Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06TOKYO1186, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/06/06

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TOKYO1186.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO1186 2006-03-06 07:52 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO8607
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1186/01 0650752
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060752Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9395
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7600
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4969
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8082
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5006
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6157
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0963
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7155
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9150
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 001186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/06/06 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Questions and answers from interview with Kevin Maher, 
Security Division Director at the US Embassy in Japan: 
Strengthening Guam base would improve Japan's deterrence 
capabilities 
 
(2) Strains in the Japan-US alliance (Part 1): How will two 
countries break away from dependence on Koizumi-Bush friendship? 
 
(3) Tasks to clear before removing ban on US beef imports: 
Interview with Tetsuo Jinbou, freelance journalist; Argument 
"beef will be safe under blanket-testing system" is fictitious 
 
(4) Tasks to clear before removing ban on US beef imports: 
Interview with NCBA Chairman Michael John; US ready to take 
sufficient safety measures, including inspectors' retraining 
 
(5) Self-destruction of Minshuto (Party 3 - conclusion): Restart 
of stricken Minshuto 
 
(Corrected copy) Self-destruction of Minshuto (Part 2): President 
Maehara manages the party as if he is still in college 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Questions and answers from interview with Kevin Maher, 
Security Division Director at the US Embassy in Japan: 
Strengthening Guam base would improve Japan's deterrence 
capabilities 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
March 5, 2006 
 
The following are the questions and answers from Sankei's 
interview with Kevin Maher, director of the security division of 
the US Embassy in Japan. 
 
-- The talks on the realignment of US forces in Japan are 
reaching the final stage. 
 
"All of the realignment proposals make up a package that we would 
like to see the Japanese government implement in order to improve 
the capabilities of the US-Japan alliance. We, too, think that 
the burden of the bases should be lightened, and this is Japan's 
chance to do so. The Japanese government is carrying out 
coordination with local governments, but we recognize that there 
is need to listen to the voices of the local communities in 
implementing the plans." 
 
-- Are you thinking of responding to calls for revision of the 
(coastal plan) for relocating Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab? 
 
"Specifically, we need to make technical adjustments. The basic 
plan agreed on (coastal plan) should be implemented, but in order 
to do so, we need to listen to the voices of the local 
communities, and if there are small technical adjustments needed, 
we will respond flexibly." 
 
-- There is a request from the local community for you to move 
the relocation spot toward the ocean  (okiai ni surashite 
hoshii). 
 
 
TOKYO 00001186  002 OF 009 
 
 
"(The relocation) would not be possible unless we can provide 
assurance to the people in the local area by taking into 
consideration the safety and noise factors. There is flexibility 
in making adjustments based on that perspective." 
 
-- By moving the Okinawa Marines to Guam, won't deterrence 
capabilities drop? 
 
"Although the most important purpose of moving the Marines to 
Guam is to lighten the burden of Okinawa, another part of 
realignment is to be in a location where they can respond 
flexibly to a crisis. Even if the command is shifted to Guam, the 
combat troops and functions of Futenma air field would remain on 
Okinawa, and the deterrence capabilities would not be degraded." 
 
-- What level of the shared cost of relocating the Marines to 
Guam are you asking Japan to bear? 
 
"That is something the Japanese government and the Japanese 
people will decide. If Japan cooperates, the relocation of the 
Marines will be swift, and the facilities on Guam will be 
improved. It will also be possible for the Self-Defense Forces to 
increase their drills on Guam, which will be a plus for Japan. I 
would like to stress that the strengthening of the functions of 
the Guam base will lead to improved deterrence capabilities for 
Japan." 
 
-- How is the perception of China as a threat reflected in these 
moves? 
 
"The need to improve the capability of the alliance is not 
thought of as a response to any one specific country. The changes 
are to respond to new threats and diverse situations. Rather than 
focusing on a threat, we should improve our relations as 
countries that are being called to play important roles globally. 
" 
 
-- The Japanese government is having difficulty coordinating with 
the local governments, so do you feel frustration? 
 
"None in particular. The Japanese government I believe can 
implement the plans." 
 
(2) Strains in the Japan-US alliance (Part 1): How will two 
countries break away from dependence on Koizumi-Bush friendship? 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
March 5, 2006 
 
On Feb. 18, talks were held at a US military facility in Tokyo's 
Minamiazabu district between senior Japanese and US officials to 
discuss the realignment of US forces in Japan. In the 
discussions, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless 
repeatedly stressed sharply, "Futenma is our top priority. 
Without that problem solved, 8,000 Marines will not move." 
 
Lawless was making it clear that the transfer of 8,000 US Marines 
out of Okinawa is strictly conditioned on the relocation of the 
US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. 
 
Although Tokyo and Washington agreed 10 years ago to relocate 
Futenma Air Station to a new site in Okinawa, the Japanese 
government has yet to convince affected local governments to 
 
TOKYO 00001186  003 OF 009 
 
 
accept a relocation plan within the prefecture. Although Japan 
and the US are in accord in principle on the need to alleviate 
the burden on Okinawa, they are wide apart when it comes to 
specifics. 
 
Japan and the US also disagree on the reform of the United 
Nations. Japan, Germany, India, and, Brazil jointly produced a 
plan to expand the 15-member UN Security Council by 10 seats. But 
the US refused to support the plan. As a result, Japan changed 
its position and independently came up with another plan to 
increase the membership only by six in a bid to win the 
endorsement of the US, which wants to keep the framework 
relatively small. But the US has yet to express its support for 
even that plan. Some Japanese officials have begun speculating 
that the US is just trying to buy time in order to shelve UN 
reform. 
 
There is a reason for Japanese officials to feel uneasy. 
 
Prior to the Japan-US summit meeting last November, Japanese and 
US officials actually had agreed to add six seats to the UNSC. 
But the summit meeting failed to nail down the plan, as Prime 
Minister Koizumi forgot to broach it in his talks with President 
Bush. Reportedly this prompted the US to become even more 
reluctant to back Japan's reform plan, concluding that Koizumi 
himself was unenthusiastic about reforming the world body. 
 
To begin with, Japan-US relations now rely heavily on the 
personal relationship between Koizumi and Bush. Their mutual 
trust was solidified by Japan's deployment of Ground Self-Defense 
Force troops to Iraq. 
 
Koizumi once confided to an aide, "Even if Japanese troops were 
attacked by terrorists and faced tremendous difficulty, I would 
not pull them out of Iraq." The US highly evaluated Koizumi's 
unprecedented resolve to take risks. 
 
The President's power in the United States seems almost absolute. 
Thus, Koizumi, being recognized as a friend of the US President, 
has been able to use that relationship as Japan's trump card in 
dealing with the US. 
 
But the GSDF mission in Iraq, a symbol of how well the Japan-US 
alliance is going, is expected to come to an end shortly. Prime 
Minister Koizumi is also scheduled to step down from his post in 
September. 
 
Will Tokyo and Washington be able to break away from their 
reliance on the personal friendship of the two leaders and 
rebuild strong institutional relations? 
 
One of the answers to that question would be enhancing foreign- 
policy cooperation between Japan and the US centering on Asia. 
The two countries need to tighten the noose around North Korea's 
nuclear ambitions by keeping the "dialogue and pressure" approach 
in place. China's rapid growth also requires long-term strategies 
by Japan and the US. 
 
The security front also needs closer bilateral cooperation. The 
two countries produced an interim report last October specifying 
a variety of objectives, such as missile defense, intelligence 
sharing between the SDF and US military, and greater 
interoperability. 
 
TOKYO 00001186  004 OF 009 
 
 
 
Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga noted, "Japan 
must select and address areas on its own before being pressed to 
do so by the US military." 
 
Koizumi is considering making his last visit to the US as prime 
minister. If realized, his visit is certain to become a major 
event to forecast the future of the Japan-US alliance under the 
Koizumi administration. 
 
Japan-US relations, reputed to be the best in the postwar era, 
are now at a crossroads. The two countries have begun locking 
horns over US force realignment, beef trade, UN reform, and other 
issues. Where will the Japan-US alliance head for, once the 
Koizumi-Bush honeymoon relationship is over? 
 
(3) Tasks to clear before removing ban on US beef imports: 
Interview with Tetsuo Jinbou, freelance journalist; Argument 
"beef will be safe under blanket-testing system" is fictitious 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Slightly abridged) 
March 3, 2006 
 
The government has re-imposed its ban on US beef imports, 
following the discovery of vertebral columns, a specified risk 
material (SRM), in a shipment to Japan. Japan has criticized the 
US for violating the agreement reached between the two countries. 
But the agreement itself, in a sense, is unreasonable. The 
government assumes the responsibility for this development, 
because it has not satisfactorily provided the people with 
information to enable them to make a proper assessment of the 
situation. 
 
When the first case of BSE was announced in Japan in September 
2001, the government was slow to disclose the information, 
resulting in heightening public distrust in beef. To eliminate 
the uneasiness, the government explained: "If a blanket 
inspection system is introduced, the safety of beef will be 
ensured." This misguided explanation complicated matters even 
further. 
 
Many might think that if a blanket-inspection system is 
introduced, all products to be shipped to market would be tested. 
But even under this system, only those parts of the brain in 
which agents causing BSE tend to be accumulated are tested. Of 
course, this can be taken as a part of the safety net, but the 
risk of BSE still will not be completely removed. 
 
To prevent BSE, it is important to impose restrictions on animal 
feed and to remove SRMs. Following the discovery of the first 
case of BSE in the nation, Japanese cattle farmers began to take 
these measures, and by 2003 or so, the measures were fixed across 
the nation. 
 
Despite this fact, the government continued to take advantage of 
the "myth of blanket testing." The media also stopped shy of 
reporting that blanket testing is not a perfect safety measure. 
As a result, many Japanese still believe that "beef will be safe 
under the blanket-inspection system." 
 
In the US, satisfactory restrictions have not been imposed on 
animal feed. SRMs have not been completely removed, either. That 
is the reason why concerns about the safety of US beef remain. 
 
TOKYO 00001186  005 OF 009 
 
 
 
The US allows livestock farmers to use meat-and-bone meal from 
cows as animal feed. It is difficult to confirm cross 
contamination, namely, that cattle never eat feed intended for 
pigs or chicken. Feeding cattle chicken manure is also allowed. 
Given these circumstances, the risk of indirect contamination 
cannot be ruled out. 
 
In Japan, SRMs are required to be removed from all cattle. In the 
US, though, the requirement is to remove SRMs only from cattle 30 
months of age or older. It has also been reported that the SRM- 
removal process is considerably sloppy at leading meat-processing 
plants in the US. There are loopholes in feed restrictions, and 
SRMs have not been satisfactorily removed. The rate of cows 
subjected to BSE testing to all cattle in the US is only 1%. 
Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that the US has not 
come up with an accurate BSE incident rate. 
 
In Europe, SRMs must be removed from cattle 12 months of age or 
older. Compared with this, the US standards are overly lenient, 
but in contrast, Japan's standards are too strict for even the 
international community. 
 
Even so, I cannot totally agree with the view that "Americans eat 
beef without any anxiety about its safety and that Japanese 
people are overly nervous." In the US, 13 states have introduced 
a so-called food libel laws (TN see URL: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food libel laws ). In part because 
of this, ordinary American people cannot easily obtain 
information about BSE. 
 
Experts see the possibility of humans being infected with BSE as 
considerably low, based on the view that the species barrier 
would prevent BSE from infecting humans. They say it would be 
unreasonable to fuel general public distrust in beef. 
 
The Japanese government, even so, must set two key requirements - 
- feed restrictions and SRM removal -- as the absolute conditions 
for resuming US beef imports. The government then should disclose 
information and provide the public with the opportunity of 
deciding on whether to eat US beef. To do so, it is also 
necessary to impose the labeling requirement of origin on 
processed products, in addition to raw meat now subject to the 
application of the requirement under the current JAS Law. 
 
(4) Tasks to clear before removing ban on US beef imports: 
Interview with NCBA Chairman Michael John; US ready to take 
sufficient safety measures, including inspectors' retraining 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Full) 
March 3, 2006 
 
I have been greatly disappointed at our loss of the Japanese 
market again following the discovery of a violation of the 
agreement reached between the US and Japan last December. I hear 
that the vertebral columns in question were shipped in response 
to an order from a Japanese company, but the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for export procedures in the 
US. Japan is an important trading partner for US beef producers, 
and we would like to maintain good relations with Japan in the 
future, as well. We are determined to address the BSE issue in 
the form of cooperating with Japan, instead of taking an 
adversarial position. 
 
TOKYO 00001186  006 OF 009 
 
 
 
The recent violation, however, has nothing to do with the issue 
of food safety but is from start to finish simply a technical 
problem. The responsible inspector made a mistake. In dealing 
with a special case (of veal from a calf several months of age, 
which is considered free from BSE risk in the US), the inspector 
reportedly was not fully trained. 
 
In the report on research results released by USDA on Feb. 17, 
Secretary Johanns presented measures to prevent a recurrence of a 
 
SIPDIS 
similar violation, specifically, including retraining inspectors 
and increasing the number of personnel engaged in inspections. 
Although I cannot speak from the standpoint of Japanese 
consumers, I believe those measures will be sufficient to restore 
their trust in the safety of US beef. We will also offer 
cooperation so that the measures in the report will be actually 
implemented. 
 
The longer Japan puts off a response to the report, the more 
heated arguments (calling for Japan's early resumption of US beef 
imports) will be heard in the US Congress. The National 
Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) will hold a spring general 
convention in Washington and pay calls on the Congress in late 
March. I think American producers are willing to do whatever they 
can to help Japan resume US beef imports. There are congressmen 
who support the principle of free trade and are calling for 
actions to maintain fair trade relations. 
 
We would like to avoid a situation in which Japanese consumers 
would become distrustful of US beef in the belief that Japan 
decided to resume imports under political pressure from the US. 
We have promised, though, to observe the Japan-US agreement, and 
in actuality, there is no problem in terms of safety. If the US 
takes measures to prevent a similar case, I believe there will be 
no reason for Japan to keep a permanent ban on US beef. 
 
I hear some Japanese are skeptical of the United States' system 
for estimating the age in months of cattle, but there is the 
requirement for us to prove that beef bound for Japan is from 
cattle 20 months of age or younger by either means - USDA 
inspection of meat quality at slaughterhouses or birth records. 
The conditions that producers must abide by are clearly set forth 
in US export procedures. I do not think there is any problem with 
the US age-determination system. 
 
In addition, US slaughterhouses have long taken the measure to 
remove specified risk materials (SRM). Meat-processing plants 
have been inspected more strictly than any other food plants in 
the US and even in the world. 
 
Since the first case of BSE was reported in the US in December 
2003, we have inspected more than 630,000 head of cattle at high 
risk of BSE, but only one tested positive. We have also banned 
SRM from being used as animal feed for more than eight years, in 
response to a request by the World Organization for Animal Heath, 
known as the OIE. 
 
I have been a rancher who raised cattle, so cooked beef has been 
a daily essential on our family's dinner table. I guess the same 
is true for most families in the US. American consumers' trust in 
the safety of beef remains unchanged. We will carry out whatever 
we can to convince Japanese consumers of the safety of US beef. I 
am looking forward to seeing Japanese consumers enjoy the taste 
 
TOKYO 00001186  007 OF 009 
 
 
of US beef again. 
 
(5) Self-destruction of Minshuto (Party 3 - conclusion): Restart 
of stricken Minshuto 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
March 4, 2006 
 
Kozo Watanabe, 73, the new chairman of the main opposition party 
Minshuto's (Democratic Party of Japan) Diet Affairs Committee, 
made former Diet affairs chief Yoshihiko Noda, 48, laugh on March 
3 by saying, "Actress Mitsuko Mori can still to hand stands 
despite her being 85 years old. We both eat three raw eggs every 
day." 
 
At a meeting of all Diet members of the party, Watanabe urged the 
participants to get moving with more vigor during the second half 
of the ongoing Diet session or else, "We won't be able to respond 
to the public's expectations. 
 
The largest opposition party appeared to have has momentum at the 
opening stage of the current Diet session having obtained a set 
of four issues to grill the government and ruling coalition. The 
four issues include: the Livedoor scandal; the anti-earthquake 
data falsification scam; the issue of US beef imports; and the 
bid-rigging scandal involving the Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency. Lower House member Sumio Mabuchi, who 
pursued the government on the earthquake-proof data falsification 
scandal, expressed enthusiasm on his own website that since the 
Diet is the only place for the opposition to display its 
presence, he would carry out heated debate at the session. 
 
Minshuto, however, made a fatal mistake in dealing with the e- 
mail fiasco, lodgind allegations made by one of the party's 
lawmakers based on a fabricated email message. As a result, the 
party's pursuit of the set of four issues foundered. Last weekend 
when lawmaker Hisayasu Nagata, who had brought up the e-mail 
allegations in the Diet, was hospitalized, Mabuchi grumbled to 
the party's Budget Committee members: "We don't need to change 
our stance of pursuing the government and ruling camp. We should 
not just be thinking about pursuing scandals." 
 
Based on the self-examination that the party lacked investigative 
and verification capabilities, giving priority to Diet 
performances, the party held on March 2 a first meeting of its 
investigative team on the e-mail uproar. The panel began looking 
into measures to prevent a recurrence. Some mid-level and junior 
lawmakers have called for reconsidering how the party should 
basically deal with matters as an opposition party. 
 
The opposition usually grills the stance of the government-ruling 
coalition and their responses at the budget committees of both 
chambers where the ruling and opposition camps conduct debate on 
national issues in general. After that, they deliberate 
individual bills, presenting counterproposals to play up the 
capability of assuming the political reins. 
 
Minshuto conceives such Diet debate as realizing a functioning 
two-party system. 
 
However, the Yomiuri Shimbun has learned from an ad-hoc public 
opinion survey conducted on March 1-2 that 72% of the respondents 
thought that Minshuto did not have the capability of assuming the 
 
TOKYO 00001186  008 OF 009 
 
 
reins of government. Despite the fact that the party's survival 
is at stake, many veteran and mid-level lawmakers have been 
quietly watching from afar the maneuvering at the top on choosing 
the new chairman of the party's Diet Affairs Committee. The 
maneuvering is aimed at the party leadership race in September. 
Such moves in Minshuto may explain the public's dissatisfaction 
with the main opposition party. 
 
President Maehara said on March 3: 
 
"I want to rebuild the leadership. I also would like our party to 
fulfill the responsibility of the largest opposition party by 
pursuing the set of four issues and distortions of the Koizumi 
reform drive." 
 
Watanabe categorically said this about his party's Diet strategy: 
 
"We don't have to stick to just stating the policy line. If we 
consider that a bill benefits the public, we will approve it. But 
if we assume that a bill will not be good for the people, we 
might boycott debate on it." 
 
In an attempt to stand up against the huge ruling coalition, it 
is absolutely necessary for Minshuto to secure public confidence. 
Whether it can do so is an open question. 
 
(Corrected copy) Self-destruction of Minshuto (Part 2): President 
Maehara manages the party as if he is still in college 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
March 3, 2006 
 
On the night of February 28 when Minshuto (Democratic Party of 
Japan) Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Noda was forced to step 
down from his post to take responsibility for the e-mail fiasco, 
seven members, including Mitsuo Mitani and Keiro Kitagami, got 
together at a Tokyo restaurant. The seven were elected for the 
first time to the Diet in last year's House of Representatives 
election. They were all concerned about the future of their 
party. 
 
One lawmaker said: 
 
"The current executive is a party of good friends or a group of 
persons who have similar characteristics. They have no one who 
can work behind-the-scenes. I wonder if the party can survive as 
is." 
 
Some junior lawmakers supporting Maehara even began to question 
the party leadership, which is now exposed as incompetent, 
witnessing party leaders' slapdash handling of the e-mail issue. 
 
Maehara has managed the party along with his close friends, 
including Yoshihiko Noda, who resigned as chairman of the Diet 
Affairs Committee, Acting Secretary General Koichiro Genba, and 
Goshi Hosono, his junior in Kyoto University. Maehara, Noda and 
Genba are graduates of the Matsushita Institute of Government and 
Management. A lawmaker affiliated with the now defunct Democratic 
Socialist Party commented: "(Maehara) conducts politics just like 
college students carrying out activities." 
 
Maehara, who aims to fulfill strong leadership, tried to reach 
internal consensuses on such basic policies as security and 
 
TOKYO 00001186  009 OF 009 
 
 
constitutional amendment through his top-down management. For 
example, without getting approval of the party, he stated in a 
speech last December that China was a threat to Japan. He then 
tried to make his view the party's. 
 
Maehara's political methods are similar to those of Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who got postal privatization bills 
through the Diet, refusing harmony and cooperation with anti- 
postal reform forces in the LDP. Since Maehara has often left 
Secretary General Hatoyama out of the loop, some party members 
 
SIPDIS 
dub him the "mini Koizumi." By calling anti-Koizumi lawmakers as 
the forces of resistance, Koizumi won public support. One of the 
reasons why Maehara cannot unify the party is that he does not 
have a strategy, something that politicians who have managed to 
clear a number of obstacles usually have developed. 
 
Minshuto's local organizations and support groups of its 
lawmakers are weak. Although Minshuto is regarded as a party that 
might form a two-party system with the LDP, the main opposition 
party has only 35 local government assembly members, which means 
that it is difficult for the party to observe views of voters and 
local governments, lacking a sense of balance to give 
consideration to a variety of views in the party. 
 
Hiroshi Yamada, the head of Suginami Ward, dined with Maehara, 
Noda and Genba on Feb. 7. Yamada, the three lawmakers' senior of 
the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management, gave them 
advice, saying, "You have to widen personal network as 
politicians. I'm worried about your political activities. You 
must have intelligent agents to establish information networks." 
 
Maehara, however, only replied, "You can say that again." 
 
The e-mail fiasco came about ten days later. Taking the 
information obtained by lawmaker Hisayasu Nagata on faith, a few 
members in the party executive decided to take it up at the Diet 
-- a decision that led the party to self-destruction. 
 
Bunmei Ibuki, a former labor minister, said in a meeting of his 
faction on March 2: 
 
"Senior lawmakers elected to the Diet a number of times have a 
political sense of balance and guardedness. But Minshuto has 
excluded such thinking in its management." 
 
Ibuki's analysis is that this structural problem in Minshuto led 
to the e-mail uproar. 
 
Yesterday the executive was finally able to pick former Lower 
House Vice Speaker Kozo Watanabe as chairman of its Diet Affairs 
Committee. The appointment of Watanabe is probably their 
afterthought to downplaying of "behind-the-scenes maneuvering" in 
the party. Maehara's term as president will expire in September. 
Minshuto members have to work hard against time to unite. 
 
SCHIEFFER