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Viewing cable 06SINGAPORE990, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MOF/MFA SECOND MINISTER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SINGAPORE990 2006-03-28 06:44 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Singapore
VZCZCXRO3700
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGP #0990/01 0870644
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280644Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9340
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 000990 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE PASS TREASURY FOR PBROWN AND HLOUIE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV ETTC PGOV PREL SN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MOF/MFA SECOND MINISTER 
RAYMOND LIM 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary. Second Minister for Finance and Foreign 
Affairs Raymond Lim told the Ambassador during a March 24 
courtesy call that the United States and Singapore could resolve 
issues separating us on a double taxation agreement (DTA).  On 
casinos, he said that Singapore would implement additional laws 
and regulations needed to keep the country's clean and uncorrupt 
reputation intact.  The Ambassador emphasized that a robust 
casino regulatory regime required laws governing cash couriers 
(which Singapore lacks).  Acknowledging the good cooperation 
under the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to monitor cargo 
bound for the United States, the Ambassador stressed that the USG 
remained concerned about the lack of screening for cargo bound 
elsewhere.  Second Minister Lim said that he was worried about 
the ramifications for free trade stemming from the recent Dubai 
ports decision.  On encouraging Thailand to join the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Lim urged patience as 
the Thai government worked through its political difficulties. 
He noted that Iran's making its nuclear ambitions a matter of 
national pride had made dealing with that country's nuclear 
ambitions increasingly difficult.  End summary. 
 
Double Taxation Agreement 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The Ambassador raised our ongoing discussions to 
negotiate a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) and, possibly, 
a DTA.  She noted that in both cases, Singapore would need to 
meet Treasury's requirements on certain, fundamental 
prerequisites such as information sharing.  In reference to the 
DTA, Second Minister Lim said that Singapore wanted to conclude a 
tax treaty with the United States.  In his correspondence with 
Secretary Snow, he had asserted that the issues could be 
 
SIPDIS 
resolved, he said; they were not insurmountable.  (Note: the 
Attorney General's Chamber has the lead on negotiating an MLAT. 
End note.) 
 
Casinos 
------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Asked how Singapore would cope with the law enforcement 
and social ramifications of two multi-billion dollar casinos 
slated to come online in 2009, Second Minister Lim said that 
Singapore was "quite seized" with this issue, especially since 
Singapore's reputation for "integrity, honesty, and 
trustworthiness" was at stake.  He expressed confidence that 
Singapore had a solid anti-money laundering and terrorist finance 
regime.  The government was working to implement the Financial 
Action Task Force's (FATF) legal and regulatory recommendations 
in this regard, he said.  The Ambassador emphasized that laws 
governing cash couriers (which we are urging Singapore to enact) 
would be a critical component of a robust casino regulatory 
environment. 
 
Screening Transshipped and Transit Cargo 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Asked about Singapore's efforts to enhance its 
screening of transshipped and transit cargo, especially for WMD, 
Second Minister Lim said that this was a question of balancing 
efficiency with security.  Timely and useful intelligence -- upon 
which Singapore will promptly act -- was the best way to manage 
the security angle, he asserted; it was not sensible to check 
every container.  The Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
represented a positive step, and we could do more, he concluded. 
The Ambassador agreed that we enjoyed good cooperation on 
containers bound for the United States under CSI.  She 
emphasized, however, that the USG remained concerned about 
unscreened cargo bound for dubious destinations like the DPRK. 
 
 
Dubai Ports 
----------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Second Minister Lim said he worried that the recent 
Dubai ports decision, coupled with the earlier CNOOC controversy 
over its attempt to acquire Unocal, portended more than just a 
temporary spike in protectionist sentiment in the United States. 
The Ambassador agreed that politics was partially to blame, but 
observed that Dubai Ports World probably could have undertaken a 
more thorough lobbying effort in Washington and with the media in 
order to build consensus ahead of time. 
 
PSI 
--- 
 
6.  (SBU) Asked how best to convince Singapore's neighbors like 
Thailand to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 
 
SINGAPORE 00000990  002 OF 002 
 
 
Second Minister Lim said that PSI partners would have to be 
patient as Thailand sorted through its political preoccupations. 
In dealing with Thailand, he stressed the need to engage multiple 
channels and not just the respective Minister.  Although the 
situation had improved under Prime Minister Thaksin, the tenure 
of ministers in previous Thai administrations had been generally 
short.  This had emboldened certain civil servants opposed to 
their minister's views to wait him or her out, he said.  The 
result--policy stagnation. 
 
Iraq and Iran 
------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Singapore's 
logistical and other support in Iraq and its position on Iran vis- 
a-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Recalling a 
recent conversation with a non-proliferation expert based in 
Geneva, Second Minister Lim said that he was concerned about the 
way Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had linked the nuclear 
stand-off to national pride.  In effect, the Iranian government 
sat passively while those around them did the negotiating, he 
ventured; high oil prices made the Iranians even less inclined to 
compromise. 
 
HERBOLD