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Viewing cable 06TOKYO1300, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/10/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO1300 2006-03-12 23:00 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6120
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1300/01 0712300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 122300Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9624
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7693
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5062
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8186
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5090
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6243
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1068
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7260
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9243
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001300 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/10/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) LDP presidential race 2006 (Part 2): Nationalism in Japan, 
China, South Korea a challenge to Koizumi's successor; Internet 
rife with criticism, aspersions 
 
(2) Mori faction's presidential candidate -- Abe or Fukuda? 
Generational change may occur; Faction pressed to steer difficult 
maneuvering 
 
(3) Interview with former Minshuto head Katsuya Okada: Not a good 
idea for party leader to easily take responsibility 
 
(4) Interview with Hiraku Tomizawa, former GSDF chief of staff, 
on significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Don't be satisfied only 
with results from dispatch 
 
(5) Interview with Yukio Okamoto, president of think tank, on 
significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Japan should continue 
contributions for people's livelihood even after withdrawal 
 
(6) Interview with Bunroku Yoshino, former Foreign Ministry 
American Bureau chief, on the secret Okinawa pact 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) LDP presidential race 2006 (Part 2): Nationalism in Japan, 
China, South Korea a challenge to Koizumi's successor; Internet 
rife with criticism, aspersions 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged slightly) 
March 10, 2006 
 
On March 8, 2-Channel, the popular Internet bulletin board (blog) 
was filled with messages critical of Japan's "weak-kneed" policy 
toward China. For instance, messages read: "Japan was completely 
defeated; soundly walloped"; "What is Japan doing? Japan needs to 
get going, otherwise China will drill everything out," and "Let's 
go to war! I'm serious!" 
 
Those messages followed media reports that in recent talks with 
Japan, China had proposed the joint development of gas fields 
including areas surrounding the Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu 
in China, over which both Japan and China have claimed 
sovereignty. 
 
Criticism is relentlessly directed at individuals, as well. 
 
Every time a senior Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker touches on 
Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine on television, 
he receives a large number of e-mails from the general public. 
Last June, the lawmaker visited China as a member of an LDP 
delegation. As of the end of February, his website received a 
total of 107 e-mails, mostly anonymous, including the following: 
 
"The prime minister should continue visiting Yasukuni Shrine. 
Taking a resolute stand toward China serves the interests of 
Japan." 
 
"Yasukuni is a Japanese domestic matter, and other countries must 
not interfere with it. Japan must not kowtow to China." 
 
The city of Sakaiminato, Tottori Prefecture, known as the 
 
TOKYO 00001300  002 OF 011 
 
 
unloading port for North Korean crabs, has also received angry e- 
mails. 
 
A total of 50 messages were posted in several weeks last October 
on the bulletin board on the official website run by the 
Sakaiminato Tourist Association. One of them accused the city of 
providing funds to North Korea. Another message read, "North 
Korean ships often visit out port, and they might abduct Japanese 
citizens." 
 
The association closed its bulletin board in mid-October. Similar 
messages posted on the bulletin board run by the Sakaiminato 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry also led to its closure. Since 
concluding a friendship agreement in 1992, Sakaiminato sent 
delegations to North Korea's Wonsan, but that tradition ended 
with the September 2002 Japan-North Korea summit talks. 
 
A city official lamented: 
 
"For the sake of the local economy, we cannot suspend trade with 
North altogether. Then again, a resumption of exchanges with the 
North would give rise to public criticism." 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi has repeatedly said that paying tribute to 
the war dead and renewing one's resolve never to wage war again 
is a matter of the heart. He did not stop visiting Yasukuni 
Shrine despite strong protests from China and South Korea, 
declaring, "Yasukuni is no longer an effective diplomatic card." 
 
An LDP member who won a Lower House seat for the first time in 
last year's general election also noted: "Japan has been reticent 
and unassertive. Its' good for Japanese lawmakers to speak their 
minds." 
 
An anti-Korean manga comic book titled Kenkanryu 2 ("Hating the 
Korea boom-2") that went on sale Feb. 22 has become the 
bestseller on the Internet bookstore Amazon. The manga book 
condemns Tokyo's position toward Takeshima, known as Tokdo in 
South Korea, as weak-kneed. According to the publisher Shinyusha, 
Kenkanryu 1, which went on sale last July, and 2 sold 650,000 
copies as of Feb. 28. 
 
Kenkanryu 2 was released Feb. 22, the first "Takeshima Day" set 
by Shimane Prefecture. At a rally held in Matsue, a certain 
prefectural assemblyman charged that Japan has been shelving the 
Takeshima issue. He said: 
 
"A guilt-ridden Japan has not revealed its mind throughout the 
postwar period. It is important to say what must be said and make 
efforts to deepen mutual understanding without fearing 
confrontation." 
 
His words brought to mind the Feb. 8 Lower House Budget Committee 
session. In response to Social Democratic Party lawmaker Kiyomi 
Tsujimoto's question on Yasukuni Shrine, Koizumi retorted: 
 
SIPDIS 
 
"Ms. Tsujimoto, are you saying that in order to visit the shrine, 
we need the consent of China and South Korea and that we cannot 
do so because China is against it?" 
 
Koizumi stuck to his guns. At the same time, it seems impossible 
to restrain the national sentiments of Japan and China. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001300  003 OF 011 
 
 
According to an opinion poll released by the Cabinet Office in 
December, the answer "I do not feel friendly toward China" marked 
the highest level ever. Meanwhile, radical messages on anti-Japan 
websites are believed to have triggered massive anti-Japan 
demonstrations in China. 
 
Koizumi did not fan anti-Japan sentiment. 
 
During his visit to China in October 2001, Koizumi visited the 
Anti-Japan Aggression War Memorial Hall on the side of Lu Gou 
Bridge. He later said, "I felt sincere regret and deep sympathy 
to the people of China." Although Koizumi avoided offering a 
prayer at Yasukuni's inner shrine last October, his 
"consideration" has not borne fruit. 
 
In the Jan. 24 Lower House plenary session, Koizumi declared, "I 
will advance exchanges at all levels so that Japan-China 
relations will not be affected by narrow-minded nationalism." 
 
But reciprocal visits by top leaders of Japan and China are 
unlikely until after Prime Minister Koizumi steps down in 
September. 
 
Nationalism must be controlled 
 
By Kengo Sakajiri 
 
Speaking to the press Mar. 8, LDP Policy Research Council 
Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa underscored the significance of a Japan- 
China Ruling Party Exchange Council meeting held in late 
February, saying, "An agreement was reached for Japan and China 
to work hard to prevent parochial nationalism. It's a great 
achievement." Nakagawa specifically meant the control of 
nationalism. 
 
Exchanging self-centered views will not help open the door for 
Asia policy. Politics is responsible to control extreme 
nationalism. 
 
On Mar. 4, I listened to a speech delivered in Mito by former 
Prime Minister Yasuhiko Nakasone, who said: 
 
"Nationalism is emerging in all parts of the world. China is 
using anti-Japan nationalism to strengthen its solitarily. In 
Japan, Yasukuni-centered nationalism is gaining ground." 
 
Growing nationalism worries even Nakasone, a leading 
constitutional revisionist who once officially visited Yasukuni 
Shrine himself. 
 
Nakasone also said, "World leaders today must have the wisdom to 
discuss matters in a way to keep nationalism under control." 
 
Growing nationalist will soon test the wisdom of the successor to 
Koizumi. 
 
(2) Mori faction's presidential candidate -- Abe or Fukuda? 
Generational change may occur; Faction pressed to steer difficult 
maneuvering 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
March 10, 2006 
 
 
TOKYO 00001300  004 OF 011 
 
 
All eyes are now focusing on moves in the Liberal Democratic 
Party's (LDP) Mori faction, which has two possible candidates -- 
current and former chief cabinet secretaries Shinzo Abe and Yasuo 
Fukuda -- for the LDP presidential election in September, which 
will choose a successor to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. The 
prevailing view in the LDP is that the moves of Abe, who is most 
popular with the public, and of veteran lawmaker Fukuda will 
determine the trend of the party leadership race. The Mori 
faction is now being pressed to steer a difficult course in 
choosing a candidate. 
 
Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori joined meetings of young 
lawmakers belonging to his faction each and every day in 
February. On the night of the 15th at a Chinese restaurant in 
Tokyo, he participated in a meeting of members of the two Diet 
chambers, who are now serving in their first term in the Diet. He 
told the junior lawmakers, "Our faction alone can do nothing 
about the presidential race." 
 
Junior and mid-level lawmakers in the LDP have called on Abe to 
become the next LDP president and prime minister. Veteran 
legislators, however, prefer the 69-year-old Fukuda to the 51- 
year-old Abe. There are mixed motives among generations. Given 
the situation, Mori is desperately trying to put a cap on the 
leadership race. 
 
Mori seemed to think Fukuda is most suitable to serve in the 
party's presidential post. Mori seems to assume there would be 
less internal friction if Fukuda served in the post before Abe. 
He has told faction members favoring Abe that it would be better 
for the faction to field Abe in a later leadership race. He 
predicts that bitter fight will take place in next year's Upper 
House election, even if the LDP wins the election, it won't be 
able to secure a single-handed majority of the Upper House. 
Therefore, a competent candidate is not necessary. He has kept in 
line with Mikio Aoki, the chairman of the LDP Upper House caucus, 
who places top priority on organizational reform. 
 
However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has implied he hopes it 
will be Abe. Among the Lower House members of the Mori faction, 
13 members, including Fukuda, were elected more then six times to 
the Diet, while 47, including Abe, were elected five times or 
less. If Mori's group can take the lead in choosing a candidate 
for the presidential race, it will be able to keep influence over 
the party. Should a rift appears in the faction, its influence 
may weaken. 
 
Mori once considered having Fukuda head the faction. If the 
faction picks Abe as a presidential candidate, it will then 
choose Fukuda as its head, saving his face. If Abe does not run 
in the race, the faction will field Fukuda in the race. However 
since Fukuda turned town such an offer, Mori's scenario hit a 
roadblock. Since then Mori has refrained from making comments 
favoring either one of the two. 
 
The Mori faction, however, is beginning to lose all restraint. In 
a general meeting of the faction on March 9, Mori openly 
criticized LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa, 
who proposed an idea of selling housing for government workers as 
a pillar of the squeezing of government-owned assets. Nakagawa 
then rebutted: "We should implement administrative reforms before 
debating a consumption tax hike." A gulf was seen between 
Nakagawa, who tends to support Abe, and Mori. 
 
TOKYO 00001300  005 OF 011 
 
 
 
On the night of Feb. 13, Fukuda showed up at a small Japanese 
restaurant in Shinbashi, Tokyo, where nearly 11 Mori faction 
lawmakers, who were elected for the first time to the Diet the 
same year as Fukuda. One of the participants said to Fukuda, "You 
are now a famous face from the political world." Fukuda, however, 
made no response without expression. But he has recently held 
meetings with other faction members. Another participant said: 
"Mr. Fukuda is full of drive. I appear to be considering the 
possibility that he will run in the presidential race." Former 
LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki sent out positive signals to 
Fukuda, noting, "I feel sympathy for Mr. Fukuda's views." 
 
A group composed of lawmakers who were elected for the first time 
to the Diet when they were 50 years old or over plans to pick 
Fukuda as its head and start  activities as early as this month. 
 
Those supporting Fukuda have distanced themselves from the 
Koizumi government. LDP forces critical of Koizumi's foreign 
policy prefer Fukuda, who puts much faith in Asia diplomacy 
rather than Abe, who is a hawk. Fukuda has, however, no intention 
of starting to slander Koizumi. 
 
Meanwhile, although Abe has devoted himself to the job of 
government's spokesman, he has recently strengthened his own 
views on such issues as a revision of the Imperial House Law and 
Japan's perceptions of its historical past. His supporters are 
now growing in the Tsushima and Niwa-Koga factions. 
 
"If Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Mori discuss the issue, its direction 
will be decided," said Aoki in late January. He then added, "Both 
(the prime minister and Mori) have made remarks even though they 
know each other's feelings." Koizumi put on a grin at Aoki's 
remark as if to say the two have shared the same view. There is 
no guarantee whether Fukuda will be elected as president of the 
LDP as Mori planned since the Mori faction is losing its 
significance. 
 
(3) Interview with former Minshuto head Katsuya Okada: Not a good 
idea for party leader to easily take responsibility 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
March 9, 2006 
 
Questioner: Why do you think the e-mail fiasco happened? 
 
Okada: I think there were such reasons as the personal problems 
of lawmaker Hisayasu Nagata himself and (bullish) remarks by 
executive members. Those reasons created as serious situation for 
Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan). 
 
Questioner: Do you think it was problem that a decision was made 
by a few executives and President Seiji Maehara's bullish remarks 
made the situation worse? 
 
Okada: Making a decision by limited persons is inevitable. The 
more the number is increased, the greater chance information will 
be leaked. However, it is important to deal organizationally with 
matters. That point was lacking this time. Mr. Maehara's judgment 
that time was not good at all. However, we cannot blame him in a 
unilateral way. There are things that only a party in charge 
knows. I think since the executive had various pieces of 
information, they might have mixed up desire and reality. 
 
TOKYO 00001300  006 OF 011 
 
 
 
Questioner: Some party members are still calling on Mr. Maehara 
to take responsibility. 
 
Okada: I think the executives should refrain from commenting on 
the next presidential race because we are trying to do our best 
in unison. It is the bad nature of this party to always make the 
party head take responsibility whenever a bad thing happens. What 
is important is to offer an apology and take next action. Unless 
we create circumstance under which the leader can fulfill 
initiatives, the party will go down. 
 
Questioner: The dominant view in the party is that Mr. Nagata 
should give up his Diet seat. 
 
Okada: Although he took hasty action, he did so during Diet 
deliberations. We should be cautious about snatching the title 
from a Diet member. It is true that he played a role that other 
persons did not want. I think he remains someone the party should 
treat as precious. 
 
Questioner: Because of the e-mail uproar, Minshuto has lost 
public confidence. 
 
Okada: It is true that our party suffered serious damage. We have 
no choice but to fulfill our responsibility inside and outside 
the Diet in order to regain public trust. Our responsibility is 
to carry out heated debate in the Diet. I want Mr. Maehara to 
have a debate with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in the Diet 
as early as possible. The party should field a candidate for a 
Lower House by-election for the Chiba No. 7 constituency and 
fight the election in unison. We should carry out a thorough 
investigation into the e-mail issue in order to come to a 
conclusion as quickly as possible. 
 
(4) Interview with Hiraku Tomizawa, former GSDF chief of staff, 
on significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Don't be satisfied only 
with results from dispatch 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Excerpts) 
March 10, 2006 
 
There has not been a single casualty among the Self-Defense Force 
(SDF) troops dispatched to Iraq. In humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance being offered based on the Iraq 
Humanitarian Reconstruction Support Special Measures Law, Ground 
Self-Defense Force (GSDF) members stationed in Samawah have 
steadily performed their assigned tasks, including supplying 
water, repairing public facilities, and giving medical guidance. 
The GSDF units there have also employed about 1,000 local 
residents a day. In security assistance, the Air Self-Defense 
Force (ASDF) has engaged in transport operations, winning high 
marks from other participating countries. 
 
SDF troops are not allowed to engage in security-maintaining 
operations overseas that would entail the use of armed force. In 
addition, Japan's standards on weapon use are stricter than any 
other countries'. Under such legal restrictions, the SDF have 
carried out splendid services in a combat area in corporation 
with the Foreign Ministry. Their activities should be highly 
evaluated. 
 
Such services should not be seen only from the context of support 
 
TOKYO 00001300  007 OF 011 
 
 
for the US. Japan's personnel assistance in addition to financial 
aid, will contribute to boosting its international position and 
also its influence, as well as to ensuring the security of trade- 
oriented Japan. 
 
Nonetheless, I do not want the government to make the case of the 
SDF Iraq dispatch as a precedent for its international 
contributions. Besides Iraq, there are many more countries filled 
with destabilizing elements across the world. It is fully 
conceivable that Japan would have to participate in 
rehabilitation assistance in even more dangerous countries in the 
future. On such occasions, if the government entrusts everything 
only to the SDF without altering relevant laws or its 
interpretation of the laws, Japan will find it impossible to 
offer satisfactory personnel contributions. 
 
When I was GSDF chief of staff, GSDF troops were dispatched to 
the Congo (formerly Zaire) on the mission of rescuing Rwandan 
refugees. I was surprised at that plan because I had never 
thought of sending our units to the interior of Africa. Now the 
world is becoming smaller and smaller. If reconstruction 
assistance is need, making a delay response will no longer be 
inexcusable. 
 
Fortunately, Japan has had the valuable experience of working as 
a member of the multinational force in Iraq. The members of the 
multinational force determine responsible missions for each 
nation and construct everything on their own while acquiring 
other countries' assistance. This process is quite different from 
that of United Nations' peacekeeping operations (PKO). I think 
opportunities for such type of activities will increase in the 
future, so I hope (the SDF) will try to find better ways of 
contributions while making use of the assets it has gained in 
Iraq. 
 
On the question of whether to withdraw SDF troops from Iraq, it 
would be desirable to keep them in the nation a little longer, 
given that the security situation in Iraq remains bleak. But if 
the British and Australian troops, which are responsible for 
maintaining local security, withdraw, it will become impossible 
for only the SDF to stay behind. 
 
I hear that the government is considering the possibility of 
leaving senior liaison officers of GSDF in Iraq and continuing 
ASDF activities. I expect this plan will be translate into action 
without fail. If all troops joining in the multilateral force are 
pulled out, Japan's influence and amount of information will 
unavoidably decrease sharply. In order to use best the results it 
attained so far, it is important for Japan to continue to offer 
possible personnel contributions also in the future. 
 
For the time being, there will be no other means for Japan but to 
watch the security situation in Iraq carefully while continuing 
assistance based mainly on the official development assistance 
(ODA) program. Once the security situation there improves, Japan 
will be able to offer civilian aid. If the situation becomes 
worse, Japan should look into a dispatch of SDF troops again. To 
do so, it would be undesirable to give the impression that SDF 
troops flied back. 
 
I want to see the government leave the judgment on the best 
timing for SDF withdrawal to the commander in Iraq and map out 
every possible security measure, for instance, continued hiring 
 
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of local residents and promising to come back in times of 
emergency. These commitments are extremely important for Japan to 
continue to be involved in Iraq on its own initiative. 
 
(5) Interview with Yukio Okamoto, president of think tank, on 
significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Japan should continue 
contributions for people's livelihood even after withdrawal 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Full) 
March 10, 2006 
 
The major significance of the dispatch of Self-Defense Force 
(SDF) troops to Iraq is that Japan has shared a due level of risk 
in order to ensure the security of the world. 
 
In other words, should Iraq become a destroyed nation, the nation 
would become a base for terrorists to launch attacks. In such a 
case, an unfathomable threat will be inevitably posed to the 
world. As part of antiterrorism efforts, it is important to 
stabilize Iraq as soon as possible. 
 
On the occasion of the Gulf war, Japan offered as much as 13 
billion dollars, but the international community evaluation of 
Japan was that "Japan avoided risk by providing only money." 
Learning from this bitter lesson, the government came to the 
conclusion that Japan must bear a due level of risk by the sweat 
of its brow. 
 
Many persons opposed the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq, but the 
main reason for their opposition was that Iraq was dangerous. SDF 
personnel have received training to protect themselves. If a 
decision had been made not to allow SDF personnel to go to Iraq 
for the reason of their risk, diplomatic groups and NGOs 
naturally should have been sent back to Japan. In such a case, 
any Japanese would not have been allowed to go to Iraq. I think 
Prime Minister Koizumi made a bold decision. 
 
The Iraqi people also had strong expectations for Japan's 
assistance. By carrying out humanitarian and reconstruction 
activities in Al Muthanna Province, such as repairing schools and 
medical institutions, supplying water, and offering power 
generation equipment, I think that Japan achieved invaluable 
results in relations with local residents. 
 
Of course, relations with the US have also constituted a major 
element. Despite strong criticism of the US in the international 
community, Britain, Australia and Japan persistently showed a 
willingness to support the US. Their relations with the US are 
the closest ever. Now that Japan might fall in a state of drift 
in the international community, Japan has been held fast by Japan- 
US relations. The relations have served as the anchor. In this 
sense, too, the decision was proper. 
 
If SDF troops complete their mission without any trouble, it may 
be no exaggeration to define their achievements as the greatest 
results in Japan's diplomacy in the postwar era. 
 
There are endless needs on the Iraqi side for reconstruction 
assistance, so it might be ideal, in a sense, for SDF troops to 
continue to stay until Iraq becomes a completely stabilized 
state. 
 
Even so, it is necessary to give consideration to ethnic 
 
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sentiments in neighboring countries. Some persons in such 
countries have reacted to the stationing of foreign troops in 
their brother country Iraq. When considering this, it might be 
undesirable only for Japan to take outstanding action. It may be 
reasonable for Ground Self-Defense Force troops to pull out of 
Iraq with England and Australia. 
 
The US rushed too quickly to form a political framework. Before 
doing that, the US should have made utmost efforts to stabilize 
the people's livelihood. Japan is expected to make up for what is 
lacking in US policy toward Iraq. It is essential for Japan to 
continue to send the message that "Japan will continuously be 
supportive of Iraq" even after SDF troops withdraw from that 
nation. Unfortunately, it is impossible to send Japanese citizens 
to Iraq under its current security situation. However, there must 
be ways to assist Iraq in cooperation with its neighbors and by 
offering our knowledge and funds. For instance, Japan has 
implemented a project under which Japan sends some hundreds of 
Iraqi doctors and nurses to Cairo University in Egypt with 
Japan's funds to receive retraining with modern medical 
technology and equipment. This project has been greatly 
appreciated among local people. Based on such experiences, Japan 
should offer contributions to stabilize the people's livelihood. 
 
(6) Interview with Bunroku Yoshino, former Foreign Ministry 
American Bureau chief, on the secret Okinawa pact 
 
ASAHI (Page 37) (Abridged slightly) 
March 8, 2006 
 
The following is a gist of an Oral History interview with former 
Foreign Ministry American Bureau chief Bunroku Yoshino, 87, by 
the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies: 
 
Interviewer: You were chief of the American Bureau in 1971. What 
were your duties? 
 
Yoshino: I was chiefly responsible to finalize a couple of items 
for the planned Okinawa pact to get them approved by the Diet. 
 
One of the most memorable events is that Japan was supposed to 
have Okinawa back without paying compensation, and we all 
believed in such a deal. (Prime Minister Eisaku) Sato also 
publicly spoke about it. 
 
The biggest obstacle was the Voice of America. America was 
sending out messages to all parts of the world via the VOA 
Okinawa station. 
 
The problem was enormous costs required for relocating facilities 
and the like, and the US Treasury Department said, "We are not 
going to foot the bill anymore. Let Japan pay for it." 
 
But word had been spread that the US would return Okinawa to 
Japan for free, so Japan was not prepared to make payment. 
 
I believe the Finance Ministry held talks one day with the US 
Embassy, in which the US said, "OK, we need this much money." 
Japan was now in trouble. How could Japan conclude an agreement 
that included such terms? Needless to say, the government 
couldn't disburse funds without Diet approval. 
 
Interviewer: So the (US) Treasury Department did discuss money 
 
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with the Finance Ministry. Anything else? 
 
Yoshino: The US Embassy in Tokyo at first didn't discuss money 
with us, but because talks with Finance Ministry officials 
cropped up, they showed us the price tag. And we tried very hard 
to keep it a secret. 
 
But what was discussed between Japan and the US -- something like 
cables to the Japanese Embassy in Washington -- was leaked to 
outsiders. 
 
I believe it was around March 1972, lawmaker (Takahiro) Yokomichi 
grilled me: "The Japanese government did all those things behind 
the scenes. You also said, 'There was no secret deal. The US 
would return Okinawa to Japan unconditionally.' How do you 
explain that?" 
 
In November or December 1971, the Treaties Bureau chief and I had 
answered questions in turns, saying, "Japan will not have to pay 
for Okinawa, and there is no secret deal." 
 
I also said, "Such a cable does not exist, and we didn't discuss 
such things." 
 
And Mr. Yokomichi read a cable before me and said, "Did you hear 
what I just read?" So I said, "I can't tell if the cable Mr. 
Yokomichi has is authentic or not. Let us compare it with the 
cable we wrote." 
 
Then I hurried back to the Foreign Ministry and checked out the 
cable sent out by the ministry. The cable carried the signatures 
of the drafter and division director, and I though that the cable 
Mr. Yokomichi just read had probably leaked from the Foreign 
Ministry. But I still denied it. 
 
Several hours later, I received a call from the personnel 
division director, who said, "Deputy Director General (Takeshi) 
Yasukawa said he was going to quit to take responsibility because 
it become clear that his secretary had leaked the cable." 
 
Around that time, there was a political reporter named (Takichi) 
Nishiyama at the Mainichi Shimbun. I thought he was a rather good 
reporter. But he was having an affair with (Yasukawa's secretary) 
and he got the cable from her. 
 
I immediately called on Mr. (Susumu) Nikaido and (Noboru) 
Takeshita of the Liberal Democratic Party and told them, "We are 
in trouble." 
 
But they said to me nonchalantly: "Mr. Yoshino, you are too 
naive. Foreign Ministry cables have been leaking from long 
before." I said "No way!" to myself. But the fact was that cables 
had been leaking by the same method. 
 
Speaking of those days, after asking for the return of Okinawa, 
Mr. Sato explained: "Japan will have Okinawa back without paying 
compensation. There is no better deal than this." In my view, 
such an explanation was bad. The US said that it would return 
Okinawa and seek nothing in return, but that country was strapped 
for money back then. Japan tried to settle the matter 
artificially and that was the problem. 
 
When it comes to returning bases, Japan and the US use every 
 
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bargaining chip available, and I think there was every reason for 
America to use such a bargaining chip in those days. At a time 
like this when antidumping duties usually follow growing imports 
from Japan, it's hard to imagine that the US would return Okinawa 
unconditionally. 
 
The US returned Okinawa to Japan, but there are still many US 
bases on the island. The matter is closely associated with the 
security of Japan. Things are not that simple. 
 
Interviewer: What about the Nishiyama incident? 
 
Yoshino: Newspapers had all been critical of the Foreign Ministry 
until the incident came to light. Their tone has now completely 
changed, and that helped me. 
 
The Criminal Affairs Bureau asked me to testify. I replied: "I 
cannot disclose anything because talks are still underway. I must 
think of the credibility of Japan, and if I disclose anything, 
Japan will not be able to continue talks with the US. Therefore, 
everything is secret, and therefore, I will deny things even at 
the Diet, telling lies." 
 
Interviewer: And that's what you did at the Diet. 
 
Yoshino: I denied things too strongly. I should have said, "I 
cannot discuss anything that is connected with the bilateral 
talks." Instead, I flatly denied everything, and that has raised 
some questions. 
 
SCHIEFFER