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Viewing cable 06ABUJA729, DARFUR PEACE TALKS: PRONK WARNS UN TRANSITION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ABUJA729 2006-04-03 10:53 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
VZCZCXRO0228
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #0729/01 0931053
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031053Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5102
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3727
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: PRONK WARNS UN TRANSITION 
BEING UNDERMINED 
 
 
 1.  (SBU)  Summary: (SBU)  UN Special Representative for 
Sudan Jan Pronk expressed his concern that the African 
Union's top leadership, including Alpha Omar Konare, does not 
support the transition of an AU force to UN in Sudan on April 
1 and 2.  Pronk told USDEL and international partners that 
Konare reportedly outlined for UNSG Kofi Annan the three 
options being considered by the AU in Sudan: continuing with 
AMIS, an augmented AMIS plus a "coalition of the willing", 
and the least favored option of a UN transition.  According 
to Pronk, the AU executive is being manipulated by Khartoum 
and Tripoli to prevent an AMIS-UN transition.  The lack of 
cooperation from Khartoum and the AU will affect the 
transition assessment due to the UNSC on April 24, further 
undermining efforts to attract troop contributors.  Even more 
alarming is the prospect that AMIS forces will be paid for by 
the Government of Sudan and its Arab allies, an unacceptable 
development on all fronts.  AU President Denis Sasou-Nguesso 
and Konare are expected in Abuja on April 8 for consultations 
with Obasanjo and the AU mediation.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
KONARE TO ANNAN: UN TRANSITION ONLY ONE OPTION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2,  (SBU)  On April 1, UN Special Representative Jan Pronk 
outlined to USDEL his concerns that the African Union (AU) 
Executive may be working against the transition to a UN force 
in Darfur.  According to Pronk, AU Secretary General Alpha 
Konare meet with UNSG Kofi Annan last week.  Konare allegedly 
reported that the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in 
Addis supported the following options for Darfur: a 
continuation of AMIS as it is, an AMIS plus a "coalition of 
the willing" augmentation, and as a last resort, a transition 
to a UN force. 
 
3.  (SBU) Pronk also pointed out since the Government of 
Sudan began lobbying against a UN transition, the AMIS has 
been less cooperative with UN requests.  He speculated that 
AU sector commanders may have been given instructions to 
refer all matters to Force Headquarters.  These instructions 
are complicating and hampering ground operations, resulting 
in a situation in which there are more cease-fire violations 
occurring, but less AU monitoring.  Pronk also noted that the 
enlarged AU force is less proactive than its smaller 
predecessor.  Pronk was particularly critical of Konare for 
not attending the March 10 AU Peace and Security Council 
meeting and then allowing a range of interpretations of the 
PSC decision.  As further evidence of the AU's weak position 
on transition, Pronk stated that the AU did not argue "very 
strongly" in favor a UN transition at the Arab League Summit 
in Khartoum. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
AU WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR UN TRANSITION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (SBU)  Pronk reiterated these concerns to international 
partners on April 2, but was even more direct in criticizing 
Konare for falling for GOS manipulation and allowing the 
possibility of GOS funding for AMIS.  According to Pronk, 
Konare has stated that the AU PSC meeting on March 10 
emphasized giving AMIS a new mandate rather than a transition 
to the UN.  Pronk again stressed that, in his opinion, the AU 
executive views the AMIS transition to a UN force as a least 
favored option, which coincides with the GOS position. 
According to Pronk, the international community is now facing 
a situation in which AMIS will be funded by the GOS and Arab 
countries, a situation that the movements will find 
unacceptable.  He said that the AU has decided that it will 
finance AMIS for four months, the GOS will furnish two months 
of funding, and the Arab League pledge would cover the force 
after October 1. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Pronk said that without the consent of Sudan a UN 
mission in Darfur would be impossible.  An overall peace 
agreement in Abuja could help to secure this consent.  Pronk 
judged that President Bashir wants a full settlement, that 
the wealth- and power-sharing documents could be settled 
quickly, and that the security discussions were finally 
moving forward.  Without a full agreement Bashir will oppose 
UN forces.  He explained why further progress toward a full 
settlement now required a comprehensive security agreement, 
not an enhanced ceasefire.  In turn, due to the limits of AU 
capacity, the UN would be required to take over the 
peace-keeping to meet the requirements of a full settlement. 
 
6.  (SBU)  In response to questions, Pronk said that the UN 
 
ABUJA 00000729  002 OF 002 
 
 
had no evidence of direct GOS involvement in the recent 
fighting with Chad, but Arab militias had been involved.  He 
warned that the rumored April 8 heads of state meeting in 
Abuja could be "highly risky", because the participation was 
both selective and arbitrary.  At the end of the session he 
told the international partners that peace required a full 
package of texts, including a solution to disarming the 
janjaweed and demobilizing other forces.  He said it was 
positive that all of the elements were finally on the table 
for discussion. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ENHANCED HUMANITARIAN CEASE-FIRE NOT ENOUGH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (SBU)  The AU Mediation's determined pursuit of an 
Enhanced Humanitarian Cease-fire is not enough to allow for 
the transition to a UN force for Darfur and could become a 
"stumbling block" to the process, according to Pronk.  He 
explained that despite his misgivings, he had supported the 
AU mediation's effort on EHCF if it did not lead to a 
deterioration of the situation on the ground or stop the 
negotiations on the comprehensive peace deal from moving 
ahead.  Now, Pronk said, it is clear that the EHCF is not 
supported by any of the parties and does not provide for a UN 
transition.  Pronk also said that the AU's continued 
postponement of key decisions prompted his approach to key 
UNSC members to encourage Khartoum to accept the joint AU-UN 
assessment mission. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
AU LEADERSHIP TO ABUJA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (SBU)  According to the AU Mediation, AU President Denis 
Sasou-Nguesso and Konare will be visiting Abuja for 
consultations with Obasanjo on April 8.  Other heads of state 
are rumored to be coming.  The AU has called a Joint 
Commission meeting in Addis Ababa from April 4-6 in advance 
of an AU PSC meeting on April 6.  Salim departed Abuja on 
April 2 for Dar Es Salam and then for Addis for the PSC 
meeting, to be back t Abuaj in time for the Sassou/Konare 
et.al. visit. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
9.  (SBU)  In the absence of a full agreement, the government 
of Sudan and the AU leadership are keeping ideas for a 
continued AMIS mission in play, slowing down the UN 
transition process as well as the peace talks.  It is 
important that the progress being made toward a full 
agreement not be derailed at either the PSC meeting in Addis 
or the April 8 meetings in Abuja.  Pronk's visit helped to 
alert other international partners to these risks, but some 
European partners have a lingering attraction toward the idea 
of priority for a cease-fire text rather than for the full 
settlment needed for a UN transition. 
CAMPBELL