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Viewing cable 06NAHA79, FUTENMA RELOCATION: NAGO MAYOR'S HIGH-WIRE ACT GETS SHAKEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAHA79 2006-03-31 00:14 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Naha
VZCZCXRO7935
RR RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0079/01 0900014
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310014Z MAR 06
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0438
INFO RHMFIUU/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFIUU/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFIUU/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBANB/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFIUU/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFIUU/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0122
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 0075
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0474
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0194
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0159
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0429
RUEAHIC/USARPAC COMMAND CENTER FT SHAFTER HI
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NAHA 000079 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PREL JA
SUBJECT: FUTENMA RELOCATION: NAGO MAYOR'S HIGH-WIRE ACT GETS SHAKEN 
 
REF: A) NAHA 0027; B) NAHA 0024 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: As events appear to be building toward a 
"final decision" by the GOJ on the specific location and 
configuration of the Marine Corp Air Station (MCAS) Futenma 
relocation facility (FRF), the personal negotiation track 
between Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga and Nago Mayor 
Yoshikazu Shimabukuro has become the avenue for seeking local 
acceptance for the FRF.  While Okinawan FRF proponents are very 
satisfied with this track, opponents are not because they fear 
Nukaga and Shimabukuro may reach an agreement - their worst 
nightmare.  In the last two days, tough remarks in Tokyo 
attributed to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Nukaga, and 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Administrative Vice Minister Takemasa 
Moriya have put more pressure on Nago to agree to the FRF plan. 
This public perception could very well make Shimabukuro's 
negotiation task more difficult by limiting his ability to make 
concessions.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------- 
Nago Mayor in the Driver's Seat 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------- 
 
2. (SBU) Newly elected Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro has 
become Okinawa's lead negotiator on the FRF revision plan and 
the lead target for reformist criticism.  The reason for both 
may lie in the fact that almost all parties recognize that if 
Nago officials agree to an FRF proposal it will make it hard for 
those who dislike the plan to reject it.  Many Okinawans also 
feel that if Nago reaches an agreement, it will put pressure on 
Governor Keiichi Inamine, possibly forcing him to back away from 
his refusenik stance and if not actively support the plan than 
at least not actively oppose it.  But the Governor's refusenik 
stance is part of the reason that the GOJ has turned to 
Shimabukuro during these negotiations, because Shimabukuro is 
willing to compromise.  Shimabukuro has made it clear publicly 
and privately that he is not rejecting the plan to relocate MCAS 
Futenma to the Henoko area, but rather he opposes any planned 
relocation that will put the flight route over residential and 
business areas. 
 
3. (SBU) With Shimabukuro taking the lead on negotiations, GOJ 
officials apparently believe there is a chance for progress on 
the FRF.  Shimabukuro told ConGen staff that he received 
separate phone calls on March 27 from former Foreign Minister 
Nobutaka Machimura and current Environment Minister Yuriko Koike 
encouraging him to keep on talking with JDA, but also warning 
him not to make a "hasty or easy" decision.  Both ministers told 
him that there was an internal battle within JDA on the FRF's 
location, and that if Shmabukuro kept talking and defending his 
position there was a good chance he could get enough of what he 
wants to be satisfied.  Koike said she was willing to take 
responsibility for the environmental issue. 
 
4. (SBU) Nonetheless, Shimabukuro has tried to avoid making a 
concrete proposal to the GOJ, in line with an Okinawan 
preference for sitting in judgement of proposals from Tokyo 
rather than making Okinawan proposals.  Sometimes this coyness 
 
NAHA 00000079  002 OF 005 
 
 
takes on a ludicrous aspect; Shimabukuro told us that for fear 
of leaving behind a permanent record of what was acceptable to 
Nago, he described moving the runway more out to sea by using 
his finger (instead of a pen) to draw a new runway location on a 
map.  Nago City Vice Mayor Bunshin Tsuematsu, however, offered a 
more permanent manifestation of what the city could accept when 
he pulled out a map during the Nago City Assembly's question and 
answer period in mid-March and indicated what areas would be 
acceptable to Nago.  Whatever the method, it is clear that a 
small shift seaward (on the order of less than 100 meters) is 
not acceptable to Nago.  Shimabukuro told us he had rejected an 
earlier offer to move the runway 50 meters and is pushing for a 
400-meter adjustment towards the sea. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------- 
Mayor's Role in Negotiations Causing Some to Squirm 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Shimabukuro taking the lead in the discussions is 
unsettling to some in Okinawa, but for differing reasons. 
National Diet member Mikio Shimoji, an opponent of the current 
"coastal Schwab" plan, told ConGen that Inamine has to take a 
leadership role in order to expedite the Futenma relocation 
project, and right now Shimabukuro is working harder than the 
Governor.  Shimoji complained that since the Governor has the 
authority, he should take the initiative and make the 
appropriate decision for Okinawa.  Leading reformists like 
Kantoku Teruya are worried that Shimabukuro and Nukaga might 
reach an agreement and are calling for Governor Inamine to take 
a leading role - at least as long as Inamine continues to oppose 
building the FRF at Camp Schwab.  Teruya recently proclaimed he 
was worried about the Governor's isolation and asked for the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to bring him back into the mix. 
 
6. (SBU) The Governor himself appears concerned enough about his 
isolation to attempt to repeatedly link his position with that 
of Shimabukuro, noting that both oppose the "coastal Schwab" 
plan.  What Inamine and the reformists invariably omit, however, 
is that while the Governor is unwilling to accept anything 
outside the original Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) 
proposal to build a deepwater FRF, Shimabukuro is willing to 
accept a revised version of the "coastal" plan.  The Okinawa 
Prefectural Government (OPG) is desperate not to acknowledge 
that Shimabukuro might be on the verge of agreeing to a 
compromise, especially since if the Mayor cuts a deal then 
Inamine will be on the spot to either bless it or reject it. 
What Inamine will do if Shimabukuro reaches an agreement with 
the GOJ is still unclear.  Shimabukuro told Polmil specialist 
that he believes that despite Inamine's recent statements 
against considering the Schwab "coastal" plan or any alteration 
of it, if Nago can achieve a workable compromise with the GOJ, 
Inamine will, at a minimum, not do anything to stymie the new 
plan.  In mid-March, Inamine told ConGen that during the 1996 
SACO process the GOJ had had close contacts with the OPG, Nago 
City, local communities, and fisherman's associations to get a 
local consensus.  In contrast, Inamine said he was "frustrated 
and confused" because of the lack of adequate justification from 
 
NAHA 00000079  003 OF 005 
 
 
the GOJ for the "coastal plan."  OPG Senior Counselor for 
Military Affairs Reiji Fumoto told ConGen in early March the OPG 
would be willing to look at an alternative plan if the GOJ 
proposed one.  Also former President of LDP Okinawa and party 
advisor Kenjiro Nishida told Polmil chief in mid-March that he 
believed Inamine would not oppose an amended FRF plan if the 
Nago City mayor accepted it.  Nishida said that at some point, 
the Governor will officially accept the amended plan because it 
will eliminate the danger to Ginowan posed by Futenma. 
 
7. (SBU) The local reformist media is deeply unhappy with 
Shimabukuro's leading role because they too fear a 
Nukaga-Shimabukuro agreement.  In an editorial on March 27, the 
Ryukyu Shimpo warned Mayor Shimabukuro against entering the 
"sumo ring" of the GOJ, noting that the GOJ did not plan to 
compromise.  The editorial stated that the "true feelings" of 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi could be seen in his repeated 
statements that he had no intention of modifying his fundamental 
position on Futenma relocation.  Also, the "true feelings" of 
the central government were reflected in statements by senior 
Defense Agency officials who said that they would not compromise 
even once with Okinawans because it would cause locals to expect 
further concessions.  The Okinawan Times editorial urged 
Shimabukuro not to compromise easily and to avoid actively 
proposing his own alternative plans to the central government. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------------------- 
FRF to be Decided By Locals, But Who Defines "Local?" 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) A large stumbling block for the GOJ has been trying to 
satisfy all the diverse Okinawan opinions, which even many 
Okinawans acknowledge is a Herculean task.  Inamine admitted in 
his March discussion with ConGen that Okinawan opinions on the 
FRF are not unified and that he is in a difficult position, 
noting "we Okinawans are facing a difficult phase in the 
negotiations and I do not have any good ideas on how to resolve 
this tough issue."   LDP Okinawa General Affairs Committee 
Chairman Toru Oda complained to ConGen that Okinawan Diet 
members' lack of unity caused them to be unable to take a strong 
stance with the GOJ on the Schwab FRF plan. 
 
9. (SBU) Nonetheless, the definition of who is "local" has 
become a hot topic, with those favoring Futenma relocation to 
Henoko satisfied to limit "local" to only Nago citizens, or even 
only ward residents near Henoko, while opponents insist all 
Okinawans are equal stakeholders in the issue.  In early March, 
Shimabukuro helped the GOJ by publicly commenting that the 
"local communities who have a right to pass judgment on FRF" was 
limited to just three of Nago's 55 wards, or about 5 percent of 
the Nago area population.  Inamine told reporters on March 26 
that "local" meant all Okinawans, not just Nago/Henoko 
residents.  The same day on TV Asahi's "Sunday Project" 
(equivalent to "Meet the Press") Diet member Mikio Shimoji 
echoed the Governor's position, but was contradicted by former 
JDA Director General Shigeru Ishiba, who asserted that "local" 
means Nago residents only. The Okinawan media, of course, insist 
 
NAHA 00000079  004 OF 005 
 
 
that all Okinawans need to pass judgment on the FRF plan and on 
March 30 both papers highlighted a planned rally by Nago's 
neighboring town of Ginoza as evidence of an expansion in "local 
concern."  The  papers gave prominent space to the rally against 
the shallow water project set for April 4 and the Higashi 
Village Chief statement that "More than just the fact that the 
flight route will pass over us, we want to make the 'appeal' 
that we also should be considered citizens of communities 
surrounding Heneko and, as such, should be consulted on the 
matter." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------------- 
If All Politics "Local," Then Shimabukuro has Political Backing 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Shimabukuro does have local electoral backing for his 
negotiations according to an NHK exit poll done after his 
victory in the January Nago mayoral election.  The poll showed 
that 59 percent of respondents who backed Shimabukuro either 
accepted the plan to relocate MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab or 
some modification of the plan.  Also, Shimabukuro was supported 
by 60 percent of voters ages 20 to 70 years old.  Among LDP and 
Komeito supporters, Shimabukuro's support rose to 80 percent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Nago Putting Hope in Nukaga and Yamasaki; Moriya Remains A 
Source of Distrust 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
11. (SBU) In late March, Shimabukuro told ConGen officials that 
he thinks very well of JDA Director General Nukaga and that 
Nukaga seems to be sincere and undertaking a genuine effort to 
achieve a compromise with Nago.  Separately, LDP Okinawa 
Secretary General Kosuke Gushi told ConGen officials that LDP 
 
SIPDIS 
Security Research Council Chairman Taku Yamasaki personally 
assured him in mid-March that Yamasaki would be directly 
involved in drafting and then pushing a revised FRF plan.  The 
revised plan would presumably incorporate local requests that 
the facility be located further out on Henoko Point, if not all 
the way into the shallow water off Camp Schwab. 
 
12. (SBU) Shimabukuro, however, told us he had "no use for [JDA 
Administrative Vice Minister] Moriya."  He also noted that 
someone, possibly Moriya, is giving Nukaga "misinformation," 
telling Nukaga that some wards near Henoko (Abu and Mihara) 
"approve" of the current Camp Schwab plan.  After hearing this 
report, the chairman of the Kanucha Bay Resort (near Abu) met 
with Nukaga to personally tell him that he did not want to have 
aircraft flying over his resort.  One of the Nago City Ward 
chiefs also confided to Polmil officer he was worried that 
Moriya was intervening and preventing the "true feelings of 
Okinawans" from reaching Koizumi. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------- 
 
NAHA 00000079  005 OF 005 
 
 
Tough Words from Tokyo Putting More Pressure on Shimabukuro 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) News stories on March 29 extensively reported a March 
28 meeting between Koizumi, Nukaga, and Moriya, in which Koizumi 
called for minimal concessions and for proceeding with the 
current plan even if Nago refuses to agree.  Press backgrounders 
by Moriya after the meeting emphasized that now is the "last 
chance" for Nago to agree to the Camp Schwab plan.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, Mayor Shimabukuro promptly postponed his 
scheduled March 29 meeting with Nukaga, citing the need for 
prepare for former Nago Mayor Tateo Kishimoto's funeral on April 
2.  The funeral itself could become a venue for some Tokyo-Nago 
dialogue, since both Nukaga and Aso have announced they will 
attend. Note. Shimabukuro is chairman of the Kishimoto funeral 
committee. End Note. 
 
14. (SBU) Comment: For the past two weeks, Shimabukuro has been 
engaged in a high-wire act in his negotiations with Nukaga.  Not 
only is he trying to avoid an open break with Inamine, he is 
facing increasing media-led calls for him to break off the talks 
altogether.  To the degree that Nukaga is able to project an 
image of understanding and openness to reasonable compromise, 
Shimabukuro feels sufficiently protected to continue the 
discussions.  The most recent hard-line, uncompromising 
statements out of Tokyo, however, will undoubtedly make 
Shimabukuro's job more difficult if they destroy the public 
perception of understanding on Nukaga's part and thereby limit 
Shimabukuro's room to maneuver.  End comment. 
REICH