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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA633, NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: MASAYA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA633 2006-03-21 21:33 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0633/01 0802133
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 212133Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000633 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV SOCI
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: MASAYA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
 1.  (U)  SUMMARY:  Meetings with political and business 
leaders in the department of Masaya suggest that the 
presidential race remains wide open.  While most Liberals 
leader agree that Eduardo Montealegre is the likely Liberal 
candidate, support for him among the small business owners, 
who form the backbone of the Masayan economy, is tepid at 
best.  Local leaders from the various Liberal parties urged 
the Embassy to do something to unite their various factions. 
Liberal leaders also predicted that if they were unable to 
get behind a single Liberal candidate, the door remains open 
for a Sandinista victory in the department. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U)   Over several weeks in February conoff and consular 
FSN traveled to the department of Masaya, which borders 
Managua.  Given Masaya's size, geographically the smallest 
department in Nicaragua, and location, bordering Managua, our 
interlocutors were well informed about events in the Capital 
and several presidential candidates had already visited the 
Department.  Among those we spoke with were representatives 
from the Catholic Church, the Convergencia Mayor of Managua, 
representatives of Vamos con Eduardo, the Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC), the Masaya Chamber of Commerce, 
Alliance for the Republic (APRE), Movimiento Herty 2006 and 
"Businessmen for Eduardo."  Our interlocutors largely agreed 
that the campaigns had not yet begun in earnest and that 
things would likely begin moving after the jockeying on the 
Liberal side was completed and a single standard-bearer had 
emerged. 
 
LOCAL PRIESTS OPENLY ANTI-SANDINISTA 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Conoff met with Monsignor Cesar Castillo, Pastor of 
Masaya's cathedral and a pair of parish priests.  Priests 
were troubled by support among their parishioners for the 
FSLN, and linked that support to the poverty, lack of 
opportunities and inability of the central government to 
improve their lives.  Priests lamented that the Sandinista 
provision of the occasional bag of food or cement continued 
to gain them influence and likely votes among the poor.  In 
no uncertain terms however, Castillo noted that "the Catholic 
Church does not want the Sandinistas to win," and that 
priests would be "raising awareness" in their sermons and in 
meetings at their churches.  Castillo demurred when asked if 
this was the policy throughout the country, only stating the 
Church recognizes that a Sandinista return would be 
disastrous for the country and the Church. 
 
4.  (C)  Masaya Mayor Orlando Noguera of the 
FSLN/Convergencia Party refused to give conoff a prediction 
on what would happen, but did say he believed a second round 
was a very real possibility given the division amongst the 
Liberals.  (COMMENT:  Noguera was elected on the 
FSLN/Convergencia ticket, but he is well known as a 
Sandinista among the groups we spoke with.  He, however, 
declined to be labeled as such.  He is widely seen by other 
interlocutors as a competent technocrat rather then an 
ideologue, the FSLN flag and AK-47 displayed in the first 
floor museum at the town hall notwithstanding. END COMMENT). 
Noguera noted that Lewites could have a strong showing in the 
Department given the predominance of small businesses and 
farms in Masaya and that Montealegre would have to fight the 
perception that he is the candidate of the wealthy.  He 
jokingly asked when the Embassy would be announcing "our 
candidate."  Noguera declined to make a prediction on the 
outcome, but said that the elections would depend on whether 
or not the Liberals could unite. 
 
SMALL BUSINESSMAN SPLIT ON MONTEALEGRE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U)  Bernardo Silva, the Masaya coordinator for Vamos con 
Eduardo, described the well-developed campaign apparatus in 
Masaya and the overwhelming preference of Liberal voters for 
Montealegre in Masaya.  When asked about support for other 
Liberal candidates, Silva was dismissive and stated that he 
believed that the Liberals would unite behind Montealegre. 
Silva noted that Montealegre had visited the Masaya area 
several times and that his campaign was raising good money 
from the local business elite. Silva described Lewites as a 
threat to take votes from the Sandinistas but that he would 
not have much support from liberals. 
 
6. (U)  Francisco Valdivia, leader of a group of businessmen 
who have thrown their support behind Montealegre, stated his 
enthusiastic support for the candidate. Valdivia, a wealthy 
cattle rancher, said he was coordinating efforts for 
Montealegre because he thought he was the best candidate for 
the job, and he does not want to see the Sandinistas return 
to power.  He said he has dozens of people contributing to 
 
MANAGUA 00000633  002 OF 003 
 
 
Montealegre's campaign and he has no doubt that Montealegre 
will win.  He assured conoff that the support for Montealegre 
is deep in Masaya and that none of the other Liberal 
candidates has any chance of winning the election.  He 
repeatedly told conoff he hopes the Embassy will get behind 
Montealegre and pressure the other Liberal candidates out. 
 
7. (C)  In contrast to Valdivia, Masaya Chamber of Commerce 
President Donald Porras said that support for Montealegre 
among his members is tepid at best.  While Porras himself is 
a Montealegre supporter, he described his members (mostly 
small businessman) as not caring very much for Montealegre. 
Porras stated clearly that his members believed that 
Montealegre is the candidate of the bankers and the wealthy 
and would do nothing to help the "little guy".  Porras 
expressed frustration that he was unable to get his members 
fully behind Montealegre.  He also said that a recent 
fundraiser for Jose Alvarado was attended by a number of his 
members, but he did not believe Alvarado had deep support as 
anything other than an alternative to Montealegre.  (COMMENT: 
 The perception of Montealegre as the candidate of the 
wealthy was also voiced by the Lewites and APRE camps.  This 
is an important issue in Masaya as the department lacks large 
employers/farms.  The strength of the Masayan economy is 
based on small scale artisans and businessmen who generally 
lament their lack of access to credit and blame the banks, 
and by association, Montealegre. END COMMENT.) 
 
LIBERALS WANT UNITY, BUT HOW? 
----------------------------- 
 
8. (U)  Conoff also met with Masaya APRE leader Mariano Vega. 
 Their campaign headquarters is a rundown shack that was 
furnished with 3 chairs and a table and nothing else.  Vega 
said that Alvarado was not getting much traction in Masaya, 
and that was mainly due to lack of funds.  Vega was unable to 
provide much in the way of an Alvarado platform other than to 
say that the only way the Liberals could win was through a 
joining of forces of Montealegre and Alvarado.  He was more 
interested in discussing his run for the National Assembly on 
the APRE ticket.  Vega made a plea for US-sponsored election 
training and for the USG to help resolve the Liberal 
divisions. 
 
9. (U)  The meeting with PLC department head Noel Saenz was 
not productive as it turned into a rally attended by a dozen 
Aleman supporters.  Saenz assured Conoff that the PLC was 
looking forward to the elections and that a Liberal candidate 
will win.  Saenz was coy on which candidate and said that he 
would be fine with a primary, but only under the PLC banner. 
All attendees reiterated their belief that Aleman was 
innocent and begged the Embassy to "take the shackles off" 
their leader. 
 
10. (U)  A meeting with Fernando Brenes, who coordinates the 
Herty campaign in Masaya, revealed an effort at grass roots 
development and an interesting take on the importance of the 
National Assembly elections.  Brenes told conoff that he 
would be thrilled if together Lewites and Montealegre could 
gain sufficient seats in the Assembly to do away with the old 
order.  Brenes stated that he believed that irrespective of 
the winner, the two can work together in the National 
Assembly to reform Nicaragua's political system.  (COMMENT: 
This Scenario is frequently mentioned by Herty supporters and 
Lewites himself. END COMMENT).  Brenes also sketched out his 
current efforts with grass roots campaigning, noting that 
Lewites' supporters had in fact been visiting towns 
throughout the department and their efforts are gaining 
strength.  Brenes stated confidently that Lewites would 
garner 30-40 percent of the vote in Masaya, including a large 
share of the non locked-in Sandinista vote and a fair number 
of votes from those fed up with the Liberals. 
 
ALL AGREE CSE IS ACTIVELY IMPEDING VOTER REGISTRATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
11.(C)  While the FSLN-controlled Departmental offices of the 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) canceled several scheduled 
meetings, all parties/groups (aside from the Mayor) 
matter-of-factly stated that the Sandinista-controlled CSE 
was registering its supporters and making it difficult for 
others to register.  One CSE scheme, as alleged by the 
Lewites camp, was that the CSE was withholding cedulas (the 
Nicaraguan voter document) from those wishing to work in one 
of the garment assembly plants unless they were Sandinista 
supporters, essentially denying them the ability to work. 
Others made similar allegations.  There is clearly no 
confidence among the non-Sandinistas that the CSE will play 
by the rules. 
 
COMMENT: LIBERAL DIVISION LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR SANDINISTAS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
MANAGUA 00000633  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
12. (C)  As the meetings in Masaya make clear, Liberal 
division leaves the door wide open for a Sandinista victory 
in the department.  Most Liberals in Masaya believe that only 
the USG can broker a solution that would unify the Liberal 
camp. The wild card will be how well Lewites does in Masaya, 
which is considered to be one of his strongholds.  Given the 
demographics in the department, if he can not do well in 
Masaya he will not be a factor in the race. 
TRIVELLI