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Viewing cable 06PARIS2048, AFTERMATH OF MARCH 28 PROTESTS: PRESSURE TO DEFUSE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PARIS2048 2006-03-29 19:47 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Paris
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

291947Z Mar 06
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD, 
AND EB 
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA 
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV CASC EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: AFTERMATH OF MARCH 28 PROTESTS: PRESSURE TO DEFUSE 
THE SOCIAL CONFLICT MOUNTS, PUTTING KEY POLITICAL ACTORS IN 
INCREASING QUANDARY 
 
REF: A. (A) EMBASSY PARIS SIPRNET DAILY REPORT FOR MARCH 
 
        29 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. (B) PARIS 2006 AND PREVIOUS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- HANDLE ACCORDINGLY 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (SBU)  Following March 28's sizable demonstrations 
against the Villepin government's First Employment Contract 
(CPE) (refs A and B), there is a growing sense among both the 
French public and political class that leadership on both 
sides of the issue should find a way to defuse the burgeoning 
social and political confrontation that has coalesced around 
this youth employment scheme.  The weeks of demonstrations 
and protests -- and the turmoil and tension generated by them 
-- are acting as a vortex pulling in nearly every significant 
social and political division on the French political scene, 
and starkly sharpening those divisions.  There is no way to 
predict how the immediate "crisis over the CPE" will be 
resolved, but at this juncture most of those leading 
confrontation over the issue are hoping for a Constitutional 
Council decision to send the law back to the legislature and 
provide President Chirac and the government with a 
face-saving way out of the current impasse.  Otherwise Chirac 
himself may have to step in, and take a stand aimed at 
getting the issue off the street and back into the political 
process.  The rhetoric of the principal political actors 
remains that of sticking to their guns, but the supplemental 
signals they are sending, amidst growing public apprehension 
that the social confrontation could spin out of control, are 
aimed at finding a way out.  France's five major trade union 
federations "solemnly" called on President Chirac to 
"intervene," and a large majority of the ruling Union for a 
Popular Movement (UMP) members of parliament openly supported 
Interior Minister Sarkozy's compromise proposal calling for a 
delay in promulgation of the CPE law.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PUBLIC UNHAPPY WITH DIRECTION OF EVENTS 
--------------------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) According to most recent polls 83 percent of the 
French want President Chirac to step in, take charge of 
events, and defuse the social conflict that the extensive 
participation in protests March 28 (ref A) clearly showed 
could well keep growing and, possibly, spin out of control. 
The public's deep dissatisfaction with Chirac is palpable -- 
and has been building for a very long time -- but even so, 
ordinary people still look to the president to make the big 
decision to keep the ascendant turmoil and tension of 
increasing protests from snowballing into a major, social 
crisis.  Chirac is in a particularly uncomfortable quandary. 
He can repudiate the prime minister whom he had hoped would 
bring some luster to the record of his last years in office, 
or support him into a deepening confrontation that protest 
leaders have vowed to continue if the government does not 
cede.  Even as they "solemnly" asked for Chirac's 
"intervention" in defusing the crisis, France's five major 
trade union federations also announced a new day of protests 
and strike actions for April 4.  Should the Constitutional 
Council sustain the constitutionality of the CPE law (a 
decision is expected March 30), then Chirac could exercise a 
presidential prerogative for sending laws back to legislature 
for a second look (ref A), effectively getting the issue off 
the streets and back into the political process -- which is 
what most French people want. 
 
HIGHLIGHTNG FRANCE'S GROWING "SOCIAL FRACTURE" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
3.  (SBU) Much of the public also sympathizes with the 
underlying motives of the demonstrators.  Chirac and the 
political class have already ignored once -- last May at the 
time of the referendum on a proposed constitution for the EU 
-- widespread fears about France's fading promise of 
prosperity for middle-class and working people.  The current 
disagreement over the CPE reflects the deep split in French 
society, in ideological outlook and financial prospects, 
between those -- in the words of social critic Alain Minc -- 
who feel they have more opportunity in the world of 
globalization, and those who feel they have less. 
Yesterday's respectable turn-out of students, unionized 
workers and their supporters and families clearly evidenced 
how strong the demand for continued "social protection" -- 
and the refusal of structural, economically liberalizing 
reform -- remains among many in France's middle and working 
classes.  Those who favor Villepin's "liberal" reform -- 
allowing employers to fire at will within a two year period 
first-time employees under 26 -- clearly fall on that side of 
the social divide where people are more ready to let go of 
France's "social model," and accept an economic dimension of 
life that is more individualistic, competitive, and exposed 
to uncertainty. 
 
HIGHLIGHING THE SPLIT ON THE CENTER-RIGHT 
-------------------------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) The struggle over the CPE has also thrown into 
stark relief the divisions in the ruling, majority party. 
Even though "a majority of our electorate" in the words of a 
key UMP strategist and Sarkozy advisor, "support the CPE and 
what it stands for, we also know that ongoing confrontations 
risk turning very sour for the person in charge of the 
police" (UMP President and Interior Minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy).  In a meeting with UMP parliamentarians on March 
28, Sarkozy proposed the "non-application" of the CPE law in 
an effort to lower the tensions in the streets while changes 
to the law are negotiated with "the social partners" -- 
student associations and organized labor.  Sarkozy,s 
compromise solution, which would delay implementation of the 
CPE law without withdrawing it outright, is supported "all 
but about 50 or 60" of the UMP's 360 or so members of the 
National Assembly.  (Note: Assuming the Constitutional 
Council rules in favor of the CPE law, then President Chirac 
will have nine days to promulgate it.  Sarkozy,s compromise 
solution assumes that Chirac will use that nine day period to 
commence serious negotiations with "the social partners." End 
note.)  Villepin and his supporters would have President 
Chirac promulgate the CPE law as soon as the Constitutional 
Council might approve it.  In their view, Villepin's 
insistence on "realism and activist reform without delay" is 
justified.   Those who support the prime minister like to 
point out that 25 percent of France's youth between 16 and 25 
who are actively looking for a job (this is, are not 
students) can't find one, and that therefore the minor, 
belated action of the CPE reform is very much in order. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
5.  (SBU) There is no way to predict how the immediate 
"crisis over the CPE" will be resolved.  Those who worry that 
that the risks of continuing confrontation have exceeded the 
consequence of the immediate issue at stake are hoping for a 
Constitutional Council decision to send the law back to the 
legislature and provide President Chirac and the government 
with a face-saving way out of the current impasse. 
Otherwise, Chirac will have to step in and take a stand aimed 
at dampening the discontent.  Both the Socialist Party (PS) 
and the centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF) are 
insistently calling for the government to back down and 
withdraw the CPE law.  The underlying causes of the 
disagreement over the CPE reform, specifically, its 
free-market orientation and its undermining of social 
protections -- will remain.  This underlying battle over "the 
French social model" -- its adaptability to the world of 
globalization -- will also remain as the underlying issue of 
the 2007 presidential election, still over a year away.  End 
Comment. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton