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Viewing cable 06SEOUL777, SIXTH ANNUAL ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL777 2006-03-10 09:00 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO4560
RR RUEHVC
DE RUEHUL #0777/01 0690900
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100900Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6500
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0171
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5921
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0227
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 8480
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7157
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2104
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0450
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0311
RUEHVC/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER 0158
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 SEOUL 000777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/RSP, INL, DRL, G/TIP, PRM, G, IWI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KS KCRM KWMN PGOV ELAB SMIG ASEC KFRD PREF
PHUM 
SUBJECT: SIXTH ANNUAL ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 3836 
 
     B. 04 SEOUL 4843 
     C. 05 SEOUL 5240 
     D. 05 SEOUL 3880 
     E. SEOUL 689 
     F. 04 SEOUL 6235 
     G. SEOUL 321 
     H. 05 SEOUL 5330 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY 
 
1.  (U) Post's submission for the sixth annual 
Anti-Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report follows.  Responses 
are keyed to questions in Ref A. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The ROKG continued to make efforts to fight 
trafficking in persons during the March 2005 to March 2006 
reporting period.  Government efforts to educate the public 
and promote compliance with the 2004 
Anti-Prostitution/Anti-Trafficking Laws (Ref B) helped raise 
awareness of prostitution and trafficking as a crime (Ref C, 
D).  Ministry of Gender Equality and Family's (MOGEF) 
financial support for NGOs helped further the development of 
a legal and social infrastructure for victims of the sex 
industry.  Local law enforcement agencies and Embassy 
officials cooperated closely in ongoing investigations of 
visa brokers connected with international trafficking. 
Government and NGOs devoted substantial time and resources to 
anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking programs.  In 
Paragraphs 52 and 53 below, we highlight two projects for 
consideration as international best practices:  a "John 
School" organized by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to educate 
men about the hidden costs of trafficking; and an internship 
program organized by the Magdalena House shelter to help 
victims of prostitution and trafficking transition into 
legitimate employment. 
 
3.  (SBU) Despite making steady progress, the ROK remained a 
source, transit and destination country for trafficking in 
persons.  In particular, the trafficking of Korean women to 
the United States and elsewhere remained a serious problem. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
PARAGRAPH 18: OVERVIEW OF ROK ACTIVITIES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) A.  The ROK was a source, transit, and destination 
country for women trafficked for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation.  Precise numbers of trafficking victims were 
unavailable.  According to the government's 2003 statistics, 
approximately 330,000 women were involved in the sex trade. 
NGOs and other observers continued to believe that the number 
of Korean sex workers was substantial.  Prostitution occurred 
in a variety of settings, including glass-front brothels, 
karaoke rooms, massage parlors, and private night clubs 
("room salons").  The government reported that, as of 
September 2005, the size of brothel districts had decreased 
by 35 percent since before passage of the 2004 laws. 
However, some observers report that prostitution activity may 
have in part shifted to more discreet settings, including 
residential neighborhoods.  Also, solicitation was 
increasingly taking place on-line or through cellular phone 
text messaging services. 
 
5.  (SBU) B.  While women in the ROK sex industry were 
overwhelmingly Korean, NGOs believed that several thousand 
foreign women from Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and other countries of Southeast Asia 
were also involved.  Observers told us that foreign women 
were trafficked to the ROK through employment agencies, 
 
SEOUL 00000777  002 OF 010 
 
 
travel companies, and international marriage brokers.  (NOTE: 
 Foreign women have historically worked in base camps 
surrounding U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) areas.  USFK continued 
to enforce its zero-tolerance policy towards prostitution and 
other measures to fight prostitution and human trafficking. 
Although problems still existed, an NGO that works 
exclusively with basecamp communities reported the closure of 
a number of clubs and a decrease in the number of foreign 
women working near U.S. bases.  END NOTE.). 
 
6.  (SBU) B. (Cont.)  Traffickers used debt bondage and 
threats of exposure to ensure compliance.  Victims 
accumulated debt as traffickers encouraged them to borrow 
money for clothes, makeup, accessories or rent.  Victims 
accumulated further debt through penalties for being late to 
work, being sick or committing other alleged infractions of 
work rules.  Some victims reported that they were approached 
by friends or acquaintances and promised easy and lucrative 
incomes.  Others reported that they approached employment 
agents who placed them in cafes or other establishments where 
they were compelled to provide sexual services.  NGOs 
reported that employment agencies promised runaway youth 
employment assistance, but instead sold them to sex-related 
establishments.  Victims were predominantly young Korean 
women in difficult economic or social situations, often 
characterized by family violence or broken families. 
 
7.  (SBU) B. (Cont.)  Korean women were trafficked to the 
United States, sometimes via Canada (where Korean nationals 
may travel without a visa) or Mexico.  They also entered the 
United States on non-immigrant visas, sometimes issued on the 
basis of false documents.  Korean women were also trafficked 
to Japan, Saipan, Guam, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
Western Europe.  Some NGOs speculated that the trafficking of 
Korean women overseas may have increased since the enactment 
of the 2004 legislation. 
 
8.  (SBU) B. (Cont.)  Among the victims trafficked to the 
United States with non-immigrant visas, a growing number 
appeared to be traveling on student visas.  Post's Fraud 
Prevention Unit (FPU), working in cooperation with local 
authorities, uncovered a ring of fraudulent-document 
producers and visa brokers who worked in the U.S., Korea and, 
possibly other Asian countries (Ref E).  The brokers assisted 
poorly qualified applicants to obtain real I-20 forms and 
fraudulent Korean university diplomas and transcripts.  Upon 
arrival in the U.S., organizers forced some Korean women to 
work in the sex industry as strippers, prostitutes, or 
masseuses.  To date, there have been nine arrests of visa 
brokers as a result of this ongoing investigation. 
 
9.  (SBU) B. (Cont.)  The National Assembly, the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), the Korean National 
Police, and local police in a number of jurisdictions 
demonstrated the political will to address trafficking in 
persons.  We look forward to improved cooperation from the 
MOJ.  In November 2004, the MOJ at Embassy Seoul's request 
initiated a Trilateral Working Group (TWG) to address in 
quarterly meetings the trafficking of Korean women from the 
ROK into the U.S. through Canada (Ref F).  In the inaugural 
meeting, the MOJ's position was, in essence, that if the 
Korean women traveled to Canada legally, their attempt later 
illegally to enter the United States was a Canada-U.S. border 
issue over which the ROKG had no control.  During the 
reporting period, the MOJ failed to convene another TWG 
meeting.  Despite repeated high-level assurances, MOJ has yet 
to schedule any follow-up meetings (Ref G). 
 
10.  (SBU) C.  The government's main limitation remained 
societal attitudes regarding prostitution.  While attitudes 
were changing, many Koreans still regarded prostitution as a 
customary part of business and social relations.  Business 
interests, in particular, were wary about the impact that a 
crackdown on prostitution could have on the economy. 
 
SEOUL 00000777  003 OF 010 
 
 
Further, some sex workers argued that they had a right to 
choose their vocation, even if it was prostitution.  The ROKG 
devoted substantial resources to its anti-prostitution and 
anti-trafficking efforts.  In 2005, the government spent 22.2 
billion won (USD 22,560,334) on financial aid to victims. 
Corruption was not reported to be a major problem. 
 
11.  (U) D.  The MOGEF engaged in efforts to monitor its 
anti-trafficking efforts and periodically made available its 
assessments.  In addition to the quarterly meetings of its 
multi-agency anti-trafficking task force, the government 
plans to issue a report in September 2006 on the efficacy of 
the 2004 Anti-Prostitution/Anti-Trafficking Laws. 
 
 
PARAGRAPH 22: PREVENTION 
------------------------ 
 
12.  (U) A.  In 2005, the ROK acknowledged that trafficking 
was a problem to the extent that foreign women may be 
trafficked to areas surrounding military camp towns. 
 
13.  (U) B.  The following government agencies were involved 
in anti-trafficking efforts:  Ministry of Justice; Supreme 
Public Prosecutors Office; Korean National Police Agency 
(KNPA); Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF); 
Ministry of Labor; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism; Maritime Police 
Administration; and, the National Information Agency. 
 
14.  (U) C.  During the reporting period, the MOGEF and the 
KNPA conducted periodic briefings and media interviews.  The 
MOGEF managed a hotline that provided English, Russian and 
Chinese interpretation services and facilitated social, legal 
and medical assistance for victims.  The KNPA distributed 
educational material to women, Korean and foreign, working in 
entertainment venues on their rights and how to report any 
abuses. 
 
15.  (U) D.  The MOGEF sponsored various occupational 
training and employment support programs for women.  The 
government also provided women entrepreneurs with grants and 
low interest loans. In addition, election laws provided that 
National Assembly elections, 50 percent of each party's 
proportional representatives and 30 percent of each party's 
geographic representatives must be women.  In March 2005, the 
National Assembly eliminated the "hojuje," a household 
registration system that made women legally subordinate to 
the male family head. 
 
16.  (U) D.  (Cont.) To help reduce the demand for 
prostitution and human trafficking, the MOJ's Probation and 
Parole Division created a "John School" to educate men about 
the hidden costs of prostitution (Ref H).  Over one thousand 
men have participated in the program, which was a mandatory 
eight-hour class for first offenders arrested for purchasing, 
or attempting to purchase, sex.  The curriculum included 
testimony from trafficking victims, HIV/AIDS awareness, and 
other social and health information.  The government also 
targeted military servicemen and reserve forces with an 
anti-prostitution campaign. 
 
17.  (U) F. (NOTE: Para E omitted in Ref A. END NOTE.). 
Government officials, NGOs, international organizations and 
others cooperated on the trafficking issue.  In November 
2005, the ROKG hosted an international conference on human 
trafficking, the third in an annual series.  This year's 
conference focused on prosecuting international trafficking 
rings in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
18.  (U) G.  The ROKG adequately monitored its borders. 
Addressing a problem noted in previous TIP reports, the 
government took measures to assert law enforcement 
jurisdiction in the international transit lounge of Incheon 
 
SEOUL 00000777  004 OF 010 
 
 
International Airport. 
 
19.  (U) H.  Fourteen government ministries coordinated their 
anti-TIP efforts through a task force that met quarterly.  In 
addition, the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(KICAC) worked to eliminate corruption in the government and 
private sector. 
 
20.  (SBU) J.  (NOTE: Para I omitted in Ref A. END NOTE.). 
In 2003, the government created a Planning Unit on the 
Prevention of Prostitution.  Its 12 members included 
government officials, three academics, one clergyman, five 
NGO representatives and one legal adviser.  The Planning Unit 
in March 2004 created a Master Plan on the Prevention of 
Prostitution in March 2004.  The 2004 
Anti-Prostitution/Anti-Trafficking Laws were a main component 
of this plan. 
 
 
PARAGRAPH 23: INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
21.  (U) A.  In September 2004, the ROKG implemented 
legislation that specifically prohibited trafficking in 
persons and established a network of support resources for 
victims.  The 2004 "Act on the Punishment of Intermediating 
in the Sex Trade and Associated Acts," provided for the 
punishment of human trafficking for the purpose of the sex 
trade and authorized the seizure of money and property 
acquired through trafficking.  The law prohibited the sex 
trade; intermediating in the sex trade; human trafficking for 
the purpose of the sex trade; employing and recruiting others 
for the purpose of selling sex, or introducing and 
intermediating work with the knowledge that sex is traded; 
and, advertising for activities or an agency where the sex 
trade is carried out.  The law provided that sex trade 
victims would not be subject to punishment and would also be 
entitled to certain procedural safeguards, such as closed 
trials.  "Victims," under this law, were persons forced to 
sell sex by means of deceptive schemes, force or drug use. 
Juveniles, persons with serious disabilities and persons 
trafficked for the purposes of the sex trade were also deemed 
victims.  Further, monetary claims of traffickers against 
victims were invalidated regardless of the form or the 
pretext of the contract. 
 
22.  (U) A. (Cont.)  Provisions of the Criminal Act and the 
Special Criminal Act could also be used to prosecute crimes 
related to trafficking in persons.  For example: 
 
-- Kidnapping minors by force or deception was illegal under 
Criminal Act Article 287 on Kidnapping of a Minor and was 
punishable by imprisonment of up to ten years; 
 
-- Abuse of a person under one's protection or supervision 
was illegal under Criminal Act Article 273 on Cruelty and was 
punishable by imprisonment of up to two years or a fine of up 
to five million won (USD 5,119).  A person who delivered a 
child under sixteen years of age who was under his protection 
or supervision to a proprietor or agent who would employ the 
child in work that was dangerous to life or limb was illegal 
under Criminal Act Article 274 on Hard Labor by a Child and 
was punishable by imprisonment of up to five years; 
 
-- Kidnapping a person by force or deception for the purpose 
of gain, transportation to a foreign country or marriage was 
illegal under Criminal Act Article 288 and was punishable by 
imprisonment of no less than one year, Article 289 (penal 
servitude of no less than five years) and Article 291 (penal 
servitude  of up to five years); 
 
-- Falsely arresting or illegally confining another was 
illegal under Criminal Act Article 276 on False 
Arrest/Illegal Confinement and was punishable by imprisonment 
 
SEOUL 00000777  005 OF 010 
 
 
up to five years or a fine of up to seven million won (USD 
7,167) and by Article 277 on Aggravated False 
Arrest/Aggravated Illegal Confinement which provided for 
penal servitude of up to seven years; 
 
-- Intimidating another person was illegal under Criminal Act 
Article 283 on Intimidation and punishable by imprisonment of 
up to three years, or a fine of up to five million won (USD 
5,119); 
 
-- Using violence against another was punishable by Criminal 
Act Article 260 on Violence and was punishable by penal 
servitude for no more than two years or a fine of up to five 
million won (USD 5,119); 
 
-- Inflicting bodily injury on another was illegal under 
Criminal Act Article 257 on Inflicting Bodily Injury and was 
punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years or a fine of 
up to 10 million won (USD 10,239); 
 
23.  (U) A. (Cont.)  In addition, the Labor Standards Act 
prohibited forced labor, violence, and illegal exploitation 
and provided for penalties of imprisonment of up to five 
years or fines of up to 30 million won (USD 30,717).  The 
Child Welfare Act and the Youth Protection Act prohibited 
child abuse and provided for imprisonment of up to ten years 
and fines of up to thirty million won (USD 30,717).  The 
Immigration Control Act, the Passport Act, the Employment 
Security Act, and the Act Relating to Protection for 
Dispatched Workers also had provisions that prohibited crimes 
related to human trafficking. 
 
24.  (U) B.  In addition, penalties for human traffickers 
were as follows: 
 
-- A person who forced another by violence or intimidation to 
sell sex was subject to imprisonment of up to 10 years, a 
fine of up to 100 million won (USD 102,385), or both; 
 
-- A member of a criminal organization or group who forced 
another by violence or intimidation to sell sex was subject 
to imprisonment of at least one year; 
 
-- a person who forced sex trade on another by detention or 
by showing collective force was subject to a prison term of 
at least three years; 
 
-- a person who solicited sex trade customers or 
intermediated sex trade jobs was subject to imprisonment of 
up to three years, a fine of up to 30 million won (USD 
30,717), or both; 
 
-- a person who received compensation for intermediating in 
the sex trade as a business or introduced or intermediated 
sex-selling jobs was subject to imprisonment of up to seven 
years, a fine of up to 70 million won (USD 71,668), or both; 
 
-- a person who bought or sold sex services was subject to a 
prison term of up to one year, a fine of up to three million 
won (USD 3,071), or both. 
 
25.  (U) C.  Under the Criminal Act, rape and indecent act by 
compulsion were punishable by imprisonment of three to ten 
years (Article 297, 298).  Penalties for rape or sexual 
assault and for sex trafficking were roughly equivalent. 
 
26.  (U) D.  Prostitution in the ROK was illegal.  The 2004 
"Act on the Punishment of Intermediating in the Sex Trade and 
Associated Acts" provided for the punishment of human 
trafficking for the purpose of the sex trade and authorizes 
the seizure of money and property acquired through 
trafficking.  The law prohibited the sex trade; 
intermediating in the sex trade; human trafficking for the 
purpose of the sex trade; employing and recruiting others for 
 
SEOUL 00000777  006 OF 010 
 
 
the purpose of selling sex, or introducing and intermediating 
work with the knowledge that sex is traded; and, advertising 
for activities or an agency where the sex trade is carried 
out. 
 
27.  (U) D. (Cont.) Significantly, the 2004 law provided that 
sex trade victims would not be subject to punishment and 
would also be entitled to certain procedural safeguards, such 
as closed trials.  "Victims," under this law, were persons 
forced to sell sex by means of deceptive schemes, force or 
drug use.  Juveniles, persons with serious disabilities and 
persons trafficked into the sex trade were also deemed 
victims. 
 
28.  (SBU) E.  According to 2005 MOJ statistics, the arrest 
rate for prostitution-related offenses increased to 6.3 
percent from 5.5 percent, and the prosecution rate increased 
to 61.5 percent in 2005 from 46.7 percent the previous year. 
Nearly all of these prosecutions resulted in "administrative 
trials," where defendants did not have to appear in court and 
were mostly subject to a fine.  Some NGOs criticized the 
MOJ's failure to enforce the 
Anti-Trafficking/Anti-Prostitution Law to its fullest extent. 
 In particular, some NGOs noted the MOJ's reluctance to seek 
incarceration for offenders and failure to use the asset 
forfeiture provisions of the TIP laws (Ref C, D). 
 
29.  (SBU) F.  According to informed sources, employment 
agencies received commission or introduction fees from owners 
of red-light district facilities and other sex-related venues 
where victims were forced into the sex trade.  Police sources 
said transnational traffickers were based in the U.S., Korea, 
or elsewhere in Asia.  The ROKG had no information on crime 
organizations involved in human trafficking cases and had no 
evidence that profits made by transnational crime 
organizations, travel agencies or marriage agencies were 
transferred to terrorist groups, guerrilla groups, judges or 
banks. 
 
30.  (SBU) G.  The ROKG reported that it investigated cases 
of trafficking using, to the extent possible:  emergency 
arrest, restraint, search and seizure, communication 
intercepts, location tracking via mobile phones, electronic 
monitoring through cyber patrol and undercover 
investigations. 
 
31.  (U) H.  The Supreme Prosecutor's Office (SPO) provided 
training at the Legal Research and Training Institute to 
prosecutors dedicated to human trafficking or crimes of 
violence, police authorities who handled violent crimes and 
others that worked on anti-trafficking operations.  The KNPA 
also provided training on intelligence gathering and 
investigation methods through courses offered at the Police 
Comprehensive Academy and the National Scientific Criminal 
and Investigation Laboratory. 
 
32.  (SBU) I.  The ROKG cooperated with other governments 
through the Act on International Judicial Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters and the Extradition Act.  Police 
cooperation with the Embassy during the course of 
international trafficking and visa broker investigations. 
 
33.  (SBU) J.  A criminal could be extradited to the U.S. and 
the other 21 signatory nations of the Extradition Act. 
Extradition to a non-signatory country was possible through a 
mutual guarantee.  To date, no persons have been extradited 
for human trafficking. 
 
34.  (U) K.  There was no evidence of government involvement 
in or tolerance of trafficking. 
 
35.  (U) L.  There was no evidence of government involvement 
in trafficking. 
 
 
SEOUL 00000777  007 OF 010 
 
 
36.  (SBU) M.  In July, the National Youth Commission found 
that Korean fishermen were greatly responsible for the 
commercial sexual exploitation of children in the Pacific 
Ocean island nation of Kiribati.  Some NGOs have expressed 
growing concern about Korean sex tourism to China, the 
Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, and elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia.  Although prosecutors had the authority to bring 
extraterritorial charges of sex crimes against Korean 
nationals, no charges were reported. 
 
37.  (U) N.  The ROK ratified ILO Convention 182 concerning 
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labor in March 2001; the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography in 
September 2000; and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, 
in December 2000.  The ROK has not signed ILO Conventions 29 
and 105 on forced labor. 
 
PARAGRAPH 23: PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
38.  (U) A.  The 2004 "Act on the Prevention of the Sex Trade 
and Protection of its Victims," authorized the establishment 
of assistance facilities and counseling centers that would 
help sex trade victims reintegrate into society.  In 
particular, the ROKG would have to provide support facilities 
for victims, including foreign victims, that would provide 
for room and board; counseling; medical support and legal 
assistance.  The law identified four types of assistance 
facilities:  (1) general assistance facilities, which provide 
board and housing for up to six months and support the 
independence of sex trade victims; (2) juvenile assistance 
facilities, which provide board and housing for up to one 
year and support the independence of juvenile sex trade 
victims through school enrollment and education; (3) 
assistance facilities for foreign women, which provide board 
and housing for up to three months and support the victims' 
return home; and (4) self-support assistance centers, which 
provide job and technical training, employment information 
and other social adjustment services for sex trade victims. 
Under the law, state and local governments are also 
authorized to establish counseling centers, which would 
provide counseling and engage in the rescue of sex trade 
victims.  In 2005, there were 23 general shelters, 16 
shelters for teenage victims, two shelters for foreign 
nationals, two rehabilitation shelters, four group homes and 
29 counseling centers.  The MOGEF also established a Center 
for Women's Human Rights to provide overall assistance to 
trafficking prevention facilities. 
 
39.  (U) A. (Cont.)  For foreign women, the Ministry of 
Justice had the authority to grant victims of trafficking 
either a G-1 visa ("others" visa category under the 
immigration law) or to suspend their departure until damage 
claims and redress of rights had been settled.  Like ROK 
nationals, foreign women were eligible for board and lodging, 
professional counseling, legal and medical services. 
 
40.  (U) B.  The ROKG provided monetary support to NGOs that 
provided social, legal and medical services to trafficking 
and sex trade victims.  Victims in shelters were eligible to 
receive medical assistance in accordance with the Medical 
Expenses Act.  Medical services not stipulated by the Medical 
Expenses Act were provided by various rehabilitation funds, 
amounting to 4.5 million Korean won (USD 4,571) per person. 
A total of 4,185 victims received medical treatment during 
the first half of 2005.  ROKG-funded vocational and 
retraining programs in 2005 resulted in 24 victims starting 
their own businesses and 239 finding legitimate employment or 
enrolling in school. 
 
41.  (U) C.  If classified as a victim of the sex trade, a 
 
SEOUL 00000777  008 OF 010 
 
 
person would be referred to a shelter or support facilities 
related to the MOGEF.  Persons classified not as victims but 
as willing participants in the sex trade (and in violation of 
the law) would also be eligible for treatment and counseling. 
 
42.  (U) D.  ROK law specifically provided that victims of 
trafficking were to be treated as victims, not criminals. 
The law further provided that deportation orders for foreign 
victims of trafficking who reported a trafficking offense 
were to be suspended until the conclusion of the 
investigation or until their claims were redressed. 
 
43.  (U) E.  The Act on the Punishment of Intermediating in 
Sex Trade and Associated Acts stipulated that monetary 
compensation should be given to those who reported crimes 
involving human trafficking.  The amount of money would be 
determined by the reporter's contribution to solving the 
case, financial damage suffered by the reporter because of 
the report, and whether the reporter was involved in the 
crime.  The Crime Victims Support Division, which had 
branches at over 50 prosecutors offices nationwide, supported 
victims by providing information on their cases, personal 
protection, and counseling services.  The Division also 
helped victims take legal action. 
 
44.  (SBU) E. (Cont.)  Debt bondage has been one of the most 
prevalent means of keeping women in the ROK sex industry. 
Some NGOs succeeded in helping victims successfully to sue 
brothel owners and managers to nullify debt accumulated as a 
result of the sex trade (Ref D).  (NOTE:  As a result, 
brothel owners were reportedly beginning to force women to 
borrow money from secondary financial sources, thus making it 
more difficult to prove a connection between the accrued debt 
and prostitution. END NOTE.). 
 
45.  (U) F.  The Act on the Protection of Reporters and 
Associated Persons of Specific Crime stipulated that, when 
the court or the investigation authorities investigated a 
victim in a human trafficking case, or put the victim on a 
witness stand, personal protection measures should be taken 
for the victim, and the victim could apply for related 
financial aid.  The law also stipulated that the victim in a 
sex trade case was free to leave the country according to her 
will.  The government was not authorized to prevent a victim 
in a sex trade case from leaving the country. 
 
46.  (U) F.  The Act on Special Cases Concerning the 
Punishment of Specific Violent Crimes and the Act on the 
Protection of Reporters of Specific Crimes provided that when 
a victim in a human trafficking case reported a crime or 
testified in court, the victim's identity and related 
information could not be disclosed.  The Act on the 
Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims Thereof 
protected the victim during prosecution and trial by 
prohibiting the disclosure of the victim's identity and 
allowing a closed-door hearing.  According to the Act on the 
Punishment of Intermediating in Sex Trade and Associated 
Acts, when the court or the authorities questioned a victim, 
their representative could be present.  The law also stated 
that, during the investigation, the victim was eligible to 
receive protection and guidance from counselors specializing 
in sex trade victim counseling. 
 
47.  (U) G.  The ROKG provided training programs for 74 
regional government officials in 2005.  The training covered 
on-site investigation and protection of trafficking victims; 
trafficking prevention by developing ongoing relationships 
with NGOs; and trafficking prevention-related laws and 
policies. 
 
48.  (U) G. (Cont.)  The ROKG reported in 2005 that it did 
not support victims of human trafficking, or NGOs that 
supported trafficking victims, through its embassies or 
consulates. 
 
SEOUL 00000777  009 OF 010 
 
 
 
49.  (U) H.  Repatriated nationals who were victims of 
trafficking were eligible for the same social, legal and 
medical support services available for domestic victims of 
trafficking. 
 
50.  (U) I.  A variety of international organizations and 
NGOs worked with trafficking victims, including International 
Organization for Migration, the Asia Foundation, the SAGE 
Foundation, Korea Women's Associations United, Women Migrants 
Human Rights Center, Hansori House of Friends, the Jeon Jin 
Sang Social Welfare Center in Anyang, Magdalena House and 
Saewoomtuh for Prostituted Women.  The NGOs provided 
information and counseling services, as well as medical, 
legal, and social support. 
 
BEST PRACTICES 
-------------- 
 
51.  (U) While many government agencies and NGOs were 
involved in impressive projects to fight trafficking and 
rescue survivors, the following two projects stood out for 
their creativity, potential to effect positive change, and 
ability to be replicated elsewhere.  Post nominates the MOJ 
"John School" and the Magdalena House Internship Program for 
inclusion in the Best Practices section of the 2006 TIP 
Report. 
 
52.  (U) The John School:  Loosely benchmarking the San 
Francisco-based SAGE Foundation's program for sex offenders, 
the MOJ has created a "John School" to educate men about the 
hidden costs of prostitution (Ref H).  The School is an 
eight-hour class offered on Saturdays at 16 locations 
throughout the ROK.  In a typical session, participants will 
engage in discussion with victim advocates, who are sometimes 
former trafficking victims, regarding the harm that 
prostitution can inflict on families and the community. 
Attendees also receive information on HIV/AIDS prevention and 
participate in role-playing exercises and group counseling 
sessions.  Although this program is still in its infancy, 
Post believes this program may make a significant impact in 
changing attitudes in a critical target group of first 
offenders and reducing the demand for prostitution in the 
ROK.  In order to maximize the chances of this program's 
success, Post is facilitating a consultancy relationship 
between the SAGE Foundation and the MOJ and has also 
nominated the MOJ program's creator, Prosecutor Lee 
Young-joo, for an International Visitor Program grant. 
 
53.  (U) Magdalena House Internship Program:  Once victims of 
the sex industry overcome the trauma of their experience, 
finding legitimate employment becomes a major challenge. 
Some try to open their own businesses, but struggle because 
they lack experience.  In addition, they also tend to focus 
on the clothing or beauty industries, which are prone to 
instability and rapid turnover.  In order to develop more 
sustainable employment, the Magdalena House, a shelter and 
support center in central Seoul, initiated partnerships with 
local business associations, including the Korean Women 
Entrepreneurs' Association (Seoul Chapter), Korean Foundation 
for Women, and Caritas Seoul,  (Ref C).  Since 2003, 
Magdalena House has placed about four to five trafficking 
survivors per year to work as interns  members' businesses. 
These internships, which generally lasted six months, helped 
participants gain valuable business skills. 
 
EMBASSY POINT OF CONTACT AND TIME REPORT 
---------------------------------------- 
54.  (SBU) Mission point of contact for TIP issues is 
Political Officer Michael Kleine, tel. 82-2-397-4213, fax 
82-2-733-4791.  In support of this report, Embassy Seoul has 
spent approximately 1,376 hours researching trafficking 
issues, coordinating with contacts, participating in USFK 
anti-trafficking initiatives, and pursuing visa broker 
 
SEOUL 00000777  010 OF 010 
 
 
investigations over the past year.  This total includes: 
 
Ambassador: 6 hours 
DCM:  4 hours 
FE/MC/CON: 5 hours 
MC/POL: 1 hour 
02-level POL: 5 hours 
02-level POL: 315 hours 
04-level CON: 1040 hours (visa broker investigations) 
VERSHBOW