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Viewing cable 06TOKYO1249, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/08/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO1249 2006-03-08 08:05 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO1742
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1249/01 0670805
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080805Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9513
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7641
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5012
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8130
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5047
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6199
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1015
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7203
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9196
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 001249 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/08/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) US envoy cheers Oh on 
 
(2) Iwakuni referendum drawing mixed reactions from residents 
with municipal merger near at hand 
 
(3) SDF-USFJ fusion and its fate-Ahead of final report on USFJ 
realignment (Part 1): Brains; Self-reliability wavering with 
intelligence sharing 
 
(4) Japan-US alliance showing signs of strains: Budding economic 
dispute (Part 3) 
 
(5) Government to adopt flexible strategy for economic pacts: 
Shift to speedier conclusion of FTAs, alarmed by China, South 
Korea, which are way ahead 
 
(6) Editorial: Minshuto must not become so weak as to create a 
vacuum in the Diet 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) US envoy cheers Oh on 
 
NIKKAN SPORTS (Web version) (Full) 
19:39 March 4, 2006 
 
Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks Manager Sadaharu Oh, now leading Japan's 
national team for the upcoming World Baseball Classic (WBC) 
event, received words of encouragement yesterday from US 
Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer. 
 
Oh and Schieffer met at a Japan-US baseball exchange party held 
in Washington in January. When they talked about baseball topics, 
their faces really lit up. Schieffer was a co-owner of the Texas 
Rangers, a Major League Baseball (MLB) club, with US President 
Bush. "He was an owner for about 10 years," Oh said. "The 
ambassador really loves baseball," Oh added with a smile. 
 
(2) Iwakuni referendum drawing mixed reactions from residents 
with municipal merger near at hand 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Abridged) 
March 8, 2006 
 
A city referendum of Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, on the 
propriety of relocating US carrier-borne jets to the US Marine 
Corps' Iwakuni Air Station is just four days away. Mayor 
Katsusuke Ihara has been out in the streets calling for local 
residents to vote against the relocation, while some residents 
have been calling for boycotting it. Will the voter turnout reach 
50%, the minimum line for the plebiscite to be valid? What is the 
fate of the relocation plan? Perplexity is spreading among local 
residents with Iwakuni scheduled to merge with seven neighboring 
municipalities on March 20. 
 
Last-minute effort 
 
"The referendum of our city is drawing national attention. Let us 
exhibit our wishes to the rest of the country." 
 
Ihara, clad in a brown suit, delivered the above message 
 
TOKYO 00001249  002 OF 009 
 
 
yesterday afternoon to about 40 residents at a parking area near 
the Iwakuni base. 
 
Iwakuni will conduct the plebiscite in accordance with the 
interim report on US force realignment, produced last October by 
the Japanese and US governments. The referendum will be on the 
propriety of transferring 57 carrier-borne aircraft from Atsugi 
Naval Air Facility in Kanagawa Prefecture to the Iwakuni base in 
Yamaguchi Prefecture. The voters will be asked to mark yes or no 
about the relocation on the ballots. 
 
Concern is deeply seated among Iwakuni residents about possible 
noise pollution. Ihara is making a last-minute effort in an 
effort to turn the new city's mayoral race planned for late April 
in his favor, as well. If the voter turnout exceeds 50% and 
becomes valid, chances are that votes against the relocation 
would dominate the poll. Ihara may opt to use such an outcome to 
elicit what he wants from the central government. 
 
Ihara has been actively working on local residents to go to the 
polls since the referendum was officially announced. 
 
Conservative ground 
 
Not all citizens are against the relocation plan. Eizo Kobayashi 
who heads a supporters group for Taro Ajimura, 38, who is going 
to run, backed by the LDP Yamaguchi chapter, in the new mayoral 
race against Ihara, takes this view: 
 
"We have been living with the base all our lives. The area around 
here has been basically conservative, and the situation is 
different from Nago." 
 
Nago conducted a plebiscite in December 1997 over the propriety 
to constructing an alternate heliport for the US Marine Corps' 
Futenma Air Station. Supporters and opponents clashed fiercely, 
but votes against the relocation dominated the poll. But 
producing former prime ministers Nobusuke Kishi and Eisaku Sato, 
the eastern part of Yamaguchi centering on Iwakuni has 
traditionally been conservative, with no fierce anti-base 
conflict as seen in Okinawa. 
 
A picture of Ajimura and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe is 
exhibited at the supporters' office for Ajimura. Kobayashi noted, 
"It is meaningless to conduct the referendum. After the merger, 
the city will face such pressing challenges as fiscal 
reconstruction and revitalizing the economy." In a press 
conference on March 3, Abe also raised questions about Iwakuni's 
plebiscite. 
 
A call for abstention 
 
Critical voices are also being heard in the seven municipalities 
that will soon merge with Iwakuni. Yu Mayor Toshimitsu Makimoto, 
for instance, complained, "With the merger, we are going to be 
citizens of the same city, so we wanted Iwakuni to listen to our 
views beforehand." Makimoto met Abe at the Prime Minister's 
Official Residence on March 1 in which the mayor conveyed to the 
chief cabinet secretary his plan to support the relocation plan 
in essence. 
 
A group of residents opposing the referendum has also been 
conducting activities actively. The group staged a rally on the 
 
TOKYO 00001249  003 OF 009 
 
 
night of March 6, which brought together about 200 residents. 
 
Before the crowds, the group's leader Yoshimichi Hirose said: 
 
"It is the mayor's job to come up with innovative ideas for the 
government and residents. But our mayor has been engrossed in his 
own election campaign. You must not take part in the referendum, 
which is unjust." 
 
Hirose's words won applause from the crowds. 
 
A group of citizens opposing the relocation of carrier-borne jets 
and nigh landing practice to Iwakuni is unhappy with the campaign 
to boycott the referendum which the group thinks will deprive the 
residents of an opportunity to express their views. The dominant 
projection is that the voter turnout would be around 50%. 
Supporters and opponents are digging in their heels deeper. 
 
(3) SDF-USFJ fusion and its fate-Ahead of final report on USFJ 
realignment (Part 1): Brains; Self-reliability wavering with 
intelligence sharing 
 
ASAHI (Page 37) (Full) 
February 19, 2006 
 
Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) and US Forces Japan (USFJ) will 
set up a new bilateral command post, which is named the "Joint 
Operations Coordination Center" (JOCC). In October last year, 
Japan and the United States confirmed this course of action in 
their intergovernmental talks over USFJ realignment. JOCC is 
intended for the two countries to fuse their brainpowers. USFJ 
has its headquarters at the US Air Force's Yokota base, where the 
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will locate its air defense command 
functions and where JOCC will build an underground headquarters. 
 
"They're going to be ultimately complementary to each other's 
capability and intelligence," says a high-ranking official of the 
Defense Agency. 
 
USFJ Commander Bruce Wright unveiled the JOCC initiative in a 
speech he delivered five months before that. The commander 
likened the new command post to the Joint Operations Command, 
which the US military created with the air forces of various 
countries in the Iraq war. 
 
One ASDF official images JOCC in this way. There is a large 
screen installed at the headquarters of JOCC. The screen covers 
Japan and its environs, including the Korean Peninsula and even 
Russia's inland areas. Japanese and US military personnel posted 
there are riveting their eyes on the screen that shows the flight 
paths of ballistic missiles and airplanes and also shows even 
satellite-transmitted images spotting missile sites. In the event 
of an emergency, Japanese and US commanding officers talk to each 
other and issue operational orders to the two countries' tactical 
forces through their respective chains of command... 
 
Their fusion is shaped into a network of the two countries' 
radars, satellites, and intercept missile launchers. Japan 
secures intelligence from US satellites for signs indicating 
ballistic missile attacks. USFJ also gets information from the 
ASDF about aircraft presence around Japan. In the future, JOCC is 
expected to coordinate ground, naval, and air operations. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001249  004 OF 009 
 
 
Japan's intelligence-gathering capability is limited. Japan is 
thirsty for US military intelligence. That is why the ASDF has 
desired command fusion. However, the ASDF is also aware of spin- 
offs from its close links to its US counterpart. 
 
After Wright's speech, ASDF officers raised questions about the 
legal and technical feasibility of such command fusion. 
 
There would be no problem about that at a time when Japan is in 
an emergency. However, what if the US military launches combat 
operations based on SDF-provided intelligence even though Japan 
is not directly exposed to a threat... In this case, SDF 
operations will be criticized as being linked to the US 
military's use of force and unconstitutional. The targeted 
country may regard Japan as an enemy. 
 
There is a gap between the two countries' respective standpoints 
over command operations. USFJ wants to set up a standing-basis 
joint command. The ASDF, however, would like to have a standalone 
facility of its own during peacetime and wants to set up a 
bilateral joint facility during emergencies. The ASDF wants to 
avoid providing all intelligence at ordinary times. If Japan is 
too dependent on the United States, Japan might be provided with 
intelligence that cannot be confirmed. Eventually, Japan might be 
misled in its judgment. The ASDF is worried about that. 
 
The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is even more strongly aware 
of its own self-reliability in the sense of standing on its own 
feet. 
 
Last October, the Japanese and US governments released an interim 
report on the planned realignment of US forces in Japan. The 
report incorporated a plan to relocate the revamped command 
functions of the US Army's 1st Corps headquarters from the US 
West Coast to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture and to set up the 
GSDF's Central Readiness Command (CRC) there. 
 
The US Army is strong with its overwhelming intelligence- 
gathering capability and powerful firearms. The US Army's 1st 
Corps can grasp enemy moves on hand with its employment of 
satellites and reconnaissance planes, and the Army corps plans to 
move its command to Zama. This command relocation to Japan is 
encouraging to the GSDF that cannot do so. 
 
The CRC, however, is a body the GSDF is going to set up at its 
Asaka garrison in Saitama Prefecture for antiterror 
counteractions and international cooperation. The CRC's role 
differs from the US Army corps'. The CRC mobilizes about 3,000 
troops, while the US Army corps is ready to swing 100,000 troops 
at the largest and commands operations. How will the CRC team up 
with the US Army corps? The CRC might only be swallowed. One ASDF 
official said, "We will embed the CRC into the US military for 
the time being, and we will think later about how to employ its 
troops." 
 
The GSDF will launch the CRC at Asaka as initially planned. 
Meanwhile, local communities hosting Camp Zama are opposed to the 
CRC's relocation to Zama. Later on, the GSDF will explore the 
CRC's relocation to Zama after seeing local developments. 
 
"If we just get on the rails the US military lays, we may only 
become their subcontractor," a GSDF brass officer said while 
choosing his words. 
 
TOKYO 00001249  005 OF 009 
 
 
 
Japan and the United States are now in the homestretch of USFJ 
realignment talks to come up with a final report in late March. 
This series explores how the SDF and USFJ will fuse and what 
their fusion will bring about. 
 
(4) Japan-US alliance showing signs of strains: Budding economic 
dispute (Part 3) 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Slightly abridged) 
March 7, 2006 
 
Economic relations between Japan and the US have been so quiet in 
recent years that a source in the US Embassy in Japan even noted, 
"Unless you search for the issues, you won't find them." However, 
magma of sorts is beginning to build underneath the seemingly 
calm bilateral economic relationship. 
 
The greatest immediate concern is the second ban on US beef 
imports imposed in the wake of the finding of specified risk 
material (SRM) in a beef shipment to Japan. The US Department of 
Agriculture's official stance is that fault is totally on the US 
side. However, the true feeling of the US beef industry can be 
epitomized by the remark by US Meat Export Federation (USMEF) 
Chairman Patrick Boyle: "It is an overreaction to totally shut 
out US beef because of a careless blunder by one exporter." 
 
A high-level US Trade representative official, speaking on 
condition of anonymity, warned that if the embargo is protracted, 
it could throw cold water on bilateral relations, noting, "The 
beef issue has clearly caused friction between the two 
governments." 
 
If anti-Japanese sentiments mount in the US, it could spill over 
into other parts of the economy. The auto industry is viewed as 
most vulnerable. 
 
Following poor business showings, such as a sharp drop in the 
sales of large-size sports utility vehicles (SUVs) as a result of 
a rise in gasoline prices, leading automaker General Motors (GM) 
last November released a plan to dismiss a total of 30,000 
employees by closing down 12 plants across North America. Ford 
Motors also released a similar restructuring plan in January. 
There are even crisis rumors abounding in the US auto industry, 
with GM now making frantic efforts to procure capital. As part of 
such efforts, it has decided to sell off the stocks of Suzuki 
Motors. 
 
In contrast, Japanese vehicles, popular because of their fuel- 
efficiency, accounted for more than 30% of all new cars sold in 
US last year for the second straight year. 
 
Learning lessons from past auto disputes, Japanese automakers now 
locally assemble about 70% of their vehicles sold in the North 
American market. Japanese manufacturers stress that they are 
contributing to creating job opportunities in the US, but there 
is no guarantee that they can avoid criticism. 
 
The rise of the Chinese economy also made Japan-US economic 
relations complicated. 
 
As a result of a sharp increase in imports of Chinese products, 
the US' trade deficit with China reached a record high of 725.8 
 
TOKYO 00001249  006 OF 009 
 
 
billion dollars (approximately 84.34 trillion yen) in 2005. 
Though there has been no major change in the size of the US' 
trade deficit with Japan, since it is the second largest deficit 
for the US after China, criticism of it has mounted in the US. 
House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill 
Thomas even said, "When you consider the long-standing trade 
barriers erected by Japan, I would say the US has a bigger 
problem with Japan than with China." 
 
On the other hand, wherever there are areas of common interest 
between the US and Japan in terms of China, there is an emerging 
mood of searching ways to establish a new kind of "alliance" 
relationship. 
 
For example, China is under fire as being a manufacturing base 
for pirated or copied computer software and household electric 
appliances. Japan and the US, joined by Switzerland, demanded 
that China submit a report on its crackdowns on violations of 
intellectual property rights in compliance with on World Trade 
Organizations (WTO) rules. The three countries jointly applied 
pressure on China. 
 
Former US Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter pointed out, 
"Since US and Japan are the world's largest and second largest 
economies, respectively, trade friction is unavoidable." "But," 
he hastened to add, "unlike the 1980s, when the US and Japan 
fought fierce trade disputes, bilateral relations have matured so 
much that the two countries can now settle issues without falling 
into a worst-case situation." 
 
Is it just as he said that the two countries are now able to nip 
economic disputes in the bud and continue to cooperate in pursuit 
of common interests? Indeed, economic relations between Japan and 
the US are now at such a crossroads. 
 
(5) Government to adopt flexible strategy for economic pacts: 
Shift to speedier conclusion of FTAs, alarmed by China, South 
Korea, which are way ahead 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 5) (Excerpts) 
March 8, 2006 
 
The government has switched to a strategy of pressing ahead more 
flexibly in signing economic agreements on such areas as trade 
and investment with other countries. That is because there is a 
growing view in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and business 
circles that if Japan alone sticks to comprehensive economic 
partnership agreements (EPA) amid the global trend for signing 
free trade agreements (FTA), it would find it difficult to push 
forward with the drive to sign economic agreements, which will in 
turn undermine Japan's international competitiveness. The 
government intends to speed up efforts with a focus on signing 
FTAs, but its potential negotiation partners are differently 
motivated, particularly regarding the agricultural sector. FTA 
talks will not necessarily go smoothly. 
 
China and South Korea are way ahead of Japan in talks with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It appears that 
the government had decided to give priority to speediness in 
economic negotiations, because it feels pressed by China, which 
is increasing its presence through a buildup of military 
strength. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001249  007 OF 009 
 
 
The LDP Special Committee on FTA and EPA, chaired by former 
Agriculture Minister Yoshio Yatsu, urged the prime minister to 
speed up FTA talks, noting, "It is necessary to have somebody who 
directs efforts out of the need to speed up FTA talks." This 
proposal has triggered the policy switch by the government. 
 
Business circles joined forces, because they felt impatient about 
Japan lagging behind China, South Korea and India. The Japan 
Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) has cited 
efforts to tackle FTAs as a yardstick in making financial 
contributions to political parties. The LDP had to take that into 
account because of the Upper House election in 2007. 
 
Japan has thus far signed EPAs with three countries, including 
Malaysia. Talks are now under way with various other countries. 
However, signing EPAs involves a lengthy process, including 
mutually scrapping tariffs and consolidating procedures for 
settling disputes and an intellectual property rights system. 
While Japan is having trouble proceeding with EPA talks, China 
and South Korea have abolished tariffs with a number of trade 
partners. Chances are that Japanese companies may be placed at a 
disadvantage in exporting their products. 
 
Government to speed up talks with China, India and other Asian 
countries; Whether deals can be reached, while leaving 
agricultural area intact, unclear 
 
Acting on the strategy shift, the government will speed up 
efforts to sign a trade accord with India, China and other Asian 
countries. The plan is to consolidate conditions for smoother 
exports in key industries, such as autos and household electric 
appliances, while avoiding lowering tariffs in delicate areas, 
including the agricultural sector. However, as agricultural- 
exporting countries may find such agreements less beneficial, 
whether Japan can swiftly sign pacts as it hopes is unclear. 
 
The government will prepare a prototype for such an agreement, 
under which inconvenient items will be removed, depending on 
negotiating partners, so that it can speedily sign an agreement 
with negotiable countries. It will also seek an agreement that 
covers investment rules but not tariffs. This method will be 
adopted toward Asian countries, because what they expect from 
FTAs matches that of Japan, as many of them import mined and 
manufactured goods and export agricultural, marine and forestry 
products, contrary to Japan's trading pattern. The strategy is to 
speed up negotiations, by using the prototype, while avoiding 
items on which reaching an agreement is difficult. 
 
Potential negotiation partners in the future include India, China 
and Australia. The government is expected to use the prototype in 
talks with those countries. There is also a possibility of its 
aiming for an early signing of pacts, by revising the contents of 
the ongoing talks with ASEAN and South Korea, with which the 
agricultural area is causing a bottleneck. 
 
Candidates for FTA partners include many agricultural-exporting 
countries, such as Asian countries and Australia. Regarding the 
signing of an investment accord, too, China and India will not 
easily agree to remove investment restrictions in order to 
protect their domestic undeveloped industrial areas. 
 
Though Japan has shifted its economic alliance policy at the 
initiative of politicians, chances are slim that its negotiating 
 
TOKYO 00001249  008 OF 009 
 
 
partners agree to sign FTAs or investment pacts that are 
advantageous to Japan alone. In addition, on the domestic front, 
the interests of concerned government agencies, such as the 
Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, differ. The reason for the stagnation in signing 
economic agreements is not just the circumstances of negotiating 
partners. It is essential for Japan to reform the domestic 
situation as well. 
 
(6) Editorial: Minshuto must not become so weak as to create a 
vacuum in the Diet 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
March 7, 2006 
 
Maybe we missed something but in Upper House deliberations on the 
fiscal 2006 budget that started yesterday, the major opposition 
party Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) seemed to hardly try 
to pursue the Koizumi administration on a set of four issues that 
includes a bid-rigging scandal involving government officials. 
 
The House of Representatives Discipline Committee will begin 
discussing the imposition of a punishment on Hisayasu Nagata for 
launching charges by using a copy of a fake e-mail at the Diet. A 
Minshuto team tasked with mapping out measures to prevent another 
such fiasco has just been set in motion. 
 
There is every reason for Minshuto lawmakers to feel hesitant 
about reassuming the offensive against the ruling bloc until the 
e-mail fiasco is settled. 
 
But that does not mean the largest opposition should shrink from 
its duties, however. 
 
The opposition block had the edge over the ruling camp early on 
in the current Diet session, though this might sound ages ago to 
Minshuto members. 
 
Minshuto led the opposition camp in pursuing a set of four issues 
-- the Livedoor scandal, the earthquake-resistance data 
falsification scandal, bid rigging involving the Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency, and US beef trade issue. All of 
these are closely associated with the safety and livelihood of 
the public. 
 
Has income disparity widened over the last five years under the 
Koizumi administration? The public was hopeful that the ruling 
and opposition blocs would conduct heated debate to answer such a 
question, examining both the bright and dark sides of the Koizumi 
reform drive, and mull Japan's future. 
 
Although the e-mail fiasco seems to have blown away everything, 
the government and the Liberal Democratic Party are not totally 
blameless, either. 
 
A possible close relationship between LDP Secretary General 
Tsutomu Takebe and former Livedoor Co. President Takafumi Horie 
 
SIPDIS 
surfaced in connection with the Livedoor scandal. In campaigning 
for the general election last year, Takebe referred to Horie as 
"my son." 
 
The Political Ethics Hearing Committee failed to determine the 
 
TOKYO 00001249  009 OF 009 
 
 
seriousness of the good offices of former National Land Agency 
Director General Kosuke Ito, who served as intermediary between 
the developer and the Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry 
in building substandard condominiums. 
 
The bureaucrat-involved bid-rigging scandal exposed the harmful 
effects of the amakudari practice of retired senior government 
officials taking up cushy executive posts at corporations and 
government-affiliated organizations. Such arrangements have been 
underpinning the bid-rigging system. 
 
All those issues have been left unfinished. Each case deserves 
testimony by sworn and unsworn witnesses and long deliberations. 
 
Later this week, the government is planning to submit to the Diet 
an administrative reform promotion bill to reduce special 
accounts and labor costs for public servants. It will be a good 
opportunity for Minshuto, as a party that uses a counterproposal 
approach, to present another option to the public by going back 
to its original starting point. 
 
President Maehara's declining leadership in Minshuto at this 
point, well before the end of the current Diet session, has 
triggered speculation that the largest opposition party may 
conduct its presidential election early. 
 
Minshuto cannot afford to take whimsical action or stand still 
during the current Diet session. The "vacuum" created in the Diet 
by the e-mail hullabaloo must be filled immediately. 
 
To restore public trust, Minshuto has no other choice but to 
buckle down and make steady efforts. 
 
SCHIEFFER