Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KIEV957, UKRAINE: USOSCE AMBASSADOR FINLEY'S VISIT TO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KIEV957.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIEV957 2006-03-13 18:02 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kyiv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 000957 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM OSCE
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: USOSCE AMBASSADOR FINLEY'S VISIT TO 
UKRAINE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Julie Finley 
visited Kiev February 28-March 2 and met with OSCE, Central 
Election Commission (CEC), and political party 
representatives to get a better sense of how the run-up to 
the March 26 elections was proceeding.  She noted repeatedly 
that the USG was watching closely to determine how the 
elections were conducted.  Almost all interlocutors pointed 
to a vastly improved climate for the campaign in comparison 
to 2004, with the turnaround in media freedom a key factor. 
However, the OSCE's Election Observation Mission (EOM) voiced 
concern about the large shortage in personnel (some 27,000 
slots or six percent of the total) to man the polling station 
commissions (PSCs).  As a result, several PSCs are not fully 
functional; this could hamper election preparations.  The CEC 
acknowledged problems existed but stressed they were more 
logistical rather than political (e.g., blatant use of 
administrative funds to help the party in power).  Some 
opposition parties did point to cases of dirty tricks or 
harassment, but the EOM stressed these were largely isolated 
or greatly exaggerated.  The overall impression was that the 
GOU and most of the political parties were genuinely 
committed to conducting fair elections.  On a separate issue, 
the Presidential Secretariat noted problems in changing the 
OSCE mandate.  End Summary. 
 
ODIHR Observation Mission -- Good So Far, But... 
============================================= === 
 
2. (SBU) In his March 1 meeting with Ambassador Finley, 
Ambassador Lubomir Kopaj, head of the OSCE's Election 
Observation Mission (EOM) in Ukraine noted that they had 52 
long-term observers in almost all of Ukraine's oblasts and 
that thus far, the situation had been very calm.  He said 
that media freedom had improved significantly since the 2004 
presidential elections and that it was clear the GOU was 
genuinely interested in holding free and fair elections. 
Most of the allegations of violations had been grossly 
exaggerated or had not even taken place.  However, as the 
campaign heated up, he expected the appearance of dirty 
tricks and potential kompromat (compromising materials). 
 
3. (SBU) Kopaj said that the EOM was concerned about three 
main issues leading up to the election. 
 
--First was the large shortage in personnel to man the 
precinct election commissions.  The 15 parties/factions 
currently in the Rada have a right to have their 
representatives on the commissions, but since most are not 
truly national organizations, only a few have actually done 
so.  This means there are some 27,000 vacant slots, or six 
percent of the total on the PSCs.  As a result, several PSCs 
are not fully functional, which, in turn, could hamper 
election preparations.  The Central Election Commission (CEC) 
wants a law that would allow local governments to put people 
on the local commissions; however, that could disrupt the 
commissions' balance and affect their integrity.  Kopaj 
thought one possible compromise would be to have more 
representatives from the bigger parties, though he did not 
have the capacity to formally make such a recommendation. 
 
--The second issue was that some polling stations, 
particularly in urban areas, have  more registered voters 
than the mandated 2500 maximum, which could lead to long 
lines and a more drawn-out tabulation process. 
 
--Finally, it did not appear that the CEC had the ability to 
publish the election results of each polling station, which 
was important to help track any possible fraud. 
 
CEC, OSCE - Working on the Problems 
=================================== 
 
4. (SBU) Deputy Head of the CEC Mykola Melnik told Ambassador 
Finley March 2 that they were well aware of the problems 
raised by the EOM.  (Melnik said that CEC head Davidovych was 
unable to make the meeting as scheduled as he had to deal 
with an emergency at the factory that makes ballots.)  He 
contended that the problems that the CEC faced so far had 
been logistical (getting the PSCs staffed) rather than 
political (e.g., blatant use of administrative funds to help 
the party in power).  He said the political parties had been 
"irresponsible" in either not nominating enough people to 
serve on the commissions or nominating those who clearly had 
no desire to do so.  The CEC has told the parties that such 
actions endanger the political process.  Regarding large 
numbers of voters at some polling stations, Melnik said they 
have expanded voting time by three hours, from 7 a.m. to 10 
p.m., rather than 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., and by expanding the 
number of stations (though still not as many as they would 
like). 
 
5. (SBU) Melnik said that when fraud is reported on election 
day or thereafter, the commissions will investigate.  There 
will be police officers at every polling station to take 
reports and duty officers in the courts to deal with the 
complaints quickly.  He said he personally was not concerned 
about such problems as false protocols, which were a major 
issue last time, but rather with the ability of the local 
commissions to operate effectively. 
 
6. (U) Melnik had high praise for the electronic voter list 
project, implemented by the Project Coordinator in Ukraine 
(PCU), the OSCE's field presence.  He said he had just 
completed a trip throughout Ukraine and was able to see 
firsthand how effective the program had been. 
 
7. (U) In a March 2 meeting, PCU head Jim Schumaker explained 
that the project, which cost approximately Euros 4.5 million 
and to which the U.S. was a major contributor, provided over 
1000 computers, 800 printers and 27 servers to the CEC to 
completely update and modernize voter lists.  The project was 
able to purge more than one million names from old lists, 
which will greatly enhance elections' transparency and avoid 
the situation in 2004, where the Kuchma administration 
created phony voter lists on election day and then falsified 
voting results based on those lists.  In addition, the PCU 
has created grassroots forums for people to meet with local 
authorities to discuss issues.  Schumaker noted that so far, 
there has been an absence of complaints regarding the 
campaign. 
 
The Opposition - Some Praise, Some Complaints 
============================================= 
 
8. (SBU) In several meetings, leading candidates and 
representatives of political parties had some complaints 
regarding the conduct of the campaign though none accused the 
GOU of trying to outright rig the elections.  Most 
acknowledged, either openly or grudgingly, that media freedom 
was far better than before.  Ambassador Finley told all party 
and GOU representatives that the USG was watching closely to 
determine how the March 26 elections were being conducted. 
She reminded them that in a democratic system, one loss was 
not forever and that no matter what happened, she urged the 
parties to continue doing the work necessary to broaden their 
support so that they would be in a better position next time. 
 
9. (SBU) Party of the Regions leader (and 2004 presidential 
candidate) Viktor Yanukovych noted that opposition parties 
did not have the same advantages as the party in power and 
claimed they had problems getting air time.  He even 
maintained that the Presidential Administration still sent 
instructions down to media outlets from time to time, just 
like under Kuchma.  On the other hand, he did acknowledge 
that there had been major improvements on freedom of speech. 
(Note:  Yanukovych on March 4 publicly attacked the 
Yushchenko government as preparing massive voter fraud in an 
attempt to rig the elections.) 
 
10. (SBU) Others, however, were far less critical.  Oligarch 
and Party of the Regions financier and Rada candidate Rinat 
Akhmetov told Ambassador Finley in a separate March 1 meeting 
that the GOU deserved credit, with the help of the OSCE, for 
creating a much better atmosphere, especially on media 
freedom, and that opposition parties had equal access to mass 
media (note: Akhmetov owns both TV stations and newspapers). 
He flatly denied any assertions that the GOU was somehow 
telling the media what to report, noting that they have often 
been very critical of President Yushchenko. 
 
11. (SBU) Oleksandr Turchynov, Campaign chief for  the Yuliya 
Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), also admitted that the campaign was 
vastly improved from those in the Kuchma era, but said the 
GOU had been "too weak" to fully prevent some abuse of 
administrative resources at the local level.  He also showed 
concrete examples of dirty tricks, done by an unknown group. 
He pointed to a professionally done flyer with a photo of 
Tymoshenko offering children to celebrate her birthday at 
McDonald's, where they would get a free hamburger.  No such 
offer existed.  Another example was of a poster with the 
bloc's heart logo which asked people to report their 
neighbors to the authorities if they did not pay their taxes. 
 He said these were clear attempts to undermine BYuT's 
campaign.  Ambassador Finley replied that unfortunately, such 
things happened in more established democracies, such as the 
U.S., and that the real issue was whether the candidate had 
any recourse to counter the bad publicity, such as by getting 
on the news or alerting people via the Internet. 
 
OSCE Mandate 
============ 
 
12. (SBU) During her February 28 meeting with First Deputy 
Chief of Staff of the Presidential Secretariat Ivan Vasyunyk, 
Ambassador Finley raised the issue of the PCU's mandate, 
which had to be renewed every six months (versus once a year 
for most other OSCE field presences) and which also did not 
allow the PCU head to comment on political developments in 
the country.  Vasyunyk replied that the mandate had been 
negotiated under Kuchma and was ratified by the Rada.  While 
the GOU is generally satisfied with the PCU's work and wants 
to increase the number of Ukrainian staffers in the OSCE 
Secretariat, it is also hesitant to do anything to change the 
 
SIPDIS 
mandate, at least for the time being.  Such a change would 
need to be reviewed by the Rada.  That could open it up to 
other, less helpful changes, which would only hurt the PCU's 
work. 
 
13. (U) Ambassador Finley cleared on this cable. 
 
14. (U) Visit Kiev's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Gwaltney