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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD730, PST BAGHDAD: IRANIAN INFLUENCE ON BAGHDAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD730 2006-03-07 15:57 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO0967
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0730/01 0661557
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071557Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3131
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000730 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA-I/POL AND NEA-I/ECON 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID IZ IR
SUBJECT: PST BAGHDAD: IRANIAN INFLUENCE ON BAGHDAD 
PROVINCIAL POLITICS 
 
1.  SUMMARY: Iranian influence on Baghdad provincial 
politics is increasing.  Recent visits by the chairman 
of the Baghdad Provincial Council to Iran, as well as 
the past visits by rank and file members of the 
Provincial Council, point to the possibility that 
Iranian interests are establishing solid roots within 
the Baghdad Provincial Government.  Iranian overtures 
and interaction with the Provincial Council are likely 
an effort to build economic market share in the 
largest city in Iraq and build a significant degree of 
influence over key provincial leaders.  The Iranian 
government likely views the leadership of Baghdad 
province, like that of the national government, as 
important to long-term Iranian interests in the 
region.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  Over the past six months, Iranian interests have 
made substantial inroads toward developing a 
relationship with the Provincial Council.  The 
following examples provide evidence that there is 
growing Iranian influence on the Baghdad provincial 
government. 
 
3.  In late summer 2005 and again in fall 2005, 
members of the PC traveled to Iran at the invitation 
of the Iranian government to observe how Iranian 
cities about the size of Baghdad govern and to build 
rapport with the counterparts in Tehran. 
 
4.  Also in late summer 2005, members of the Iranian 
mission in Baghdad visited the PC at least once to 
hold meetings with council members.  The ostensible 
reasons for the meetings were to discuss items of 
mutual benefit and to extend invitations for both 
Iraqi representatives and Iranian representatives to 
travel to each other countries to forge closer ties. 
 
5.  According to several local political officials, 
including PC Deputy Chairman Mohan Al-Saidi, the 
Iranian embassy observes the PC and is aware of past 
and current activities of the council.  He 
characterizes the Iranian embassy's knowledge of PC 
operation as significant.  (The Iranian Diplomatic 
mission is one block south of the Provincial Council 
on Haifa Street.  This allows for ease of access by 
Iranian officials to the PC.) 
 
6.  In early February 2006, PC Chairman Mueen Hameed 
traveled to Iran with an Amanat (city hall) Baghdad 
delegation to forge closer ties with the Amanat 
Tehran, seek economic and development assistance from 
the Iranian government, and negotiate a potential loan 
from Iran to bolster local reconstruction efforts. 
Since then, at least one Iranian construction company 
that specializes in water/sewage projects seems to 
have successfully entered the Baghdad reconstruction 
and development arena.  According to Chairman Mueen, a 
number of other Iranian companies are interested in 
doing business in Baghdad. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  COMMENT: Politics at the Baghdad Provincial 
Council are driven largely by its SCIRI/Badr bloc.  At 
the national level, SCIRI/Badr has significant and 
historic ties to Iranian government interests and 
private entities.  We are confident that Iran will 
likely maintain contacts with the provincial SCIRI 
leadership in the same way it does with the national 
SCIRI leadership.  Personal affairs may also affect 
the views of PC members.  A number of PC/governorate 
members, including the PC chairman and the governor, 
spent much time in exile in Iran before the fall of 
the Saddam Hussein regime and may have extensive 
personal interests in Iran.  Moreover, a number of PC 
members have family residing in Iran. 
 
8.  COMMENT, CONT'D: Iranian overtures and interaction 
with the PC are likely an effort to build economic 
market share in the largest city in Iraq and build a 
significant degree of influence over key provincial 
leaders.  There are no overt indications, however, 
that Iranian interests are attempting to co-opt PC 
leadership or its members for anti-American activities 
or other overt nefarious activity. 
 
BAGHDAD 00000730  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
9.  COMMENT CONT'D:  The Iranian government likely 
views the leadership of Baghdad province, like that of 
the national government, as important to long-term 
Iranian interests in the region.  Baghdad, the largest 
and most populated province in Iraq, is the key to 
economic development, stability, and decision making 
for the country.  Iran is positioning itself on 
multiple tiers to exert influence in Baghdad and Iraqi 
decision making. 
 
10.  COMMENT CONT'D: Discussing Iranian overtures and 
inroads with provincial officials can be a sensitive 
matter.  Most of them are reluctant, and in at least 
one case afraid, to openly discuss the interactions 
some members of the council have had with Iranian 
interests.   PC Chairman Mueen Hameed seems to be one 
exception.  When asked about his interaction with 
Iranian interests, while not always detailed, he 
willingly discusses his efforts.  We attribute his 
openness to what he considers open knowledge that he 
lived several years in Iran in exile. 
 
11.  COMMENT CONT'D: After 25 years of little access 
to Iraq due to conflict and animosity, Iran is taking 
advantage of the current unstable environment to 
cement its economic interests and influence.  This 
trend will likely continue since it is not evident why 
Iranian interests might become less active in Baghdad 
in the months ahead.  END COMMENT. 
 
KHALILZAD