Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KINSHASA450, OFDA VISIT TO MITWABA, CENTRAL KATANGA,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KINSHASA450.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA450 2006-03-16 12:48 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #0450/01 0751248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161248Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3450
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHRO/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000450 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (DISREGARD KINSHASA 446) 
 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA- MMARX, IMACNAIRN, MSHIRLEY 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP- TANDERSON, NCOX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI- RJENKINS, KHUBER 
AID/W FOR AFR- KO'DONNELL, JBORNS 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO- JMYER, ADWYER 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP- DSUTHER, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG- RNEWBERG 
GENEVA FOR NYKLOH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT: OFDA VISIT TO MITWABA, CENTRAL KATANGA, 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) An estimated 29,000 Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) are present in several towns in Mitwaba Territory, 
located in the center of Katanga province of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These IDPs are fleeing 
conflict between government troops and Mai Mai militia, 
and have to date received little assistance as the area is 
minimally accessible by road and has only a limited-use 
airstrip. Food, in particular, is in short supply, and 
malnutrition rates have been estimated at 30 percent among 
the IDP population. Non-food items are badly needed. 
Complicating matters further is the predatory behavior of 
Democratic Republic of Congo armed forces (FARDC) 
stationed in the territory. These troops, who have been in 
Mitwaba since 1997, and use their authority to extort food 
and items of value, and to abduct women from both resident 
and IDP populations. They are widely perceived as equally 
responsible as any Mai Mai groups for insecurity in 
Mitwaba Territory and ideally need to be replaced by a 
better-disciplined unit. Until FARDC pay and support is 
improved generally however, FARDC troops will continue to 
be a problem for nearby civilians.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. (U) OFDA Rep Victor Bushamuka visited Mitwaba Territory 
February 24-26 to assess the humanitarian situation. 
During the visit, OFDA Rep met with military and political 
authorities, humanitarian actors including MSF-Belgium 
(MSF-B), Caritas, World Food Program (WFP), Action Against 
Poverty, (AAP) a local NGO), and groups of IDPs. 
 
3. (U) Mitwaba Territory, located in central Katanga 466 
kilometers (km) north of Lubumbashi, is one of the areas 
that have been most affected by attacks of the Mai Mai 
group under the leadership of notorious local commander 
Gedeon. Reports abound of villages being burned, civilians 
killed and dismembered, women raped, fields looted, and 
other violations. This violence has led to mass population 
displacements to forests near the national park of Upemba, 
to Mitwaba Center, and southward toward Dubie. 
 
4. (U) In November 2005, the FARDC forces launched an 
offensive on Mai Mai positions, forcing them from the area 
with little resistance. Shortly after, some of the 
displaced families started returning to their villages to 
rebuild their houses and engage in livelihood activities. 
However, FARDC troops in the villages were hostile toward 
the returnees, accusing them of being Mai Mai 
collaborators. Returning to the forest was also not an 
option for the IDPs, because Mai Mai there accused them of 
providing food to the FARDC. Many of these IDPs were 
forced to move for safety to the towns of Mitwaba Center, 
Kasungeshi, and Sampwe. 
 
5. (U) The FARDC troops in Mitwaba are members of the 63rd 
brigade.  Though they participated in the recent anti-Mai 
Mai campaign waged by government forces in Central 
Katanga, they are nearly all veterans of Mobutu's army, 
and were actually first sent to the area in 1997, well 
before the war between the Laurent Kabila government and 
Rwanda and Uganda began in August of 1998.  Totally unpaid 
and unsupplied, they survive by preying on the local 
residents and IDP populations. 
 
6. (U) Mitwaba Center is currently calm. MSF-B reports 
that Kasungeshi and Sampwe, the other major sites where 
IDPs have constructed camps in the territory, are also 
relatively secure. Though FARDC officers in Mitwaba state 
that the territory is now secure all the way to the Upemba 
National Park, and claim not to understand why IDPs do not 
return home, recent events contradict this assertion.  On 
February 17, only one week prior to OFDA Rep's visit, Mai 
Mai elements attacked the town of Kalenge, 150 km south 
west of Mitwaba. Local residents remain unconvinced that 
Gedeon and other Mai Mai have indeed been neutralized, and 
also fear being attacked by FARDC forces. Most IDPs and 
humanitarian actors cite the FARDC as being at least 
equally responsible for insecurity in Mitwaba Territory as 
any Mai Mai groups. 
 
---- 
IDPs 
---- 
 
7. (U) As of February 26, MSF-B had registered 29,000 IDPs 
in Mitwaba Territory. The IDPs are in 10 camps around 
Mitwaba Center and Sampwe, which is 105 km to the south. 
In Mitwaba Center, which normally has a population of only 
2500 persons, there are already 11,000 IDPs.  The number 
of new IDPs arriving averages 5 to 10 families a day.  On 
February 18, however, 150 families arrived at once, 
fleeing a Mai Mai attack in Kalenga. 
 
8. (U) The IDPs contacted by OFDA Rep originated from the 
north and west parts of the territory, and told of having 
been displaced more than three times in the past twelve 
months. They appeared to be in bad physical health and 
were barely clothed.  Many children and adults manifested 
visible signs of malnutrition.  Almost all of them said 
they had lost most of their belongings during their 
multiple displacements. 
 
9. (U) The Mitwaba IDPs receive assistance in basic health 
care from MSF-B, which supports health centers in Mitwaba, 
Kasungeshi and Sampwe by providing essential medicines, 
training and supervision.  IDPs contacted by OFDA Rep were 
generally satisfied with the services provided. 
Unfortunately, the referral hospital of Mitwaba was 
destroyed during the war and is not functional. 
 
10. (U) In addition to supporting the health care system, 
MSF-B manages a therapeutic feeding center (TFC) for 
malnourished children and adults.  Malnutrition appears to 
be very high in Mitwaba -- a preliminary study, while 
clearly inconclusive because of the way the data was 
collected, suggested a Global Acute Malnutrition rate of 
over 30% -- and the TFC receives about 43 new cases per 
week. Unfortunately, due to the difficulty of delivering 
food to Mitwaba, there is no supplementary feeding program 
to assist children after they are discharged. As a result, 
relapses are common, representing over 10% of incoming 
cases. 
 
11. (U) Non-food-items (NFI) including blankets, plastic 
sheeting, cooking pots, soap, and cups have been 
distributed to some of the IDPs who arrived before 
December 2005 in the Mitwaba area camps. However, due to a 
shortage of supply, not all IDPs were served, and not all 
those served received complete kits. In Kasungeshi, only 
soap was distributed. 
 
12. (U) Caritas is planning to distribute clothes and NFI 
kits in Mitwaba.  ACP will distribute UNICEF NFI kits in 
Kasungeshi and Sampwe. The kits are available in 
Lubumbashi, but a means to deliver the kits to Mitwaba has 
not yet been found.  Due to the small size and bad 
condition of the Mitwaba airstrip, which can only handle 
planes carrying 3-5 tons maximum, air transport is 
prohibitively costly. 
 
13. (U) Before the war, Mitwaba received supplies by road. 
The road from Lubumbashi, the provincial capital, to 
Mitwaba via Likasi is 466 km long and in bad condition. It 
is normally passable in the dry season, but is unusable at 
the present time due to the presence of resistant Mai Mai 
groups in the Kitenge-Mamba area. 
 
14. (U) An alternative overland option is to truck goods 
first to Kilwa on Lake Moero, either using Zambian roads 
and a private ferry, or another, barely-passable Congolese 
road, then to transport the supplies from there westward 
to Dubie and Mitwaba.  However, on this last leg of the 
trip, the road is in such bad shape that trucks can be 
stuck in transit for weeks at a time. 
 
------------- 
Food Shortage 
------------- 
 
15. (U) A lack of sufficient food is the most urgent 
problem facing IDPs.  Upon arrival in Mitwaba, most IDPs 
look for employment as general laborers to survive. 
Unfortunately, such opportunities are scarce. The most 
common work for IDPs includes fetching water for local 
people, assisting with house construction, and making 
charcoal for 20 to 50 Congolese francs per day (about 5 to 
12 cents). 
 
16. (U) If they do manage to earn any money, IDPs often 
still have to travel to over 50 km to obtain food. Though 
a few of the local resident families have managed to 
establish small farming activities around their houses in 
town, food is generally in very short supply in Mitwaba 
Center.  The terrain immediately surrounding the town is 
too rocky to be conducive to agricultural activity, so the 
fields which normally supply Mitwaba with food are located 
at a considerable distance.  Due to the great 
vulnerability of these far-off fields to extensive looting 
by FARDC soldiers, Mai Mai, and military predation on all 
pedestrians attempting to carry supplies into town, they 
are now largely inactive.  What little food that does make 
it to Mitwaba Center comes largely from towns located many 
kilometers away on the main road to the south. IDPs in 
Mitwaba have begun buying cassava waste, commonly used 
prior to the war for feeding pigs, for use as their staple 
food. 
 
17. (U) MONUC delivered 31 tons of WFP food by helicopter 
for IDPs the week prior to OFDA Rep's arrival, but the 
quantity was enough to assist only the most vulnerable 
people. An additional 88 tons arrived by truck March 2, 
after several weeks of travel.  Due to a shortage in the 
WFP pipeline to Lubumbashi, however, the rations include 
no pulses.  Given the apparent high incidence of 
malnutrition, this is particularly unfortunate. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Relations between FARDC and Mitwaba inhabitants and IDPs 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
18. (U) When they arrive in Mitwaba, IDPs are first 
screened by FARDC, ostensibly to identify possible Mai Mai 
elements. Many IDPs said that they were beaten during this 
process and indicated that the main purpose of the 
screening was really to rob them of any items of value. 
IDPs are asked to present their voter registration cards 
and are considered as Mai Mai if they do not have any. 
However, in the forest, Mai Mai often punish and even kill 
people they find in possession of a voter registration 
card, calling them government sympathizers, thus some IDPs 
had gotten rid of their cards during their existence in 
the forest to avoid problems with Mai Mai. 
 
19. (U) Despite the dangers, IDPs have on occasion sent 
emissaries back to check on conditions in their home 
villages so as to better judge whether it is best to stay 
in the camps or to return home.  Due to the animosity and 
high level of mistrust existing between IDPs and FARDC 
forces, IDPs in Mitwaba who have made such assessment 
trips are often end up being arrested and beaten if 
caught.  This has resulted in increased reluctance to 
leave the camps. 
 
20. (U) Since Mitwaba Territory is physically isolated 
from the rest of the country, the 63rd brigade has total 
authority there and soldiers can take what they like. 
Many of the IDPs who received plastic sheeting from 
humanitarian organizations refuse to put it on their make- 
shift huts until it is actually raining, since leaving it 
there overnight would make it vulnerable to theft by the 
military.  Whereas the population once used bicycles to 
transport goods around, now most of the bicycles appear to 
be in the hands of the military.  Women do not venture far 
from town for fear of being raped.  All of OFDA Rep's 
interlocutors in Mitwaba were adamant in declaring that 
Mitwaba's security problems would not improve until this 
particular group of FARDC military were removed from the 
area. 
 
----------- 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
21. (U) Given the logistical problems of transporting 
humanitarian supplies to Mitwaba, it will be critical to 
identify ways to facilitate, as soon as possible, a return 
of IDPs to their home villages, or, minimally, the return 
of agricultural production.  This, however, is dependent 
on the government's ability to restore security in the 
area.  Though the Mai Mai problem persists, in the view of 
many living and working in Mitwaba, a key first step would 
be the replacement of the 63rd brigade of FARDC with a 
different contingent.  Removing this group would also 
increase the impact of humanitarian efforts, since at the 
present time the value of assistance will be limited by 
the fact that the soldiers will in short time take 
possession of much of it. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
22. (U) MONUC essentially has no military presence in 
Katanga, and therefore has little to offer immediately to 
help address the security situation.  A new MONUC Benin 
battalion reportedly may be deployed to the area, but its 
arrival in the DRC has been delayed, and the date of such 
a deployment is at best open to question. In mid 2005, 
when the problem of the behavior of the 63rd FARDC brigade 
was first brought to the attention of the Humanitarian 
Advocacy Group (HAG) in Kinshasa, the group asked the head 
of OCHA to meet with military chiefs in Kinshasa to 
request that the 63rd brigade be rotated elsewhere.  OCHA 
received assurances at the time that this was indeed 
planned and would soon occur.  The 63rd is a non- 
integrated unit, and the Governor in Katanga province 
issued an order to the 6th District Regional Military 
Commander to rotate the 63rd into brassage immediately, 
which would mean their transfer to Kamina.  The Governor, 
however, does not have command authority over FARDC 
forces. In any event, the regional military commander has 
just been ordered replaced, and it likely will be 
necessary to revisit this issue with his successor on an 
urgent basis.  While the 63rd brigade appears to be a 
particular problem given its long stay in the area, the 
broader problem of a lack of pay and support to FARDC 
troops generally leads to predatory behavior by troops on 
nearby civilians.  Thus a new FARDC unit might will 
improve the local situation at least temporarily, but does 
not provide a definitive solution. That will come through 
a combination of neutralizing the threatening Mai Mai 
forces, and the longer-term project to integrate FARDC 
forces and the EUSEC comprehensive program of reforms to 
ensure at least minimally adequate pay and living 
conditions to deployed troops. End comment. 
 
MEECE