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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA723, AU APPROVES AMIS REHAT - NOW WHAT?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA723 2006-03-14 04:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO7589
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0723/01 0730445
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140445Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9520
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0093
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/E, IO/UNP, 
EUR/RPM, D (SMITH) 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO EAID PREL SU AU
SUBJECT: AU APPROVES AMIS REHAT - NOW WHAT? 
 
REF: A. STATE 36548 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. ADDIS-AF/SPG EMAILS AND PHONE CALLS MARCH 9 AND 
        10 (NOTAL) 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000723  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary/Action Request:  The March 10 African Union 
(AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) ministerial supported 
transition of the AU Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS) to a UN 
mission.  The PSC extended AMIS' mandate until September 30, 
2006, and set a deadline of April 30 to conclude the Abuja 
political talks.  The AU Commission was directed to work 
closely with the UN on joint planning of the modalities of 
the transition.  While Sudan hopes to avoid a Chapter VII 
mandate, the AU put the onus on the Sudanese parties to work 
with the international community to reach an implementable 
agreement in Abuja.  Crucially, the final PSC decision does 
not impose firm prerequisites for UN transition, or 
restrictions on the UN's mandate, except to say that a 
decision on mandate should be the product of consultation and 
based on the evolving situation on the ground.  Nor does it 
forbid the AU Commission from seeking assistance from other 
partners, such as NATO.  The USG and other partners should 
provide rapid assistance to bolster AMIS, which will also 
require AU leadership's focus on establishing the Joint 
Operations Center (JOC) with necessary partner support. 
Africans will also expect partners to prepare African troops 
for joining a UN mission, and close consultation as UN 
mission mandate and composition develops.  Post requests 
Department guidance ahead of a foreseen meeting with AU Peace 
and Security Commissioner Amb. Said Djinnit on next steps 
(see paragraph 5).  The full PSC decision was circulated to 
AF/SPG and others via email.  End summary/action request. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
AMIS RE-HAT:  CREATING SPACE FOR AN OUTCOME 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In the days leading up to the PSC, Addis-based 
African ambassadors and AU Commission officials questioned 
whether the PSC would be able to reach consensus on an AMIS 
re-hat decision March 10.  AU member states cited vehement 
Sudanese government opposition to transition, desire to 
maintain the African character of a mission in Darfur, and 
lack of clarity on a UN mandate, as potential sticking 
points.  PSC members and other key stakeholders, such as 
Egypt, appreciated clarifications provided reftel and through 
AF/SPG telephone guidance to post. 
 
3. (SBU) On March 9, AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka 
told Charge that Sudanese FM Lam Akol would announce to the 
Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC, comprised of 
African ambassadors to the AU) that Sudan no longer opposed a 
transition to a UN mission, but wanted a peace agreement 
first (i.e., before physical deployment, according to 
Mazimhaka).  Mazimhaka stated that the Commission intended to 
use this opening to secure agreement on transition and 
related planning March 10, while simultaneously setting out a 
timeframe to conclude the political talks and 
finalizing/enhancing AU deployment to Darfur.  Separately, 
Egyptian Assistant Minister for African Affairs Dr. Mohamed 
Higazy told Charge that Sudan's statement to the PRC was a 
significant development, but indicated member states had 
still not reached consensus.  According to Mazimhaka, AU 
Commission Chairperson Konare deployed Peace and Security 
Commissioner Djinnit to Brazzaville to inform AU Assembly 
Chair Sassou-Nguesso that the Commission would push for a 
heads of state-level PSC if the ministerial-level failed to 
produce a clear outcome. 
 
------------------------------- 
DECONSTRUCTING THE PSC DECISION 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Crucially, the final PSC decision does not impose 
firm prerequisites for UN transition, nor does it forbid the 
AU Commission from seeking assistance from other partners, 
such as NATO.  Background to key lines of the decision is 
outlined below: 
 
Transition (Para 2) 
------------------- 
 
 "Decides to support in principle the transition from AMIS to 
a UN Operation, within the framework of the partnership 
between the AU and the United Nations in the promotion of 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000723  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
peace, security and stability in Africa." 
 
-- According to AU member state and AU Commission 
representatives, Sudan had argued that the PSC lacks the 
legal authority to hand over AMIS to the UN.  AU Director for 
Peace and Security Geofrey Mugumya told Poloff that PSC 
members all agreed to transition, but AU legal advisors added 
the words "in principle" to the decision because only the 
UNSC can authorize UN deployment.  Mugumya said that partners 
should focus on the spirit of the decision, which supports 
transition and does not call for further PSC meetings to 
approve handover. 
 
-- PSC Chair for March, Ethiopian FM Seyoum Mesfin, stated at 
the press briefing following the March 10 decision that the 
PSC decided on transition, but details and modalities would 
be worked out among the AU, UN and other actors.  (Note: 
Amb. Djinnit sat next to Seyoum at the briefing, but made no 
statement.  End note). 
 
Timeframe (Para 3) 
------------------ 
 
"Decides to extend the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 
2006..." 
 
-- The PSC Chair clarified during the press briefing that 
this date for AMIS mandate expiration could be examined based 
on developments on the ground and with the transition 
mechanism.  He did not rule out the possibility of the UN 
taking over before or after that date. 
 
-- Deputy Chairperson Mazimhaka indicated March 9 that the AU 
Commission did not want to extend AMIS for too long, in order 
to maintain pressure on the parties to settle the political 
talks. 
 
Peace Agreement (Paras 4 and 6) 
------------------------------- 
 
 "Decides that...every effort should be made to (a) ensure 
early conclusion of a peace agreement..." 
 
-- The AU Commission has long stated preference for a 
political settlement before handover of AMIS in order to 
preserve credibility of the AU's stance of 
"non-indifference," although the AU was clear that political 
settlement is not a prerequisite.  According to Mazimhaka, 
Sudan wants a political settlement before transition in the 
hopes of avoiding a Chapter VII (peace enforcement) mandate 
under the UN Charter. 
 
-- The PSC decision language contains measures to re-energize 
the political talks, such as imposing a deadline of April 30 
for settlement, stressing the need for highest-level 
engagement by African leaders and other stakeholders, and 
recommending the establishment of a Committee of Heads of 
State and Government for that purpose. 
 
-- Paragraph six of the PSC decision notes that a successful 
outcome of the Abuja Peace Talks will be a key factor in any 
UNSC decision on the nature of a peacekeeping operation in 
Darfur.  (Note:  The decision falls short of requiring a 
political settlement for transition.  End note). 
 
AMIS Posture (Para 4) 
--------------------- 
 
 "Decides that...every effort should be made to... (b) 
improve the security, humanitarian and human rights situation 
on the ground... (and) requests the Commission to immediately 
take all necessary steps for the consistent, flexible, broad 
and robust interpretation of the mandate...in order to ensure 
a more forceful protection of the civilian population." 
 
-- Ahead of the PSC decision, the AU Commission and some AU 
member states feared that AMIS transition would remove the 
parties' incentive to cooperate with AMIS.  The PSC 
recognizes that implementation of the AU-led joint assessment 
mission recommendations, particularly relating to operational 
and tactical planning, command and control, joint operations, 
management, training, use of personnel and civil-military 
coordination, will go a long way in bolstering AMIS.  (Note: 
The PSC does not specifically call upon the AU to accept any 
particular assistance, but, importantly, it does not 
proscribe NATO or other organization assistance.  End note). 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000723  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
-- The PSC demanded that the Government of Sudan refrain from 
conducting hostile military flights and expeditiously 
implement its stated commitment to neutralize and disarm the 
janjaweed, as well as to declare those militias over whom it 
has influence.  The PSC also demanded that the rebel groups 
provide AMIS with information on their locations, ensure the 
security of commercial activities, and withdraw forces from 
contentious areas. 
 
UN Mandate, Preparations (Paras 5 and 6) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
"...Council requests the Chairperson of the Commission to 
continue his consultations with the United Nations, the 
Government of Sudan and other stakeholders on the modalities 
of the transition.  Council further requests the Chairperson 
of the Commission to work closely with the United Nations 
Secretary-General on joint planning towards that end..." 
 
SIPDIS 
 
-- While many sub-Saharan AU member states had called for a 
UN mission to have a stronger mandate than AMIS (i.e. do not 
replace AMIS for the sake of it), Maghreb AU member states 
remain opposed to a Chapter VII mandate.  All member states 
want to see the "African character" of international presence 
in Darfur maintained.  The UN had complained of lack of AU 
Commission engagement, following the January 12 PSC decision 
calling upon the AU to coordinate with the UN to inform a 
final decision in March. 
 
-- The PSC decision calls for transition to be informed by 
the (stated) preparedness of the Government of Sudan to 
accept deployment of a UN operation in Darfur.  The PSC 
stressed that events such as a successful outcome of the 
political talks, and significant improvement of the situation 
on the ground, be key factors in any decision on the mandate 
and size of a UN operation.  The PSC called for continuous 
consultations between the AU and UN before any UNSC decision 
regarding the UN mission.  (Note:  UN logistics expert Peter 
McGhie will move from the Addis-based UN Assistance Cell to 
the AU, to New York, to help manage transition requirements, 
including the Darfur survey mission.  According to UN 
officials, AU SR Kingibe will also join the UN transition 
effort at a later stage.  End note). 
 
-- Importantly, the PSC did not stipulate the nature of the 
UN mandate, except to say that it should be the product of 
close consultation and informed by the situation on the 
ground.  The PSC decision more firmly calls upon the AU 
Commission to coordinate with the UN. 
 
Other Items of Note 
------------------- 
 
-- The PSC endorsed the February 2006 Tripoli Declaration and 
Agreement and urged the governments of Chad and Sudan to 
implement it.  It requested the Commission to submit 
proposals on how AMIS could best assist implementation, 
including through necessary adjustment to AMIS' current 
mandate. 
 
-- The PSC welcomed the convening of a pledging conference in 
Brussels to sustain and bolster AMIS in the transition period. 
 
-- The PSC urged the Government of Sudan, the rebel 
movements, and the Commission to abide by UNSC 1593 and 
cooperate with the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
-- The PSC authorized the Commission to convene an emergency 
Joint Commission meeting in Addis Ababa to "take necessary 
and appropriate measures against any party that is found 
responsible for the escalation of violence in Darfur." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
COMMENT: GOOD RESULT, INTENSE FOLLOW-UP NEEDED 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5.  (SBU) Comment/action request.  The March 10 PSC decision 
provided a basis for the international community to plan a UN 
transition while simultaneously pressing for a political 
settlement and bolstering AMIS.  Before the decision, 
Addis-based partner representatives had already begun to 
focus on the immediate task of ensuring AMIS does not falter 
in a transition period.  Recognizing that much of what it 
takes to improve AMIS relies more on AU leadership than 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000723  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
tangible assets partners can provide, heads of mission have 
requested a meeting with Amb. Djinnit in the near future to 
get his urgent backing for several initiatives.  Post 
requests Department guidance in advance of the meeting with 
Amb. Djinnit, but offers suggestions of focus below. 
 
JOC 
--- 
 
-- AU-led joint assessment missions have stressed the 
importance of rendering AMIS a truly joint mission with more 
solid command and control.  The Joint Operations Center (JOC) 
is the key to this initiative, but has suffered delays due to 
disagreements on its structure.  Many lower-level items 
required to bolster AMIS depend foremost on JOC 
operationalization.  Partners need leadership from Amb. 
Djinnit to enable JOC setup and his authorization of partner 
technical assistance.  (Note:  Expanded NATO assistance for 
AMIS is still a sensitive topic, but may be pushed forward on 
a limited scale if framed in terms of training, with NATO 
experts providing on-the-job assistance for command and 
control functions.  End note). 
 
Deputy Head of Mission 
---------------------- 
 
-- Partners assess that lack of a permanent and forceful 
Deputy Head of Mission (DHM) has a negative impact on 
consistent implementation of AMIS concept of operations and 
rules of engagement (i.e. a single vision for the mission). 
Amb. Djinnit should commit to deploying a qualified, 
permanent DHM as soon as possible. 
 
Technical Committee 
------------------- 
 
-- The technical committee set up by the AU's Darfur 
Integrated Task Force (DITF) has developed a timeline for 
implementation of recommendations made by the December 2005 
joint assessment mission.  This timeline should be 
prioritized, and AU leadership must give the necessary 
support to achieve reforms.  For example, Canadian experts 
stand ready to train AU staff on information collection, 
analysis, production and dissemination, but are still waiting 
for African counterparts. 
 
AMIS Media Strategy 
------------------- 
 
-- AU media experts responsible for AMIS public diplomacy 
activities met March 9 with PAO, poloff and Canadian poloff 
to discuss how to manage AMIS media strategy during a 
transition and to render AMIS media outreach more proactive 
(septel).  Partners should emphasize the importance of 
immediately implementing improvements to AMIS public 
outreach, and inform Amb. Djinnit of which partners will 
provide AMIS with necessary equipment and technical 
assistance. 
 
Tangibles 
--------- 
 
-- Partners should come to the meeting with Djinnit prepared 
to share information on what they are prepared to do to 
bolster AMIS, as well as to ensure that AMIS troops are 
capable of being re-hatted.  Details on financial pledges 
could wait until the Brussels pledging conference, though the 
AU must be reassured that the USG and others will deliver on 
key enablers for AMIS as well as ensure AMIS can meet its 
cash requirements with more predictability. 
 
Continuing Dialogue 
------------------- 
 
-- Both the AU Commission and its member states will expect 
close consultation as UNSC deliberations regarding UN 
deployment progress.  The AU will also expect continued 
high-level key partner focus on securing a political 
settlement. 
 
6. (U) Tripoli:  MINIMIZE considered. 
HUDDLESTON