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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA738, DARFUR - AMIS MEDIA STRATEGY NEEDS HELP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA738 2006-03-14 14:01 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO8167
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0738/01 0731401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141401Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9539
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/PD. 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO SU KPAO AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - AMIS MEDIA STRATEGY NEEDS HELP 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 723 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary/Action Request:  The African Union (AU) 
recognizes that its mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS) requires 
a more proactive public outreach approach, especially in 
light of the March 10 AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
decision to approve transition of AMIS to a UN operation.  AU 
Spokesman for Sudan Amb. Assane Ba and Darfur Integrated Task 
Force (DITF) Public Information Officer David Lemon met with 
PAO, poloff and Canadian poloff March 9 to outline AMIS draft 
media strategy and request that partners provide political 
support, as well as equipment.  Post requests Department 
guidance on what support the USG is prepared to offer to 
improve AMIS media strategy (see paragraph 10).  End summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
GETTING AMIS MEDIA STRATEGY FOCUSED 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Addis-based partners working with the AU on Darfur 
have long highlighted the need to improve AMIS public 
outreach.  On March 9, AU Spokesman for Sudan Dr. Assane Ba 
and DITF Public Information Officer David Lemon met PAO, 
poloff and Canadian poloff for an exchange of views on the 
AMIS draft media strategy (circulated to AF/SPG). 
 
3. (SBU) The AU team had identified the need to properly 
manage AMIS transition in the media following the expected 
March 10 PSC decision.  Ba and Lemon acknowledged that the AU 
should also reach out to Darfur civilians in order to avoid 
the impression that transition means abandonment.  The 
partner team noted that the AU needs to convey the message 
that AMIS will redouble efforts to provide security in Darfur 
during the transition period, without raising expectations of 
AMIS capability. 
 
4. (SBU) The AU and partner representatives agreed that AMIS 
target audiences should include the international community, 
with a focus on Arab media, press in AMIS troop contributing 
countries (TCC), civilians in Darfur, and NGOs. 
 
--------------------- 
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
--------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) According to Ba and Lemon, AMIS has a Public 
Information Unit Head in Khartoum, with one staff member. 
There is also a Senior Information Officer in El Fasher.  One 
AMIS information officer is supporting the Darfur political 
talks in Abuja.  AMIS Headquarters in Khartoum issues press 
releases and compiles news summaries for dissemination to a 
mailing list.  Ba said that AMIS holds irregular press 
briefings.  The AU arranged for a press tour for 
international media representatives in May 2005.  AU 
headquarters has also circulated a CD-ROM on "The African 
Union and the Conflict in the Darfur Region of the Sudan", 
which contains AMIS photos and documents such as the AU 
Chairperson's report on Darfur.  The AU maintains a website 
dedicated to AU involvement in Darfur at 
www.africa-union.org/Darfur/homedar.htm, where it also posts 
Cease Fire Commission Reports (albeit far too slowly). 
 
6. (SBU) Lemon said that AMIS was granted two hours of air 
time per week by the Sudanese Government.  The DITF is not 
briefed on radio programming content, nor has Lemon visited 
the field to make contact with AMIS media experts. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
GETTING THE STRATEGY UP AND RUNNING, WITH HELP 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7. (SBU) Immediately following the March 10 PSC decision, the 
AU organized a press conference to explain elements of the 
outcome.  According to Amb. Ba, the AU plans a series of op 
eds on AU efforts to build peace in Sudan, a book containing 
PSC decisions on Darfur, a poster series, and a media tour 
for international and TCC press.  The AU plans to rely 
heavily on the AMIS radio segment, or to establish its own 
broadcasting system. 
 
8. (SBU) Amb. Ba emphasized the importance of public partner 
political support for AMIS and AU-led mediation in Abuja. 
Lemon cited the need for broadcasting equipment and media 
personnel with local language expertise. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment/Action Request:  Based on AU and NGO 
descriptions, AMIS media posture to date has been largely 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000738  002 OF 002 
 
 
reactive, rather than proactive.  The March 10 PSC decision 
to accept transition of AMIS to a UN mission is positive, but 
creates additional challenges for the AU's public image.  The 
future of AU-led peacekeeping requires highlighting AMIS 
success and portrayal of the transition as a natural process. 
 Populations in Darfur must also be reassured that AMIS is 
not abandoning them, and informed of AMIS mandate.  A 
proactive media strategy for AMIS and the AU-led Abuja talks 
will also help facilitate the transition process and delivery 
of necessary, but ever sensitive, partner assistance to the 
AU. 
 
10. (SBU) The AU is in many ways starting from ground zero 
when it comes to public outreach.  Former AU Spokesperson 
Desmond Orjiako highlighted severe short-staffing and 
technical constraints as major obstacles to AU proactivity. 
Amb. Ba and Lemon indicated that proactive AMIS media 
strategy still needs to be sold politically to AU leadership, 
and requested partner assistance.  Post requests Department 
guidance on how the USG may be able to help the AU take 
control of its public image on Darfur, including through 
provision of equipment or technical assistance.  Other AU 
partners are also considering assistance, but Post recommends 
a coordinated assistance package for proposal to the AU 
soonest.  Addis-based heads of mission will soon meet with AU 
Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit to press for progress 
on key issues to render AMIS more effective.  One of these 
points will relate to AMIS media posture.  End comment/action 
request. 
HUDDLESTON