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Viewing cable 06NAIROBI1111, IAGGA REPORT FOR KENYA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAIROBI1111 2006-03-10 08:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0017
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1111/01 0690847
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100847Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0201
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001111 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/C/P DIANE KOHN, AF/E 
USAID FOR AFR/DP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ECON KCOR KCRM PGOV KE
SUBJECT: IAGGA REPORT FOR KENYA 
 
REF:  State 30961 
 
Mission Nairobi's response to reftel follows below, and 
has also been conveyed to State/INL/C/P by separate e- 
mail. 
 
Government Efforts 
------------------ 
 
The performance of the Government of Kenya (GOK) in 2004 
and 2005 was mixed at best, with steady progress on the 
institutional and legal fronts juxtaposed with a serious 
lack of high-level political commitment to combating 
corruption.  In April 2004 serious allegations of grand- 
scale graft at the highest levels of the sitting Kibaki 
administration surfaced in connection with the so-called 
Anglo-Leasing procurement scandals.  Eventually, five 
officials were charged; their cases are still pending in 
court.  Investigations against more senior leaders ended 
at that time without any further arrests or prosecutions. 
The GOK's credibility in the war on corruption collapsed 
in early 2005 when John Githongo, the President's anti- 
corruption czar, resigned and went into self-imposed 
exile.  Soon thereafter, the highly-regarded Director of 
Public Prosecutions was fired and the local director of 
Transparency International was forced to resign.   In 
early 2006, Githongo went public with his Anglo-Leasing 
evidence, which directly implicated several key 
ministers, presidential advisors, and influential 
businessmen.   Under intense pressure from the public and 
the media, one implicated minister was left out of the 
cabinet following a reshuffle in December, and two others 
resigned in February 2006.  However, the GOK has not 
acted against others directly implicated in the scandals 
or their cover-up.  Further, it is widely believed that 
high-level prosecutions are being delayed or blocked by 
the Attorney General in response to political 
considerations.  Investigation and prosecution of alleged 
high-level complicity in multi-ton cocaine shipments 
through Kenya have similarly stalled. 
 
Progress was also mixed regarding follow up on corruption 
perpetrated under the previous Moi Administration.  In 
2004, the GOK released a Land Commission report, which 
includes two annexes revealing names of high-level former 
and current GOK officials implicated in the "irregular" 
acquisition of public lands.  Substantial action to 
recover illegally acquired land has yet to be taken, 
however.  Some money associated with the Anglo-Leasing 
scandals was returned mysteriously to the GOK in 2004. 
However, other efforts to recover the proceeds of 
corruption hidden earlier overseas, as detailed in a 
report compiled and completed in 2005 by Kroll 
Associates, have yet to yield results.  In February 2006, 
the GOK released the Goldenberg Report, which recommends 
action against dozens of businesspeople and members of 
the former administration in connection with a massive 
financial scandal from the early 1990s.  As a result of 
the report's findings, one implicated minister in the 
Kibaki administration was forced to resign. 
 
On the institutional front in 2004, the National Anti- 
Corruption Campaign Steering Committee was appointed, 
along with the leadership of the Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission (KACC).  The KACC, the country's leading graft 
investigative body, became fully staffed and operational 
in mid-2005 and has launched dozens of investigations and 
forwarded files for prosecution to the Attorney General's 
Office.  In April 2005, in response to pressure from 
civil society and development partners, the GOK prepared 
a 12-month anti-corruption action plan, and in some areas 
such as public expenditure management reform and civil 
service reform, important progress has since been made. 
Further, the GOK pushed through two important bills in 
Parliament late in 2005 dealing with privatization and 
government procurement.  If effectively implemented, the 
laws have the potential to eliminate or sharply narrow 
loopholes through which corruption has traditionally 
flourished in Kenya.  Finally, Kenya has both signed and 
ratified the UNCAC, while it has signed but not yet 
ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (AUCPCC). 
 
Law Enforcement and Legal Systems 
--------------------------------- 
 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, the USG continued support to 
the specialized unit on anti-corruption, economic crimes, 
serious fraud, and asset forfeiture within the Department 
of Public Prosecutions (DPP).  As a participating 
institution in the GOK's Governance, Justice, Law, and 
Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Program, the DPP contributes 
to the key result area focused on reducing corruption. 
The USG assistance to the DPP contributes towards the 
professional prosecution of criminal corruption cases 
through: an improved case tracking system; the 
development of specialized curriculum and delivery of 
subsequent training; the provision of direct technical 
assistance through a Resident Legal Advisor and short- 
term technical experts; enhanced monitoring and 
evaluation; the establishment of a reform program 
secretariat; and the acquisition of reference materials 
 
SIPDIS 
and related equipment for a dedicated research facility. 
 
Transparent Governance 
---------------------- 
 
In 2004, the USG's key anti-corruption partner was the 
Department of Governance and Ethics (the DGE), within the 
Office of the President and led by John Githongo (see 
above).   In collaboration with the Kenya chapter of 
Transparency International (TI-Kenya, also a USG 
grantee), the DGE hosted an international experts meeting 
in 2004 on the challenges that "new governments" face 
when tackling corruption fQowing a political 
transition.  USG-sponsored activities with the DGE 
included the design of several anti-corQtion measures 
such as a system for the collection, storage, and 
analysis of public officers' asset declaration forms, a 
public complaints unit, an assets restitution division, 
and a national baseline survey of citizens' views of 
corruption.  Following Githongo's resignation, which 
called into question the GOK's commitment to fighting 
corruption within its own ranks, the USG ended its 
support to the DGE, and the  GOK subsequently disbanded 
the office altogether. 
 
Assistance to the Parliament continued to further 
strengthen the legislature's oversight capacity.  With an 
emphasis on oversight committees, the USG trains 
legislative staff, including researchers, so that the 
committees may more effectively hold the Executive to 
account.  USG support also facilitates Parliament's 
outreach to civil society and the private sector to 
solicit citizen's views and expert opinions when 
considering and amending legislation.  USG funds are 
being used to build Parliament's in-house budget analysis 
capacity and will enable Parliament to provide more 
substantive input into the budget process.  As part of 
this, Parliament is expected to shortly establish both a 
Parliamentary Budget Committee and a Budget Office. 
 
Civil Society 
------------- 
 
As the GOK's progress in combating graft has waned, the 
USG has maintained support to civil society organizations 
(CSOs) that monitor government performance and advocate 
for accelerated reforms.  Since 2004, the USG has awarded 
grants to Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K), the 
Center for Governance and Development (CGD), the Kenya 
Institute for Supplies Managers (KISM), the Institute for 
Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR), and the Kenya 
chapter of the International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ/K).  USG support to CSOs enhances non-governmental 
advocacy capacity and increases the public demand for 
anti-corruption reform.  Furthermore, to strengthen CSOs 
such as TI-Kenya and other groups engaged in policy 
reform, advocacy, and GOK monitoring, the USG is 
launching a program to strengthen CSOs' technical skills 
and sustainability through a training and capacity 
building component.  The program will engage new non- 
governmental partners in anti-corruption efforts, 
including private sector coalitions, professional 
associations, membership organizations, and faith-based 
groups. 
 
Advocacy 
-------- 
 
Improving governance and assisting in the fight against 
corruption are major themes of the U.S. Mission in 
Nairobi in both its private and public diplomacy.  The 
U.S. decision to halt funding for certain governance- 
related activities following the Githongo resignation was 
announced in a major and widely read public address by 
the Ambassador on the theme of corruption and good 
governance.  U.S. Mission leadership has also been 
instrumental in keeping governance concerns front and 
center in the broader donor dialogue with the GOK and in 
making improved governance and tangible GOK actions 
against corruption a prerequisite for improved GOK-donor 
relations.  In 2004, the U.S. revoked the visa of a 
former high-level Kenya official for his central role in 
grand scale corruption under the previous administration. 
In 2005, again to plaudits from a majority of Kenyans, 
the USG similarly suspended entry into the U.S. of a 
standing minister in the Kibaki administration. 
 
BELLAMY