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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM633, SPLA's Cirilo: JIUs Not Operational Anytime

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM633 2006-03-10 15:34 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5232
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0633/01 0691534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101534Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1850
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000633 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MOPS SU
SUBJECT:  SPLA's Cirilo:  JIUs Not Operational Anytime 
Soon 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On March 4, CG Juba Officials met with 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Brigadier 
General Thomas Cirilo, commander of the SPLA Joint 
Integrated Units (JIUs) and member of the Joint Defense 
Board (JDB).  Cirilo said the JIUs still only exist on 
paper, and that the March 15 deadline for deploying 
troops into JIUs will be missed.  He explained that all 
SPLA troops are in position in the south, but the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have yet to deploy in most 
places.  Cirilo characterized this delay as another sign 
that the north is not serious about peace implementation. 
In addition to this lack of will, Cirilo believed the 
greatest challenges facing the formation of the JIUs are 
budget, logistics, communications, and training, although 
some progress has been made.  Cirilo could not give an 
estimate for when the JIUs would be ready, which he 
though was problematic for ensuring CPA implementation 
and even possible prospects for peace in Darfur.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------- 
Movement at the Top 
------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Although the JIUs are a long way from becoming 
operational, Cirilo said some work has already been done. 
The JDB has been meeting and the organizational structure 
for the JIUs has been generally agreed upon.  The JIUs 
will be formed with separate SAF and SPLA units operating 
under a unified command structure.  For instance, in one 
brigade, the basic units will be split evenly between SAF 
and SPLA troops.  Above these units, at every level in 
the command structure, there will be either an SPLA 
commander with an SAF deputy or vice versa.  The two may 
then switch positions after a predetermined period of 
time, perhaps one year.  Within this brigade, the troops 
will live, work, and train together. 
 
3. (SBU) Cirilo said that the Joint Military Technical 
Committee (JMTC), essentially the secretariat of the JDB, 
has also begun work.  After holding meetings in the 
Officer's Club in Khartoum, the group was now looking for 
a new space. 
 
4. (SBU) However, even at this operational level, there 
are problems.  Cirilo's only communication with the JDB 
and JMTC is through his Thuraya phone, making him 
inaccessible when he is inside a building.  Cirilo said 
that the JIUs also need a headquarters in Juba. 
Gesturing to the mangoes overhead, Cirilo pointed out 
that the JIUs function like guerrillas, meeting under the 
trees.  He complained that all SPLA troops in Juba were 
still living like guerrillas.  There have been 
discussions about moving SPLA troops into the Juba 
military base as a part of JIU formation, but the 
timeframe they have been given for this by the SAF is 
"inshallah." 
 
5. (SBU) The only operational unit of the JIUs is the JIU 
military police (MP) in Juba.  Cirilo said this group has 
been effective in keeping the peace and has been able to 
respond quickly and effectively to any disturbances, 
especially disturbances involving soldiers.  Because each 
JIU MP unit has at least one person from each army, they 
have the credibility to calm most situations, and to take 
into custody anyone who needs to be arrested. 
 
6. (SBU) By contrast, he said that the SPLA and SAF 
troops in Torit, from which he recently returned, were 
causing problems.  Cirilo believes that both armies need 
to pull back to their barracks and allow civilian police 
to maintain order. 
 
-------------------------- 
JIUs Need A Lot of Support 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Cirilo said that the JIUs were a long way from 
becoming operational, and that he could not even estimate 
a timeframe for formation.  He said they needed a budget, 
effective communications and other logistics, and joint 
training.  On the budget, he said that the Ministry of 
Finance only recently started releasing money to support 
the JIUs, which are funded separately from each 
individual army to ensure parity.  To date, Cirilo 
claimed the SPLA has only received half the money it 
needs to pay its JIU-deployed soldiers for January.  To 
prevent problems associated with making partial payments 
or only paying some troops, the SPLA has, therefore, 
decided to withhold all payments until the full amount is 
released. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000633  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) In terms of communications and logistics, Cirilo 
said that they lack the fundamental equipment necessary 
to deploy as a joint unit and to coordinate any 
operations.  Joint training is also important to ensure 
that all JIU troops from both armies are at the same 
level, and to build confidence and teamwork between them. 
Cirilo said he was unfamiliar with the IMAT training 
program, but that the SPLA Chief of Staff, General Oyai 
Deng, was handling all training directly. 
 
------------- 
Distrust High 
------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Throughout the meeting, Cirilo expressed a high 
level of distrust of the SAF and northerners.  He felt 
the SAF was stalling in JIU deployments to prevent the 
units from forming.  Meanwhile, he maintained that the 
SAF was not redeploying its non-JIU troops to the north, 
and was even bringing in additional weapons in violation 
of the CPA.  Cirilo said that the SAF has not been 
notifying the SPLA of redeployments, as stipulated in the 
CPA, so they have been unable to verify any SAF claims. 
 
10. (SBU) Cirilo asserted that the SPLA is constantly 
under surveillance and said that he cannot use his 
satellite phone anymore, his primary means of 
communication, because all his calls are monitored. 
Cirilo requested assistance from the USG in providing the 
SPLA with secure communications so that they could 
exercise command without being compromised.  Cirilo also 
said that he believes the vehicles provided to GoSS 
officials in Khartoum are bugged. 
 
----------------------- 
JIUs No Help For Darfur 
----------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Cirilo believes that the formation of the JIUs 
is critical for protecting CPA implementation, and if 
they are not properly formed, unity will be impossible. 
The general also briefly touched on John Garang's plan to 
use JIUs to help control the situation in Darfur.  Cirilo 
said that he has not heard any talk of this plan since 
Garang died, but that it was now impossible because of 
the length of time it would take to bring the JIUs up to 
speed.  We estimate six months of basic training and six 
months of additional training in peacekeeping would be 
necessary for the JIUs to be effective. 
 
WHITAKER