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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT1001, MGLE01: MINISTER OF JUSTICE EXPLAINS DECISION ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT1001 2006-03-30 05:37 2011-07-21 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16461
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16546
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16605
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16606
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16703
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16793
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16794
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17148
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17149
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17150
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17152
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17155
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17156
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17157
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17158
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17159
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17160
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17161
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17163
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17164
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17165
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17166
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17167
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17169
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17170
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17171
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16723
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16637
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16638
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16639
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16640
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16641
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16642
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16643
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16644
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16645
VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLB #1001/01 0890537
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300537Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2823
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0134
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 
TAGS: LE PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  MINISTER OF JUSTICE EXPLAINS DECISION ON 
HAMADEI EXTRADITION 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 12817 
 
     B. BEIRUT 00286 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b). 
 
1.  (C)  On March 22, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk and 
Judge Chukri Sadr discussed with the Ambassador the MOJ's 
deliberations regarding the U.S. extradition request for the 
four terrorists -- Mohammod Ali Hamadei, Hasan Izz-al-Din, 
Ali Atwa, and Imad Mughniyah -- responsible for the hijacking 
of TWA 847.  Passing a non-paper prepared by Sadr and 
Prosecutor General Said Mirza, Rizk said that the MOJ had no 
choice but to advise the GOL to deny the USG request.  But, 
Rizk emphasized, he was providing us the legal rationale 
before passing it to the MFA.  "Please demolish our 
arguments," Rizk said, expressing deep sympathy for the 
victims of the hijacking.  "Show us how we can comply with 
your request."  Rizk said that he would postpone forwarding 
his ministry's findings to the MFA for now, in hopes that the 
USG would come back to him with questions and objections. 
 
2.  (C)  Sadr said that the principal legal obstacle is the 
penal code's prohibition against the extradition of Lebanese 
citizens.  This was a "sacred principle" in Lebanon, and an 
especially sensitive issue since both Israel and Syria had 
seized Lebanese citizens and incarcerated them abroad.  Given 
this history, no cabinet would violate Lebanese law and 
custom by extraditing Lebanese citizens.  The Ambassador 
asked whether there was any precedents for rendering Lebanese 
citizens to another country under a form that would not be 
defined legally as extradition.  Sadr said that there may be 
some examples under a 1950 protocol with Syria, but the 
Syrian case is special and shouldn't serve as a precedent for 
others. 
 
3.  (C)  Unprompted, Sadr said that he had also considered, 
as an alternative, trials in Lebanon for the four fugitive 
felons.  He had ruled out this option as well, because of the 
ten-year statute of limitations in Lebanese law.  This 
ten-year statute of limitations also hindered further the 
GOL's ability to comply with the USG extradition request. 
Emphasizing that he was not a lawyer, the Ambassador asked 
whether a statute of limitations really applied when it came 
to crimes that would fall under international air piracy and 
terrorism protocols signed by Lebanon and when there 
outstanding interpol notices on which Lebanon had never 
acted.  Neither Sadr or Rizk knew the answer. 
 
4.  (C)  Sadr also noted the USG proposal to Lebanon to sign 
an Article 98 agreement on a reciprocal basis.  In legal 
reasoning that escaped this non-lawyer Ambassador's 
understanding, Sadr argued that the philosophy behind the 
Article 98 proposal was contrary to the USG extradition 
request.  The Ambassador responded that the Article 98 
proposal was designed to ensure that neither Lebanon nor the 
United States would render citizens of the other state to a 
third party without the agreement of the home state.  It did 
not, in the Ambassador's mind, contradict the extradition 
request.  Moreover, as the GOL and USG have not concluded an 
Article 98 agreement in any case, it appears entirely 
irrelevant.  (Both Sadr and Rizk expressed support for an 
Article 98 agreement, a topic we will pursue separately.) 
 
MINISTRY'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Justice Sadr's written analysis follows: 
 
Begin Embassy informal translation: 
 
Main outcomes of the study by the Prosecutor General of 
Lebanon and the Legal Department of the Ministry of Justice, 
as drafted by Justice Chukri Sader, Head of the Council of 
Legislation and Advice: 
 
In the absence of any extradition agreement between Lebanon 
and the United States of America, Article 30, and the 
following, must be implemented taking into account the 
presence of the fundamental conditions for extradition. 
 
The crime of hijacking on TWA flight 847 was committed by 
Lebanese citizens, therefore, it falls under the jurisdiction 
of Lebanese law. 
 
The international agreement mentioned in the US Bill of 
Indictment does not reject the legal jurisdiction of the 
(accused persons') country of origin, especially when the 
 
(accused persons) are present on its territory. 
 
With regard to the theory of reciprocity, the United States 
of America does not allow its citizens to be prosecuted in 
front of foreign courts, and insists that such prosecutions 
occur before U.S. courts. 
 
In addition, the United States of America suggested to 
Lebanon that it sign a bilateral convention whereby both 
sides would refuse the extradition of their citizens to the 
International Criminal Court, and recognize the competence of 
the US courts for judging US citizens and the competence of 
Lebanese courts for judging Lebanese citizens.  Although this 
convention has not been signed, it reflects a principle in 
international law that each country (should) judge its 
citizens for crimes they commit in foreign territories, 
applying the law of the country where the crimes took place. 
 
Since the persons subject to the request of this extradition 
have already been prosecuted since the 1985 TWA hijacking, 
the prosecution has exceeded the 10-year prescription 
(statute of limitations), as defined by Article 10 of 
Lebanon's penal code. 
 
The competence of the courts to judge the crimes of the 
Lebanese hijackers is given (only) to Lebanese courts, as 
defined by Article 20 of Lebanon's penal code. 
 
Article 32 of Lebanon's penal code does not permit 
extradition for crimes related to Lebanese personal 
competence, as described in Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 
21 of the Lebanese penal code. 
 
Since the conditions requested for the extradition of the 
four Lebanese citizens mentioned above have not been 
fulfilled, the Lebanese authorities cannot agree to the 
extradition as requested by the US authorities. 
 
End Embassy translation. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6.  (C)  Rizk and Sadr were at pains to demonstrate that they 
are not rejecting the USG extradition request out of hand but 
are taking the issue seriously.  We are not lawyers, but we 
believe that the political obstacles (with the four 
terrorists being Hizballah members) are stronger than the 
legal arguments.  Rizk is trying to be helpful, in sharing 
with us the MOJ's thinking before providing it to the MFA for 
formal transmission to us.  Before the MOJ arguments evolve 
into a formal GOL denial of our extradition requests, we 
would welcome Washington's views on how to refute the GOL 
legal arguments.  For example, is it true that the USG never 
extradites its citizens?  We believe that the single most 
difficult legal issue to overcome is the legal prohibition on 
extraditing Lebanese citizens.  If there are ways to use the 
international conventions Lebanon has signed to get around 
this and the statute of limitations question, we would like 
to make the case. 
FELTMAN