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Viewing cable 06KINSHASA446, OFDA VISIT TO MITWABA, CENTRAL KATANGA,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA446 2006-03-15 15:43 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO9655
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR
DE RUEHKI #0446/01 0741543
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151543Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3440
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHRO/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KINSHASA 000446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
SECSTATE WASHDC 
INFO STET 
SADC 
 
AIDAC 
 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA- MMARX, IMACNAIRN, MSHIRLEY 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP- TANDERSON, NCOX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI- RJENKINS, KHUBER 
AID/W FOR AFR- KO'DONNELL, JBORNS 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO- JMYER, ADWYER 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP- DSUTHER, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG- RNEWBERG 
GENEVA FOR NYKLOH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PREF CG
 
SUBJECT: OFDA VISIT TO MITWABA, CENTRAL KATANGA, 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) An estimated 29,000 Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) have appearedare present in several towns in 
Mitwaba Territory, located in the center of Katanga 
Province province of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). These IDPs are fleeing conflict between government 
troops and Mai -Mai militia, and have to date received 
little assistance as the area is minimally accessible by 
road and has only a limited-use airstrip. Food, in 
particular, is in short supply, and malnutrition rates 
have been estimated at 30 percent among the IDP 
population. Non-food items are also badly needed. 
Complicating matters further is the predatory behavior of 
Democratic Republic of Congo armed forces (FARDC) the DRC 
armed forces brigade (FARDC) stationed in the territory. 
These troops, who have been in Mitwaba since 1997, 
constitute the real authority in the area and use this 
their authority to extort food and items of value, and to 
abduct women from both resident and IDPs populations. They 
are widely perceived as equally responsible as any Mai- 
Mai groups for insecurity in Mitwaba Territory, and 
ideally need urgently to be replaced by a better- 
disciplined unit. Until FARDC pay and support is improved 
generally however, FARDC troops will continue to be a 
problem for nearby civilians.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. (U) OFDA Rep Victor Bushamuka visited Mitwaba territory 
Territory from February 24 to- 26 to assess the 
humanitarian situation. During the visit, OFDA Rep met 
with military and political authorities, humanitarian 
actors (including MSF-Belgium (MSF-B), Caritas, World Food 
Program (WFP), Action Against Poverty (ACP), a local non 
governmental organizationNGO), and groups of IDPs. 
 
3. (U) Mitwaba Territory, located in central Katanga 466 
kilometers (km) north of Lubumbashi, is one of the areas 
that have been most affected by attacks of the Mai- Mai 
group under the leadership of notorious local commander 
Gedeon. Reports abound of villages being burned, civilians 
killed and dismembered, women raped, fields looted, and 
other violations. This violence has led to mass population 
displacements to forests near the national park of Upemba, 
to Mitwaba centerCenter, and southward toward Dubie. 
 
4. (U) In November 2005, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
armed forces (FARDC )forces launched an offensive on Mai- 
Mai positions, forcing them from the area with little 
resistance. Shortly after, some of the displaced families 
started returning to their villages to rebuild their 
houses and engage in livelihood activities. However, FARDC 
troops in the villages were hostile toward the returnees, 
accusing them of being Mai- Mai collaborators. Returning 
to the forest was also not an option for the IDPs, because 
Mai- Mai there accused them of providing food to the 
FARDC. Many of these IDPs were forced to move for safety 
to the towns of Mitwaba Center, Kasungeshi, and Sampwe. 
 
5. (U) The FARDC troops in Mitwaba are members of the 63rd 
63rd brigade.  Though they participated in the recent anti- 
Mai- Mai campaign waged by government forces in Central 
Katanga, they are nearly all veterans of Mobutu's army, 
and were actually first sent to the area in 1997, well 
before the war between the Laurent Kabila government and 
Rwanda and Uganda began in August of 1998.  Totally unpaid 
and unsupplied, they survive by preying on the local 
residents and IDP populations. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000446  002 OF 005 
 
 
6. (U) Mitwaba Center is currently calm. MSF-B reports 
that Kasungeshi and Sampwe, the other major sites where 
IDPs have constructed camps in the territory, are also 
relatively secure. Though FARDC officers in Mitwaba state 
that the territory is now secure all the way to the Upemba 
National Park, and claim not to understand why IDPS IDPs 
do not return home, recent events contradict this 
assertion.  On February 17, only one week prior to OFDA 
Rep's visit, Mai- Mai elements attacked the town of 
Kalenge, 150 km south west of Mitwaba. Local residents 
remain unconvinced that Gedeon and other Mai- Mai have 
indeed been neutralized, and also fear being attacked by 
FARDC forces.  Most IDPs and humanitarian actors cite the 
FARDC as being at least equally responsible for insecurity 
in Mitwaba Territory as any Mai- Mai groups. 
 
---- 
IDPs 
---- 
 
7. (U) As of February 26, MSF-Belgium (MSF-B) had 
registered 29,000 IDPs in the Mitwaba tTerritory of 
Mitwaba. The IDPs are in 10 camps around Mitwaba center 
Center and Sampwe, which is 105 kilometers to the south. 
In Mitwaba centerCenter, which normally has a population 
of only 2500 persons, there are already 11,000 IDPs.  The 
number of new IDPs arriving averages 5 to 10 families a 
day.  On February 18, however, 150 families arrived at 
once, fleeing a Mai- Mai attack in Kalenga. 
 
8. (U) The IDPs contacted by OFDA Rep originated from the 
north and west parts of the territory, and told of having 
been displaced more than three times in the past twelve 
months. They appeared to be in bad physical health and 
were barely clothed.  Many children and adults manifested 
visible signs of malnutrition.  Almost all of them said 
they had lost most of their belongings during their 
multiple displacements. 
 
9. (U) The Mitwaba IDPs receive assistance in basic health 
care from MSF-B, which supports health centers in Mitwaba, 
Kasungeshi and Sampwe by providing essential medicines, 
training and supervision.  IDPs contacted by OFDA Rep were 
generally satisfied with the services provided. 
Unfortunately, the referral hospital of Mitwaba was 
destroyed during the war and is not functional. 
 
10. (U) In addition to supporting the health care system, 
MSF-B manages a therapeutic feeding center (TFC) for 
malnourished children and adults.  Malnutrition appears to 
be very high in Mitwaba -- a preliminary study, while 
clearly inconclusive because of the way the data was 
collected, suggested a Global Acute Malnutrition rate of 
over 30 percent% -- and the TFC receives about 43 new 
cases per week. Unfortunately, due to the difficulty of 
delivering food to Mitwaba, there is no supplementary 
feeding program to assist children after they are 
discharged. As a result, relapses are common, representing 
over 10% of incoming cases. 
 
11. (U) Non-food-items (NFI) including blankets, plastic 
sheeting, cooking pots, soap, and cups have been 
distributed to some of the IDPs who arrived before 
December 2005 in the Mitwaba area camps of the immediate 
Mitwaba area before December 2005. However, due to a 
shortage of supply, not all IDPs were served, and not all 
those served received complete kits. In Kasungeshi, only 
soap was distributed. 
 
12. (U) Caritas is planning to distribute clothes and NFI 
kits in Mitwaba.  Action Against Poverty (ACP), a local 
NGO, will distribute UNICEF NFI kits in Kasungeshi and 
Sampwe. The kits are available in Lubumbashi, but a means 
to deliver the kits to Mitwaba has not yet been found. 
 
KINSHASA 00000446  003 OF 005 
 
 
Due to the small size and bad condition of the Mitwaba air 
strip, which can only handle only planes carrying 3-5 tons 
maximum, air transport is prohibitively costly. 
 
13. (U) Before the war, Mitwaba received supplies by road. 
The road from Lubumbashi, the provincial capital, to 
Mitwaba via Likasi is, however, 466 km long and in bad 
condition. It is normally passable in the dry season, but 
is unusable at the present time due to the presence of 
resistant Mai- Mai groups in the Kitenge-Mamba area. 
 
14. (U) An alternative overland option is to truck goods 
first to Kilwa on Lake Moero, either using Zambian roads 
and a private ferry, or another, barely-passable Congolese 
road, then to truck transport the suppliesthem on from 
there westward to Dubie and Mitwaba.  However, on this 
last leg of the trip, the road is in such bad shape that 
trucks can be stuck in transit for weeks at a time. 
 
------------- 
Food Shortage 
------------- 
 
15. (U) A lack of sufficient food is the most urgent 
problem facing IDPs.  Upon arrival in Mitwaba, most IDPs 
look for employment providing as general laborers to 
survive. Unfortunately, such opportunities are scarce. The 
most common work for IDPs includes fetching water for 
local people, assisting with house construction, and 
making charcoal for 20 to 50 Congolese francs per day 
(about 5 to 12 cents). 
 
16. (U) If they do manage to earn any money, IDPs often 
still have to travel to over 50 km to obtain food. Though 
a few of the local resident families have managed to 
establish small farming activities around their houses in 
town, food is generally in very short supply in Mitwaba 
Center.  The terrain immediately surrounding the town is 
too rocky to be conducive to agricultural activity, so the 
fields which normally supply Mitwaba with food are located 
at a considerable distance.  Due to the great 
vulnerability of these far-off fields to extensive looting 
by FARDC soldiers , and Mai- Mai, and to military 
predation on all pedestrians attempting to carry supplies 
into town, they are now largely inactive.  What little 
food that does make it to Mitwaba Center comes largely 
from towns located many kilometers away on the main road 
to the south. IDPs in Mitwaba have begun buying cassava 
waste, commonly used prior to the war for feeding pigs, 
for use as their staple food. 
 
17. (U) MONUC delivered 31 tons of WFP food by helicopter 
for IDPs the week prior to OFDA Rep's arrival, but the 
quantity was enough to assist only the most vulnerable 
people. An additional 88 tons arrived by truck on March 2, 
after several weeks of travel.  Due to a shortage in the 
WFP pipeline to Lubumbashi, however, the rations include 
no pulses.  Given the apparent high incidence of 
malnutrition, this is particularly unfortunate. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Relations between FARDC and Mitwaba inhabitants and IDPs 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
18. (U) When they arrive in Mitwaba, IDPs are first 
screened by FARDC, ostensibly to identify possible Mai- 
Mai elements. Many IDPs said that they were beaten during 
this process and indicated that the main purpose of the 
screening was really to rob them of any items of value. 
IDPs are asked to present their voter registration cards 
and are considered as Mai- Mai if they do not have any. 
However, in the forest, Mai- Mai often punish and even 
kill people they find in possession of a voter 
registration card, calling them government sympathizers, 
 
KINSHASA 00000446  004 OF 005 
 
 
thus some IDPs had gotten rid of their cards during their 
existence in the forest to avoid problems with Mai- Mai. 
 
19. (U) Despite the dangers, IDPs have on occasion sent 
emissaries back to check on conditions in their home 
villages so as to better judge whether it is best to stay 
in the camps or to return home.  Due, however, to the 
animosity and high level of mistrust existing between IDPs 
and FARDC forces, IDPs in Mitwaba who have made such 
assessment trips are often end up being arrested and 
beaten if caught.  This has resulted in increased 
reluctance to leave the camps. 
 
20. (U) Since Mitwaba Territory is physically isolated 
from the rest of the country, the 63rd63rd  brigade has 
total authority there and soldiers can take what they 
like.  Many of the IDPs who received plastic sheeting from 
humanitarian organizations refuse to put it on their make- 
shift huts until it is actually raining, since leaving it 
there overnight would make it vulnerable to theft by the 
military.  Whereas the population once used bicycles to 
transport goods around, now most of the bicycles appear to 
be in the hands of the military.  Women do not venture far 
from town for fear of being raped.  All of OFDA Rep's 
interlocutors in Mitwaba were adamant in declaring that 
Mitwaba's security problems would not improve until this 
particular group of FARDC military were removed from the 
area. 
 
----------- 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
21. (U) Given the logistical problems of transporting 
humanitarian supplies to Mitwaba, it will be critical to 
identify ways to facilitate, as soon as possible, a return 
of IDPs to their home villages, or, minimally, the return 
of agricultural production.  This, however, is dependent 
on the government's ability to restore security in the 
area.  Though the Mai- Mai problem persists, in the view 
of many living and working in Mitwaba, a key first step 
would be the replacement of the 63rd63rd  brigade of FARDC 
with a different contingent.  Removing this group would 
also increase the impact of humanitarian efforts, since at 
the present time the value of assistance will be limited 
by the fact that the soldiers will in short time take 
possession of much of it. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
22. (U) MONUC essentially has no military presence in 
Katanga, and therefore has little to offer immediately to 
help address the security situation.  A new MONUC Benin 
battalion reportedly may be deployed to the area, but its 
arrival in the DRC has been delayed, and the date of such 
a deployment is at best open to question. In mid 2005, 
when the problem of the behavior of the 63rd63rd  FARDC 
brigade was first brought to the attention of the 
Humanitarian Advocacy Group (HAG) in Kinshasa, the group 
asked the head of OCHA to meet with military chiefs in 
Kinshasa to request that the 63rd63rd  brigade be rotated 
elsewhere.  OCHA received assurances at the time that this 
was indeed planned and would soon occur.  The 63rd  is a 
non-integrated unit, and the Governor in Katanga province 
issued an order to the 6th6th dDistrict rRegional 
mMilitary cCommander to rotate the 63rd63rd into so-called 
brassage immediately, which would mean their transfer to 
Kamina.  The Governor, however, does not have command 
authority over FARDC forces. In any event, the regional 
military commander has just been ordered replaced, and it 
likely will be necessary to revisit this issue with his 
successor on an urgent basis. As it has not happened, 
 
KINSHASA 00000446  005 OF 005 
 
 
humanitarians need to urgently pursue the matter again. 
The HAG, might, for instance, ask that the UN Humanitarian 
coordinator bring the issue to the attention of the group 
of foreign ambassadors which meets regularly with the 
highest level government authorities. While the 63rd 
brigade appears to be a particular problem given its long 
stay in the area, the broader problem of a lack of pay and 
support to FARDC troops generally leads to predatory 
behavior by troops on nearby civilians.  Thus a new FARDC 
unit might will improve the local situation at least 
temporarily, but does not provide a definitive solution. 
That will come through a combination of neutralizing the 
threatening Mai Mai forces, and the longer-term project to 
integrate FARDC forces and the EUSEC comprehensive program 
of reforms to ensure at least minimally adequate pay and 
living conditions to deployed troops. End comment. 
MEECE