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Viewing cable 06PESHAWAR108, ANP CHIEF SCANS THE HORIZON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PESHAWAR108 2006-03-06 15:21 2011-05-23 01:00 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Peshawar
VZCZCXRO9425
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHPW #0108/01 0651521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061521Z MAR 06
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6553
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0179
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1964
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0095
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0390
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0856
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0086
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0872
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0274
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 2116
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/6/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PTER KDEM PK
SUBJECT: ANP CHIEF SCANS THE HORIZON 
 

REF: (A)  PESHAWAR 077  (B) PESHAWAR 058  (C) 05 PESHAWAR 536  (D) 05 PESHAWAR 
 
167 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Spangler, Principal Officer, Amconsul 
Peshawar, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
--------------- 
1.  (C)  Awami National Party (ANP) Chief Asfandyar Wali Khan  would actively support President Musharraf's government, if the  GOP embraced three key ANP initiatives: (1) provincial autonomy  in health, local government, education, and agriculture; (2) 
changing the name of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) to  Paktunkhwa; and (3) comprehensive political development in the  FATA. Senator Asfandyar claims a GOP-ANP alliance would  demonstrate Musharraf's genuine commitment to ""enlightened  moderation"" and give the ANP a fair chance to challenge  anti-American religious parties that currently fill the  political vacuum here created by the exclusion of mainstream  parties in the 2002 general elections.  Asfandyar was not  sanguine about receiving his chance.  End summary. 
  Military-Mullah Ties 
----------------------------------- 
2.  (C) Inheriting his father's position as ANP leader, Senator  Asfandyar kicked off our two-hour discussion by analyzing the  political realities of the so-called military-mullah  relationship, asserting it was more accurate to describe it as a  ""master-servant"" bond.  While the MMA (1) stepped into the  political vacuum created by Musharraf's exclusion of mainstream  parties from the 2002 general elections and (2) helped to pass  the 17th amendment securing Musharraf's dual tenure as Chief of  Army Staff and President, the MMA is no longer a willing or  constructive partner in Musharraf's long-term goals for  Pakistan.  The Senator is prepared to make a pact with Musharraf  and the PML-Q, but he demands action -- not rhetoric -- on three  key points: 1) provincial autonomy; 2) changing the name of the  NWFP to Paktunkhwa; and 3) a commitment to comprehensive  political development in the FATA. 
 
3.  (C) If the President pledges to support these initiatives,  and follows through, Asfandyar promises strong, active public  support for Musharraf.  The Senator bluntly conceded his party  is regionally based, and he and his senior party officers have  no desire to accept Cabinet-level federal positions that would  require them to step down as party officers, according to his  party's by-laws. 
 
--------------------------  Provincial Autonomy 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The Senator called for devolution of power from the  federal government to the provinces in four key areas: health,  local government, education, and agriculture.  The federal  government could create foreign relations cells that interface  with foreign and international donors, but the actual  development of policy and implementation of services must be  left to the provinces.  Asfandyar argued there is nothing in  provincial autonomy ""that is against Pakistan.""  The provinces  have greater understanding of the needs of their citizens, and  are better positioned to deliver services than the federal  government.  The Center should not create the impression that it  reserves the concurrent list powers chiefly to consolidate its  political control and safeguard its bureaucratic clout. 
 
---------------  Paktunkhwa 
--------------- 
 
5.  (C) A long-standing ANP goal calls for changing the name of  the province to Paktunkhwa. Asfandyar insisted that the other  provinces are named for their most prominent ethnic groups, and  the NWFP should similarly honor the Pakhtuns.  The government  would lose nothing in doing so, and Pakhtuns would feel they  have a standing in Pakistan similar to the Punjabis, Sindhis,  and Baluchis.  The name change also helps to defuse brewing  resentments over the perceived relegation of Pakhtuns to  second-class citizenship. 
 
------------------------------------ 
  PESHAWAR 00000108  002 OF 002 
 
  FATA Political Development 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Asfandyar outlined a multi-pronged 18-month program that  he argued would usher in vitally needed changes to the FATA,  empowering the local population and drawing the region more  closely to the rest of Pakistan. 
 
-- Controlling ISI and the Afghan desk of the Pakistan Army in  the FATA.  He argued the two entities often work at  cross-purposes and in isolation from each other.  Operatives  oftentimes support long-standing relationships with Taliban and  Al Qa'ida leaders that undermine the policy initiatives of  senior GOP leaders. 
 
-- In parallel with reigning in ISI and the Afghan desk,  permitting soft political party activity in the FATA.  He  explained that ""soft"" activity meant allowing ANP party members,  without government approval, to participate in social events in  the tribal areas (marriages, condolences, etc.) and thus develop  the relationships necessary to establish a political foothold  over the longer term.  Asfandyar reasoned this could begin  before reforming the intelligence agencies, and is vital to  balance the power of the mullahs in the region. 
 
-- After one year of soft political activity, the Political  Party Act should be amended to permit full political party  activity in the FATA.  The one-year lag is necessary because the  religious parties already have extensive political networks in  the FATA, and liberal, progressive parties need time to  articulate and offer a competing vision to the FATA's people. 
 
--Empower the true maliks (qomi mashuran) -- those whose have  support from local people rather than Political Agents -- and  allow them to police their regions using lashkars (tribal police  forces). 
 
--Acknowledging that lashkhars might not be up to Taliban  policing efforts, he suggested the USG/GOP consider missile  strikes against second- and third-generation Taliban Pakhtun  leaders that have emerged after the elimination of Nek Mohammed  in mid-2004.  Asfandyar stressed the ANP supports strong  counter-terrorism efforts, but does not believe Pakistan Army  occupation will prove effective in the FATA. 
 
-- Integrate the FATA into the NWFP by transforming it into a  Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) in conjunction with  the national elections in 2007. 
 
--Introduce a local government system (LGS) after the 2007  Presidential election.  By this time the political parties would  have established themselves in the region and help to tie the  FATA into the NWFP. 
 
--As a high priority in economic development, construct a  trans-FATA highway connecting all the agencies to each other. 
Currently, to go from one agency to the next generally requires  traveling in and out of the NWFP.  The highway would facilitate  the movement of goods and permit industry to flourish. 
  COMMENT 
--------------- 
7.  (C) Asfandyar did not appear optimistic that he and the ANP  would be given a chance to work with Musharraf or the PML-Q.  Possibly, he calculates that Musharraf does not see him as a  powerful enough partner, and the ANP program would open up the  GOP to calls for greater autonomy from other parts of Pakistan. 
Asfandyar's remarks balance a realistic assessment of current  FATA problems with a progressive vision for the future. His  18-month plan for political reform would likely pay long-term  dividends, but requires bold action on the part of President  Musharraf in the midst on an ongoing War on Terrorism.  END  COMMENT.  SPANGLER