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Viewing cable 06LIMA1154, VIEWS FROM THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: AREQUIPA IS HUMALA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA1154 2006-03-23 22:38 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1154/01 0822238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 232238Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9376
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3148
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6599
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9205
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR QUITO 0150
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0323
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4155
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS LIMA 001154 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: VIEWS FROM THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL:  AREQUIPA IS HUMALA 
COUNTRY 
 
REF: A. LIMA 658 
 
     B. 05 LIMA 5487 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY 
---------- 
 
1. (SBU) In traditionally idiosyncratic, independent-minded 
Arequipa, business, media, and University leaders told 
Poloff, during a 3/16-19 visit, that Ultra-nationalist, 
"outsider," Union por el Peru (UPP) presidential candidate 
Ollanta Humala would decisively win in Arequipa Department as 
well as throughout southern Peru.  They attributed this to an 
electorate that seeks a strong, authoritarian leader; has no 
confidence in current politicians; and identifies with Humala 
on a personal, not necessarily a political, level.  A 
recurring theme was that leaders in Lima and national 
politicians were out of touch with the "real Peru" 
exemplified by perceived demographic trends in Arequipa of 
increased informality, underemployment, poverty, and 
discontent.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) Poloff visited Arequipa 3/16-19 to assess electoral 
trends there.  He met with Chamber of Commerce President 
Mauricio Chirinos, business leader Mauricio Chabaneix 
Belling, Vice Rector of San Agustin University (the third 
largest university in the country) Valdemar Medina Hoyos, 
Rector of San Pablo University Alonso Quintanilla 
Perez-Wicht, Chief Editor Enrique Zavala Concha of local 
daily "Arequipa al Dia," Director Ruben Collazos Romero of 
leading daily "Correo," and Regional President Daniel Vera 
Ballon.  Poloff also discussed the election with numerous 
residents on the streets, and attended a rally headlined by 
APRA presidential candidate (and former President) Alan 
Garcia. 
 
------------------------ 
AREQUIPA EMBRACES HUMALA 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Those interviewed, with the exception of Regional 
President Vera Ballon (of the APRA party), were confident 
that Humala would win Arequipa by a significant margin. 
Rector Alonso Quintanilla and media editor Enrique Zavala 
said Humala's electoral dominance extended throughout 
southern Peru, and that if the election were held only in 
southern Peru, Humala would likely win in a first round. 
Vice Rector Valdemar Medina stated that though Humala was 
firmly in the lead in Arequipa, in neighboring Cuzco where 
Medina had just attended a conference, support for Humala was 
even stronger.  Some said voters in Arequipa simply referred 
to voting for "la ollita". (Note: This is a reference to 
Humala's UPP party symbol, a traditional bowl painted red 
with a white stripe.  Voter identification with a party 
symbol is important come voting day given literacy issues and 
that Humala's brother, Ulises, is also on the ballot. End 
Note.)  The local press reported that Humala would finish his 
campaign in Arequipa on 4/7 (subsequently confirmed by 
Humala's campaign officials).  According to Zavala the 
electoral campaign was to close in Cusco, but now the 
Humalistas are opting for Arequipa due to the groundswell of 
support there, as well as the symbolic message of closing in 
what has historically been the country's second city. 
 
4. (SBU) Most contacts agreed that the basis for Humala's 
strong support was an electorate that wants a firm 
authoritarian leader, identifies with Humala, sees him as a 
persecuted underdog, has no confidence in the current 
political class, and would cast a vote of frustration or 
vengeance against the establishment anyway.  Poloff daily 
reviewed the local UPP headquarters, which was a constant 
buzz of activity.  "Reservistas" (former Army recruits) in 
fatigue pants and black t-shirts milled around as did 
interested citizens, mostly men of diverse ages, reading 
propaganda posted on the walls.  One poster was a press 
release from UPP congressional candidate for Arequipa, Alvaro 
Gonzalo Gutierrez, that advertised that he secured six full 
scholarships for poor Arequipenos (Arequipa residents) to 
study medicine in Cuba.  Several contacts pointed out that 
 
Ollanta and his brother Antauro have a history and standing 
base of support in Arequipa.  They said the Humala brothers' 
2000 uprising, which started in Moquegua, actually culminated 
in Arequipa Department, and that Antauro spent significant 
time in Arequipa before his 2005 violent uprising in 
Andahuaylas. 
 
------------------- 
GARCIA PAYS A VISIT 
------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) APRA presidential candidate Alan Garcia, on a 
campaign swing through southern Peru, arrived in Arequipa 
from Puno and held two rallies and a community lunch in the 
poor outskirts of Arequipa on 3/19.  Poloff attended one of 
these rallies, which drew an estimated 2,500 supporters.  It 
was unclear how many of these supporters were from the 
locality, as numerous empty busses were visible in the 
vicinity, apparently waiting for the rally to end to take 
many of the participants home.  (COMMENT:  That Garcia chose 
not/not to hold a rally in Arequipa's main square could be 
interpreted as an admission that he could not/not fill it, 
something which Humala has done.  END COMMENT). 
 
6.  (SBU)  The Regional President and the Mayor of Arequipa 
both belong to APRA, but they have long been at odds and the 
Mayor, Yamel Romero, has not hesitated to criticize Garcia. 
Those interviewed by Poloff opined that these officials do 
not help APRA's cause, as they are seen by the populace as 
incapable of cooperation and are surrounded by an aura of 
corruption and irresponsibility.  Garcia's Second Vice 
President candidate Lourdes Mendoza del Solar is from 
Arequipa and her father owns a local TV station and the daily 
"Arequipa al Dia." (Note: Chief Editor Zavala works for both 
the daily and TV station. He said he was very conscious of 
the political slant and free advertising.  However he was not 
an APRA supporter and tried to convey a balanced message. End 
Note.)  Zavala and Collazos said that Mendoza is not well 
known in Arequipa though she was elected local Registrar. 
They added that she is not perceived as being qualified for 
national office and thus does not boost Garcia's campaign. 
Regional President Vera Ballon was the only source who 
insisted that APRA remains popular in Arequipa, claiming to 
Poloff that Garcia and Humala were virtually tied in 
Arequipa. 
 
7. (SBU) While APRA may have lost popularity, it nonetheless 
remains well organized in Arequipa.  In what looks like a 
violation of the electoral laws, which prohibit the use of 
government property for campaign purposes, four APRA 
political operatives who joined the meeting between Poloff 
and Regional President all appeared to be operating from the 
latter's offices, even though they were working to advance 
the APRA campaign. 
 
8. (SBU) Zavala told Poloff that there had been some suspect 
management changes at the Arequipa Decentralized Office of 
Electoral Processes (ODPE) and APRA was prepared to use this 
as a basis for challenging unfavorable electoral results. 
(Note: Local press reported that the head of the Arequipa 
ODPE was a registered member of the Socialist Party and was 
biased against employees.  He was temporarily removed from 
the position, but then reinstated on 3/17.  End Note.) 
 
----------------------------- 
FLORES AND CHAVEZ IN AREQUIPA 
----------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Despite comments by the Regional President and other 
contacts that Unidad Nacional (UN) alliance presidential 
candidate Lourdes Flores' campaign was "dead" in Arequipa, 
her local campaign headquarters was active with staff, 
volunteers, and interested citizens milling about (though in 
slightly less numbers than the UPP headquarters).  Regional 
Campaign Secretary Irma Lopez Vera told Poloff that the local 
campaign was upbeat and that UN's regional polling showed 
that Flores had solid support in the region although 
admittedly still trailed Humala.  Lopez lamented the scarce 
local UN party resources and the constant attacks on the 
party, complaining that APRA militants paint over UN signs on 
private property where UN had permission to promote Flores 
 
and the alliance's other candidates. 
 
10. (U) Flores' Second Vice President candidate, Luis Enrique 
Carpio Ascuna, is an Arequipeno, and, though generally well 
regarded as a former university rector, most interviewees 
said that he was not a politician and did not add much value 
to the UN campaign.  The local press reported that Lourdes, 
like Humala, would visit Arequipa toward the end of the 
campaign in April. 
 
11. (U) Fujimorista Alliance for the Future candidate Martha 
Chavez also was in Arequipa on 3/12, but according to 
Poloff's press contacts, she attracted little attention and 
small crowds. 
 
-------------------------------- 
A SPLIT CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION 
-------------------------------- 
 
12. (U) Those interviewed predicted a politically fragmented 
Arequipa congressional delegation (it has five legislative 
seats).  Most expected that at least one seat will go to each 
of the three leading alliances/parties (UN, APRA, UPP), with 
the two remaining seats going to two of the three.  Other 
parties that these observers thought had an outside shot were 
Alliance for the Future's Daniel Postigo Cerpa, Justicia 
Nacional's Rafael Valencia Dongo (an incumbent legislator), 
and Fuerza Democratica's Marco Falconi. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AREQUIPA'S DEMOGRAPHICS FAVOR HUMALA 
------------------------------------ 
 
13. (SBU) Arequipa's demographics are changing due to a high 
rate of immigration from neighboring Puno.  Various 
interviewees estimated that two-thirds of the current 
Arequipa population is first or second generation immigrants 
from other departments, principally Puno. The immigrants from 
Puno speak Quechua and bring their own customs with them. 
According to business leaders interviewed, many successful 
Arequipenos have moved to Lima chasing commercial 
opportunities. The result is a ballooning population 
belonging to the poorest C-E sectors, and a relatively 
shrinking population drawn from the prosperous A-B sectors. 
According to local business leader Chabaneix, the market in 
Arequipa is increasingly informal and dominated by contraband 
goods from Bolivia.  The business leaders told Poloff that 
this new population in Arequipa does not often see the 
benefits of trade and is the "real Peru".  They added that 
though they personally supported Flores, she and other Lima 
politicians are out of touch with this reality.  Chabanaeix 
emphasized that southern Peru is more connected culturally 
and economically to Bolivia than it is to Lima. 
 
---------- 
COMMENT 
---------- 
 
14.  (SBU)  Arequipa provides an excellent illustration as to 
why southern Peru is Humala country.  Historically 
marginalized by Lima, residents are distrustful of the 
capital, hostile towards traditional politicians, and 
prepared to embrace an "outsider" who promises to shake up 
the status quo.  These tendencies seem to be magnified by the 
regions demographic shifts, with most of the current populace 
still closely tied to Puno, one of Peru's poorest and most 
isolated regions, as well as a hotbed of leftist politics. 
APRA, which traditionally has not/not obtained much support 
in Arequipa, managed to win both the regional presidency and 
mayor's office in 2002.  Infighting between these two 
officials, combined with allegations against them of 
misgovernment and corruption, appear to have discredited that 
party and undercut Alan Garcia's attempts to gain a 
significant share of the vote there.  Flores, in turn, is 
perceived as being "out of touch" with the Arequipenos and 
their needs, presumably due to her being seen as a Limena and 
as the "candidate of the rich."  END COMMENT. 
STRUBLE