Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KIEV1247, UKRAINE: ELECTION SNAPSHOT OF SEVERODONETSK, HOST

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KIEV1247.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIEV1247 2006-03-29 16:06 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kyiv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM OSCE
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ELECTION SNAPSHOT OF SEVERODONETSK, HOST 
OF THE LATE NOVEMBER 2004 SEPARATIST RALLY 
 
REF: A. 04 KIEV 4355 
 
     B. KIEV 936 
     C. KIEV 1022 
 
(U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for Internet 
distribution.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  We observed Ukraine's March 26 Rada and 
local elections in the city of Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, 
site of the infamous November 28, 2004 separatist rally held 
at the height of the late 2004 Orange Revolution, at which 
then-PM Yanukovych, many Party of Regions backers from 
eastern and southern Ukraine, and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov 
suggested that eastern and southern Ukraine might pursue 
separatism rather than coexist under an "Orange" government 
in Kiev.  Severodonetsk's vote went relatively smoothly March 
26, with Regions winning in a landslide, though our 
observation team observed more election day procedural 
violations in Severodonetsk than in other locations, 
suggesting that some old habits die hard.  At least in 
Severodonetsk, concerns about voter list inaccuracies and 
polling station commission (PSC) understaffing proved less 
disruptive than the opposition Regions Party and the 
independent Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) had 
predicted.  Most Severodonetsk PSCs were formed a week late, 
but CVU thought that voters had had an adequate opportunity 
to check their names on the voter list, and only small 
numbers of voters were turned away on election day because 
their names were not on the voter list.  The complexity of 
holding four elections at the same time, plus inadequate 
space in some polling stations, led to long lines and 
exhausted PSC staff, who were in many instances still 
counting votes late on March 27, with results reported to the 
Central Election Commission only on March 29.  End summary. 
 
Severodonetsk: from separatist rally to Regions' landslide 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Severodonetsk earned an enduring place on Ukraine's 
political map by hosting a frenzied separatist rally, which 
then-PM Yanukovych attended on November 28, 2004, at the 
height of the Orange Revolution.  During Ukraine's March 26 
Rada (Parliament) and local elections, we observed the 
election in Severodonetsk under the auspices of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). 
3. (U) In Luhansk oblast overall March 26, Regions scored a 
74-percent outright victory (with 91 percent of the oblast 
vote tallied), largely consolidating the base Yanukovych 
established in the 2004 presidential election cycle, when he 
received over 90 percent of the vote, shifting the province's 
primary allegiance from Communist "red" to Regions' "blue" 
(ref A).  In the 2002 Rada elections, the Communists won a 
plurality of 39.7 percent in the oblast, followed by the 
pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine (from which Regions emerged) 
with 14.4%, SPDU(o) 9.5%, Vitrenko 4%, Our Ukraine 3.6%, the 
Socialists 3.1% and the Tymoshenko Bloc 1.4%. 
 
4. (U) Severodonetsk is an industrial city of 140,000 in 
Luhansk Oblast, near the border with Russia.  Severodonetsk 
hosts the AZOT fertilizer plant, subject of a heated 
privatization dispute (it was privatized in November 2004 in 
the midst of the heated presidential election season); a 
massive oil refinery is located in the bordering city of 
Lisichansk.  On March 25 in advance of the vote, we met with 
Sergey Kamyshan, head of the CVU's Severodonetsk branch; 
representatives of District Election Commission (DEC) 109; 
and with 4 polling station commissions (PSCs) in DEC 109.  On 
election day, March 26, we visited 10 PSCs in DEC 109. 
 
Problems with voter list, but not insurmountable 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5. (SBU) CVU's Kamyshan predicted there might be problems on 
election day due to the poor quality of the voter list, an 
assessment echoed by numerous PSCs.  (In the end, however, 
the problems did not appear to be that great.)  Kamyshan and 
the PSCs blamed the Voter List Working Groups (VLWGs) tasked 
with updating the voter list and the city administration 
heads charged with coordinating the VLWGs.  The working 
groups failed to go door to door verifying people's 
information, as was expected.  Separately, a PSC chairperson 
indicated that the VLWGs were hotbeds of nepotism and 
cronyism with relatives and friends being hired, but not 
actually working on improving the voter list.  Problems on 
the voter lists frequently cited by PSCs were bad computer 
transliterations of names and addresses from Russian to 
Ukrainian, some translations of street names from Russian to 
Ukrainian, and persons being listed at one address but 
actually living at another address.  Both the CVU and PSCs 
thought that these problems were well within the capacity of 
PSCs to deal with on election day, an assessment that was 
borne out in our observation of the voting. 
 
PSCs formed late, but good balance 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Similar fears that PSCs would not have sufficient 
staffing also went unrealized, with the DEC using the March 
17 amendment to the parliamentary election law to top up PSC 
staffing.  According to the DEC, additions were mostly people 
who worked at the same institution or business that hosted 
the PSC.  The DEC indicated that 28 parties were represented 
on PSCs, with mainly small parties unable to supply 
commissioners.  Visits to PSCs showed a good distribution of 
party representatives on PSCs, with representatives from a 
wide range of parties playing leadership roles.  Kamyshan 
indicated that most PSCs opened 5-7 days late, an assessment 
verified by our discussions with PSC commissioners.  Kamyshan 
and the PSCs thought this still gave voters sufficient time 
to check their names on the voter list and prevent themselves 
from being disenfranchised, an assessment borne out by our 
observation on election day, when the number of voters turned 
away by polling stations ranged from 0-10 per station. 
 
Long lines, late counts 
----------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The biggest concern voiced by the DEC and PSCs 
concerned the difficulty of administering four elections at 
the same time, particularly the time involved in counting the 
ballots by hand at large polling stations (2000-plus voters). 
 These concerns were borne out as we observed long lines at 
some polling stations, particularly those with large numbers 
of registered voters, but too small a facility to handle the 
voters.  PSC management played an important role, with 
well-run PSCs keeping lines outside the PSC proper to prevent 
overcrowding, and badly-run PSCs allowing everyone to wait 
inside, leading to standing-room only conditions that limited 
access to the booths/ballot boxes.  We observed wait times 
averaging from 30 minutes to an hour at large urban PSCs. 
Fears of long vote counts also came to pass; we observed the 
vote count at PSC 17 in Severodonetsk, which took 12 hours to 
count 1672 parliamentary ballots.  PSC 17's results finally 
appeared on the CEC website mid-day March 29 (accurately, we 
note).  Conversations with OSCE/ODIHR's long-term observers 
in Luhansk indicated that these problems were endemic 
throughout Luhansk Oblast. 
 
Possible fraud in local elections 
--------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) CVU's Kamyshan thought that, while administrative 
resources would not be used to influence the parliamentary 
election, falsifications were likely on the local level. 
Kamyshan alleged that Party of Regions twice rigged the 
selection process for the chairmanship of a Territorial 
Election Commission (TEC, the supervisory commission for the 
local elections) in Severodonetsk.  The first time the TEC 
chairman was selected by random drawing, and the CVU filmed 
an official holding aside the envelope with the Party of the 
Regions commissioner's names so that it was drawn first.  CVU 
sued to have the selection invalidated, but the local court 
threw out the suit; an appeals court overthrew this decision 
and ordered that the selection be redone.  Suspiciously, on 
the repeat selection, Regions won again. 
 
9. (SBU) During our observation, we identified some 
violations of election law in the outlying town of Rubizhne, 
likely connected with local elections there.  At PSC 54, we 
observed PSC workers giving out ballots without checking the 
voter list, or even having a copy of the voter list on the 
table.  When we asked to see the voter list, we were whisked 
away to see the PSC chairperson.  When we returned with 
chairperson in tow, a voter list had appeared.  In Rubizhne 
we also noted PSCs with 100-200 voters registered to vote 
from home.  (Note:  Ukrainian election law allows the elderly 
and sick to vote from home via a mobile ballot box.  CVU in 
Severodonetsk had advised us that more than 50 mobile voters 
registered with a single PSC should be considered 
suspicious.)  At PSC 65 in Rubizhne, the mobile ballot boxes 
were not stored in the open as required by law, but were kept 
in a back room, without control slips in them.  PSC 65 had 
approximately 200 voters on the mobile list, but at 11:00 am 
the mobile boxes were empty and being kept in a back room, 
raising suspicions that they were going to be stuffed.  We 
related this to fellow election observers with CVU, who sent 
a team to PSC 65 to investigate.  When they spoke with the 
PSC Chairperson, she reportedly falsely claimed that we had 
been there at 6:15 am, thus explaining the lack of control 
slips in the empty boxes.  (Comment:  The number of votes 
involved was relatively small on the national scale, but 
could be significant in local elections, particularly in city 
council or mayoral elections.) 
Old habits die hard 
------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Comment:  The Embassy observation team in 
Severodonetsk witnessed more procedural violations than in 
other provinces covered by Embassy teams.  Though 
circumstantial, the evidence was suggestive of abuses that 
had been commonplace on behalf of Regions' leader Yanukovych 
in 2004 when he ran for president (stacking committees, 
manipulating voters' lists, abusing mobile ballot boxes). 
While the actions in 2006 may well have been locally 
initiated and intended to boost performance in local 
elections, the violations stood in contrast to Regions Party 
efforts to project an image of concern over the integrity of 
the election process (refs B-C).  In the end, the highlighted 
shortcomings in the voter list should have been addressed by 
the voter list working groups staffed by local administration 
officials, which in Severodonetsk at least mostly claim 
fealty to Regions. 
 
11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Herbst