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Viewing cable 06CHIANGMAI59, VISIT TO SHAN CAMP HIGHLIGHTS US CONCERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06CHIANGMAI59 2006-03-31 10:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO8449
PP RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0059/01 0901013
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311013Z MAR 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0169
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0451
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0199
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0009
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV TH BM
SUBJECT: VISIT TO SHAN CAMP HIGHLIGHTS US CONCERN 
 
REF: 05 CHIANG MAI 245 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000059  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.   Despite the last-minute refusal by Thai 
government authorities to allow entry into an informal Shan 
refugee camp in northern Chiang Mai province, Ambassador Boyce's 
March 21 visit to the area succeeded in highlighting U.S. 
concern about the group.  By traveling to the Thai-Burma border 
area near the camp and meeting with Thai officials and Shan 
groups, the Ambassador encouraged both sides to explore 
solutions that would respect Royal Thai Government decisions, 
protect the safety of the refugees, and allow greater access to 
aid organizations offering humanitarian assistance.  The 
Ambassador later underscored U.S. interest in the Shan situation 
by briefing National Security Council chief Gen. Winai on his 
trip.   End summary 
 
2. (SBU)  RTG sensitivities toward the status of ethnic Shan 
refugees in Thailand came to the fore March 21 when Ambassador 
Boyce attempted to visit a group of some 600 refugees based at 
an informal camp in Wiang Haeng, Chiang Mai province.    Thirty 
minutes before setting out for the camp, the Ambassador was told 
by Chiang Mai Governor Suwat Tantipat that the trip was "not 
appropriate."   Suwat said he worried that the visit would 
strain Thai-Burmese relations and give prominence to the Shan 
that the Thai government did not want.  At the same time, Suwat 
acknowledged the importance of acting in accord with 
humanitarian principles and noted that the RTG turns a blind eye 
toward the assistance provided the Shan by NGOs. 
 
3. (SBU) After assuring Gov. Suwat that he did not intend the 
visit to be a media event, the Ambassador requested and received 
permission to travel to an RTA border outpost located 1.5 
kilometers from Goong Jor and meet with Swan Women's Action 
Network (SWAN) member Charm Tong, who had discussed Burmese 
issues with President Bush at the White House last October, and 
other Shan representatives.  Col. Suthad Charumanee, an ethnic 
Shan and RTA 7th Infantry Regiment commander, accompanied the 
delegation along with several members of his staff to the border 
post. 
-------------------------------- 
Thai Concerns About the Shan 
------------------------------- 
4. (SBU) The 600 Shan have been living in the makeshift Goong 
Jor camp since 2002, after fighting between the Burmese State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the Shan State 
Army-South (SSA-S) drove the residents of four small villages 
across the border into Thailand (reftel).  The RTG has not given 
official refugee status to the Shan because of what Thai 
officials call the close ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
relationship between the Thai and Shan peoples.  With these 
close ties, RTG officials say, Shan can easily assimilate into 
Thai society and refugee camps could be used to perpetuate armed 
conflict inside Burma.  The Thai also worry about the pull 
factor and say the Shan in practice are allowed to enter 
Thailand when fleeing fighting.  Without official refugee 
status, Shan leaders fear their populations are more vulnerable 
to labor exploitation and political mistreatment, while 
international aid organizations face more barriers to 
distributing food and medical assistance.  While there are no 
precise statistics on the Shan in Thailand, the number is likely 
to be in the hundreds of thousands.  Some have lived in Thailand 
for many years, though others are more recent arrivals who have 
fled fighting or persecution in Burma. 
 
5. (SBU) Col. Suthad and Gov. Suwat assured the Ambassador that 
the RTG would not forcefully move the 600 Shan away from their 
current location.  Instead, the Thais are proposing the Shan 
voluntarily move to a less accessible location a few kilometers 
away, called Doi Dam, which the RTG claimed was a safer location 
with more fertile soil.  This area is across the border from 
SSA-S occupied territory in Burma; the Thais hope that the Shan 
will eventually cross back into Burma to the SSA-S controlled 
area.  In the event of an SPDC attack, the RTG would provide 
refuge at the Doi Dam location, allowing the Shan quick movement 
across the border as needed. Col. Suthad said he understood the 
refugees' concerns but that their leaders had refused to fully 
listen to the RTG's proposals. 
--------------------------------------- 
Shan Concerns About Thai Proposals 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Later, in a separate meeting near Goong Jor, SWAN 
members and refugee representatives told Ambassador Boyce that 
the Thai proposals were less than ideal and did not address 
their educational and health needs.  From their current 
location, refugee children are able to attend Thai government 
schools in two nearby towns; it would be more difficult to do so 
from the remote Doi Dam area and educational opportunities 
inside Burma are nearly non-existent.  RTG officials responded 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000059  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
that children could be allowed to board at their current schools 
but that such details had yet to be worked out.  Both sides also 
disagreed over the quality of access roads to Doi Dam during the 
rainy season. 
 
7. (SBU) Refugee representatives said they see a return to 
Burma, even to SSA-S-controlled areas, as too dangerous and have 
no desire to give the appearance that they have aligned 
themselves with Shan rebel forces. Although there has been no 
recent major violence between SSA-S and SPDC forces, Shan 
leaders said the risk of landmines or attacks from the SPDC and 
United Wa State Army was still too high to return to their 
homeland.  Shan leaders said they were unlikely to accept offers 
to relocate. 
 
8. (SBU) A handful of NGOs, some of which also work in the nine 
ethnic Karen and Karenni refugee camps along the Thai-Burma 
border, are currently supplying Goong Jor with basic foodstuffs 
and medical supplies.  The Ambassador told the Shan that the USG 
would look into getting NGOs better access to the group and 
possibly dedicating some USAID funds for the refugees through 
Shan community-based organizations.  USAID's U.S. NGO partners 
have begun discussions with these groups regarding possible 
assistance to strengthen access to health and education services 
and anticipate beginning to award sub-grants and providing 
targeted technical support as early as May 2006.  The Ambassador 
encouraged the Shan to listen to the RTG proposals and consider 
them carefully and added that he would convey their concerns 
about access to humanitarian aid to the Thai government and 
other interested parties.  The Ambassador stressed, however, 
that any move of the Goong Jor group would have to be voluntary. 
 
9. (SBU) To underline U.S. interest in the Shan situation, on 
March 24 the Ambassador briefed NSC chief Gen. Winai Phattiyakul 
on the trip.  Ambassador said the current situation seemed 
satisfactory and emphasized that anything the RTG asks the Goong 
Jor group to do should be voluntary.  Winai commented that the 
Ambassador was the first envoy from any country to visit the 
Goong Jor area. 
 
10. (SBU) Comment:  The Chiang Mai Provincial Office confirmed 
that the last-minute decision to stop the Ambassador from 
visiting Goong Jor was made by Gov. Suwat, after informal 
consultation with colleagues at the Ministry of Interior.  The 
MOI, which drives policy on refugees, prefers to keep the Shan 
issue low-profile and Gov. Suwat reportedly wanted to avoid any 
publicity that might damage the Thaksin government in the 
lead-up to the election.  The high level of attention the USG 
decided to give to the Shan refugees struck a particularly 
sensitive nerve in this context.  While the Thai military's 
proposed temporary solutions are not ideal for the Shan, the 
Ambassador's demonstration of USG interest should help prevent 
any drastic actions that will affect this group and open the 
door for greater access for humanitarian aid.   Shan leaders 
expressed their appreciation for the Ambassador's trip, which 
they regarded as extremely helpful. 
CAMP