secretary 
General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hedi Annabi, and 
included the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary 
General for Sudan, Taye Zerihoun, as well as staff from DPKO 
and UNMIS. 
HUDDLESTON