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Viewing cable 06TOKYO1461, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/20/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO1461 2006-03-20 08:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4580
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1461/01 0790807
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200807Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9946
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7846
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5218
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8361
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5238
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6401
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1225
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7412
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9376
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 001461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/20/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Nago City mayor on Futenma relocation plan: Minor change is 
unacceptable; Must be on the outer side of Henoko Point 
 
(2) Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe negative about revising Futenma 
relocation plan 
 
(3) Editorial: US request for 7.5 billion dollars for force 
realignment extravagant 
 
(4) Editorial: The price tag for US troops relocation extravagant 
 
(5) Gas fields in East China Sea: JDA considering expanding 
interpretation of SDF Law to allow ASDF planes to back up MSDF 
vessels 
 
(6) Successors to Koizumi (Part 1): Study of Shinzo Abe -- 
playing up own political identity is a double-edged sword 
 
(7) US closely examining third BSE case 
 
(8) Personnel affairs at Foreign Ministry 
 
(9) CEFP changing its nature from top-down decision making forum 
to setting for various government agencies to coordinate views: 
Chasm between Takenaka and private-sector members: Yosano 
gradually seizing initiative 
 
(10) EDITORIALS 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Nago City mayor on Futenma relocation plan: Minor change is 
unacceptable; Must be on the outer side of Henoko Point 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Excerpt) 
Evening, March 20, 2006 
 
Commenting on the issue of the relocation of the US Marines' 
Futenma Air Station to Henoko Point in Nago City, Okinawa 
Prefecture, Nago City Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro today said, "We 
cannot go along with a revision that goes no farther than 
changing the angle of the proposed runway." He made it clear that 
the city was sticking its call for a large-scale revision that 
would move the location to "someplace in between the outer 
perimeter of the seaside of the Henoko Point proposal and the 
formerly planned site in the offing of Henoko." The mayor was 
responding to coverage by the Asahi Shimbun and other news 
companies. 
 
Mayor Shimabukuro also commented on the statements of flexibility 
toward revising the government's plan that are starting to come 
from senior ruling camp officials, such as Liberal Democratic 
Party Policy Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa, saying: 
"(Minor revisions) are unacceptable. We insist that it be on the 
outer side of the proposed Henoko Point site." 
 
(2) Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe negative about revising Futenma 
relocation plan 
 
Asahi, (Page 3) (Full) 
Evening, March 20, 2006 
 
TOKYO 00001461  002 OF 009 
 
 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe during his press briefing this 
morning touched on remarks by Liberal Democratic Party Policy 
Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa suggesting the 
possibility of a revision of the plan to relocate the US Marines' 
Futenma Air Station. He said, "I think he was only speaking from 
the point of view of the party." In addition, he took a negative 
view about revising the government's plan, saying: "I would like 
to expend every effort to explain to the local community the 
contents of the joint document of agreement between Japan and the 
US from last October. With the final compilation by Japan and the 
US coming in March, there will be no change in the stances that 
were taken during the talks on the current proposal." 
 
(3) Editorial: US request for 7.5 billion dollars for force 
realignment extravagant 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
March 19, 2006 
 
A fierce tug-of-war between Japan and the United States over the 
cost of relocating US Marines from Okinawa to Guam is becoming a 
major focus in the ongoing bilateral talks on the realignment of 
US forces in Japan, now in the final stretch. 
 
US Defense Department authorities have revealed that they have 
estimated the cost for relocating 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa 
to Guam to be 10 billion dollars, or 1.18 trillion yen, in total 
and that they have asked Japan to bear 75% of it. It was unusual 
for the US to reveal what was being discussed at the 
administrative level. What was more unusual and surprising was 
Japan's share of 885 billion yen. 
 
Reportedly, the US government had initially estimated the 
relocation cost to be 3 billion dollars and presented Japan with 
a figure of 8 billion dollars in February. An additional 2 
billion dollars on top of that is hardly acceptable. The price 
tag is extravagant in comparison to Japan's annual host nation 
support for US forces in Japan, which is approximately 230 
billion yen. 
 
To begin with, the realignment of US forces in Japan is part of 
the ongoing global transformation of US forces. In other words, 
the realignment of US forces in Japan is designed to serve the 
interests of the United States. 
 
In the bilateral talks, Japan has also asked the US for steps to 
reduce the burden on local areas hosting US bases. Relocating US 
Marines to Guam is the largest step to reduce the burden on 
Okinawa. The US logic is that because US Marines will be 
transferred to Guam in compliance with Japan's request, there is 
every reason for Japan to bear the cost. 
 
Some Japanese have doubts about the need for Japan to foot the 
bill for relocating US troops. There are various views on the 
cost-sharing percentages of Japan and the US and exactly what 
should be borne by Japan. 
 
Approximately three decades ago, Japan began providing host 
nation support (HNS), which is commonly called the "sympathy 
budget" in Japan, to shoulder the salaries of Japanese workers 
employed at US bases in Japan. The system has gradually expanded, 
and there is criticism that the government has been too generous. 
 
TOKYO 00001461  003 OF 009 
 
 
 
The government has refused to acknowledge the reported cost of 10 
billion dollars for the redeployment of US Marines to Guam, 
pointing to the inappropriateness of revealing matters under 
discussion with the US. 
 
It is not good, however, for figures alone to run ahead of a 
clear basis for the calculation. The government needs to explain 
its views on the relocation cost to the general public. What is 
the definition of relocation expenses? To what extent should 
Japan foot the bill? If the relocation cost is borne by Japan, 
will Japan's host nation support shrink? Will the relocation cost 
be financed with defense spending? There are mounting questions. 
 
The US is becoming increasingly irritated with Japan's delay in 
coordinating views with local areas, a matter specified in the 
interim report produced last October. 
 
That does not justify the US request for 7.5 billion dollars. The 
Japanese people would still find such a request perplexing and 
react negatively to it. If US force realignment is aimed at 
greater credibility of the Japan-US alliance, the two countries 
need to spell out matters step by step in order to win the 
support and understanding of the Japanese public. 
 
The two countries' timetable for producing their final report 
before the end of this month is in danger. We would like to see 
the two countries proceed with talks coolly and vigorously. 
 
(4) Editorial: The price tag for US troops relocation extravagant 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
March 19, 2006 
 
In its ongoing talks with Japan on the realignment of US forces 
in Japan, the US has asked Japan to bear a large portion of the 
cost required for relocating US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. 
 
The estimated relocation cost is extraordinary. The US Defense 
Department has estimated the relocation cost to be10 billion 
dollars, or 1.16 trillion yen, in total. Of it, the US has 
reportedly asked Japan to shoulder 75%, or 7.5 billion dollars 
(870 billion yen). 
 
At present, there are 15,000 US Marines in Okinawa. The US has 
presented Japan with a plan to remove 8,000 of them, mostly 
headquarters personnel, to Guam. According to the US, the 10 
billion dollars is necessary just for relocating the troops, 
building facilities, such as barracks, and infrastructure, such 
as roads, in Guam, and that the amount could swell further. 
 
Japan has long asked for ways to reduce the burden on Okinawa, 
which houses the bulk of US bases in Japan. The planned 
relocation of US Marines is part of such steps. Japan therefore 
must be prepared to pay a price for it to some extent. 
 
But the price tag of 7.5 billion dollars is extravagant by any 
standards. Japan's budget for official development assistance 
(ODA) for fiscal 2006 is 760 billion yen. Japan's share of 870 
billion yen is greater than that by more than 100 billion yen. 
 
Japan has been providing 230 billion yen annually in host nation 
support (HNS), which is commonly called the "sympathy budget," to 
 
TOKYO 00001461  004 OF 009 
 
 
shoulder the necessary costs for the US forces in Japan, 
including maintenance expenses for US base facilities in Japan 
and the salaries of Japanese workers employed at US bases. 
Japan's generously stands out among countries hosting US bases. 
 
Japan's financial assistance has been confined to US bases in 
this country. This time, Japan is being asked to foot the bill 
for building new base facilities in Guam, which is US territory. 
There is every reason for Japanese people to criticize such a 
step as going overboard. 
 
There is no legal ground to spend our tax money for such a 
purpose, and the government is even considering establishing a 
new law. 
 
The US thinks that because US Marines will be removed in 
compliance with Japan's request, Japan should bear the cost 
accordingly. A US official in charge also said: "The United 
States is responsible for the defense of Japan. It is Japan's 
role to bear the cost." 
 
US bases in Japan have been playing an important role in the US' 
global strategy. Bases in the US have been playing an even 
greater role. The comment suggesting that Japan is the sole 
beneficiary is deviated from the reality of the Japan-US security 
system and is unconstructive. 
 
The government described the figure as hardly agreeable. In view 
of the nation's financial situation, the amount is hard to 
swallow. 
 
The government must explain clearly to the public why Japan has 
to foot the bill for building facilities at a base outside Japan. 
The government also needs to ask the US for a clear basis for the 
calculation. 
 
Washington is trying to strengthen Guam as a strategic stronghold 
in the Asia-Pacific as part of its ongoing global transformation 
of U.S. forces. The matter is not just about relocating troops 
there. The two countries need to conduct in-depth discussion to 
probe such a political and diplomatic implication, as well. 
 
(5) Gas fields in East China Sea: JDA considering expanding 
interpretation of SDF Law to allow ASDF planes to back up MSDF 
vessels 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
March 17, 2006 
 
The Defense Agency is now looking into the possibility of 
adopting a measure that will enable the Self-Defense Forces' 
(SDF) fighter planes to provide covering fire, applying the 
article under the Self-Defense Forces Law prescribing the 
protection of weapons and other objects, in the event Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessels are attacked within the 
Japanese air defense identification zone. This presumes a 
military collision with China over the development of gas fields 
in the East China Sea. Coinciding with the switch to integrated 
operations of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the MSDF, and 
the ASDF, the Defense Agency (JDA) will strengthen cooperation 
between the MSDF and the ASDF in monitoring areas close to the 
gas fields. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001461  005 OF 009 
 
 
The air defense identification zone is set wider than the 
territorial airspace for the defense of the mainland. 
 
In the East China Sea, it is set beyond the median line with 
China, and the gas fields in question are located within the 
defense identification zone. In the event an aircraft of 
unidentified nationality, such as a military plane, intrudes into 
Japanese airspace, an ASDF fighter will scramble and urge the 
intruder to alter its flight route. 
 
If that aircraft fires a machine gun or other weapons at the ASDF 
jet, the pilot will fire back to defend himself and to facilitate 
an emergency escape. JDA is now looking into the possibility of 
applying the interpretation of Article 95 of the SDF Law, which 
prescribes the protection of weapons and other items, so that a 
commander can order the use of weapons under such a situation 
from the perspective of protecting fighter jets as a weapon. 
 
The JDA also intends to use the interpretation of the article on 
the use of weapons and other items in protecting MSDF escort 
ships. Under the current law, ASDF fighter jets can use weapons 
only for the purpose of protecting other jets in the same 
operation, but JDA intends to expand this interpretation so that 
they can protect MSDF equipment as well. 
 
Specifically, if escort ships on patrol in the East China Sea or 
P3C patrol aircraft come under attack by Chinese aircraft within 
Japan's air defense identification zone, fighter jets that have 
been scrambled would back up the attacked vessels or planes. This 
would be the strongest possible step under the current legal 
framework. 
 
Focusing on sovereignty over the Nansha Archipelago and the 
Paracel Islands, China has repeatedly carried out military 
drills, including amphibious operations, alongside oceanographic 
surveys, thereby strengthening effective control of the areas. 
The JDA has determined that it is imperative to urgently consider 
the matter with this fact in mind. 
 
However, provided that Japan starts test drilling in gas fields 
and China tries to obstruct it by such means as firing warning 
shots, it will be the Japan Coast Guard that will face the 
situation first. It is not possible to protect the JCG's patrol 
ships just by changing the interpretation. For this reason, many 
ruling party members are calling on the government to drastically 
change the legal framework. 
 
(6) Successors to Koizumi (Part 1): Study of Shinzo Abe -- 
playing up own political identity is a double-edged sword 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
March 20, 2006 
 
The major political issue of the year is how the September 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election will turn 
out. Since this will be the first LDP leadership race to be held 
in five and a half years, this newspaper feature monthly articles 
about the presidential candidates. 
 
"China should make its military spending much clearer. Let's 
further strengthen the bonds of the Japan-US alliance, while 
watching the movements of China," Abe told former US Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage. The two held a secret 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TOKYO 00001461  006 OF 009 
 
 
meeting on March 4 at a Tokyo hotel. The main topic of their 
conversation was the China problem. 
 
Although Abe has been cautious in his remarks since he assumed 
his present post last October, he has now begun to show some of 
his own political identity not just on his hard-line stances 
toward China and North Korea but also on other issues, as well. 
He even suggested an early revision of the Basic Education Law, 
on which views are split in the ruling coalition. He has started 
revealing subtle differences between his views and that of Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi, as in February when he suggested 
Koizumi put off revising the Imperial House Law. 
 
When it comes to the LDP leadership race, Abe has repeatedly 
said, "I've concentrated all my energies into my current job as 
chief cabinet secretary." 
 
But many junior LDP lawmakers supporting Abe do not think (he is 
indifferent to the presidential post). On March 13, about 20 
young lawmakers from various LDP factions, including Yoichi 
Miyazawa of the Niwa-Koga faction, got together at a Japanese 
restaurant in Tokyo in order to listen to what Abe would say. On 
the day when Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives last 
year for a snap election, the 20 members assembled at party 
headquarters and promised to aim at creating "a young LDP" led by 
Abe. 
 
Abe enjoys the highest popularity among the post-Koizumi 
contenders. When he moves into action, it always causes 
significant ripples in the LDP. 
 
House of Councillors member Shuntaro Kageyama, in a speech 
delivered on March 11 in the city of Unnan, Shimane Prefecture, 
stated, "I would like to select as the next LDP president a 
person who can mend Japan's strained relations with China and 
South Korea." This remark by Kageyama, who has close ties with 
Mikio Aoki, the chairman of the LDP caucus in the Upper House, 
immediately spread across the party. Aoki, who has supported the 
Koizumi government, has yet to clarify whom he will back. But 
Aoki does not seem to look favorably on Abe. Aoki said in a cool 
manner: "A total of 65 LDP candidates (including the now defunct 
Conservative Party members, who rejoined the LDP) were elected in 
the 2001 Upper House election, taking advantage of the Koizumi 
boom. In the 2004 election, the number of LDP candidates elected 
totaled 49. At that time, Mr. Abe was the party's secretary 
general." 
 
Aoki's reluctance to support Abe stems from concern expressed by 
business leaders that they do not expect Abe as prime minister 
would be able to repair Japan's strained relations with China and 
South Korea. 
 
Taku Yamasaki, who has proposed building a national war memorial 
to replace Yasukuni Shrine, bluntly commented on Abe, "He has a 
open-and-shut ideology." 
 
Even though the LDP replaced many old lawmakers with younger ones 
in the Lower House election last year, 179 of the 408 Diet 
members belonging to the LDP are senior to the 51-year-old Abe. 
Therefore, there still remains strong resistance to generational 
change in the LDP. 
 
On March 14, Abe asked his deputy Ichiro Aisawa to consider 
 
TOKYO 00001461  007 OF 009 
 
 
advertising for candidates. He advertised for candidates for the 
Lower House election while he was serving as secretary general of 
the LDP. He flatters himself that he worked hard to make the LDP 
"an open party." His fight against "the old LDP" is one of his 
selling points. The LDP Upper House executives, including Aoki, 
prioritize repairing relations with industrial associations and 
the party's regional chapters. 
 
Abe must show his own policy imprint if he is to attract young 
lawmakers to his side, but it is also a double-edged sword for he 
could find himself surrounded by an encircling net of this party 
enemies. Abe has yet to find the way to succeed Koizumi as LDP 
president and prime minister. 
 
(7) US closely examining third BSE case 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 3) (Full) 
March 20, 2006 
 
Kazuaki Fujii, Washington 
 
The US Department of Agriculture has begun a thorough 
investigation into the nation's third case of BSE found in 
Alabama. The department has begun reexamining the cow itself, 
which had been buried, and its offspring. USDA had earlier 
generally concluded that the cow was over 10 years of age from 
its dentition and other factors, but the department has again 
asked experts to examine the case from all angles. USDA aims to 
find out how the cow became infected with the disease by closely 
examining when and where it was born. USDA apparently also 
intends to demonstrate the US government's sincere efforts toward 
Japan and other countries. 
 
(8) Personnel affairs at Foreign Ministry 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 3) (Full) 
March 20, 2006 
 
The following personnel appointments are to take effect March 20: 
 
Hideaki Hoshi as consul general in Penang; Hajime Hayashi as 
Financial Affairs Division director general; and Koichi Mizushima 
as Second North American Division director general. 
 
(9) CEFP changing its nature from top-down decision making forum 
to setting for various government agencies to coordinate views: 
Chasm between Takenaka and private-sector members: Yosano 
gradually seizing initiative 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
March 19, 2006 
 
The nature of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), 
which has served as a vehicle for implementing the Koizumi reform 
initiative, is now greatly changing. Until last fall when it was 
still under the leadership of Heizo Takenaka, now internal 
affairs and communications minister, the panel made one policy 
proposal after another, eliminating the involvement of ruling 
party members and the bureaucracy, with Takenaka teaming up with 
four powerful private-sector members. However, the panel has lost 
its forceful driving force ever since State Minister in charge of 
Economic and Fiscal Policy Hajime Yosano replaced Takenaka. It 
has instead turned into a setting for various government agencies 
 
TOKYO 00001461  008 OF 009 
 
 
to coordinate views when vetting reforms. With Yosano steadily 
seizing the initiative, a gulf has widened between Takenaka and 
the CEFP's private-sector members. 
 
Changes that had occurred to the panel were visible at a meeting 
held on March 16. As a mid- to long-term target of overhauling 
the nation's finances, private-sector members came up with nine 
cases, based on a basic-case scenario of achieving a nominal 
growth rate of 3% and a long-term interest rate of 4% over the 
next 20 years. In presenting the basic case, the panel potently 
hinted at its judgment that tax hikes would be unavoidable, by 
differentiating the data used to back its decision from other 
data by using blue ink. 
 
Takenaka countered that judgment, saying, "It is strange to reach 
a decision in advance." He pitted himself against private-sector 
member Hiroshi Yoshikawa, professor at Tokyo University, who 
called for boiling down assumptions. In the end, Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi judged, "We will not reach a decision in 
advance. We will make a political decision in the final stage." 
The panel then agreed to discuss four estimates out of nine. 
 
The private-sector members are Yoshikawa, Masaaki Honma, 
professor at Osaka University, Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of the 
Japanese Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), and Jiro Ushio, 
chairman of Ushio Inc. They, along with Takenaka, are the 
original members of the panel since its inauguration under the 
Koizumi Administration. For four years and a half through the 
reshuffle of the cabinet last fall, private-sector panel members 
held their own sessions in advance before panel meetings and 
submitted their own papers at every panel meeting, which often 
helped Takenaka to get his views reflected in the government's 
policy stances. However, cooperation so common in the past is now 
nowhere to be found. 
 
A certain senior official of the Cabinet office portrayed the 
current structure of the panel: " Yoshikawa was never close to 
Takenaka from the start. Nowadays, Honma does not align himself 
with the opinions of Takenaka very much. Okuda, a leading figure 
in business circles, takes a neutral position. Ushio, a relative 
of Abe (chief cabinet secretary), is the only private-sector 
member close to Takenaka." During discussions on Mar. 16, Ushio 
acted as arbitrator, saying: "We need to set a target sooner or 
later. But it is not necessary to do so today." Honma and 
Yoshikawa acrimoniously exchanged views with Takenaka over fiscal 
reconstruction on Feb. 1 and Mar. 15, as well. 
 
It is Yosano who holds together the private-sector members who 
have split with Takenaka. He sometimes does not even introduce 
Takenaka's statements in press conferences held after meetings. 
Yosano is thus tactfully increasingly his presence, taking 
advantage of the management style set by Takenaka. Yosano and 
Finance Minister Sakadakazu Tanigaki take the position that it is 
unavoidable to raise the consumption tax in order to reconstruct 
the nation's finances. The panel is expected to finalize its 
major policy theme "package reform of expenditures and revenues" 
in June. It wants to take the lead in policy-setting by a post- 
Koizumi administration. 
 
Takenaka, on the other hand, fights back, sparring with private- 
sector members at every panel meeting, alarmed that they might 
reach a conclusion in a way that would directly lead to a hike in 
the consumption tax. His last resort is a solid channel with 
 
TOKYO 00001461  009 OF 009 
 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi and Liberal Democratic Party Policy 
Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa, but this channel is 
also waning in strength. 
 
(10) EDITORIALS 
 
Asahi: 
(1)  Information leak: Winny not the only cause 
(2)  Recognition of Minamata disease patients; Criteria should be 
set first 
 
Mainichi: 
(1)  Integration of government-affiliated financial institutions 
is not the end of the issue 
(2)  Is widening social divide indispensable for revitalization 
of Japanese society? 
 
Yomiuri: 
(1)  Continuation of employment through age 65: Make best use of 
older people's desire and capability to work 
(2)  Three years since start of Iraq war: Bush diplomacy throws 
out isolationism 
 
Nihon Keizai: 
(1)  Three years of chaos in Iraq: Use lessons learned to bring 
about stabilization 
 
Sankei: 
(1)  Winny: If problem goes unattended, Japan will become an IT 
developing country 
(2)  Health food: Consider new legal framework 
 
Tokyo Shimbun: 
(1)  Human rights council at UN: Effective activities urged 
(2)  Ferrosilt: End the vicious circle 
 
SCHIEFFER