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Viewing cable 06TOKYO1587, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/27/06
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06TOKYO1587 | 2006-03-27 07:49 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO2202
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1587/01 0860749
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270749Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0158
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
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RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
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RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8471
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5332
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6504
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1330
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7517
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9468
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 TOKYO 001587
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ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/27/06
INDEX:
(1) Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe proposes setting up panel for
promotion of second chance for failed executives
(2) Koizumi successor - Study of Shinzo Abe (Part 4): Making
preparations for dispute on consumption tax, Yasukuni issue
(3) Interview with 1st Joint Staff Chief Massaki: SDF ready for
terrorist attacks, disasters
(4) Roundtable: Where is Iraq going?
(5) Deployment of X-Band Radar in Tsugaru: Residents fear that
Shariki base will become target of enemy missiles; Defense Agency
underscores difference from X-rays
ARTICLES:
(1) Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe proposes setting up panel for
promotion of second chance for failed executives
SANKEI (Page 5) (Excerpts)
March 24, 3006
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe revealed in a press conference
on March 23 a plan to set up a panel made up of bureau director-
level officials from ministries and agencies to discuss the
creation of a social framework in which failed entrepreneurs can
try again to reenter the market. Abe would head the advisory
panel. As a measure to respond to criticism that the Koizumi
structural reform drive created social disparity and had its dark
as well as light side, the government intends to incorporate the
panel's suggestions in its "big-boned reform policy guidelines"
to be worked out in June. Many in political circles think that
Abe will make the ideas that come out into a part of his campaign
pledges for the upcoming presidential election of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP).
Asked by reporters about why he formed the panel, Abe responded
firmly:
"Fair competition can boost the economy and add to Japan's
strength. Sometimes we win and sometimes we lose. It is not
desirable for a permanent class of winners and losers to become
entrenched. It is important to create a society in which people
who fail can have another chance to try again."
Creating a society that offers a second chance at success means
placing more importance on an equal opportunity than on the
equality of results. In turn, it means a "counterattack" against
forces in the ruling camp that have been calling for correcting
social disparity.
Although there are many problems to tackle in order realize his
goal, Abe intends to hold a first meeting of the panel as early
as next week and come up with an interim report before the end of
May. He proposed the plan to Prime Minister Koizumi on March 22.
Koizumi reportedly said on approving it, "It's a good idea, so, I
want you to do your best."
Abe has been skeptical about postwar Japan's policies of
democratic "equality" (i.e., equal results instead of equal
TOKYO 00001587 002 OF 012
opportunity). He has, therefore, long cherished the idea of a
"second chance" as part of his political belief since he was
elected to the Diet. During his tenure as secretary general of
the LDP, Abe worked hard to change the way of the LDP officially
introducing candidates in national elections. At the time, he
used the phrase: "We need to establish a system under which
everybody can challenge politically again and again," as the
keyword of a reform of the party. When he met last December with
Carlos Ghosn, president and the CEO of Nissan Motor Co., he
enthusiastically told him: "A society in which the effort pays
off will enrich a country. It is the political responsibility to
create a society in which those who have failed can have the
chance to try again."
Regarding the Team Japan's victory in the World Baseball Classic,
Abe repeatedly said, "We should never give up. Team Japan showed
us that as long as we refuse to give up, we will always have
another chance."
All the more because the idea seems to be a key notion in his
forming an administration, it is now causing a stir in the LDP. A
mid-level LDP lawmaker, who has close ties with Abe, commented:
"The idea reflects Mr. Abe's political identity. But I did not
think he would have revealed it so soon. He might be trying to
erase the image of his being weak in economic and domestic
affairs."
A former cabinet minister said, "Since the next government will
continue to focus on the "big-boned guidelines" policy, I assume
that he wanted to place his own policy imprint in the
guidelines."
(2) Koizumi successor - Study of Shinzo Abe (Part 4): Making
preparations for dispute on consumption tax, Yasukuni issue
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Excerpts)
March 23, 2006
Shinzo Abe, who is known as a political hawk, also has been
working hard as a member of the social welfare-policy clique in
the Diet while serving as Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Social
Affairs Department head and other key posts.
The LDP, the Social Democratic Party, and the New Party Sakigake
inaugurated the Murayama administration in 1994. In this
government, Abe was picked as a member of its social welfare
project team. This gave Abe his start in social welfare-related
activities.
"You assume the post, Mr. Abe," said Junichiro Koizumi, who
having already served as health and welfare minister, declined a
turn at the lesser post and recommended that freshman lawmaker
Abe get it instead. Abe's grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, started
work on launching national healthcare and pension systems. The
systems were introduced in 1961, but Kishi was forced to step
down in 1960 in the aftermath of the struggle over the Japan-US
Security Treaty. So Abe took the plunge and accepted the big role
as team leader.
In 1999, Abe engaged in negotiations with the Japan Medical
Association over a revision of the nation's medical treatment fee
system. These experiences were of great help for him to unify
TOKYO 00001587 003 OF 012
views in the government over a reform of the medical system late
last year. He attends a weekly meeting of the "parliamentary
group to work out a sustainable social security system" -
composed of mid-ranking and junior lawmakers - almost every week.
He has stressed the necessity of reforming the pension, medical,
and nursing systems in a comprehensive way.
Spending cuts first
On the controversial issue of whether to raise the consumption
tax rate, Abe's assertion is that cutting spending should come
first before the consumption tax is hiked. He draws a line with
Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki, who proposed submitting bills
to raise the consumption tax to the Diet in 2007.
Abe also has backed administrative reforms, such as a second
round of reforms of the central government offices and further
strengthening of the functions of the Prime Minister's Office. He
believes these tasks the next administration should tackle on a
top priority basis, as part of an effort to form "small
government."
Abe never forgets to cite the plan to raise by fiscal 2009 the
share of the burden on the national treasury of pensions from one
third to half the total payment. Some observers speculate that
Abe is considering the possibility of submitting related bills to
the Diet in 2008, while carefully watching moves for spending
cuts and economic trends.
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) lifted its monetary-easing policy on
March 9. Abe opposed the new policy to the last minute. Even
after the BOJ came up with the policy-switch decision, Abe has
continued his efforts to discourage the BOJ from immediately
abandoning its zero interest-rate policy. Should the economy fall
into a flat spin, the current administration will unavoidably be
at a disadvantage. Economic stagnation could also block the way
to his assumption of the prime minister's post. The wrangling
between Abe and the BOJ is likely to continue for a while.
Importance placed on results
In revising the Constitution, Abe wants Japan to be allowed to
use the right to collective self-defense. He also emphasizes the
need to strengthen Japan's role in helping to stabilize the
international community. Even while recognizing the difficulty of
immediately placing the task of revising the Constitution on the
political agenda, he thinks that if Japan and the US increase
their interdependence under their security arrangements, it will
become possible for Japan to offer its views on even ground with
the US.
The image of a state that Abe has envisioned for Japan is a
"country that can be proud of its history and culture." Many
lawmakers from the ruling and opposition camps look favorably on
such a conservative stance.
Abe has no intention to avoid disputes over Asia policy. China
has sent a signal that "if Koizumi's successor refrains from
visiting Yasukuni Shrine, Japan-China relations will head for
normalization." Abe, however, instructed the Foreign Ministry to
map out a strategy toward China on the premise that the prime
minister will continue to visit the shrine.
TOKYO 00001587 004 OF 012
Abe said: "To pursue national interests, it is necessary to adopt
a strategic approach. Politicians must be realists." Producing
results is an essential matter for Abe.
(3) Interview with 1st Joint Staff Chief Massaki: SDF ready for
terrorist attacks, disasters
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
March 25, 2006
On March 27, the Self-Defense Forces will integrate its three
branches under a joint chain of command. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun
interviewed Joint Staff Council (JSC) Chairman Hajime Massaki,
61, who will become the first chief of the Joint Staff Office
(JSO) of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces (GSDF,
MSDF, and ASDF) to hear his views on the aim of SDF integration
and challenges.
-- Why does the SDF need to integrate its three services?
Massaki: In the event of major disasters, the GSDF, MSDF, and
ASDF will have to respond immediately and effectively. In order
for the three SDF services to do so, it's only natural to ready
them. It will take time to respond if the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF
separately assist the Defense Agency director general in that
event. And now, we must integrate their respective chains of
command to be ready at any time for missile attacks and other
newly emerging threats.
-- At the time of the Hanshin (Osaka-Kobe) earthquake, the SDF
services were out of step in their disaster relief operations.
Massaki: Indeed, we could do more from the perspective of
effective operations. Meanwhile, at the time of the 2004 Sumatra
offing earthquake, we employed MSDF vessels to sealift GSDF
members and used GSDF helicopters for rescue operations. That
became a touchstone for the SDF integration.
-- Will the SDF integration affect the SDF's partnership with US
forces?
Massaki: We'll also integrate out points of contact with US
forces, so our bilateral alliance will be more credible.
-- What's up ahead of the SDF integration?
Massaki: For the time being, under the JSO's command, we need to
facilitate the deployment of GSDF members in Iraq and the
deployment of MSDF vessels in the Indian Ocean. Each of the three
SDF services has a history of 50 years. In addition, they also
have different cultures. We should not just mix them up but
should make the most of what they have. In that image, we'd like
to take time. It's also critical to team up with other government
ministries and agencies. There's also something the Defense
Agency alone cannot do. We'd like to ready ourselves for
political decisions.
(4) Roundtable: Where is Iraq going?
ASAHI (Page 15) (Full)
March 16, 2006
On March 20, Iraq will be at three-year mark since the war
TOKYO 00001587 005 OF 012
started. Amid bloodshed and turmoil, Iraq somehow managed to
elect state parliamentarians for its recovery and entry into the
community of democratic nations. However, Iraq has now become a
theater of intensifying conflicts involving Islamic sects. Such a
situation prevents Iraq from launching a permanent government,
with foreign security troops about to pull out. As it stands, the
situation in Iraq is growing even murkier than before, with
uncertainties looming ahead. The Asahi Shimbun held a roundtable
of three experts on Iraq to discuss its future course: Keiko
Sakai, a professor at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies;
Fumiaki Kubo, a professor at the University of Tokyo; and
Kunihiko Miyake, representative of the AOI Institute of Foreign
Policy Studies.
Iraq now
-- What's your view of Iraq now?
Sakai: There are three points to note. First, there is now
spreading armed clashes involving the Iraqi people themselves. In
the past, local people resorted to violence to stir up religious
conflict. However, this February's bombing of a mosque in Samala
touched off a chain reaction of armed conflicts across that
country. The clerics could no longer control the perpetrators, or
their own control system didn't work in itself. So the situation
is now serious. Second, Islamic groups are on the rise. Last
year, in January and in December, Iraq held elections for its
national assembly. But secular candidates couldn't get enough
votes. In the meantime, Islamic groups have now come to stay with
their overwhelming power. From now on, their emergence would
become a focus along with situations in neighboring countries,
such as the rise of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority. And
third, I can't ignore Iran's intervention.
Kubo: The US Bush administration wants to pull out some of those
US troops in a visible way before this November's off-year
election and leave security jobs in the hands of reinforced Iraqi
forces and local police. But the Shiites and the Sunnis are
intensifying the conflict. So I wonder if Iraqis can make it in
such a situation when such things are happening. They face a new
challenge.
Miyake: In January last year, Iraq held an election for its
national assembly. In that election, the turnout of voters was
over 8 million. But in the next election that took place in
December last year, a total of 12 million people-or nearly 80% of
that country's voting population-went to the polls to cast their
votes. The political elite of that country used to be a governing
council of 25 members picked by the US-led occupation forces. But
now, that country's poverty-stricken groups, including Sadr's
supporters, are somehow taking part in the political process.
This situation is a far cry from being a civil war, that is,
armed insurgents try to secure the legitimacy of governance. In a
civil war, the Sunni people will suffer the worst. In that case,
(autonomy-minded) Kurds will enjoy themselves. However, Iraq has
yet to have its own full-fledged security forces. So there may be
no end to the rat race going on with the resistance forces.
-- What's your view of the deployment of US troops in Iraq? Is
Iraq recovering public security and making progress in the
political process?
Kubo: The present-day situation in Iraq is often compared with
TOKYO 00001587 006 OF 012
the Vietnam War. However, the government of South Vietnam, which
the United States backed in those days, had almost no democratic
legitimacy. Besides, people in South Vietnam distanced themselves
from the then government. The Iraqi government now is of
qualifying legitimacy in terms of average democracy in the world.
Miyake: Iraq is now undergoing a historic experiment. From the
start, that country's border is a man-made product. Kurdish
people live in northern districts, Sunni people in the middle
part, and Shiite people in southern districts. Iraq has more than
20 million people, and the Iraqi people were under the rule of
autocracy. This pattern of governing is now back to where it
started. In the history of Iraq, the ruler threatened to kill
political opponents. There are still many people being killed.
However, Iraq has never held such talks to make political
decisions. The United States' deployment of 160,000 troops in
Iraq will not lead to the recovery of public security in that
country. But if the United States discontinues its troop
deployment there, the local situation will go from bad to worse.
When I was in Iraq as a diplomat, the multinational force used to
be the main target of attack. But now, the resistance forces
target Iraqis. They have lost public support, so they're now
being isolated and weakened. In such a situation, it would be
better at this point to continue the deployment of US troops in
Iraq.
-- What made Shiite and Sunni peoples intensify their conflicts?
Sakai: They long lived together in Iraq. But there is an Islamic
political party that upholds the ideology of Shiite people. That
political party's militia now controls the national security
organization that should be neutral. Sunni people think the
Islamic Shiite group is using force to control the Sunni people.
So the Sunnis are going against the Shiites. In addition, the
United States created the governing council after the war to help
reconstruct Iraq. In that process, the United States created a
political elite in the form of such-and-such persons from the
Shiites and from the Sunnis. There's no denying that this also
provoked the Sunnis. In Iraq, the Kurdish people have long
desired autonomy. However, they've never had a political party of
their own because the Shiites and the Sunnis have already had
their own to govern within the framework of their regime. This is
also a primary factor explaining their clashes. In such a
situation, the United States does not want to be involved in any
local political party. That's why US forces can do nothing about
their conflict. In the meantime, Ayatolla Ali Shistani called for
state-controlled security as a religious authority of the
Shiites. But now, even Shistani has no choice but to have his own
bodyguards.
US and Mideast democratization
-- How is the US reacting?
Kubo: In the United States, Iraq policy has now become a major
political issue. That's true. When the Iraq war started, an
overwhelming majority of the Americans supported the Iraq war. In
the spring of 2004, however, public opinion in the United States
was split over that war, with the even proportions of those
supporting the Iraq war and those thinking it was wrong. And now,
their proportions have changed places. At the same time,
President Bush's approval rating also went down, now hanging low
at 34%. I can say the US is paying a big political cost for the
TOKYO 00001587 007 OF 012
Iraq war. Even so, the Democratic Party, now on the opposition
bench, is also in a dilemma. They know it's not good enough to
only target antiwar people in their campaigning for the 2008
presidential election. For one thing, the United States is
fighting against terrorism. Many of the Americans want the Bush
administration to take an even stronger stand against terrorists.
That's why.
-- When it comes to interventions from outside, Al Qaeda and Iran
are reportedly pulling the wires behind the scenes.
Miyake: In Iraq, there are diehard survivors from the former
Baath party, swearing loyalty to former President Hussein, as
well as fanatical militants. Moreover, in Iraq, there are also Al
Qaeda members and other foreign insurgents. They would continue
their activities in Iraq. But it looks like they're now wide
apart from the Iraqi people and they're becoming weak. The
political situation in Iraq now is close to the Liberal
Democratic Party's one-time factional struggle. They at least
understand that it's in their common interest to keep up the
current political system. In the meantime, the biggest problem to
Iraq is its nuclear development program. The United States is
standing against Iran's nuclear program. Iraq is now being driven
into a tight corner in the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). They know the United States would next target their
country after Iraq becomes stabilized, so I think they're
maneuvering in Iraq. They probably want Iraq to remain in turmoil
as far as they're not affected, and they want to be left alone.
That's probably the best possible situation for them.
-- What about other neighboring countries?
Miyake: Sunnis form a majority in Arab countries along the Gulf.
They have a very strong fear of Iraq that is ruled by Shiites.
They also don't want Iran to gain power under the rule of
Shiites. For the Gulf states, Iraq is a buffer and the present-
day situation is best.
-- President Bush used the words "Islamic radicalism" in his
strategy to contain enemies.
Kubo: He wouldn't compromise on Iran's nuclear development.
People called "neoconservatives" were optimistic about the Iraq
war. One of them said Iraqis would welcome American troops as
liberators. So they've now lost their influence. But they have
not completely disappeared from the administration. They would
remain influential in the United States' foreign policy, for the
United States is taking a hardline stance toward China and Syria.
-- What about the Middle East's democratization? How do you think
the secular government of Iraq will turn out?
Sakai: It would be a centralized governance structure and Iraq
would become an Islamic state. Otherwise, it would go for
decentralization while remaining secular. At present, there are
struggles between two political groups, one opting for secular
decentralized governance and the other for Islamic centralized
governance. In either case, the current secular centralized
government would substantially change.
Miyake: They say they have only to create a secular democracy.
That's their postwar approach in Iraq. But it's no good to talk
about secularism or democracy to people who devote their lives to
TOKYO 00001587 008 OF 012
their god. I think there's a hint in the idea of Christian
democracy in Europe. Religious people must not be excluded. Iraqi
people will have to acquire experience to establish their own
Islamic democracy and govern in a realistic way, or the Middle
East can't be democratized, I think.
Sakai: Basically, I agree to that view. The more elections they
have in Iraq, the more elections Islamic groups win. That's clear
in the past two years. It's no use dreaming of a secular
governance structure. There's no choice but to think of how well
to get along with Islamic groups on the rise. When taking a look
at Shiite political groups now, there's a pragmatic Islamic
political party mainly consisting of elite people, and there's a
group that has almost no pragmatism like Sadr's supporters but
has strong clout on the masses. The two groups are fifty-fifty in
their balance of seats. This situation is a factor of trouble in
electing their prime minister.
Kubo: Even in the Middle East, there's a country like Iran that
restricts people's candidacy for elections. In the case of
Palestinians, they don't have such restrictions. There are such
important differences. Even after a democratic election, the
governing party may change rules to remain in office. That's
undeniable, indeed. However, the important thing is to maintain
democratic rules. That's the starting point of mature democracy.
-- The US appears returning to multilateralism in its relations
with Europe.
Kubo: In terms of multilateralism, there are important criteria,
such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Kyoto Protocol.
However, it's inconceivable that the United States will turn out
to be a multilateralism-oriented country under the Bush
administration. The United States may think over the deadlocked
situation in Iraq. But Iraq and Iran are in quite different
circumstances. It's not a fundamental change in the United
States' foreign policy. We should take it as a limited move
aiming in part to repair the United States' relations with
Europe. For example, the United States recently agreed with India
to extend technological cooperation to India in the area of
atomic power generation. Such cooperation, however, could
unilaterally undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In
the end, the United States factored in what's in its national
interests. That's probably their judgment. I guess that the
United States deemed it important to strengthen its economic ties
with India or otherwise to check China and not to isolate India
as a democratic country.
SDF evaluation
-- Then, what's your evaluation of Japan's deployment of Self-
Defense Forces personnel in Iraq?
Sakai: According to findings from public opinion surveys
conducted in Samawah and other local districts around the SDF
camp, there are no negative reactions to the SDF presence. At the
same time, however, local people also don't think the SDF
presence there has dramatically improved the livelihood of local
people. Nevertheless, they want the SDF to stay on. They're
probably aware that Japan's assistance with its deployment of SDF
troops supports their daily lives. If that's the case, the SDF
deployment there might have had little to do with the
TOKYO 00001587 009 OF 012
effectiveness of Japan's aid to that country. In other words, it
might be better for Japan to only provide official development
assistance (ODA) from the start.
Miyake: Japan's deployment of SDF troops in Iraq and Japan's
assistance to that country with ODA projects have nothing to do
with the United States. Japan demonstrated its intention to
support Iraq. It's wrong to separate ODA projects and SDF
activities in this way or that way when talking about Japan's
contribution to Iraq. The Japanese government decided to carry
them out as one. There's an argument raising a question about
continuing the SDF deployment. At this point, however, there's no
information enough to decide to recall the SDF troops. Even Prime
Minister Koizumi probably can't make such a decision. There's no
choice but to wait and see the situation for a while.
Kubo: There are various opinions among the Iraqi people, too.
However, if their democratic and legitimate government asks the
SDF to stay on or appreciates Japan's cooperation, then we should
probably think in a positive way. We should not evaluate the SDF
from the aspect of how many people the SDF hired or how many
buildings the SDF created. Instead, we should evaluate the SDF
from the perspective of the fact that Japan demonstrated its
willingness to assist with Iraq's nation rebuilding.
-- How do you think Japan should get along with Iraq from now on?
Sakai: The local image of Japanese technology is probably high.
That's what shows Iraqi people's expectations for Japan. Iraqi
people are asking for economic aid, but only the political
process is going ahead. So their frustration is growing stronger.
The question is how to meet their expectations for Japan's aid in
the areas of infrastructure construction and education. That's
probably the point.
Iran policy involved
Daiji Sadamori, Asahi Shimbun
How will future historians depict the Iraq war? Will they regard
the Iraq war as a 'lost war' for the United States that further
destabilized the Middle East although the United States, burning
with vengeful thoughts for the 9-11 terrorist attacks, could not
satisfy itself with the Afghan war alone and went so far as to
topple even the Hussein regime, an enemy of long standing? Will
they otherwise give high marks to the Iraq war as what paved the
way to the Middle East's democratization and strengthened the
United States' unipolar structure as the only superpower in the
long run although the United States' prestige was called into
question with its largest military strategy since the Vietnam
War?
In the roundtable, the three experts were split in opinion about
Iraq that still remains unable to find a way out of its bogged-
down situation. That is because Iraq is at a risk for a civil war
like the former Yugoslavia and Lebanon but the country's
democratic political process has not died out.
The international community's desired future image of Iraq is
that Iraq will have a government of national unity that overcomes
the barriers of religious sects and ethnic groups and will
rebuild itself into a nation that is stabilized enough for the US-
and UK-led multinational force to pull out. Iraq's national
TOKYO 00001587 010 OF 012
assembly will meet March 16 to establish a legitimate government.
It is three months after its election held late last year.
However, there would be struggles for the posts of oil, defense,
and home affairs ministers and other key cabinet posts. It would
not be easy for Iraq to inaugurate its new government.
US President Bush, now hovering low in his approval ratings at
home, and his administration are still optimistic about the Iraqi
situation. However, how long can the Bush administration remain
tough against Iran, which has influence on Iraq, over its nuclear
development issue?
The United States once attempted in vain to contain both Iran and
Iraq. How will the United States settle its showdown with Iran?
The Iraq war, in its settlement, will involve such a factor, too.
(5) Deployment of X-Band Radar in Tsugaru: Residents fear that
Shariki base will become target of enemy missiles; Defense Agency
underscores difference from X-rays
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Pp.29-30) (Abridged)
March 24, 2006
Although Okinawa Prefecture seems to be stealing national
attention due to the planned relocation of the US Marine Corps'
Futenma Air Station, there is another essential site elsewhere in
the country connected to the realignment of US forces in Japan.
It is Tsugaru City, Aomori Prefecture. The US military has
decided to deploy in Tsugaru an X-Band radar, designed to detect
and track ballistic missiles, as part of the missile defense (MD)
system. This article examines local reactions to MD, which has
been likened to hitting a fired bullet with another fired bullet,
according to experts.
On the afternoon of March 22, the Tomiyachi community center in
Tsugaru was packed with some 90 local business leaders. Before
SIPDIS
the local audience, officials from the Defense Agency and the
Sendai District Defense Facilities Administration Bureau
repeatedly said, "Obtaining your understanding is essential for
Japan's national defense." Their explanation elicited questions
from attendees, such as, "Why did you have to pick Shariki?" and,
"Is it all right for fishermen to be showered with radio waves
every day?"
Located in Tsugaru in the northeastern Aomori Prefecture facing
the Sea of Japan, the Shariki district is a quiet farming village
known for its delicious melons and other products. Fishing is
also a main industry. But since the Air Self-Defense Force's
Shariki detachment base was established in 1980, national defense
has been a matter of concern for the residents of Shariki.
On March 3, the Defense Facilities Administration Agency unveiled
a plan to deploy the X-Band Radar at the Shariki base. The
announcement was followed by the Aomori prefectural government's
decision not to conduct a plebiscite. Feeling uneasy, residents
have launched a group opposing the X-Band Radar led by Shozo
Narita, chairman of the Tomiyachi association. The group has
repeatedly asked DFAA for a briefing session.
What is the X-Band Radar? Newly developed by the US military, it
is designed to detect and track ballistic missiles heading toward
countries that are friends and allies of the United States.
Composed of a container-like unit weighing 30 tons or so, the
TOKYO 00001587 011 OF 012
radar is easily mobile and is capable of emitting radio waves to
detect objects.
The Defense Agency plans to deploy the unit at the Shariki base
this summer or later against missiles from North Korea and China.
Having heard rumors, local residents fear the radio waves'
hazardous effects on humans and damage to agricultural and marine
products. One resident said apprehensively, "Shariki may become a
target of enemy missiles. Public security may be disturbed by US
troops stationed here."
To appease local concerns, a DFAA official explained:
"Although it is called the X-Band, it is different from X-rays
and is safe. The deployment will help increase Japan's deterrent
capability against armed attacks. The agency will urge the US
military to maintain high discipline. DFAA will station its
officials on a regular basis as counselors."
Mitsuo Narumi, 76, a Tomiyachi association executive, commented
in a strong tone:
"Until recently, we were left in the dark about the plan, on
which the government must have decided a long time ago. The
government is trying to steamroll the plan by ignoring local
residents."
A cabinet decision was made in late March 2003 to introduce the
US-led MD system. The government plans to begin deploying the X-
Band Radar in late fiscal 2006 in the hope it will play an
important role in missile defense.
But why was Aomori Prefecture picked?
Military analyst Motoaki Kamiura takes this view:
"In 1998, a North Korean ballistic missile flew over the Tohoku
region and splashed into waters off Sanriku. If North Korea is to
launch a ballistic missile at a direction of the United States,
it has only the technology to fire it eastward. For this reason,
the Defense Agency seems to have picked Aomori to prepare against
another missile from North Korea."
It is also greatly significant to deploy the X-Band Radar at an
ASDF base instead of a US military facility.
Military affairs commentator Osamu Inagaki noted:
"Until now, cooperative relations existed in the form of the SDF
providing the US military with intelligence on submarines
collected by P-3Cs. The future image is that SDF personnel will
work side by side with US military personnel. It will be part of
the transformation for the efficient integrated operations of the
SDF and US forces in Japan."
But the integrated operations of Japanese and US forces run the
risk of integrating some residents into the US military, as well.
Inagaki explained the fear of residents, saying, "Missile defense
requires both ballistic missiles and a radar, and an enemy is
expected to take aim at the radar."
Missile defense may rock Japan's basic security principles. Under
TOKYO 00001587 012 OF 012
the SDF Law, Japan is allowed to intercept incoming ballistic and
other missiles only. It is extremely difficult to determine if a
missile is headed for Japan. Shooting down a missile with an
unpredictable destination may constitute the exercise of the
right of collective self-defense, which is prohibited under the
Constitution.
Kamiura raised questions, saying:
"A launched missile changes its direction to the east after the
boost phase. It's possible to determine where it is headed from
its altitude and its angle. But it takes only about 10 minutes
for a North Korean missile to land in Japan. It's actually
impossible to selectively determine to intercept a Japan-bound
missile and stay away from one headed for Guam."
A lack of discussion on the right of collective self-defense
Aomori prefectural assemblyman Hidehiko Watanabe of the Social
Democratic Party noted in an angry tone:
"Residents fear the radar's possible adverse effects on humans
and the environment. The US military and the Japanese government
are trying to deploy the radar without making sufficient efforts
to dispel their concerns. The residents are becoming distrustful
of such an approach."
Kamiura also expressed apprehensions about the government's
approach of pushing ahead with the plan without resolving
problems:
"The government is trying to move on to the deployment of the X-
Band Radar and the operation of MD without discussing at the Diet
what to do with the question of exercising the right of
collective self-defense under the Constitution. Japan would end
up as a strategic stronghold for the US military."
Last October, Tokyo and Washington produced an interim report on
US force realignment requiring Japan to complete local
coordination by the end of this month.
"The government underestimated Aomori because unlike Okinawa and
Iwakuni, we didn't voice our opposition to the X-Band Radar,"
Watanabe said angrily.
The Defense Agency is scheduled to brief the Aomori prefectural
assembly today and Tsugaru residents tomorrow to seek their
understanding. Chairman Narita of the group opposing the X-Band
Radar commented: "Explanations have been insufficient. We will
file a petition and take other actions."
Tsugaru city assemblyman Katsuhide Shirato from the Shariki
SIPDIS
district said:
"We will boil down conditions, such as regular health checkups. A
signature-collecting campaign may follow the government's refusal
of our requests."
SCHIEFFER