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Viewing cable 06PHNOMPENH516, CAMBODIA: SRP'S INTERNAL REFORM EFFORTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PHNOMPENH516 2006-03-17 09:45 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO2455
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0516/01 0760945
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 170945Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6287
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1350
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM  PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: SRP'S INTERNAL REFORM EFFORTS 
 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary.  Senior SRP officials recently discussed 
the challenges of reforming the Sam Rainsy Party, touching on 
internal elections of party leaders at the grassroots level, 
intraparty strife, the former Secretary General and Sam 
Rainsy's lack of consultation with the SRP's steering 
committee on major decisions.  They also discussed the 
challenge the SRP faces as an opposition party in light of 
the political shifts of the last month.  End Summary. 
 
SRP's Efforts to Reform the Party 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  Emboffs met with senior SRP officials Son Chhay on 
March 15 and Mu Sochua on March 16 to discuss the SRP's 
efforts at internal party reform.  The party is trying to 
reform, but it is sometimes finding it difficult.  Son Chhay 
cited the incident in Prey Veng province on March 12, where a 
proposal to conduct local SRP elections caused a disagreement 
between party leaders.  Local SRP staff tried to hold party 
elections in three villages, but Prey Veng National Assembly 
MP Chea Poch did not want the elections to go forward until 
all villages in the district had completed voter 
registration.  Ang Sokhnao, a long-time competitor with Chea 
Poch, advised that the election should proceed as planned as 
the three villages in question had already completed their 
registration process; the SRP trainer who had come to conduct 
the elections agreed.  Chea Poch's supporters were able to 
cause enough disruption that that only two of the three 
villages held the elections, and one of those only had a 50 
percent turnout of registered SRP voters. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Mu Sochua, on the other hand, recently returned 
from a monitoring trip covering Battambang and Pursat 
provinces, where SRP local elections reportedly went 
smoothly.  She said that no incidents took place similar to 
what transpired in Prey Veng, and SRP voters were very 
enthusiastic about the local reforms and party leader Sam 
Rainy's return.  She is optimistic from what she has seen 
that SRP is gaining new voters from both the CPP and 
FUNCINPEC.  In Battambang, for instance, she said party 
registration was up 25 percent.  Some voters brought their 
former CPP registration cards as evidence of their previous 
party affiliation.  Land issues appeared to be a primary 
source of discontent and reason for switching parties. 
 
4.  (SBU)  According to Son Chhay, however, the party has not 
really accepted reforms.  He referred to former Secretary 
General Eng Chhay Eang, who was removed by the SRP Steering 
Committee in December because of corruption and gambling 
problems, as one person who has tried to undermine reform 
efforts.  When IRI outlined a reform program agenda to the 
SRP, Eng Chhay Eang selected only those proposed reforms that 
he thought he could manipulate to his advantage, said Son 
Chhay.  Son Chhay added that Eng Chhay Eang has not really 
distanced himself from his old responsibilities as Secretary 
General, and continues to act as though he is managing the 
party.  He added that Sam Rainsy would like Eng Chhay Eang to 
remain as Secretary General, but that the steering committee 
adamantly opposed Sam Rainsy on that score.  Son Chhay said 
Sam Rainsy rejected a proposal to appoint a new Secretary 
General, saying it could wait until the party congress in 
December. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Son Chhay mentioned that he disagrees with Rainsy 
on some key issues.  He referred to Rainsy's proposal to 
change the Constitution to the 50 percent plus one rule, and 
said that Rainsy told him about this only after he had 
already sent the proposal to Hun Sen.  If he had seen the 
letter before, Son Chhay said, he would have told him not to 
send it.  The issue of 50 percent plus one is more complex 
than a single article in the Constitution, said Son Chhay, 
and required further legal consideration.  That said, Son 
Chhay noted that the 50 percent plus one now puts all the 
pressure on the CPP.  If reforms are not completed as 
promised, Hun Sen and the CPP can no longer blame FUNCINPEC 
and the two-thirds rule; from now on, it's either the CPP's 
gain or their defeat.  Son Chhay also disagrees with Sam 
Rainsy's proposal to create the National Authority for 
resolving land disputes.  He said it is not the opposition's 
role to help the government.  The opposition should point out 
what the government is doing wrong, and if the opposition 
agrees to work with the government on a solution, they can be 
easily blamed if it fails. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Comment:  SRP's commitment to reform is strong but 
clearly not universally held within the party.  We believe, 
however, the Prey Veng case is an isolated instance where 
individual officials like Chea Poch are concerned that a 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000516  002 OF 002 
 
 
reformed SRP will not support their candidacies as MPs in the 
future; similar cases may arise as the reform program goes 
forward.  The road to reforming the SRP will go forward but 
may have more bumps along the way.  Finally, it is too soon 
to judge how much popular discontent with the government over 
land grabbing and corruption will benefit SRP's voter 
registration drive and future election results, but SRP 
officials like Mu Sochua are optimistic based on what they 
are seeing in the field thus far.  End Comment. 
Mussomeli