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Viewing cable 06ABUJA772, DARFUR PEACE TALKS: TAHA OPTIMISTIC, MEDIATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ABUJA772 2006-04-12 10:41 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
VZCZCXRO5971
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #0772/01 1021041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121041Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5163
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3767
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: TAHA OPTIMISTIC, MEDIATION 
MISSTEPS 
 
REF: ABUJA 758 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary: Sudanese Vice President Taha remains 
hopeful that a comprehensive peace deal can be reached within 
weeks.  Taha and top SPLM leaders continue bilateral meetings 
with the movements in order to develop clear proposals on the 
way forward.  Taha expressed his desire for the AU to put 
forward the entire peace deal soon.  The talks experienced a 
temporary setback on April 11 when the AU tried to narrow 
differences on the cease-fire document at the same time it 
began consultations on the final security arrangements. 
USDEL and international partners are working with the parties 
and mediation to get the security arrangements discussions 
back on track.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - 
TAHA MEETING 
- - - - - - - 
 
2.  (SBU)  Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha received 
USDEL on April 10.  He was hopeful that an agreement could be 
reached within two weeks and said he encouraged the mediation 
to put forward a comprehensive document.  Taha described his 
meeting with Sudan Liberation Movement faction leader Minni 
Minnawi as "positive".  Taha also met with Abdelwahid Nur 
later that day.  He expects to meet with Justice and Equality 
Movement.  After he completes his meetings with the parties, 
Taha said his team will make an assessment and make clear 
proposals.  He indicated some GOS flexibility.  Taha thanked 
the US Government for its overall engagement and praised 
USDEL for its efforts in Abuja that created momentum in the 
process.  Sudanese delegation leader Magzoub al-Kalifa 
described USDEL's persuasion of the movements to map their 
locations as the key impetus in moving the security 
discussions forward.  He also said that USDEL remains a 
critical player in obtaining an final agreement.  Taha is set 
to depart on April 13. 
 
3. (SBU)  Khartoum CDA Hume told Taha that USDEL will 
continue to push for a balanced, comprehensive package from 
the AU mediation.  Once the package is introduced, USDEL will 
support negotiated changes only as long as a fair balance on 
key issues is maintained.  Taha appreciated USDEL willingness 
to work with all parties to encourage trade-offs and 
flexibility and continued pressure on AU mediation for a 
final document. 
 
- - - - - - - 
AU MEDIATION 
- - - - - - - 
 
4.  (SBU)  AU Special Envoy Salim Salim is staying in Abuja 
until VP Taha leaves.  In a meeting with USDEL and Special 
Representative Ranneberger on April 9, Salim said that he 
would reschedule a trip to New York to brief the UNSC.  In 
the meantime, Salim is encouraging bilateral discussions 
between the movements and Taha.  The AU intends on narrowing 
the "gaps" on some issues before presenting the comprehensive 
peace deal, according to Salim.  The AU is starting 
discussions on the final security arrangements document and 
getting the parties' final views on the cease-fire document. 
Salim said that if the parties balk at the cease-fire 
document, the AU will put the rest of the security 
arrangements (DDR, integration) forward.  Amb. Ranneberger 
expressed our desire to see the comprehensive deal on the 
table as soon as possible.  According to Salim, Taha had 
encouraged him to do the same thing.  On the UN transition, 
Salim said that AU President Sassou-Nguesso is supportive an 
AMIS-UN transition and that the preponderant view among 
African countries is that the UN re-hatting is necessary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MIXED SIGNALS SCUTTLE SECURITY MEETINGS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (SBU)  On April 11, the AU proceeded in its attempt to 
"narrow differences" on the cease-fire document while 
simultaneously carrying out discussions on the final security 
arrangements.  Their clumsy efforts created significant 
confusion and mistrust throughout the day.  In two plenary 
meetings, the AU's lack of clarity as to the purpose of the 
meetings led to embarrassing situations for the GOS and the 
movements.  In the morning, the AU called a meeting with the 
GOS.  The GOS arrived to discuss the cease-fire document only 
to be told by the AU mediation that the purpose of the 
meeting was to get the GOS's thoughts on final security 
arrangements.  After a brief delay, the GOS's delegation head 
 
ABUJA 00000772  002 OF 002 
 
 
Gen. Esmat made the best of the meeting but he expressed his 
delegation's frustration with the AU's performance.  He 
accused the AU of trying to embarrass the GOS delegation 
while their Vice President was in town.  After the meeting, 
Khartoum CDA Hume explained to Esmat what the AU was trying 
to achieve. 
 
6.  (SBU)  The AU then conducted separate, private bilateral 
meetings with the movements on the final security 
arrangements.  In the evening, the AU held a plenary with all 
the parties and partners on the cease-fire document.  The 
parties had told the partners and mediation that they needed 
to have the final security arrangements text prior to 
concluding work on the cease-fire document.  International 
partners were led to believe that the meeting would register 
the parties' positions on the cease-fire draft, which would 
then allow the AU to immediately put the final security 
arrangements text on the table.  AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok, 
however, unexpectedly proceeded to try to narrow differences 
on the document.  He asked the parties to express their 
concerns with the cease-fire document, which led the GOS 
delegation into a page-by-page discussion of the text. 
 
7.  (SBU)  In his reaction to the GOS presentation, SLM's 
security arrangements chief negotiator, Ali Trai, asked the 
mediation for more time to prepare.  The movements had 
received mixed signals throughout the day on the purpose of 
the meeting.  According to Trai, they came to the meeting to 
say that they would not accept the cease-fire document 
without knowing the future status of their forces.  Ibok then 
chastised the movements publicly, which created a significant 
level of anger, embarrassment, and distrust of the AU 
mediation.  USDEL members spoke with Ali immediately after 
the meeting to help smooth unnecessarily ruffled feathers. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
7.  (SBU)  The process can overcome yesterday's brief setback 
brought on by the AU's own miscalculation of the parties 
positions, failure to take its own experts' advice, and 
deeply-ingrained sense of caution.  We will encourage the 
mediation to get the final security arrangements document to 
the parties rather than discuss the cease-fire document. 
Taha and top level SPLM members are continuing their 
bilateral discussions with the movements.  We will continue 
working with the parties to rebuild their trust in the 
mediators and pushing the mediation to move the comprehensive 
document forward. 
CAMPBELL