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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA756, DARFUR PSC DECISION: KONARE EMPHASIZES AFRICAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA756 2006-03-16 07:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO0456
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0756/01 0750708
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160708Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9569
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/SPG, IO/UNP, D 
(SMITH) 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO EAID SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PSC DECISION:  KONARE EMPHASIZES AFRICAN 
LEADERSHIP 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 723 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary:  In a March 15 briefing for Addis-based 
partner ambassadors, African Union (AU) Commission 
Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare emphasized the importance of 
African leadership in creating a democratic Sudan.  Konare 
called for partner support in pressing for a political 
solution to the situation in Darfur, measures to address 
tensions between Chad and Sudan, and reinforcement of AMIS as 
the only means of bringing about sustainable peace in Sudan. 
While Konare's comments smacked of conditionalities to a UN 
transition, a senior AU official privately told Charge that 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided on March 10 to 
support transition and did not lay out specific 
prerequisites.  USG and other partners' efforts to 
re-energize the Abuja talks, and immediate delivery of 
assistance to render AMIS more effective, remain productive, 
as will continued close consultations with the AU and key 
member states on the modalities of transition.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
FOCUS ON AFRICAN RESPONSIBILITY 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Konare, accompanied by Deputy Chairperson Patrick 
Mazimhaka, Peace and Security Commissioner Amb. Said Djinnit 
and Political Affairs Commissioner Julia Dolly Joiner, told 
partner ambassadors that a solution to Darfur is needed to 
ensure progress on the continent.  He said that it is 
absolutely necessary to prepare the ground for the UN, and 
expressed doubt that the UN would be prepared to undertake a 
peace enforcement mission in Sudan. 
 
3. (SBU) Konare characterized reaching a political settlement 
in Abuja as necessary for ensuring the development of a 
democratic Sudan.  He called for highest level African and 
partner efforts to bring about a breakthrough in the 
political talks as soon as possible. Konare stressed the need 
to pressure both the GNU and the rebels.  The rebels must be 
told there will be no other outcome but peace, he said. 
Konare lamented the tendency in Africa to resort to armed 
solutions to political grievances, but said that the AU 
intends to hold Africans to a higher standard.  The AU will 
stand by the rebels in their fair pursuit of a democratic 
Sudan, but rejects unrealistic demands and any attempt to 
take over power by armed conflict.  Konare called upon the 
partners to support the AU's firm stance and avoid sending 
mixed signals to the parties. 
 
4. (SBU) Turning to the GNU, Konare said that some hard core 
elements of the Sudanese government still want to resolve 
problems through war.  "They are preparing for a genocide" 
since the obvious result of war operations in Darfur is 
genocide, he stated.  The GNU must be called upon to play the 
democracy card instead, Konare said.  Sudan must take 
responsibility for ensuring unity and plurality, he noted. 
The AU will demand that the GNU remove all impediments to 
AMIS operations, stop bombings and overflights, and end 
hostilities against humanitarian groups and international 
organizations.  Konare cited the GNU's failure to disarm the 
janjaweed.  He said that the rebel groups must declare their 
positions and be given sufficient security guarantees by the 
international community, but the GNU has to also do its part 
to create confidence.  Konare indicated that the AU would 
call for a revised AMIS mandate to enable AMIS to patrol the 
Chad-Sudan border to follow up on agreements brokered in 
Tripoli. 
 
5. (SBU) Konare said that improved relations between Chad and 
Sudan, and progress on the political talks, will lead to a 
better security situation on the ground in Darfur.  He 
expressed deep concern that, unless the parties can be 
brought together through a political agreement, Darfur will 
spell the end of unity in Sudan and create conflicts in 
neighboring countries.  Only African leadership can produce a 
sustainable solution to Darfur, Konare emphasized.  While the 
AU will work with the UN to find conditions under which the 
UN will deploy to Darfur, the AU's strong wish is to succeed 
and to have political agreements in place before the UN 
deploys. 
 
---------------- 
TOOLS FOR ACTION 
---------------- 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000756  002 OF 002 
 
 
6. (SBU) Konare said that the international community must 
have the courage to apply sanctions if the parties do not 
cooperate.  He renewed his call for a united and energized 
approach to the political talks.  Konare said that he would 
call a meeting in the second half of May to judge progress on 
the political talks, and to assess whether a new strategy is 
required.  He said that the AU will not wait until AMIS' six 
month mandate is about to expire.  Konare added that he will 
chair a meeting in Khartoum on March 27, and that both the 
Deputy Chairperson and Amb. Djinnit would attend. 
 
7. (SBU) On AMIS, Konare applauded its quick deployment, but 
noted the need to correct command and control deficiencies to 
more effectivly protect civilians.  AMIS must be able to 
properly explain its mandate and also make sure its mandate 
is implemented consistently, he said.  Konare called upon the 
international community to speedily render all necessary 
support to strengthen AMIS and correct its weaknesses. 
 
8. (SBU) Asked about the planned pledging conference for 
Darfur, Konare said that the AU cannot wait for a pledging 
conference and will immediately begin approaching countries 
regarding support requirements.  Djinnit reiterated the 
appeal for funding predictability for AMIS, and noted that 
putting AMIS on the right footing will facilitate transfer to 
the UN. 
 
9. (SBU) UN, U.S., and UK statements following Konare's 
address emphasized the process of transition.  The UN noted 
that it bears overall responsibility for maintenance of peace 
and security and said it will continue to work in close 
partnership with the AU at this crossroads.  Charge said that 
we all want Abuja to succeed, and will work to support AMIS 
in the interim, but transition is the best way to provide 
stability in Sudan. The British Ambassador endorsed the need 
to redouble efforts on the political talks and to provide 
resources for AMIS during the transition period. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (SBU) Although Konare's emphasis during the March 15 
meeting suggested that agreement in Abuja might be a 
prerequisite for transition, his comments rather reflect his 
firm belief that failure to broker a political agreement will 
spell longer-term disaster for Sudan.  Asked by Charge to 
provide clarity following the meeting, Peace and Security 
Commissioner Djinnit (protect), who has been more pragmatic 
than Konare on the transition issue, simply said that making 
a political agreement a prerequisite "was not what the PSC 
decided."  The AU wants to focus all efforts on the political 
talks to create a best-case scenario for UN deployment and 
pressure the parties to reach a deal, but Konare's remarks do 
not change the PSC decision.  Charge and the British 
Ambassador plan a joint approach to Konare to ensure 
transition does not slip, even as the international community 
focuses on Abuja settlement and bolstering AMIS (which also 
requires AU leadership in effecting command and control 
improvements with partner assistance).  Post will seek 
guidance ahead of any such meeting. 
HUDDLESTON