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Viewing cable 06LAPAZ769, COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS BOLIVIAN SOY PRODUCERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LAPAZ769 2006-03-21 18:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0769 0801831
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211831Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8504
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5704
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2974
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6853
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4083
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1404
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1328
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3654
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8565
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS LA PAZ 000769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/AND 
STATE PASS FOR USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EAGR EINV ECON PGOV PREL USTR BL
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS BOLIVIAN SOY PRODUCERS 
GAME A RIGGED SYSTEM 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 712 
 
     B. LA PAZ 734 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Colombia's Ambassador to Bolivia, Edgar 
Papamija, met with Ambassador Greenlee March 17 to express 
concern that Bolivian government officials had inaccurately 
spun President Uribe's recent message about the FTA (ref A), 
and to receive a read-out of Greenlee's meeting with 
President Morales (ref B).  The Colombian Ambassador noted 
that his own investigations of the soy issue had led him to 
conclude that Bolivian producers, far from threatened by the 
FTA, simply wished to avert losing a lucrative (i.e., rigged) 
business facilitated by their preferential access to 
Colombian markets.  Based on the private and public comments 
of Bolivia's soy producers, we suspect the Colombian 
Ambassador is correct.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) At his request, Colombia's Ambassador to Bolivia, 
Edgar Papamija, met with Ambassador Greenlee March 17. 
Papamija was concerned about the Bolivian government's public 
messages following President Uribe's March 14 meeting with 
President Morales and following Ambassador Greenlee's meeting 
with Morales on March 17 (refs A and B).  He reiterated that 
Uribe had unambiguously declared that the FTA with the U.S. 
was concluded, while also (for diplomatic purposes) 
expressing a willingness to support any effort initiated by 
the Government of Bolivia that found flexibility on the U.S. 
side.  Morales had publicly spun Uribe's words to signify 
Colombia's supposed willingness to negotiate with the U.S. at 
Bolivia's side, which Papamija emphasized was not the case. 
 
3.  (SBU) Ambassador Greenlee reassured his Colombian 
counterpart that President Morales had received Uribe's firm 
message loud and clear, and that that message had prompted 
Morales to seek an urgent meeting with us.  He stated that 
official talking points for his meeting with Morales had also 
emphasized that the FTA was a done deal, that the ATPDEA 
would not likely be extended, and that negotiating an FTA 
with Bolivia would depend on the GOB's interest, political 
commitment and cooperation on counternarcotics.  Ambassador 
Greenlee noted that the GOB would probably send a high-level 
delegation to the U.S. to discuss the soy issue within the 
month. 
 
4.  (SBU) Ambassador Papamija then explained that, as a 
relative newcomer, he had initially accepted at face value 
the argument that preferential access to Colombia's soy 
market was critical for the survival of Bolivia's soy 
industry.  After looking into the issue in greater depth, 
however, he had found that Bolivian soy production costs were 
relatively low, and that Bolivian producers appeared to be 
gaming their preferential access to the Colombian market to 
ensure that their soy was always sold just below the price of 
competing product from countries lacking such access.  He 
further noted that Bolivian soy was sold in the Venezuelan 
market for significantly less than it fetched in Colombia, 
and that this fact disturbed Colombian leaders including 
President Uribe.  He speculated that Bolivian soy producers 
were up in arms about the prospective loss of preferential 
access to the Colombian market not because they suspected it 
would do them in but because it would end a rigged system 
that was exceedingly lucrative for them. 
 
5.  (SBU) Comment: In earlier meetings with Embassy 
officials, Bolivian soy producers acknowledged that the 
largest among them could probably compete in an open 
Colombian market. In recent press statements, the Bolivian 
soy producers association stated that the industry could 
significantly improve its efficiency within the next year. 
We suspect the Colombian Ambassador has much of the truth on 
his side: more than markets, Bolivian profits are at stake. 
GREENLEE