Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06RANGOON312, NATURE, GOVERNMENT CONSPIRE AGAINST RICE FARMERS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06RANGOON312.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06RANGOON312 2006-03-08 00:42 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rangoon
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

080042Z Mar 06
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR PGOV ECON BM
SUBJECT: NATURE, GOVERNMENT CONSPIRE AGAINST RICE FARMERS 
 
REF: RANGOON 0235 
 
1. (U) Summary: In 2005, unpredictable new export 
restrictions, higher fuel prices, political interference in 
planting decisions, and a shorter than usual summer monsoon 
added new problems for Burmese rice farmers.  Rice exports 
increased 90% over the previous year to 220,000 metric tons 
as a GOB ban was lifted, but unseasonable weather and 
increasing costs make prospects low for rice production in 
2006.  End summary. 
 
Rice Exports Up 
--------------- 
2. (SBU) Once the world's dominant rice producer and 
exporter, in 2005 Burma exported only 220,000 metric tons 
(MT), leagues behind neighbors Thailand (7.5 million MT in 
2004) and Vietnam (5 million MT in 2005).  Burmese exports 
increased 90% over 2004 because the GOB lifted its six-month 
ban on rice exports in July 2004, and exported only 115,000 
metric tons of rice in the second half of the year.  Most 
Burmese exports go to Malaysia, Singapore, and Africa. 
Prospects for rice exports in 2006 are lower because unusual 
late December rains severely damaged crops, including stores 
for domestic consumption.  Some in the trade speculate there 
may even be a domestic rice shortage in 2006. 
 
3. (SBU) To prevent hoarding and reselling, the GOB allows 
only entrepreneurs who grow rice on government land to 
export.  In 2005, however, much of the production from the 
leased government land did not meet export-quality standards, 
so the entrepreneurs purchased most of the rice they exported 
from domestic markets.  The government also allowed some 
millers to export rice from the "Buffer Stock", normally held 
in reserve to intervene when domestic rice prices rise too 
high.  Because of its poor handling and milling processes, 
Burma exports a higher percentage of low quality rice today 
than in the past.  Last year, 25% of its exports was poor 
quality Ehmata rice, most of which went to African markets. 
 
Costs for Rice Farmers Up, Too 
------------------------------ 
4. (SBU) The GOB's decision to cut fuel subsidies in October 
2005 forced farmers to pay 800% more to operate the diesel 
pumps used to irrigate their paddy fields.  Farmers who can't 
afford this are sub-leasing their fields, becoming farm labor 
on their own land.  Prices for some fertilizers rose over 30% 
in 2005 because of increased transportation costs.  This has 
led to an increase in arrests along the Burma/Bangladesh 
border, as farmers who cannot afford the scarce, expensive 
local fertilizers turn to smugglers selling cheaper 
subsidized products from Bangladesh. 
 
5. (SBU) The GOB enforces strict trade controls in Rakhine 
State on the border with Bangladesh, even restricting the 
movement of rice between townships.  This makes local rice 
prices among the highest in the country, in an area that is 
one of Burma's poorest.  Because of the tenuous food supply 
situation, the World Food program (WFP) distributes free rice 
to the most vulnerable groups in Rakhine.  WFP supplied 185 
metric tons in 2005 and plans to give away 616 metric tons in 
2006.  WFP also plans to adjust its Burma food vulnerability 
map, now broken down by townships, to a more general 
breakdown by state/division level.  Unfortunately, this will 
also dilute awareness of the desperate poverty of the 
northern parts of Rakhine State (reftel), since the rest of 
the state does not suffer the same trade and travel 
restrictions, and has a higher standard of living. 
 
6. (SBU) Farmers and traders tell us that the GOB has ordered 
some farmers to grow rice, instead of more profitable (and 
environmentally-suitable) crops.  In rice-producing areas, 
the GOB has ordered farmers to plant two crops of rice 
annually, instead of alternating rice with other crops as 
they have traditionally done during Burma's two growing 
seasons.  Farmers and FAO reps also told us that the GOB 
forced some farmers in northern Shan State to plant "Sin Shwe 
Li," a hybrid rice from China that requires more expensive 
inputs and is ill-suited to local climates.  The farmers 
borrowed money to purchase the new seed and fertilizers, but 
the low yields of the new crop have driven many into debt. 
The GOB ordered the farmers to plant this rice, we are told, 
to meet demand in China. 
Burma's Broken Rice Bowl 
--------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) Comment: What Burmese farmers need to restore their 
country's rice production to historic levels is more capital 
investment, modern technology, access to chemical fertilizers 
and other inputs, scientific research, and current 
information about local market conditions.  Instead, they get 
arbitrary production quotas, orders to grow crops that local 
conditions cannot sustain, increased costs for fuel and 
fertilizers, poor transportation and communication networks, 
and unpredictable weather.  2006 looks to be an even tougher 
year for farmers and the domestic rice market.  Until the 
regime institutes more rational and open policies, and 
creates a more welcoming investment climate, Burma's rice 
production will continue to fall behind its neighbors, and 
far below its potential.  End comment. 
STOLTZ